IR 05000528/1981012
| ML17297B077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1981 |
| From: | Bishop T, Eckhardt J, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17297B075 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-81-12, 50-529-81-10, 50-530-81-10, NUDOCS 8112080364 | |
| Download: ML17297B077 (22) | |
Text
50-528/81-12 50-530/81-10 Report No.
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Docket No.
Licensee:
5 0 License No.
rvi e Com an Safeguards Group 666 Facility Name:
Inspection at:
iz na 85036 d
Nuclear Generatin Station - Units 1, 2 and-3 d
C nstruction Site Wintersbur Arizona Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
.
A ust 17-21 1981 ctor Inspector-or Inspector ion Chief f, Reactor Projects Section
J Eckhardt, R
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Wagoner, Rea fm/ i+
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. Bishop, Se
'-=:""Approved by:
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W. Bishop, Chs iilie /Bi Date Signed li/l&Igi Date Signed ii is/a)
Date Signed
.ii/is ei Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Au ust 17-21 1981 Re ort Nos. 50-528/81-12 50-529/81-10, 50-530/81-10)
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of activities associated with:
licensee action on previous inspection findings; reactor vessel internals installation; structural concrete activities; structural steel installation; electrical component installation; preservice inspection; and pipe support installation.
The inspection involved 75 inspector hours on-site by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the activities inspected, three items of noncompliance were identified in the areas of structural steel bolting, weld rod moisture RV Form 219 (2)
control, and,access control to the fuel pool area.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted k
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Arizona Public Service Com an APS
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- E. E.
Van Brunt,'r., Vice"Pres'ident, Nuclear Projects Management
- J. A. Roedel, Corporate, QA'Mana'ger.'D.
B. Fasnacht Site Construction 'Man'ager
- W. E. Ide, Site QA<<Supervisor
- R. J.
Kimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor
- C.
N. Russo, Operations QA Manager G. Pankonin, QA Engineel
- D. E. Fowler, QA Engineer
- J.
C. Solakiewicz, QA Engineer (Op'erations)
D. Wittas, QA Engineer Bechtel Power Cor or'ation Bechtel
- S. M. Nickell, Project Superintendent
- A. K. Priest, Project Field Engineer
- D. R. Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor
- M. A. Rosen, Engineer J. White, QC Engineer J.
Keenan, QC Engineer J.
E.
LaRue, Electrical Field Engineer J. Lepin, Lead Electrical Field Engineer V. Mallen, Lead Electr ical QC Engineer
Management meeting attendees.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s The inspector examined the action taken by the licensee on the following items.
a.
(Closed Followu Item 50-528/80-01/02 Develo ment of formal roce ure for r e ortin o
.
e items.
The licensee issued procedure NS-17,
"Processing Bechtel's Deficiency Evaluation Reports," April 14, 1981, dealing with review of construction deficiencies and reporting in accordance with requirements of
CFR 50.55(e).
The inspector reviewed this procedure and considered it satisfactory.
This iteto is close Itt tt h'I h(
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It'em-50.-528/81-02/01 Mater ial cal lout incons istenc for soc o ets.
Purchase order specification 10407-13-PM-307,
"Nuclear Service Pipe and Fittings. 2 Inches and Smaller" was changed (SCN 2585-March 16, 1981) to correct the material callout.
This item is closed.
e Closed Fol 1owu Item 50-528/81-02/02 Heat treatment verification
~re or s.
The checklist in specification 13-PM-307 used by source inspectors and receiving inspectors to verify that the required documentation has been received, did not include an item for,heat treatment certification documentation.
Specification change notice (SCN)
2585, issued March 16, 1981, added heat treatment verification reports to the checklist to ensure all required documentation is received.
This item is closed.
(Closed Noncom liance 50-530/80-16/01 Cleanliness control rior to concrete acemen
.
To verify the effectiveness of the corrective action outlined in the licensee's response (February 4, 1981) to the notice of violation, preplacement cleanliness examinations and postplacement examinations were performed and are detailed in paragraph 4 of this report.
No problems of a similar nature were identified.
This item is closed.
Closed Noncom liance 50-528/80-06/01 Timel re ortin of 50.55 e
items.
During the past 15 months, all 50.55(e) reports have been submitted within the required 30 day period.
Based on this history of timely reporting, this item is closed.
Closed Followu Item 50-528/81-02/03 Installation instructions for u
enetrati on cor ner we s
or we o ets and sockol ets.
Bechtel issued SCN 2565 (February 26, 1981) to the gener al welding specification 13-PM-204, "Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems" and also PCN 46 (April 6, 1981) to WPP/QCI<:-101.0,
"Welding Control".
