IR 05000528/1984065
| ML17298B887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1985 |
| From: | Hollenbach D, Miller L, Myers C, Narbut P, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298B886 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-84-65, 50-529-84-43, 50-530-84-30, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, NUDOCS 8502150140 | |
| Download: ML17298B887 (34) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-528/84-65, 50-529/84-43 and 50-530/84-30 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos.
CPPR-141, 142 and 143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P. 0. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at: Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conduct
No be 26-and December 17-21, 1984 Inspectors:
Approved By:
D o
enbac ct Specialist R.
S rensen Sf.
t Inspector C.
1 ers, R
r I pector P.
N ut, Re nspector L.
ler, Jr.,
ief Reactor Projects Section
I -~V-8D Date Signed l -2'/-3'>
Date Signed
~ -mV-3'S Date Signed
)-'zg-3g Date Signed Date Signed
~Summa'ns ection on November 26-29 and December 17-21, 1984 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/
84-65, 50-529/84-43 and 50-530/84-30)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of licensee followup of construction open items, Bulletins, and violations in Units 1, 2 and 3.
In addition, operations activities and procedures involving Unit 1 were examined.
The inspection involved 143 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a
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Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
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MJ Van Brunt Jr., Vice President Nuclear Production Ide, Corporate QA/QC Manager Russo, Quality Audits and Monitoring Manager Bloom, Licensing Engineer Daley, QA Engineer Penick, QA Document Review Supervisor Le Bouc, QA Engineer Provost, QA Engineer Green, QA Engineer Bynum, Plant Manager Fernow, Plant Services Manager Souza, Assistant Corporate QA Manager Karner, Assistant Vice President Nuclear Production Zeringue, Technical Support Manager Barron, QA Engineer Spiers, QA Engineer Ramey, Lead QA Engineer Allen, Operations Hanager b.
Bechtel Power Cor oration (BPC)
J. Black, Resident Engineer H. Patel, Civil Structural Field Supervisor H. Guire, Lead QA Engineer S. Karimi, QA Engineer D. Steropoulous, Engineering Group Supervisor In addition, various other engineering, craft, and QC personnel were contacted.
2.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Construction Deficiencies (DERs)
The following 50.55(e)
items were reviewed by the inspector for reportability and to determine the thoroughness of the licensee's corrective action.
The items marked with an asterisk (-) were judged by the licensee to be reportable under the
CFR 50.55(e) criteria; the others were considered not reportable.
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(Closed)='ER 82-73 Pi e Su ort Clam s in MSSS have Excess Ga During installation, the licensee discovered some pipe clamps did not fit firmly onto the pipe.
All the loosely fitting pipe clamps were located in the Unit 2 Main Steam Supply System (HSSS).
This condition resulted in a sliding fit rather than the required firm fit. necessary for the associated snubber or sway strut to function as designe ~
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ITT Grinnell, the pipe clamp supplier, witnessed the reinstallation of the seven potentially defective clamps.
All but two were found to be unacceptable and were replaced.
The five defective pipe clamps were returned to ITT Grinnell.
The inspector examined the NCRs used to document the installation of the 5 replacement clamps; NCRs PC-4870, PC-4871, PC-4872, PC-4873 and PC-4874.
The licensee feels this is an isolated case since the deficiency was identified during normal installation inspections.
The licensee is conducting a receipt inspection to provide advance identification of nonconforming pipe clamps.
This item is closed.
b.
(0 en)* DER 84-38, Im ro erl Welded Flan e in Unit 2 The licensee discovered a pipe support improperly welded to the lower flange of an I-beam.
In the installed configuration, the loads transferred from the pipe support to the I-beam during an SSE would exceed the structural capacity of the bottom flange.
The licensee repaired the improperly welded flange by adding welds on the correct sides.
While examining this DER during a previous inspection the inspector found the identical problem with the same pipe support in Unit l.
This is described in Violation 50-528/84-47-01.
The safety significance of this pipe support is a result of the combination of a heavily loaded pipe support on a light gauge I-beam.
The licensee previously reinspected 2199 pipe supports and pipe racks in Unit 1 under WPP/QCI 543.0.
Several improperly welded pipe supports were identified during this reinspection.
