IR 05000528/1984060
| ML17298B806 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1984 |
| From: | Ivey K, Kellund G, Miller L, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298B805 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.5, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-528-84-60, NUDOCS 8501100562 | |
| Download: ML17298B806 (17) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORX COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-528/84-60 Docket No.
50-528 License No.
CPPR-141 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 1 Inspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site, Vintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:
November 26-30, 1984 Inspectors:
.
C. Kellund, Re tor In ec K. D. Ivey, Jr.,
actor tor Date Signe r - 8'-t Date Signed Approved By:
Approved By:
Summary:
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ef, E i e r ng Section ef; Re'a tor'~Project Date Signed
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Section II Date Signed Ins ection on November 26-30 1984 (Re ort No. 50-528/84-60)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's surveillance program, maintenance program, 50.55(e)
items and implementation of TMI Action Plan Items.
The inspection involved 66 inspector-hours by two regional based inspectors.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8501100562 841219.
PDR ADOCK 05000528
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
-W. Ide, Corporate QA/QC Mana'ger T. Bloom, Licensing Engineer L. Carr, Surveillance Control Group Supervisor W. Cruse, I,ead Planner Coordinator D. Deruiter, HCC Work Control Supervisor, Mechanical F. Hicks, Training Manager M. Jenkins, Welding Technician J. Tills, Supervisor for Haintenance Engineers D. Wooten, Iead ISEG Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Co oration. (Bechtel)
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W. Montefour, QA/QC,Engineer B. Hopkins, QA/QC Engineer K. Daley, QA/QC Engineer M. Provost, QA/QC Engineer G. Smith, QA/QC Engineer, DER Group B. Creel, QA/QC Engineer, DER Group B. Kerrigan, QA/QC,Engineer, DER Group R. Doskocil, QA/QC Engineer, DER Group,,
R. Vote, QA/QC Supervisor, DER Group'.
-"Denotes those attending the exit interview on November 30, 1984.
2.
Surveillance Testin N
The inspector examined the status of implementation of the surveillance testing program and the adequacy of the surveillance test implementing procedures.
The licensee has identified 270 surveillance test implementing procedures to be required for performance of all surveillance requirements.
The licensee indicated that 102 of these were required for entry into Mode 6.
Of the total required for all modes, the licensee stated that 78 percent were ready for use.
Of the 102 required for Mode 6, 93 percent were said to be complete.
The inspector reviewed a sample of surveillance implementing procedures required for Mode 6.
The procedures were reviewed for technical adequacy, acceptance cri.teria, notification requirements and administrative controls on the performance of tests and the review and approval of results and procedures.
The procedures that were sampled appeared adequate in the above areas.
The inspector examined the mode entry surveillance checklists contained in procedure 410P-lZZ11
"Mode Change Checklist" and (for initial Mode
entry) procedure 72IC-1RX01 "Initial Fuel Loading" for completeness.
The inspector identified a small number of discrepancies in the initial Mode 6 entry checklist but determined that all were identified previously
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t by the licensee and will be addressed in the upcoming revision to the procedure.
The licensee has initiated programs in the Maintenance Department and the Power Ascension Support Group to trend equipment malfunctions and to perform root cause analyses.
The inspector discussed these programs with licensee representatives and reviewed the Root Cause Analysis Guidelines.
Both programs appeared adequate to trend surveillance test failures and to effect corrective action.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Maintenance The inspector examined the licensee's maintenance program, with particular attention paid to the implementation of the program in the areas of preventive and corrective maintenance orders, maintenance classifications and qualification of personnel performing special processes.
The inspector reviewed a sample of closed corrective maintenance packages and verified completion of scheduled preventive maintenance orders.
Documentation, review, and equipment controls were proper.
The actions taken and personnel and materials involved were identified.
The inspector reviewed the procedure for special processes, 30AC-9ZZ07
"Welding and Brazing Control", as well as the qualification records for personnel involved in special processes.
The program and records appear adequate.
The inspector discussed the methods of maintenance classifications (safety/non-safety related) with responsible maintenance planners to verify they were cognizant of program classification requirements.
The program requirements and personnel appear to address classification adequately.