The SCN added an attachment to the specification to provide formal installation instructions for weldolets and sockolets.
A Bechtel inspection of the existing Q class field welded sockolets and weldolets identified eleven unacceptable welds due to either weld size or welder certification.
The unacceptable welds were appropri ately dispositioned on nonconformance reports.
This item is closed.
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)I Closed Unresolved Item 50-528/79-04/02 Noncom li ance 50-528/
9-05 Noncom iance 50-5 8/79-7/09 Undersize fil et wel s
on i e and e ui ment su orts.
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The licensee's responses (dated October 22, 1979 and February 19, 1980) to the items of poncompliance were reviewed and considered satisfactory.
To ver jfy the effectiveness
.,of the, corrective action, pipe support welds were inspected to en'sure proper size and configuration;"
The details of,this -inspection are in paragraph 8 of this report.
This ',item;is,clo'sed.
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Closed Followu Item'0-528/80-08/01 and 50.55 e
Item Ruskin fsre am er dsstortion sndin rob em.
ll During a previous inspection (no.'50-528/80-08),a modification to Ruskin fire dampers based on a Pant '21 report was examined.
The modification consisted of= installation of spr'ing s'lot clamps to prevent the closing'pring-from slipping out of'ts retaining bracket.
During operational testing of the fire dampers to verify the design modification, some of the fire dampers failed to close due to minor distortion of the sheet metal sides.
This problem was unrelated to the Part 21 design modification.
The licensee wrote a 50.55(e) report (September 15, 1980) concerning the closure problem.
The c8rrective action consisted of cycling all fire dampers for operability, followed by a clearance measurement between the frame and blade.
Out of a total of 280 fire dampers tested, 58 failed the test.
A total of 56 of the failed dampers were scrapped and replaced by functional dampers and two 48 inch fire dampers were reworked to ensure operability.
In addition, Ruskin added channel stiffeners to all new fire dampers over 12 inches high.
The inspector verified this corrective action by visual examination, and review of Waldinger Corporation nonconformance reports dealing with this problem.
This followup item and the resulting 50.55(e) corrective action is considered closed.
Closed Followu Item 50-528/81-02/05 Batter char er mechanical snter oc evince.
On November 5, 1980, the licensee submitted a final 50.55(e)
report concerning a deficiency related to the mechanical interlock device on Unit 1 battery charger 1-E-PKA-H15.
The interlock could be defeated, allowing simultaneous closure of breakers supplying redundant DC busses, thereby placing these busses in parallel.
The report indicated that the condition was isolated to the above identified battery charger.
During a previous inspection (no. 50-528/81-02),
the inspector noted an identical fault in the mechanical interlock on Unit 1 redundant battery charger 1-E-PKB-H16. Also,
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the inspector noted that the interlocks were not labeled to alert operating personnel of the possibility of electrically connecting two redundant DC busses if the inter lock was defeated, and the breakers themselves were not labeled or color coded in a manner that would indicate they were part of redundant trains.
The licensee submitted an amended final 50.55(e) report February 6, 1981 to include Unit 1 battery charger 1-E-PKB-H16.
Also, a
design change package was written, to engrave and install nameplates on the chargers to clarify the labeling.
This item is closed.
Closed Followu Items 50-528/81-02/06 07 and
Identification of con uit an ca e for t ir -of-a-kind pads; use of flexib e con uit as a means of rovidin se aration; and inconsistencies between t e FSAR and IEE -38 se aration re uirements.
SAR Change Notice 1053, dated March 6, 1981, was written to change sections 8.3. 1.3 and 8.3. 1.4 of the FSAR.
The change details the identification of Class 1E conduit and cable used for third-of-a-kind loads, identifies the use of flexible conduit as a
means of providing separation, and makes the FSAR consistent with IEEE-384 concerning separation of redundant circuits by means of conduit or enclosed raceways.
This item is closed.
Closed Noncom liance 50-529/81-04/03 Removal of tern orar attachments.
The licensee's corrective action concerning the item of noncompliance was documented in written response dated June 2, 1981.
The inspector examined the repair of the two gouges in Unit 2 containment column number 14 and considers the repair-,satisfactory.
This item is closed.
3.
Reactor Vessel Internals Installation and Weldin Unit 1 and
Unit Unit
)t Activities associated with reactor vesCe1 internals installation for both Unit 1 and 2 were examined to ascertain compliance to the CE Reactor Vessel Internals,'nstr uction Manual,and appropriate Integrated Construction guality.Procedures (IC(Ps'). '
1:
Incore instr0'ment'ation (ICI)'qide.'ubes were, being welded to the reactor-'essel.'",Complet'ed
'welds 'for ICI. guide tube numbers 50,53, 56,and,57 were, examined.