However, all of them were dispositioned
"use as is".
The licensee is also planning a similar reinspection for Units 2 and 3 under WPP/QCI 555.0 and WPP/QCI 556.0.
The inspector asked the licensee if either the previous or the planned reinspections involved looking specifically at cases of heavily loaded hangers on light gauge I-beams.
The licensee indicated the reinspection in Unit 1 did not include this condition.
The licensee did commit to include this condition in the Unit 2 and 3 reinspection.
This item remains open pending the results of these reinspections.,
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(0 en * DER 84-48, Im ro er Material Used for Pi e Plu s on MSIVs Namco, the switch manufacturer, has determined certain EA180 Series switches use expansion plugs made of the wrong material.
The plugs presently installed can gall during installation.
This could cause the switch to fail to indicate the correct valve position in the control room and fail to actuate the hydraulic pilot valve which controls the MSIVs and FWIVs.
The licensee is planning to replace the expansion plugs on all deficient switches.
All deficient switches are identified on NCR SJ-4341.
The licensee is waiting for the replacement'lugs to
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arrive on site.
The licensee has committed to replacing all deficient plugs before entering Mode 6.
The licensee also plans to replace all deficient end plugs in Units 2 and 3.
Investigative Reports IR 2S-IR-036 and 3S-IR-036 have been
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issued to implement walkdowns in Units 2 and 3 to identify the suspect switches on all Q-class valves.
This item remains open pending the replacement of all end plugs in Unit 1.
(0 en)* DER 84-52, Atmos heric Dum Valve Resistor Could Fail Control Components Inc.
(CCI) provided the atmospheric dump valves and their resistors in accordance with specification 13-JM-601A.
During a review of the associated seismic report Bechtel discovered the piping loads on the resistor base flange had not been considered.
Bechtel Power Company '(Bechtel) determined the resistor base flange would become overstressed during a seismic event and could fall on safety-related equipment.
A later seismic analysis, performed by CCI, showed that in order to meet seismic loading requirements the resistor base flange thickness must be increased from one inch to two inches.
The inspector examined Design Change Packages (DCPs)
1-SJ-SG-117, 2-SJ-SG-117, and 3-CJ-SG-117 initiated to increase the resistor base flange thickness to 2 inches in Units 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
All DCPs have been issued and are being tracked by APS.
However, none of the work has been done.
This item remains open pending the completion of work in Unit 1.
(0 en)* DER 84-64, Pi e Su ort Could Not Be C cled Throu h Its Entire Stroke During an inspection of all safety-related
.shock suppressors after Hot Functional Testing, APS discovered 11 that were damaged and would not cycle through their thermal expansion travel ranges.
All the damaged shock suppressors were in the Pc or 84 size ranges.
Six of the damaged shock suppressors were previously found damaged and were fixed prior to this inspection.
The shock suppressors were sent back to the manufacturer, Pacific Scientific, for analysis to determine what caused them to lock-up.
The manufacturer determined the shock suppressors were either overloaded or improperly installed.
The results of the Hot Functional test were also analyzed by Bechtel.
They concluded the shock suppressors locked-up during the cool down cycle of the test mode and the condition of the piping shows no overstress occurred as documented on Gale.
13-MC-SG-507R.
Bechtel's evaluation determined the damage to the shock suppressors was caused by the friction between the piping system and the structural steel supporting it.
The pipe is stationary until the
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static friction between the pipe and supporting structural steel is overcome.
When this friction is overcome the pipe jumps, overloading the shock suppressors, causing the shock suppressors to lock-up.
Nonconformance Reports (NCRs)
SM-4682 and SM-4734 have been dispositioned to replace all damaged shock suppressors.
The inspector examined these NCRs and found they included all applicable shock suppressors and were signed off as complete.
Also, Design Change Packages DCPs 10S-SG-131, 2SS-SG-131, and 3CS-SG-131 were examined by the inspector for completeness.
These DCPs were initiated to install low friction sliding plates in critical positions and to increase all shock suppressor in piping systems SG-048 and SG-039 from 8Q to Pl.
The licensee has committed to finish the work prior to initial entry into Mode 4 on Unit 1.
