IR 05000528/1984043
| ML17298B515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1984 |
| From: | Miller L, Sorensen G, Sorensen R, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298B514 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-1.A.1.2, TASK-1.B.1.1, TASK-1.C.2, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-TM 50-528-84-43, 50-529-84-30, 50-530-84-21, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8411190094 | |
| Download: ML17298B515 (20) | |
Text
I U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/84-43 50-529/84-30.and 50-530/84-21 Docket Nos.
50-528 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos.
CPPR-141 142. and 143 License:
Arizona Public Service Com an P.
O. Box 21666 Phoenix Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generatin Station Units
2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site Wintersbur Arizona Inspection conducted:
Se tember 24 - October
1984 Inspectors:
R.
. Sorensen, Reactor Inspector W.
. Wagner, Reactor Inspector
/0- 3i)-g Date Signed
/g -)0+
Date Signed Approved by:
L.
. Miller, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Section
/< 3'
"8'ate Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Se tember 24 - October
1984 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/84-43 50-529/84-30 and 50-530/84-21 Areas Ins ected:
Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of IE Bulletins, and implementation of Three Mile Island Lessons Learned actions in Unit 1, with some examinations carried over into Units 2 and 3.
The inspection involved 104 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8411190094 841031 PDR ADOCK 05000528
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
cE.
-W.
""L.
'T-R.
-R.
-R.
'"R.
J.
W.
F E. Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Production Ide, Director, Corporate QA/QC Bynum, Director of Nuclear Operations Souza, Assistant Manager, Corporate QA/QC Shriver, Manager, Quality Systems and Engineering Kimmel, Transition Group Representative Burgess, Field Engineering Supervisor Ozment, Startup Admin. Tech Support Manager Hamilton, Quality Monitoring Supervisor Allen, Operations Manager Fernow, Manager, Plant Services Hicks, Training Supervisor b.
Bechtel Power Cor oration (Bechtel)
-M. Stubblefield, Construction Manager-D. Hawkinson, Project QA Manager-F. Herman, Assistant Project Field Manager-P. Huber, project Quality Coordinator
"-Denotes those persons attending exit meeting, October 5, 1984.
The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed)
IE Bulletin Number 79-14:
Seismic Anal ses for As-Build Safet -Related Pi in S stems The licensee's response indicated that a program had been established to assure that the final stress analysis, including seismic analysis, of safety-related piping systems apply to the actual configuration of the plant.
The inspector reviewed this program to assure compliance with the request of this Bulletin, and to assure that the program is being properly implemented.
The inspector reviewed Bechtel Internal Procedure Number IP-4.37 entitled "Final Design Verification for Safety-Related Piping Systems,"
Revision 3 of May 3, 1984.
The review revealed that this procedure meets the requirements of the Bulletin to assure conformance between the piping stress analyses, design documents, and the as-built configurations. of the installed piping system In accordance with IP-4.37, Bechtel-Project Engineering assembles the 79-14 walkdown packages and the Field Walkdown Group performs the actual walkdown of the piping systems.
The inspector examined 22 out. of 173 completed walkdown packages, generated for Unit 1, for compliance with IP-4.37.
This included a review of the associated summary reports completed by the Bechtel design group to reconcile any deviations with stress calculations.
The following is a list of the 79-14 walkdown packages reviewed:
79-14 Packa e Number
110
34
8
78
145 140 165 129
104
138
118
1
13-P Piping ISO Number SSF-148 ZAG-021 ECF-302 GAF-169 HPF"202 CHF-208 CHF-222 CHF-224 ECF-202 SGF-145 SGF-,119 RCF"114 PCF"201 CHF-207 CHF-165 AFF-134 AFF-131 SIF-214 SIF-108 SIF-151 ZYA-926 SPF-701 S stem Number RC-03 NC-01 EC-02 SG-04 HP-01 CH-08 CH-08 CH-08 EC-01 SG-02 SG-01 RC-03 SI-07 SI-09 CH-03 AF-03 AF-03, SG-02 SI-05,
SI-02 SIF-02 CH-02 SP-01 Four walkdown packages identified as-built conditions not reconcilable with existing design calculations.
These conditions, which require design changes, are documented on a Design Change Package (DCP).
The four DCP's reviewed by the inspector indicated that no trending problem was evident.
The proper project engineering and quality assurance approvals and sign-offs were as required.
J The DCP's and a brief description of the identified problem are as follows:
/
(1)
DCP ISS-SI-022 (Walkdown Packa e Number 1)
The walkdown identified.two supports that were designed and installed as two-way restraints.
The stress calculations requires three-way restraints at these locations to resist seismic loads.
(2)
DCP-ISS - SP-025 (Walkdown Packa e Number 7)
Engineering review of the walkdown package revealed that one pipe support must be modified to accommodate the increased loads per final stress calculations.
(3)
DCP ISS-SI-061 (Walkdown Packa e Number 70)
The walkdown identified two supports that were designed and installed as three-way restraints, whereas the design analyses had specified two-way restraints at these locations.
