IR 05000528/1984006
| ML17298A924 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1984 |
| From: | Vorderbrueggen, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298A921 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-84-06-01, 50-528-84-6-1, 50-529-84-06, 50-529-84-6, 50-530-84-04, 50-530-84-4, NUDOCS 8404050319 | |
| Download: ML17298A924 (18) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-528/84-06 50-529/84-06 Docket Nos. 50-528 50-529 50-530 License Nos.
CPPR-141 CPPR-142 CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Co an P.
O. Box 21666 Phoenix Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generatin Station - Units
2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site Wintersbur Arizona Inspection Conducted:
Janus 3 - Februa
1984 Inspectors:
L. E. Vorderbrueggen Senior Resident inspector Approved by:
~P Q m ~+
T. Young, Jr.,
Chic Reactor Projects Section
p( (g(~op Date Signed I9 8'l Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Janua 3 - Februa
1984 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/84-06 50-529/84-06 and 50-530/84-04 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities pertaining to Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump 1A hydrotest and cladding repair records; Unit 3 containment post-tensioning; damaged electrical cables in Unit 3; site design control; follow-up on 55.55(e)
items and licensee action on deviation item; and general activities inprogress throughout the plant site.
The inspection involved 123 inspector hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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'8404050319 840320 PDR ADDCK 05000MB,~
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a
~
Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
<<E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President
- Nuclear
<<W. E. Ide, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager D. B. Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager B. Kaplan, Quality Systems and Programs Manager-L. Souza, Construction Quality Assurance/Quality Control Manager (Acting)
<<R. J. Burgess, Field Engineering Supervisor (Acting)
S. Penick, QA Engineer D. Wittas, QA Engineer R. Forrester, QA Engineer N. I,ossing, QA Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Cor oration (Bechtel)
<<W. J. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager, S.
M. Nickell, Project Superintendent
<<W. A. Miller, Project Field Engineer D. R. Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor
<<R. E. Vote, Assistant Project QA Supervisor
<<H. D. Foster, Project QC Engineer J. L.
Black, Resident Engineer R. Roehn, Project QA Engineer D. Hess, Design Document Control Center Supervisor M. Alexander, Iead Discipline Field Engineer-Electrical/Instrumentation J. Donaldson, Lead Field Welding Engineer c ~
Combustion En ineerin Inc.
(CE)
S. Mager, Site Manager R. Talbott, Field QA Representative (Avery-Newington)
d.
e.
The Waldin er Co oration (TWC)
D. Wheeler, Site QA Manager Western Concrete Structures Inc.
(WSC K. Guffey,-Field Installation Superintendent P. Donigan, QA Manager Other persons contacted during the inspection period included construction craftsmen, inspectors and supervisory personnel.
- Management Meeting Attendees
1'
C. ~
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s a.
(Closed Follow-u Item (50-530 83-15-01) Procedural Adherence b
WCS Personnel This item involved the procedural error of using the stressing jack (2000 kip capacity)
instead of the slack jack (60 kip capacity) for
"seating" the button-headed wires of a containment post-tensioning tendon in its anchor head.
The concern here related to the possibility of overstressing a tendon during installation activities prior to the final tensioning operation.
A review of the installation and field button-heading records of
twenty randomly selected tendons disclosed no evidence of deviation from the applica'ble procedures (PTP-6, Tendon Installation and PTP-7, Installation of Field Anchor Head and Field Button-Heading).
In addition, observations by the inspector or work activities on three tendons (see paragraph No.
5 of this report) demonstrated close adherence to the procedures.
This item is closed.
b.
(0 en Devi.ation Item.
50-528/83-34-09)
- Weld Acce tance Criteria in Discord with AWS Dl.l Structural Weldin Code The Licensee's response to the Notice of Deviation was reviewed by the inspector.
The response states that the deviations from AWS Dl.l are based on "the flexibilitypermitted by the Code",
and that a change to the FSAR committment will be submitted for NRC approval.
This item will remain open pending further discussion with the Licensee and review of the FSAR change submittal.
3.
Unit 1 - Reactor Coolant Pum 1A - Records Review of Casin Girth Weld Claddin Overla and H drotest The removal of unacceptable indications from the pump casing girth weld and associated NDE acceptance were discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-32, paragraph 4.
Subsequently, the Licensee decided that the excavated area should have an overlay of stainless steel which would smoothly blend with the existing undisturbed cladding.
That work was performed on November 7 and 8, 1983.
The records associated with that activity were examined by the inspector.
CE Procedure No. 0709-650500 was developed and appropriately approved to accomplish the work.
ASME Section XI was the governing Code.
The records package included the, approved welding procedure (No. WNC-10-14, Rev. 00), the welding electrode certifications, and the qualification records of the welders and the NDE examiners.