Finally SFR 1SG-346 has been initiated to monitor these shock suppressors during the next Heat-up-Cool-down cycle.
This item will remain open pending the completion of all outstanding work.
(Closed)* DER 84-100, Loose Hold-Down Screws Found on Com ression Fittin s on MCCs.
During a QA walkdown, documented on SFR 1SI-729, the licensee discovered loose screws holding compression terminals to split terminal blocks.
An investigation of Unit 2 Class 1E MCCs (Motor Control Centers)
identified loose hold down screws on 79% of the compression type terminals.
Also slight discoloration was found on some of the conductor insulation.
These, MCCs are manufactured and supplied by the General Electric Company (GE).
An evaluation by the licensee determined the loose screws had either been delivered with loose terminals and not tightened, or the terminals had been loosened during testing.
The slight discoloration was caused by heating due to loose connections.
Since the discoloration was only on the insulation and not the conductor, the licensee concluded the conductors were not degraded.
The licensee issued Investigative Report IR-031 to inspect and tighten the compression terminal screws on the Class 1E MCCs in Units 1, 2, and 3.
The inspector verified that IR-031 is complete for Unit 1 and being tracked by the licensee for Units 2 and 3.
The licensee has committed to completing IR-031 for Units 2 and 3 before their respective operating licenses are issued.
Also, to preclude recurrence, Specification 13-EM-306 was revised to inspect the tightness of compression terminal holddown screws and tighten them after installation.
This item is closed.
(0 en)* DER 84-102, Missin Tack Welds On Anchor/Darlin Check Valves The licensee initiated Investigative Report IR-37 to perform a site inspection of Anchor/Darling (A/D) swing check valves for missing
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tack welds.
Two types of deficiencies were identified during this inspection:
set screws were not tight against the hinge pin and the disc nut pin was not tack welded to the disc nut.
As a result of this inspection, Construction Inspection Plans '(CIPs)
592.0, 606.0 and 607.0 have been initiated to inspect and document all deficiencies on all A/D swing check valves in Units 1, 2 and
respectively.
The identified defective valves will be reworked per A/D direction and reinspected via NCRs SM-5320, SM-5321, SM-5322, and SM-5355.
The licensee has committed to finish all work on Unit 1 valves prior to initial entry into Mode 4 and prior to licensing of Units 2 or 3.
The inspector has examined all applicable CIPs and NCRs and found them satisfactory.
The present status of CIP 592.0 showed all Unit 1 valves were inspected and all but one valve was reworked and accepted.
This item remains open pending completion of all work in Unit 1.
(Closed)
DER's 84-21*, 84-27, 84-77* dealin with various instrumentation roblems (Closed) Violations (50-528/84-21-01, 50-530/84-12-05)
dealin with HVAC Instruments B~ack tound:
Initially, DER 84-27 dealt with the limited sub]ect of Waldinger HVAC instruments.
However due to two notices of violation issued by the NRC and several other DER's dealing with instrumentation, the licensee chose to address the general area of instrumentation using this DER.
Therefore the inspector examined the licensee's actions for all the instrumentation problems addressed in this DER 84-27.
This section of the report will address the areas examined.
DER 84-27:
This DER dealt with HVAC instrumentation which had been modified by unauthorized personnel after final installation
'acceptance by QC personnel.
The licensee's corrective action includes a
100% reverification of safety related HVAC (Waldinger)
instrumentation installations plus a 10% sampling of non-HVAC (non-Waldinger) instrumentation to evaluate whether non-Waldinger instrumentation had been improperly modified after final acceptance.
At the time of inspection the licensee had completed inspection of the Unit 1 HVAC instrument and identified discrepancies for correction prior to fuel load.
Unit 2's inspection had been done but discrepancies had not been corrected.
Unit 3's reinspection was planned but not completed.
Additionally, the licensee had reviewed applicable procedures, revised them, and trained personnel to prevent recurrence.
The results of the walkdown of 10% of the non HVAC instrumentation identified discrepancies.
Generally the discrepancies were minor and acceptable as is.
However, a problem with mounting bolting for transmitters was identified.
Consequently a
100% reinspection of
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the affected transmitters was performed.
Note that this problem was identified by the licensee as DER 84-21.