Fitup and cleaning of ICI guide tube number 52.-was observ'ed. In addition, the completed 'lower support striicture',to* core support barrel flexure weld was examined."",, ".>
2:
Activities concerning -the, verification of perpendicularity of the reactor'iesse1 alignment keyways were observed (step number 4.4 of IC(P-'001).
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The inspectors observed that access.,control was not being maintained to the refueling'pool (zone IV designated areas)
as specified in WPP/OCI-13.0,
"Housekeeping".
For Unit 2, uncontrolled access was observed from the fuel transfer tubearea into the fuel pool; and for Unit 1, uncontrolled access was.observed through an open door above the fuel pool.
This is considered an apparent item of noncompliance (50-528/81-12/01, 50-529/81-10/01).
4.
Concrete Activities - Unit 3 Concrete activities for the following Unit 3 work were observed to ascertain compliance with preplacement, placement, and postplacement procedures:
Cleanliness preplacement examination for containment wall placement number 3C110 (eleventh lift).
Curing of previous containment wall placement.
Removal of forms from auxiliary building wall placement number 3A087 (100 to 120 ft. elevation).
After form removal, areas around wall penetrations, doors, and embeds were'nspected to ensure proper cleanliness conditions existed prior to pl-acement.
No.deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Steel Structures and Su orts a.
Weldin Procedure S ecifications The inspector examined Bechtel welding procedure number Pl-A-Lh (structural),
Revision 3, for compliance with AWS D1.1 requirements.
This procedure was followed in welding the clip to channel plate which the inspector observed as reported in paragraph b.(2) below.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Observation of Weldin Activities In-process welding was observed to ascertain compliance with applicable procedures and standards.
The following welds were examined:
(1)
Unit 2 - Containment internals platform framing at E1 168'6".
(2)
Unit 3 - Welding clip to channel plate in auxiliary building at El 156 4",
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The wel ding at the joints were examined for correct fi 1 1 er material, proper weld filler metal control, weld type and identification, weld joint geometry and welding technique.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Visual Examination of Welds The inspector visually examined,ten completed structural welds in the Unit 2 containment and ten 'c'omplet'ed structural welds in the Unit 3 auxiliary building.
These welds were examined for location, size, shape, surface condition, and appearance.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Weldin Material Control e.
The control, issue return and storage of weld filler materials was observed by the inspector.
When inspecting Rod Room No. 4, which services Unit 2 welding activities, the inspector discovered a lunch in one rod oven used for the storage of low hydrogen electrodes.
The Bechtel Quality Assurance Manual for ASME Section III requires that filler material be stored and protected from unwanted moisture.
This is consider ed an apparent item of noncompliance (50-529/81-10/02).
Structural Steel Boltin A Unit 2 containment structural steel platform at elevation 149 ft. was examined to ascertain compliance with WPP/QCI-58.0,
"Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel."
Inspection documentation indicated that the platform had been inspected in April, 1981 and was considered satisfactory.
Examination of the platform bolting, revealed three bolted joints where the bolting was not as specified by the WPP/QCI.
Section 4.4.4 of WPP/QCI-58.0 states,
"Wher e long slotted holes are used on an outer ply, a plate washer or continuous bar of at least 5/16 inch thickness with standard holes shall be provided.
These washers or bars shall have a
size sufficient to completely cover the slot after installation."
Three joints had oversized slots not covered with a plate washer or continuous bar.
After this condition was pointed out to the licensee, Bechtel documented the condition on nonconformance report CC-2837 (August 21, 1981).
This improper bolting is considered an apparent item of noncompliance (50-529/81-10/03).
6.
Electrical Com onent Installation - Unit 2 Installed Unit 2 electrical components were examined to ascertain compliance with WPP/QCI-258.0, "Electrical Equipment Install ation".
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I ff Diesel generator A.
4160 volt bus 2-E-PBA-503.
Motor control center for essential spray pond pump (2E-PBA-503C).
4160V-480V load center E-PGA-L31 (2E-PBA-503H).
480V load center main feeder breaker (2E-PG9-L3382).
Motor control center for containment normal air conditioning unit fan (2E RGA-L3302).
Motor control center for diesel generator room essential exhaust fan (2E-PGA-L31D2).
Diesel exhaust fan M-HDA-J01.
Particular attributes checked included bolting, welding of cabinets to floor embeds, grouting, and cleanliness/maintenance conditions of equipment.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Preservice Ins ection Baseline)
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
(C-E) is responsible for preservice inspections (PSI) activities to be performed on the primary coolant boundary welds at Palo Verde Units 1, 2 and 3.