Also, if a maintenance planner cannot determine the classification of a particular piece of equipment the planner will write an Engineering Evaluation Request to Operations for their disposition.
The inspectors viewed a maintenance activity in progress to verify that maintenance controls were being utilized.
The preventive maintenance involved, per work order No.
65027 on Diesel Engine A, was performed per procedures and with proper reviews, personnel, and actual work documented.
No violations or deviations were identified.
TMI Action Plan Re uirements I.C.5: Feedback of 0 eratin Ex erience (Closed)
This item was examined during a previous inspection (Inspection Report 84-47)
and remained open pending incorporation of NRC comments into procedure 7I 405.02.01,,ISEG Operating Experience Review, and approval of
this procedure.
The inspector verified that these comments were incorporated and that the procedure has been approved.
This item is closed.
II.B.4: Trainin for Hiti atin Core Dama e (Closed)
This item was examined during a previous inspection (Inspection Report 84-43)
and remained open pending verification of completion of radiation monitoring training for six individuals.
The inspector reviewed the training records for the six individuals and verified that each has completed the required training.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Iicensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Construction Deficiencies (DERs)
The following potential 50.55(e)
items were reviewed by the inspectors to determine the thoroughness of the licensee,'s corrective action.
All of'he DERs inspected were judged by the licensee to be reportable under the
CFR 50.55(e) criteria.
a.
(Closed)
DER 84-60 Un uglified Lubricant in Limitor ue 0 erators A review of the limitorque instruction and maintenance manual revealed that for type SHB/SB/SBD 000 and 00 model operators with serial numbers below 295809, the standard lubricant provided by limitorque, Sun Oil Co. 50-EP, was not the. same as the lubricant used at PVNGS, Exxon Nebula EP-0/EP-l.
In addition, Sun 50-EP cannot be mixed with Nebula EP-0 or EP-l.
A nonconformance report, NCR SH-4645, identified 50 questionable operators.
Ten of the operators identified are located in containment, with the remaining 40 located outside containment.
Limitorque confirmed that Nebula EP-1 was 'supplied in nuclear containment units regardless of serial number.
Sun 50-EP was supplie'd in outside containment and commercial SMB-000 and SHB-00 units up to serial number 295809.
The root cause of this deficiency (mixture of lubricants)
may be partially attributed to the limitorque instruction manual and partially to oversight.
All of the maintenance manuals for the valves that use the identified limitorque operators contain an old revision of the limitorque instruction manual (SMBI-170).
This manual contains no information as to which lubricant was originally used nor does it contain a warning about mixing Nebula EP-0/EP-1 with Sun 50-EP.
Limitorque had provided the licensee with the updated manual (SMBI-82), however, and it was used by Startup as the source document for the recommended lubricant.
The licensee committed to flush and relubricate all safety-related limitorque SMB 000 and 00 valve operators in Unit 1 with serial numbers below 295809 prior to fuel load.
The licensee has also created a schedule for flushing and relubricating all other
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limitorque SMB 000 and 00 operators with serial numbers below 295809.
The licensee has initiated Investigation Request IR-30 to inspect Unit 1 for any additional operators not identified by NCR SM-4645 and to investigate Units 2 and 3 for the subject operators.
As a
result of IR-30, two NCRs, RC-607 and AF-425, have been written identifying 11 more questionable operators in Unit 1.
Allll operators are non-safety related and will be included in the flushing and relubricating schedule.
Future lubrication of valve operators will be performed in accordance with PVNGS procedures which require the Exxon Nebula EP-0 or EP-1 lubricant.
Also, limitorque's standard lubricant is now Exxon Nebula EP-0/EP-1 and 'thus all limitorque operators delivered in the future will be consistent with the lubricant supply maintained at PVNGS.
The corrective actions',
completed or in-process, taken by the licensee provide assurance.
that the limitorque operators will be properly lubricated and the mixing problem will not occur in future delivered limitorque operators.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
DER 84-68 Failure of the Essential Chiller Tem erature Switch T
During the integrated safeguards pre-operational test program the Train "A" Essential Chiller 1-M-ECA-E01 failed to re-start after a
simulated loss-of-power (IOP).