DER 83-73 identified problems with Foxboro instrument power supplies.
The licensee's corrective actions were examined and closed in report 50-528/84-51.
Additionally, DER 84-55 identified other problems with Foxboro instruments which were examined and closed in report 50-528/84-51.
The final instrumentation problem dealt with Rosemount transmitters which may have a bad hermatic seal per the manufacturer's 10 CFR 21 report.
The licensee reported this condition as DER 84-77.
At the time of inspection the Unit 3 transmitters had been refurbished by the manufacturer and installed in Unit 1.
The licensee's paperwork had not cleared at the time of inspection and therefore the completion of this DER was made a license condition.
During the inspector's review of the instrumentation problems, it appeared that the licensee's sampling of 10X of non HVAC instruments was overly restrictive in that only transmitters were examined and not the corresponding )unction boxes.
Since the HVAC instrumentation problem included such items as loose terminations the licensee committed to perform additional inspections (10% of safety related junction boxes)
associated with non-HVAC instrumentation.
In view of the above actions related to instrumentation and based on the licensee's planned actions, DER's 84-27, 84-21 and 84-77 are considered closed.
DER's 83-73 and 84-55 were previously closed.
Violations 50-528/84-21-01 and 50-530/84-12-05 are similarly closed.
The remaining action, committed to by the licensee, to perform a 10X sample inspection of safety related junction boxes for non-HVAC instrumentation is considered a followup item.
(Followup Item 50-528/84-65-01)
(0 en)+ DER 84-54, Containment Sum Isolation Valve Could Not Be Electricall 0 ened After Bein Manuall Closed Previous Ins ection Containment sump isolation valve 1JSIAUV673 would not open electrically after being shut manually.
Seven other valves in each unit were identified with the same characteristics as this valve.
Work on corrective action was complete in Unit 1, but the retest of the eight valves was not complete.
The cognizant start-up engineer agreed to include, as part of the retest, electrically opening the valves after manually closing them.
This would prove the effectiveness of the corrective actio l
This Ins ection Retest of the eight valves in Unit 1 is not yet complete.
In a letter dated December 21, 1984, licensee management committed that, prior to initial entry into any mode, the corrective action for this DER will be complete for any structure, system, or component required to be operable for that mode.
This DER will remain open until all corrective action is complete and verified by the inspector.
(0 en * DER 84-101, Containment Pur e Valve Failed to 0 en A containment purge isolation vlave, 1J-CPB-UV005B failed to open even though local and remote indicators showed the valve to be open.
Further investigation by the licensee revealed that the drive gear on the valve shaft had become disengaged from the shaft.
This occurred due to:
(1) the absence of Locktite between the driven gear adapter and the drive shaft and (2) the fact that the Limitorque operator is below the valve body, thus allowing the gear adapter to disengage from the shaft, due to gravity.
The valve is supplied by the Henry Pratt Company.
The licensee has identified 17 Henry Pratt Company valves installed in Unit 1 of which 5 are installed in this configuration.
The valves are installed in the Containment Purge and Essential Cooling Water systems.
Investigation Request IR-50 is being initiated to examine these Pratt valves for the existence of Locktite.
The licensee has determined this deficiency to be reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e),
but not reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 21, as the vendor believes this to be an isolated case based on past experience.
By letter dated December 21; 1984, licensee management committed that, prior to initial entry into any mode, the corrective action required by this DER will be complete for any structure, system or component required to be operable for that mode.
This DER will remain open until all corrective action is complete.
Closed
- DER 84-88 Anchor Bolts for Embed Plates The inspector reviewed the licensee's final report ANPP-30852-TDS/TRB, involving defective wall embed plates.
Instances of deficient wall embed plates missing one or more anchor bolts or with bolts having thread engagement less than required by specification were found by the licensee during reinspection of accessible plates in all units.
Based on the low frequency (0.01%)
of defective plates identified in the inspection, the licensee does not consider the isolated cases to be indicative of a deficiency in the overall construction program.
Project Work Plan Procedure WPP/QCI 54.0 has been revised to improve the QA inspection of the anchor bolt thread engagemen j
Based on a review of the licensee's final report and revised Project Work Plan Procedure 54.0, the licensee's corrective actions appear to be appropriate in addressing the deficiency.