(4)
DCP-ISS-RC-095 (Walkdown Packa e Number 99)
Reconciliation of deviations with stress calculations identified an increase in the insulation weight on the nuclear sampling lines to the pressurizer.
The modifications required by the DCP's to assure reconciliation of the differences between the as-built condition and the design analyses are completed.
The inspector reviewed the "Inspection Team Members Qualification Record."
The records documented the individuals walkdown team members power plant experience, education level, and training received in compliance with IP-4.37.
The licensee also committed in their response to the Bulletin to audit the piping design and review process to assure implementation of the program.
Review of APS Audit Number P-83-23 indicated that this audit was performed on November 2 and 3 of 1983, at the Bechtel Downey office.
The design group activities were audited to the requirements and criteria of IP-4.37 and IE Bulletin 79-14 Supplements 1 and 2.
The audit, identified three deficiencies with were identified on Corrective Action Reports (CAR's) P-83-33D, P-83-34D and P-38-35D.
The inspector's review of the CAR's indicated that the corrective actions taken were appropriate to assure compliance with IP-4.37.
NRC Region V has performed independent walkdown inspections of piping systems to assess whether the construction was performed in accordance with quality requirements by comparing the as-built configuration to the design documentation.
The inspection activities are documented in NRC Report Number 50-528/83-14 and 50-528/84-48.
The latter report includes inspection of design activities related to the seismic analysis concerns addressed in IE Bulletin 79-14.
The licensee's response to IE Bulletin 79-14 and their actions taken to comply with the Bulletin requirements are satisfactory.
This item is close i k
I
'I C
y
3.
Im lementation of Three Mile Island Lessons Iearned The inspector reviewed the below listed items which represented a
portion of a comprehensive and integrated plan to improve safety following the events at Three Mile Islarid, Unit 2 in March 1979.
(The item numbers are from Enclosure 2 of NUREG-0737.)
I.A.1.2 Shift Su ervisor's Res onsibilities (Closed)
One open aspect remained concerning this TMI Action Plan item, as documented in Inspection Report 84-42.
This involved the licensee's commitment for the Vice President of Nuclear Production to periodically review the administrative duties of the shift supervisor.
The inspector reviewed Arizona Nuclear Power Project Policy j/1P202.00 which states that the Vice President of Nuclear Production will review the administrative duties of the shift supervisor on an annual basis to ensure his duties are appropriate.
This policy with take effect October 15, 1984 and is currently being reviewed by applicable corporate personnel to ensure awareness of their responsibilities.
This TMI item is considered closed.
I.C.2 Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures (Closed)
Five open aspects remained from Inspection Report 84-42; the inspector closed all five.
(1)
The inspector noted that the Shift Turnover procedure (40AC-9ZZ16) has been approved for use and acceptably addresse's shift turnover concerning control room operators and auxiliary operators.
In addition, it also stipulates a system to evaluate the effectiveness of shift turnover which the inspector finds acceptable.
These aspects are closed.
(2)
The radwaste supervisor committed to providing guidance for shift turnover for all radwaste technicians.
The shift turnover procedure for radwaste personnel now includes provisions for all radwaste technicians on shift.
This aspect is closed.
(3)
The radiation protection supervisor has developed a procedure that adequately addresses shift turnover for radiation protection technicians, including a checklist.
This aspect is
'close I.C.6 Procedures for Verif in Correct Performance of 0 erator Activities 0 en This TMI item involves independent verification of operator activities.
Three open aspects remain:
(1)
Several operating procedures remain in various phases of procedure review and approval.
These procedures involve-systems to which the licensee committed to including independent, verification.
This aspect will remain open until all operating procedures that include this requirement have been approved.
(2)
The licensee committed to revising the Conduct of Shift Operations procedure (40AC-9ZZ02) to include more specific guidance as to who performs independent verification for restoration of various systems.
This aspect will remain open until the inspector verifies implementation.
(3)
The inspector identified a surveillance procedure, 41ST-lZZ13, entitled "Containment Integrity-Penetrations" that should include provisions for independent verification of containment penetration closure installation.
The procedure contained no such provisions and the licensee committed to revising the procedure accordingly.
This aspect will remain open until the inspector verifies completion of the revisions.
B.
New Items I.B.1.2 Inde endent Safet En ineerin Grou (0 en)
NRC Position Reference:
NUREG 0737 Each applicant for an operating license shall establish an onsite Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) to p'erform independent reviews of plant operations.
Licensee Commitment Reference:
PVNGS TMI-2 Lessons Learned Implementation Report In summary, the licensee states:
ISEG will be comprised of those.Shift Technical Advisors who are not on duty assisting a Shift Supervisor.
While acting as the ISEG, the following functions will be performed.
(1)
Evaluation of Operating Experience Information.
(2)
Independent Evaluation and Surveillance of'lant Activities.
(3)
Other duties.involving the safe operation of the plant as directed by the Safety Audit Committe Ins ector Pindin s
The inspector notes that currently only 3 of the required 5 ISEG members exist, with plans to hire 3 more the week of October 8.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the current ISEG members and noted that they all had at least 3 years of nuclear power plant experience.