Two unrelated conditions caused this failure:
l.
Bearing temperature switches that protect the chiller motor from overheating and trip after a IOP failed to reset.
2.
The 30 second override of the 20-minute start-to-start anti-recycle timer circuit failed to allow re-start of the chiller.
Failure to allow 're-start of the chiller by the start-to-start anti-recycle timer circuit was considered not reportable because:
a)
If the override of the 20-minute start-to-start anti-recycle timer fails, the chiller will re-start either in 2-1/2 minutes or 20 minutes, depending on how long the chiller had been, operating previously.
b)
The maximum elapsed time of 20 minutes for the chiller to re-start will not ca'use overheating of any safety-related component.
Failure of the bearing temperature switches was considered reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The root cause of this problem is that the Essential Chillers were equipped with temperature switches that will remain in a trip position after
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a momentary loss of power, even though the sensed temperature is below the trip point.
The internal circuitry is designed such that on IOP the switch opens (trips), independent of the sensed temperature, and does not close upon return of power until the lower
"re-set" temperature of 168 F is reached.
It is estimated that under some circumstances it would take more than 30 minutes before the sensed temperature has decreased to the reset point, allowing the chiller to re-start.
If this condition were to remain uncorrected it would represent a significant safety concern.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) SJ-4779 documented the problem and provided the corrective actions to be performed.
New temperature switches that will close (remove trip) when power is restored after a
LOP if the sensed temperature is below the trip point have been installed in both Unit 1 Essential Chillers per Field Change Requests (FCRs) 83.027-M, 83.028M, 83.029M, and 83.030M.
The corresponding Units 2 and 3 modifications will be done per DCPs 2SE-EC039 and 3CE-EC039.
The corrective action taken by the licensee is adequate to assure proper operation of the temperature switches and re-start capability of the Essential Chillers.
This item is closed.
(0 en)
DER 84-78 Failure of Valcor Solenoid Valves During startup testing, four valcor safety-related solenoid valves either failed to operate or failed while operating.
Also, there were instances where the position indication for these valves was incorrect and required adjustment, or was lost due to switch failure.
As documented by Nonconformance Report (NCR) SE-4933, troubleshooting identified inoperative valve coils as the cause of the failure.
Overvoltage operation was considered to be the primary cause of the failures.
The root cause of the failures was attributed to overheating of the coils which in turn overheated the switches.
The coils became excessively hot because of a combination of the high working fluid temperatures and operation of the valves at dc voltages higher than assumed in the initial equipment qualification report for extended periods of time.
The PVNGS g-Class battery systems will be operated at 135 V-dc at least 98 percent of the time.
To prevent coil overheating, the licensee is installing a Valcor supplied qualified, timed, dropping resistor in-line, upstream of the coil in each solenoid valve.
This device allows the valve solenoid coil to be energized at full line voltage while reducing the coil voltage to 40-60 volts which allows the coil to run significantly cooler and prevents premature failure of the coils and switches due to overheating.
The licensee has prepared Design Change Packages 10M-SG-126, 2SM-SG-126, and 3CM-SG-126 to implement the addition of the timed dropping resistors for all units.
The licensee is also presently reevaluating equipment qualification work which was performed on
continuously energized equipment, assuming a 125V-dc input voltage, to determine the impact of higher voltage operation.
Combustion Engineering has identified ASCO and Target. Rock as suppliers of the other g-Class Solenoid Valves and is currently investigating these for the same problem.
The licensee has committed to resolve this activity prior to fuel load.
This DER will remain open until objective, reasonable evidence is given to verify DCP 10M-SG-126 has been completed, that the work is done, and that the reevaluation of equipment qualification for other continuously energized equipment is completed.
(0 en)
DER 83-73 Un uglified Foxboro Power Su lies 0 en DER 84-55 Un ualified Foxboro Modules These DERs address the problem that Foxboro Power Supplies and modules have been found to be commingled, i.e.,
some non-Class IE modules and power supplies have been installed in Class IE cabinets.
The licensee has performed corrective actions on these problems and has written final reports for both DERs." In a related licensee DER review a Corrective Action Request, CAR No. S-84-111, was written against the final reports for these DERs.