This item is closed.
(0 en)
DER 83-33, Incorrect Swa Strut Su ortin Class IA Pi in The inspector reviewed the licensee's final report ANPP-30311-TDS/TRB dated August 23, 1984, involving incorrect capacity sway struts supporting class QIA piping.
Based on a review of licensee's submittal, additional information was required concerning the results of the reinspection program for Unit 1 under VPP/QCI 564.0.
This item was considered open at the November 29, 1984 exit interview.
(0 en)
DER 84-31 Unsealed Pi e Penetrations The inspector reviewed the licensee final report ANPP-29952-TDS/TRB dated July 12, 1984, on a Reportable Deficiency under 10 CFR 50.55(e)
involving unsealed piping penetrations in the main steam support structure.
This item was considered open at the November 29 exit interview pending licensee action in response to Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. S-84-117 to resolve an apparent discrepancy in the actual status of work completed per DCP 1SA-ZM-01.
3.
Follow-U of Licensee Action Items a.
(Closed) Violation 50-530/84-07-14, Re enerative Heat Exchan er Previous Ins ection During a previous inspection, the inspector found one of the outer jam nuts for the expansion support of the Regenerative Heat Exchanger was only finger tight and an inner jam nut was out of adjustment.
This Ins ection The licensee issued Nonconformance Reports NCRs NC-398, NC-282, and NC-1328 for Units 1, 2, and 3 to remove the carbon steel fasteners and replace them with nickel plated bolts, nuts and flat washers.
Also, the jam nut is eliminated and replaced with a cotter pin installed through a hole drilled through the hex nut and bolt.
The inspector examined the proposed actions documented in the NCRs and found them acceptable.
The NCRs were signed off as complete indicating all work is complete.
This item is closed.
b.
(0 en) Followu Item 50-528/84-10-02, Installation of the Fire Protection S rinkler S stem (FPSS
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Previous Ins ection The inspector examined several hangers used to support the FPSS in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building and Containment Building for any apparent installation deficiencies.
The inspector identified many cases of inadequately installed hangers.
The licensee, however, had already identified several problems with the FPSS and was planning a major reinspection of this system.
The inspector also questioned the lack of procedures governing the use of Nelson studs to anchor the FPSS supports.
This Ins ection The licensee did a 100X reinspection/rework of the entire FPSS in Unit 1 in accordance with procedure WPP 205.0.
This reinspection including torquing all hangers to the torque valves prescribed in Viking Standard Practice SP 69.
The licensee is planning a similar reinspection of Units 2 and 3.
The inspector examined several of the reworked hangers.
Two hangers were found improperly installed.
As a result, the licensee randomly sampled approximately 225 more FPSS hangers for proper installation.
Three additional improperly installed hangers were identified giving an error rate of about 2.2%.
The licensee considers this is an acceptable failure rate given the conservativism built into the system.
The inspector inquired about the lack of procedures governing Nelson studs.
The licensee stated the installation of studs conforms to American Welding Standard AWS Dl.l which governs this process.
Also the licensee stated all craftsmen who install studs were trained by Nelson/TRW, the company who makes the studs and stud welding machine.
The inspector reviewed the FPSS to determine if the entire system was complete.
The inspector discovered several hangers that still needed to be installed.
According to the licensee the subcontractor initiated SDDRs (Supplier Deviation Disposition Request)
to install additional hangers in the FPSS.
These SDDRs are reviewed by Bechtel and either approved or disapproved.
Bechtel approved the installation of 38 additional hangers and issued FCRs (Field Change Requests)
to document their installation.
However, the FCRs were written as the system was being turned over from construction to operations and were apparently not accounted for in the turnover process.
The licensee was requested to determine if there was any additional unfinished work.
The licensee stated only two subcontractors use SDDRs to generate design changes; Viking.and Waldinger.
A review of all outstanding SDDRs of these subcontractors by the licensee showed all outstanding work was being properly tracked.
The licensee issued a limited DCP (design change package)
to document the installation of the additional 38 FPSS hangers.