The records confirmed that the welding electrodes were given the specified 2-hour bakeout at 550 F.
The record of the final surface NDE (penetrant test)
showed that that the work was acceptable.
I The hydrotest of the "modified" pump casing required by Section III of the ASME Code was successfully performed on November 20, 1983, and the Code N-stamp was subsequently affixed to the casing.
The records
,O'E
associated with that test. were also examined by the inspector.
The work was accomplished through the use of a step-by-step procedure that bore the signatures of appropriate CE and licensee personnel, along with the signature of the Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI).
The record package included the Test. Data, Sheet, Mater Analysis Data Record, Controlled Access (Zone III) Log, and NDE Examiner Visual Acuity Record.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Licensee's Procedure for Re ortin Deficiencies Re uired b
CFR 50.55(e) - Unit 1 The licensee has been implementing a comprehensive procedure which has provided timely and satisfactory reporting to the NRC of deficiencies identified during the design and construction phase of the Palo Verde project.
The procedure utilizes the Bechtel Construction nonconformance (NCR) reporting process for initiating the review of discoveries for potential reportability, followed by initiation and processing'of the Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) by Bechtel.
This Bechtel NCR program has continued to be used as the reporting vehicle even though Unit 1 is in the checkout and startup phase, under the jurisdiction of the APS Operations Organization.
This has led NRC to become concerned that events that occur during startup testing and which are obviously reportable (e.g.,
a sizeable leak in the primary coolant system)
might not be reported within the 24-hour time requirement of 50.55(e)
because of the intrinsic delays in interfacing with the Bechtel Construction NCR process'ee the description of this process in Topic No.,7 of this report.
The inspector has had several discussions with the licensee about this matter over the past several months but it, has not been given priority attention because Unit 1 testing has been halted since November 1983.
The licensee's Corporate Quality Assurance Hanager has informed the inspector that this matter now has been addressed and their procedure (QADP 16.1) is currently being revised to assure prompt reporting of i.tems which are discovered during startup testing.
Containment Post-Tensionin
- Unit 3 The inspector examined the condition of the tendons in the Unit 3 outdoor storage yard.
The tendons, still coiled in their shipping racks, appeared to be adequately covered and enclosed to prevent the entry of dirt and rainwater.
Spacing of the individual racks also appeared to be such as to facilitate transport vehicle access and 'passage.
The inspector observed
"buttonheading" of the vertical tendons in the tendon gallery in preparation for the stressing operation.
The tendon numbers were V-26, V-49, and V-73.
The field anchor head was properly placed in the installation fixture and appropriate care was exercised in cutting the tendon wires and inserting them in the holes of the anchor head.
The hydraulically operated button-header machine was first checked for each tendon using sample wires to demonstrate that properly "sized heads were being produced.
The Quality Control inspector was observed performing the random acceptance inspection (10'/ minimum) of the finished button-heads using the prescribed go-no-go gage.
Only one head was rejected and had to be cut off and remade.
The Tendon Button Heading
Card for each tendon was examined and found to be properly After the button-heading was completed on each tendon, the was attached to the shop head to pull it into position for ring nut and, at the same time, bottoming the buttonheaded two anchor heads and readying the tendon for the stressing The governing WCS Company procedures were PTP 7 and QCP 5.
filled out.
"slack jack" threading the wires in the operation.
The inspector also observed the stressing of three vertical tendons.
They were:
V55 traversing azimuth 135 to azimuth 335 V56 traversing azimuth 155 to aximuth 315 V14 traversing azimuth 41 to azimuth 249 Good telephone communication was maintained between the two crews during the stressing operations and no difficulties were encountered with any of the three tendons.
The pressure gauges on the hydraulic tension jacks were noted to be in current calibration.
The shims being used were the specified sizes and material.
The measured elongation at the specified 80 percent of ultimate tendon strength (7500 psig pressure on the jack pressure gauge)
was, in each case, within the tolerance range (+ 5 percent) of the pre-calculated value.
The Tendon Stressing Record, for each tendon was examined and found.to be properly filled out."
The governing WCS Company procedures were PTP 8 and QCP 6.
In both the button-heading and tensioning activities discussed above, the workmen demonstrated good knowledge of the equipment and the applicable procedures.
Also, qualified QC inspectors were continually present, documenting the required data on the inspection report forms.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Vandalized Electrical Cables and Instrumentation Tubin
- Unit 3 At approximately 7:45 AM on February 7, 1984, when the assigned electricians arrived at their woxkstation at the southeast corridor area of the 160"ft,. elevation of the Control Building, they discovered
compl'etely severed and 2 partially severed electrical cables.
The cables wexe in 9 different cable t'ray sections at, the top of the vertical cable chase.