In addition, the inspector reviewed qualification documentation of the other 3 prospective ISEG members and found their qualification met the applicable requirement.
However, the inspector notes that no policy statement or procedure has been written concerning ISEG's functions as of yet.
The inspector also notes that the ISEG now being formed deviates from the LLIR commitment.
The STA pool and ISEG are now separate organizations, whereas the LLIR commits to combining the STA responsibilities and ISEG functions into a single onsite organization.
This inspection informed the licensee that this may warrant a
change to the LLIR commitment or CESAR as applicable.
This item will remain open until ISEG is fully implemented and an LLIR change is resolved.
I.A.l.l Shift Technical Advisors (Closed)
NRC Position Reference:
NUREG 0737 Each licensee shall provide an on-shift shift technical advisor to the shift supervisor.
The shift technical advisor (STA) may serve more than one unit at a multiunit site if qualified to perform the advisor function for the various units.
The STA shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline and have received specific training in the response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.
The STA shall also receive training in plant design and layout, including the capabilities of instrumentation and controls in the control room.
The licensee shall assign normal duties to the STAs that pertain to the engineering aspects of assuring safe operations of the plant, including the review and evaluation of operating experience.
Licensee Commitment Reference:
PVNGS TMI-2 Lessons Learned Implementation Report A shift technical advisor (STA) will be provided onsite in addition to the shift supervisor for PVNGS for each shift.
The STA will service all three PVNGS units.
The duties of the STA will include:
r
It I'
'I O
k
Diagnose accidents and off-normal events for their significance to reactor safety and advise the shift supervisor.
Incorporation into the onsite Independent Safety Engineering Group.
Organizationally, the STA will report through the supervising engineer of the Independent Safety Engineering Group to the Operations Engineering Supervisor who is independent of operations.
STA training, qualifications, and selection criteria are discussed in FSAR Section 13.2.1.3.2.
STA requalification training will be conducted as described in amended FSAR Section 13.2.2.2.3.
Facility Technical Specification 6.2.4 and Table 6.2-1 will be proposed, further describing the station and duties of the STA.
Ins ector Findin s References:
(1)
Procedure 82TR-9ZZ05, Shift Technical Advisor Training (2)
PVNGS Plant Policy j/24, NRC Examination Requirements The inspector noted that the policy of PVNGS is for STAs to obtain and maintain an SRO license.
Currently 3 licensed SROs are assigned as STAs, in addition to 5 other individuals who are yet to be licensed.
The inspector reviewed the training program for STAs and reviewed training records for a sample of individuals that the licensee considers qualified to act as on-shift STA.
No deficiencies were identified.
The training program parallels the INPO guidelines contained in Appendix C of NUREG 0737.
In addition the inspector reviewed lesson plans for courses that constitute the minimum requirement for STA training.
Again, no deficiencies were identified.
Finally, the inspector interviewed an individual who had been training as an STA and asked him to discuss his assigned duties and the training he received.
His statements concerning his training were consistent with the training program the inspector examined.
In conclusion, the inspector identified no deficiencies concerning this TMI Action Plan Item and therefore this item is considered closed.
II.B.4 Trainin for Miti atin Core Dama e (0 en)
NRC Position I
References:
1)
NUREG 0737 2)
Enclosure C to Denton letter of March 28, 1980
~ >
Il I
gl Cl
Licensees are required to develop a training program to teach the use of installed equipment and systems to control or mitigate accidents in which the core is severely damaged.
They must then implement the training program.
Shift technical advisors and operating personnel from the plant manager through the operations chains to the licensed operators shall receive all the training indicated in Enclosure 3 to H. R. Denton's March 28, 1980 letter.
Managers and technicians in the Instrumentation and Control (IRC),
health physical, and chemistry departments shall receive training commensurate with their responsibilities'icensee Commitment Reference:
PVNGS TMI-2 Iessons Learned Implementation Report.
In summary, the licensee states:.
A course will be developed to train operating personnel in the use of installed plant systems to mitigate an accident in which the core is severely damaged.
The training will include the topics suggested in the H. R. Denton letter of March 28, 1980.
In addition, managers and technicians in the ISC, radiation protection and chemistry sections will receive training commensurate with their responsibilities.
The above training will be completed prior to fuel load operation.
Ins ector cindia s
The inspector reviewed lesson plans and training records for the various disciplines required to complete this training.
The inspector concluded from the review of training for ISC technicians, radiation protection technicians and chemists that this aspect appears adequate and satisfactorily meets the requirements.
A commitment has been made by the licensee to develop a lesson plan to include this in the Mitigating Core Damage Training package, and to present this training in the next requalification training cycle for operators.
- The licensee indicated that this will take approximately 8 weeks to complete.
The licensee was informed that a change to the LLIR commitment must be arranged with NRR if this training will not be completed prior to fuel load.
This TMI Action Plan Item remains open until acceptably resolve ~a H
Cl
V 4.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on October 5, 1984.
The scope of the inspections and the inspector's findings as noted in this report were discusse J f