This item remains open pending the completion of the installatio II I
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(Closed)
0 en Item 50-528/83-34-17, Cable Tra Su ort Discre ancies Previous Ins ection The inspector reviewed all Nonconformance Reports (NCRs)
and Corrective Action Reports (CARs) governing the reinspection by the licensee of 464 cable tray holddown clamps.
The inspector noticed nine holddown clamps were identified as missing.
The inspector asked the licensee to evaluate the significance of this observation.
This Ins ection The licensee did an engineering analysis of the significance of several missing clamps.
The analysis showed that there was sufficient conservatism built into the system to make the missing clamps insignificant.
This item is closed.
(Closed Unresolved Item (50-528/83<<34-01)
Weld Ri le Ima es on Radio ra hic Pilm Ma Mask Defect Indications Previous Ins ection The issue of possible masking of radiographic indications was addressed and resolved in report 50-528/84-36.
The remaining unfinished item concerned the finding of a mismarked radiographic film (marked for weld B vs weld A).
The licensee had committed to determine if the mismarking was an isolated case or not.
This Ins ection The licensee had issued a special construction inspection plan (CIP)
No. 578.0 to review all vendor radiographs for mismarking of weld identification numbers.
After a review of over 500 radiographs with no mismarkings identified, the licensee terminated the review.
The inspector considers the licensee's actions to be appropriate.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-528/84-15-04),
Review of Test, and Installation Procedures b
the NSSS Su lier Combustion En ineerin (CE)
This item was examined and closed in report 50-528/84-42 for the area of test procedure review.
During this inspection the area of construction installation procedure review was examined.
The licensee's program for CE review of Bechtel NSSS installation procedures (which are derived from and implement CE specifications)
consists of submission of all such procedures to CE for review.
CE has the option to comment or not comment on the procedures.
CE maintains a field force to oversee the NSSS installation by Bechtel.
The inspector had asked the licensee to consider a revision to the administrative system to include a positive feedback from CE when they had no comments on Bechtel's procedure, i.e.
a record of "no comments".
The licensee's Corporate QA Manager took the position
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that the administrative system in place (without a record of '!no comments")
was satisfactory and did not need to be revised.
Since the inspector has not found cases where the Bechtel procedures were not adequately implementing CE specifications, this item is considered closed.
(Closed) Followu Item (50-528/83-34-18)
Racewa Su ort Welds This item dealt with raceway support welds which were not in accordance with drawing requirements, specifically certain unistrut members had been installed with skewed fillet welds which were not shown on drawings as a standard attachment method.
The licensee actions included field sampling and calculational analysis of the sample.
This resulted in field changes (FCR's) to define acceptable configurations.
Units 1, 2 and 3 were/will be reinspected to the new criteria per NCR's EJ 4628, EX 5507, and EX 5508, respectively.
The work in Unit 1 was completed including modifications and final acceptance inspection of the modifications.
The Unit 2 and 3 inspection is planned.
This item is considered closed based on the licensee's actions, completed and planned.
(Closed) Followu Item (50-528/83-02-03)
Cold S rin in of Pi e This item had been previously inspected and partially completed in reports 50-528/83-17 and 84-36.
The remaining action was for the licensee to review any nonconformances which would indicate piping had been installed in a sprung (or forced) condition and analyze the as found condition for technical acceptability.
The licensee's review identified ten nonconformances.
Each was analyzed for the as-found condition and found to be technically acceptable.
The applicable NCR's were SM 3935, PC 8716, PC 9026, PA 4 1 94 p PG 3495 p
PG 3278 p
PC 2269 p
PC 3308 p
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This item is considered closed on the basis that although it is clear some cold springing of piping did occur during construction, the cases available for analysis show the as found conditions were technically acceptable, (Closed) Violation (50-528/83-34-19)
Racewa Welds Have Overla This violation dealt with raceway welds which had overlap.
Overlap is contrary to AWS Dl.l welding requirements but is allowed (up to 1/8") by the Palo Verde structural specifications.
The general issue of Palo Verde welding specification departures from the AWS D.l.l requirements was addressed and accepted in FSAR Amendment 13.
Additionally, the licensee initiated CAR C83-149D which provided for the inspection of 405 welds on 81 raceway supports.
No additional
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cases of overlap or lack of fusion were observed.