The cables included 4 - 2 conductor 914, 17 - 2 conductor jfl6 shielded, and 1 - 3 conductor fj16 shielded cables.
Their intended purpose is for non-safety related control, instrumentation, or thermocouple circuits, The workmen were certain that the cables were intact when they left the area at the end of the previous workday, The licensee and Bechtel launched an immediate investigation and directed the field engineers of all 3 units to inspect all cable trays, accessible cabinets, and open pull/junction boxes for additional evidence of cable damage.
On the afternoon 'of the same day, 10 - 1/4-inch diameter stainless steel instrument sensing lines assocated with the lubrication system of Train A Diesel, Generator were found to have been deliberately bent and distorted.
Additionally, 2 safety-related (Train B) 2-conductor
$/16 shielded instrumentation cables were found severed in a cable tray in the northeast corner of the control building - 120-foot elevatio O.
J'
Further inspection by the Bechtel engineers the following day led to discovery of 5 severed single conductors (816) in a cable bundle in a safety-related annuciator cabinet outside the control room (140-foot elevation),
and numerous severed small wires and cables inside a large (walk-in type) liquid radioactive waste control cabinet on the 120-foot elevation of the Rad Waste Building.
The severed cables were vendor-furnished, plug-in type serving liquid-level instruments mounted on the front of the cabinet.
The engineer assigned responsibility for that cabinet had been inside it prior to quitting time the previous day and observed no indications of any cable damage.
The FBI was contacted and informed.
The licensee, Bechtel, and the electrician's labor union have jointly offered a
$ 15,000 reward for information leading to the identity of the responsible individual(s).
To date, no suspects have been identified.
No evidence of any damage has been found in Units 1 and 2.
Control of Site Desi n - All Units The inspector reviewed the various aspects that are performed at the Palo Verde site.
significant changes in responsibilities or began and, at this stage of the Palo Verde complete.
The only organizations involved Verde project are CE for the NSSS, TWC for other portions of the plant.
of design related activities In essence, there have been no procedures since construction plant, design is virtually in the design of the Palo HVAC, and Bechtel for all For field identified interferences, nonconformances, and similar problem items that may involve a design change, CE uses the Field Action Request (FAR) and Waldinger uses a Supplier Deviation Disposition Request (SDDR).
The FAR documents the situation in detail and is sent to the CE home office for resolution.
The SDDR also identifies the situation in detail, but it goes to Bechtel for resolution.
If the resolution involves a
design change, it is detailed on a Waldinger Change Notice (WCN) which is then sent to Waldinger home office for initiation of a drawing change.
With regard to Bechtel, the only independent design work performed at the site is for temporary facilities/utilities, lighting layouts, yard piping (non-safety related),
scaffolding, rigging for hoisting activities, conduit routing details, and instrument tubing layout.
In the case of conduit and instrument tubing, basic requirements are established by Bechtel home office engineering.
These design activities are performed by Construction Department field engineers under the cognizance of the Project Field Engineer.
The Bechtel Quality Program requires that design changes be subjected to the same level of internal project controls that are applied to the original design.
Design changes are governed, just as original design, by the formal Engineering Department Procedures (EDP) and Project Internal Procedures (IP).
Minor design changes that must be accomodated because of interferences, misfits, omissions, etc. which develop during installation are dispositioned at the site using the Field Change Request (FCR).
The design change is detailed on the FCR to the extent. that the document can stand alone in identifying and resolving the situation.
All
I k'
FCR's must be reviewed and approved by home office engineering.
To expedite this review, the Project Engineering Manager relies on the Resident Engineer and his staff which we has assigned to the plant site.
The Resident Engineer's staff members are engineers with expertise in the various technical disciplines.
All FCR's are subsequently sent to home office engineering for second level (final) review and approval.
In cases where the Resident Engineer considers a change to be beyond the techincal capabilities of his staff, he defers that approval, and sometimes the identification of the solution, to the Project Engineer in the Bechtel home office.
The Nonconformance Report (NCR) is used for
'ispositioning defects, failures, deviations from procedures, or other deficiencies that render the quality of an item unacceptable or indeterminate.
The disposition of a nonconforming condition may be identified by Field Engineering, but any that are intended for
"use<<as-is" or "repair" must have review and approval of home office engineering.
Thi's review and approval requirement is also fulfilled by the Resident Engineer.
The procedures which govern design related activities are contained in the Bechtel Engineering Department Procedures Manual, the Project Internal Procedures Manual, and the Field Construction and Quality Control Manual.
These procedures are readily available to the site engineers.
The manuals provide detailed coverage for:
(1) revising drawings and specifications; (2) adhering to codes, standards, Regulatory Guides, and IE Bulletins; (3) document and drawing control; (4)
deficiency corrective action; and (5) interfacing with the home office and the licensee.