At present, PSI is 83K complete for Unit 1 and 16% for Unit 2.
No PSI activities were in progress during this inspection, nor were any records available for review as C-E personnel were offsite.
The licensee agreed to send to the Region V
inspector the PSI plans, including NDE procedures and personnel qualification, prior to the next scheduled PSI.
The licensee will notify Region V
when the next PSI date is confirmed.
8.
Safet -Related Pi e
Su orts and Restraints a ~
Review of ualit Assurance Im lementin Procedures The following pipe support and restraint documents were reviewed for conformance to licensee commitments and ASME Section III, Subsection NF requirements:
(1)
Specification 13-PM-209, Rev.
3, "Specification for Nuclear Pipe Supports."
(2)
Specification 13-PM-209, Section 4, Rev.
7 of 3/31/80,
"Technical Requirements Design Specification for Nuclear Pipe Supports."
(3)
WPP/gCI-201.1, Rev.
12 of 6/2/81,
"Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports Installation."
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These procedures incorporate satisfactory controls to assure that the type and classification of these components comply with approved drawings; location and spacing meet code requirements; impact properties are not affected by fabrication processes; bolts and nuts are of proper size and secure; snubbers and restraints are inspected for "freeze-up" and deformation prior to installation; and that only reviewed and approved welding,and associated procedures pertaining to safety-related pipe supports and restraint systems are used.
f No items of noncompliance or deviations were 'identif~ed.
The following'safety-rela'ted mechanical snubbers'nd 'restraints were selected for examination:
Snubber Number
- '
Load Classification t(
13-SI-122-H-003,
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353 1 bs.
13-SI-107-H-043:
254 lbs.
13-SI-119-H-008
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1430 1 bs.
13-SI-129-H-002 2000 lbs.
13-S I-114-H-008 184 lbs.
13-SI-107-H-041
,224 lbs.
The above snubbers were selected for inspection since they were all recently accepted by the quality control engineering department.
All snubbers appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The connecting joints and moving parts were free from foreign material, and the bolts were secure.
All the snubbers had the correct hot and cold settings indicated.
The following restraints were also examined and found to comply with applicable drawings and code requirements.
Restraint Number Load Classification 13-CH-337-H-002 13-CH-590- H-014.
13-CH-305-H-013 13-CH-287-H-035 1428 lbs.
1200 lbs.
1100 lbs.
622 lbs.
The size of fillet welds on the above pipe supports were as specified on the applicable drawings.
In conjunction with this examination, the inspector reviewed the performance qualification records for the welders involved in welding these joints.
All were qualified, on the date the welds were made, in accordance with ASME Section IX for the weld procedure and positions use I II Il It II
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The following safety-related fixed pipe supports were selected for examination:
13-SI-240-H-013 13-S I-175-H-023 13-S I-241-H-015-1 13-S I-241-H-016-1 13-S I-241-H-016-2 Load Ratin 6210 lbs.
5515 lbs.
6480 lbs.
3779 lbs.
3779 lbs.
The hanger rods for supporting the spring hangers were as required for the size of pipe being supported.
Each spring hanger had the appropriate
"hot" or "cold" position indicated for the piping system being supported.
The inspector also checked for proper thread engagement of the hanger rod to the spring can.
Spring hanger number 13-SI-241-H-015-1 did not have the correct thread engagement.
The licensee infor med the inspector that the spring cans are set, that is, receive final adjustment, during hot functional testing.
It is during this final walkdown period that thread engagement is checked.
Final walkdown is performed in accordance with procedure WPP/gCI 202.3 "Piping Systems Final Inspection."
However, this procedure does not address thread engagement.
During the exit interview the licensee committed to revise WPP/gCI 202.3 to include i nspection for proper thread engagement.
This item will be examined during a future inspection (50-528/81-12/02).
Review of ualit Assur ance Records The inspector reviewed the'onstruction Inspection Plans (CIP)
for six snubbers from Unit 1, four restraints from Unit 2, and five spring hangers from Unit 1.
These pipe supports and restraint records were from those selected for inspection as reported in paragraphs b and c.
The CIP's inspection requirements provided verification that the systems were correctly classified, located and installed in compliance with the appropriate drawing and specifications.
In addition,. the, inspector reviewed the weld procedure, welding checklist and welders qualifications associated with installation of these systems.
'All the CIP's and welding checklists contained the necessary gC and ANI approvals as required.
No items of noncompliance or devi'ations were identifie ~ 'v II p
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Mana ement Meetin
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Ig O'I On August 21, 1981, the ins'pectors
'met With 'the 1icensee representatives identified in Paragraph.';1 and summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings, as 'described in this repor l'i J
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