The single case identified in the NRC violation was dispositioned and repaired on nonconformance NCR W-C-817.
Based on the above this item is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (50-530/84-07-17),
Nonconformin Cable Without
~Hold Ta a
Previous Ins ection The inspector had expressed a concern that the licensee's original response to the violation was inaccurate and incomplete.
Explanation was not, given as to the disposition of 4 of 5 safety-related cable reels originally identified by the inspector in the quarantine area (Reel nos.
A771-0037 (2), A374-0001 and 82E-0018).
The licensee committed to provide a revised response to the Notice of Violation as documented in Inspection Report 50-530/84>>24.
This Ins ection The inspector reviewed the licensee's revised response to the Violation. NCR EY-5312 was initiated to determine the disposition of all 5 safety-related cable reels located in the roped-off area at the time of the original inspection.
The serial numbers of all 5 cable reels identified in the NCR match the serial numbers of the cables the inspector originally identified in Inspection Report 84-07.
The licensee dispositioned the NCR by researching and determining where the identified cables had been used in the plant.
Documentation of cable usage is provided by the EE580 control and tracking system.
The results showed that much of the identified cabling was installed as permanent circuitry.
Each installation had been QC inspected and documented on its respective cable installation cards.
This was documented on NCR EY 5312 which was dispositioned use-as-is, and closed.
Thus, the cable reels originally identified by the inspector'in the quarantine area have been traced and accounted for.
This Violation is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 50-528/84-15-05 Reactor Vessel Su ort Clearance At the conclusion of a previous inspection, this item remained unresolved pending clarification of the acceptance criteria for the reactor vessel lower support shim clearances.
The inspector had noted an apparent inconsistency between the requirements of the reactor vessel installation drawing (CE: Drawing E-14273-321-010, Revision 3) and the licensee's test procedure (Procedure No. 91HF-1RC01, Revision 0:
RCS Expansion 5feasurements).
The
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licensee committed to verify that the criteria used in their test procedure was technically sound and acceptable.
To resolve this item, the licensee obtained clarification of the asymmetric clearance requirement from CE and verified that the acceptance criteria used during the pre-core hot functional test was appropriate.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of the acceptability of the test procedure criteria (CE Letter No. V-CE-30326, dated June 4, 1984).
In their letter, CE clarified that the asymmetric clearance criteria (of 0.030" minimum sum of corresponding side gaps)
was applicable only during the pre-core hot functional test (HFT).
After final shim installation, the requirement for the sum of the corresponding side gaps was 0.070"
+ 0.030", which is consistent with the system specification on the installation drawing.
The inspector reviewed the Precore Pump Demonstration Test (Procedure No. 91HF-lRC20, Revision 0) which verified the final reactor vessel support clearances.
An alternate asymmetric clearance acceptance criteria of 0.070"
+ 0.030" was added by Test Change Notice (TCN 01) to supplement the individual clearance requirement of 0.035"
+ 0.015".
Furthermore, the licensee initiated a revision of the installation drawing to reflect the acceptability of asymmetric support clearances in the system specification.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-528/84-15-06)
Simultaneous Verification of Reactor Vessel Su ort Clearance This item remained open from a previous inspection pending clarification of the technical requirement for simultaneous verification of upper and lour reactor vessel support clearances.
The inspector had noted that the installation drawing (CE Drawing E-14273-321-010, Revision 3: Reactor Vessel Arrangement and Installation) specified that all requirements be met simultaneously.
The licensee had verified Unit 1 upper support shim clearances during hot functional testing (Procedure No. 91HF-lRC01, Revision 0; RCS Expansion Measurements)
and planned to verify lower support shim clearances during subsequent Pump Demonstration testing.
The inspector had questioned how this sequence of testing would satisfy the simultaneous requirement of the design drawing.
In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee incorporated a
repeat measurement of the upper support shim clearances into the Pump Demonstration Test to insure that all clearance requirements are satisfied under stable system conditions.
The inspector reviewed licensee procedure No.
91HF-1RC20, Revision 0, Precore Pump Demonstration Test/RCS Thermal Expansion
Measurements, which verified the final installed support clearances for the reactor vessel.
The inspector found that both the upper and lower support clearances were measured and verified acceptable during performance of this test.