This CAR identifies numerous inconsistencies and deficiencies in the final reports and finds that some of the corrective actions have not been completed as stated in the final reports.
These items will remain open'ending review of 'the resubmitted final reports.
(0 en)
DER 84-37 Un uglified Sealant in Essential HVAC Ductwork During an NRC inspection in January 1984, the inspector discovered that unqualified sealants were applied in essential HVAC ductwork.
The Waldinger Corporation, the HVAC subcontractor, was responsible for pressure testing the duct systems.
Prior to the actual test, Waldinger gA personnel identified that certain sections of the duct systems would not meet the leakage requirements.
To reduce leakage, various sealants were applies by Waldinger construction personnel under the direction of a Waldinger construction foreman.
Waldinger QA personnel accepted the unqualified sealants without questioning the qualification or correct uses of the sealants.
The cause of this deficiency is attributed to Waldinger craftsmen failing to follow the Waldinger HVAC installation procedures, and to the failure of Waldinger inspection personnel to detect this deviation from procedure.
These failures may be partially attributed to inadequate training on the proper use of sealants for Waldinger craft and inspection personnel.
The licensee initiated a Nonconformance Report (NCR F98F)
and an inspection of all essential ductwork was conducted.
This inspection identified 21 types of sealants that have been used.
The licensee
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is conducting an environmental qualification program for the 21 sealants used.
To date, testing and five year qualification is complete for all but four sealants.
The licensee plans to complete a test program to qualify all the sealants for 25 years in early 1985.
As additional corrective action the licensee intends to conduct a 40 year qualification test or to incorporate a matrix giving the locations of the sealant applications into the plant maintenance program.
At this time the licensee has not indicated which option will be followed.
In addition, a retraining program for Waldinger craft, engineers, and QC inspectors which includes the proper uses of sealants in ESF Ventilation Systems has been initiated.
The licensee has also placed more emphasis by gA/gC on surveillance of hardware installations.,
This item remains open pending completion of the five year qualification program and resubmission of the final report indicating licensee action on either the 40 year qualification test or incorporation of the matrix into the maintenance program.
(0 en)
DER 84-59 Motor Control Center, Cables Dama ed b Pire Sto s
During startup testing activities on Unit 2, the licensee discovered that some electrical "cabinet, moisture seals may have cau'sed damage to the associated cables'nsulation and-jacket by contact with the metal edge of the seal.
,I Por Unit 1, the licensee issued a Nonconformance Report (NCR SE 4884) to inspect all fire/moisture penetrations and to install edge protectors wherever cable jackets are in contact with the metal edge.
In addition, DCN 25 to Drawing 13-A-ZYD-096 Qas issued to add the requirement for sheet metal dam edge protectors in moisture seals.
The inspector reviewed the documentation associated with these actions and was informed by licensee representatives that the field work associated with NCR SE 4884 had been completed satisfactorily but that the NCR remained open pending final verification.
This item remains open pending examination of evidence of satisfactory completion of the work.
(Closed)
DER 84-73 Io arithmic Circuit Cards in the Excore S stem During calibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Monitoring System, the licensee identified deficiencies in channel test cards and discriminator cards.
The deficiency in the three test cards was attributed to incorrect resistors installed at the manufactures plant.
The deficiency in the discriminator card was attributed to incorrect circuit adjustments which did not permit field adjustments to 'compensate for operational variables.
The licensee initiated SFR 1SE-191/NCR SM 4859 and SFR 1SE-193/NCR SM-4927 to address the above problems.
The deficient test cards (including spares)
were replaced with cards having the correct
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resistors and the discriminator card for each channel was modified with a change in the RC filter circuit.
The inspector reviewed the SPR/NCR packages associated with the above actions and found them adequate.
The licensee's corrective action appears acceptable.
In addition, due to the fact that all discriminator cards are individually fabricated and individually tested with corresponding test cards, any deficiency in either card would be identified during calibration.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee management representative denoted in paragraph 1 on November 30, 1984.
The scope of the inspections and the inspectors findings as noted in this report were discussed.