A review of several procedures, drawings, specifications, and FCR's indicated that requirements were satisfied and good engineering practices were being followed.
In the FCR's that were reviewed, it was obvious that there was definite need for the change, and thos'e changes did not compromise the original design intent.
Several other completed FCR's were reviewed and it was confirmed that the home office review and acceptance had been completed in timely fashion and that the parent design drawings had been revised to reflect the field change, Five drawings were selected from the master drawing control register (Field Revision Iog) for review.
In each case, the site Design Document, Control Center (DDCC) had on file the latest revision of the master reproducible drawing (microfilm).
The drawing distribution file also indicated that, the latest revisions had been distributed to the field work stations in a timely manner.
The documentation pertaining to the review and approval of the latest revisions appeared satisfactory.
The procedure for processing field generated nonconformance reports (NCR)
pro4ides for prompt review for reportability to the NRC.
This review is performed in a joint meeting of the Resident Engineer and the Project Qualily Assurance Engineer, normally within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the NCR is initiated. If the review shows that a reportable situation may exist, the Bechtel Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) is initiated by Bechtel QA and the licensee is immediately informed so that, telephone notification to the NRC can be effected.
Disposition of all NCR's that constitute
"use-as-is" or "repair" are reviewed and approved/rejected by the
Resident, Engineer in order that the original design conservatism (margin)
is not compromised.
For those cases were Construction intends to depart from or modify" a design document requirement, an FCR is prepared and the NCR is dispositioned by that action, The field design change and document control program control function is audited by each organization's QA group and the licensee's QA staff.
Reports of six audits conducted by Bechtel and the licensee during 1983 (in January, February, July, August and November)
were reviewed.
The audits were in accordance with the preplanned schedule, appeared to be, comprehensive and followed a preplanned checklist, and were conducted by qualified auditors.
Adverse findings of the audits were few in number and none were of sufficient substance to be detrimental to construction.
In each case, a Corrective Action Request (CAR) was issued and action was timely taken with QA follow-up verification.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of 50.55 e) Item " All Units During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed and closed out the 14 items tabulated below which the licensee had identified to the NRC as having potential 50.55(e) reportability significance.
Each item was documented on a Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) as required by the licensee's procedure.
The DER describes the discrepant condition, identified supporting documents and the corrective action to be taken, and is the basis for the licensee's report to the NRC.
For each of the items, the records indicate that the licensee's evaluations were thorough and that satisfactory corrective action had been completed or had been arranged.
The items marked with an asterisk (>) in the tabulation were judged by the licensee to be reportable under the 50.55(e) criteria and have been satisfactorily reported; the other were considered not reportable.
The inspector concurs with the licensee's conclusions.
DER No.
82"51 82-61 SUBJECT 24" Placite lined Pipe Showing Ioss of Adhesion and Delamination of Internal Coating - Unit
Diffuser Retaining Cap Screws Failed in Test of Reactor Coolant Pumps - Unit 1 83-27 Position Indicating Reed Switches on Valcor Valves-Conduit not Sealed and Switches Cannot be Field Set-Unit 1 83-30 A354 BD Anchor Bolt on Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Over-torqued/broken - Unit 2 483-35 Improper Diesel Generator Operation Caused by Spurious Voltage Spikes on DC Supply Bus - Units 1, 2 and 3
83-36 Ventilation Actuators Exhibit Excessive Recycling Rate-Units 1, 2 and
+83-37 83-39 Missed Factory Operations/Cracks in Welds in Steam Generator No.
2 - Unit 3 f
Unacceptable Indications in Reactor Coolant Pump 1A Girth Meld - Unit
'<83-40
-"83-52 Lower Bearings Leaking Oil and Defective Welds on Lower End Brackets of LPSI and CS Pump Motors - Unit
Annunciator Power Supplies Feeding AC Spikes into the 125 VDC Vital Bus - Units 1, 2 and
83-54 Post HFT Examination Discovered Miscellaneous Hardware (Washers and Plugs) in Both Steam Generators
- Unit 1 83-62 Post HFT Examination of Reactor Vessel Disclosed Missing Core Support Barrel Snubber Pins - Unit 1
'<83-67 Ex-Core Safety Channel Detectors are Below DBE Flood Level and are not Qualified for Submersion - Units 1,'
and
"83-68 Class 1E Battery Racks Assembled with Non Safety Grade Bolts - Units
.1 and
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Ins ector Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of components, tagging and identification of material, absence of welding electrode stubs lying around the various work area's, presence of caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and presence of cribbing under stored equipment.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Mana ement Meetin On February 15, 1984, the inspector met with the licensee and Bechtel representatives identified in Paragrah 1.
During the meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this repor