This item is closed.
4.
Licensee Res onse to Bulletins and Circulars and Part 21 Re orts a.
(0 en IE Circular 79-21 Prevention of Un lanned Releases of Radioactivit The licensee's response to two aspects of this Circular were
,examined.
1)
Review of rocedures for transfer of radioactive li uids.
The inspector examined a representative sample of the licensee's radwaste procedures for implementation of the measures recommended by this circular.
All procedures contain valve lineups, signature space for each step and a signoff space at the end of each section for an independent reviewer.
Radwaste technicians are instructed in verbatim compliance to procedures.
In addition, each time a procedure is performed the Unit Radwaste Supervisor reviews the performance per Radwaste Instruction
/130.
Thus, the licensee has acceptably addressed this aspect.
2)
Preventive maintenance ro rams.
A preventive maintenance program has been established in accordance with procedure 30AC-9ZZ02.
Any discrepancies identified in the conduct of the program is dispositioned per a work request in accordance with 30AC-9ZZ01, Work Control.
The inspector reviewed two maintenance work facsimiles that implement the maintenance program in the Radwaste Building on a quarterly basis.
The licensee has addressed all aspects of this circular with the exception of the recommendation to hydrostatically test new permanent and temporary piping systems.
This Circular will remain open until the licensee has completed their review of this aspect.
b.
(0 en) IE Bulletin 82-02 - De radation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar (0 en)
This bulletin involved the following action to be taken by the licensee:
1)
Develo and im lement maintenance rocedures for threaded fastener ractices.
The licensee's maintenance procedures which remove and re-install threaded fasteners for SG manways, RCP flanges, and PZR safety valve flanges, are not yet complete.
In addition, threaded fasteners for the pressurizer manway cover have not
"Ir'll eu P
been addressed.
Also, personnel are not yet trained in the procedures.
Via letter dated December 21, 1984, licensee management committed to developing and approving these procedures prior to entering Mode 2 (initial criticality) in Unit l.
2)
Threaded fasteners of closure connections, when o ened for com onent ins ection or maintenance, shall be removed, cleaned and ins ected er IWA-2210 and IWA-2220 of ASME Section XI before bein reused.
The licensee's In-service Inspection Program addresses removal, cleaning, and inspection of studs in accordance with IWA-2210 and IWA-2220 of ASME Section XI.
This applies to Reactor Coolant Pump Studs, Steam Generator Manway Studs, Pressurizer Safety Valve Studs, Reactor Vessel Head Closure Studs and Pressurizer Manway Studs.
However, one of the concerns raised in this bulletin involves use of lubricants containing molybdenum disulfide.
Under high temperature conditions and in the presence of moisture, this compound decomposes to release sulfide, promoting stress corrosion cracking.
Combustion Engineering recommended APS continue using "Super Moly," which contains molybdenum disulfide, to lubricate reactor vessel head closure studs, but cautioned APS to remove all moisture from the studs prior to applying the lubricant.
The licensee's procedure for removal and reinstallation of these studs contained no such caution, at the time of the inspection.
During a management meeting on December 20, 1984, licensee management committed to including this precaution in their applicable procedure prior to use of the procedure in Mode
(fuel loading).
This bulletin will remain open until these actions are completed.
(Closed)
10 CFR 21 Re ort 84-02 Terr /In ersoll-Rand AFW Turbine Valves Need New S rin s The licensee was informed that the turbine trip and throttle valve on the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine would not fully close under conditions of high inlet pressure and low steam flow.
The vendor supplied new springs with sufficient force to correct the problem.
The licensee has replaced the old spring with the new spring in Unit 1 in accordance with SWA 20016 and DCP 1SM-AF-060.
Work is complete and gC has signed off the SWA, DCP and associated CIP.
Work is also complete for Unit 2.
Work in Unit 3 is not complete but has been dispositioned per DCP 3CM-AF-060.
Therefore, this 10 CFR 21 report is closed based on actions taken or planne ll
5.
Mana ement Meetin s A series of meetings with licensee management personnel, as indicated by asterisks in Paragraph l.a, were held November 29, 1984 and during the week of December 17-21, 1984.
The findings of the inspections as described in this report. were discusse V N
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