IR 05000528/1981024
| ML17297B184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1981 |
| From: | Bishop T, Vorderbrueggen, Vorderbruegger NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17297B183 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-81-24, 50-529-81-17, 50-530-81-17, NUDOCS 8201190237 | |
| Download: ML17297B184 (14) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS~
FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORC8%5IT (~
50-528/81-24 50-529/81-17 Repor't No.
50-530/81-17 50-528, 50-529, Docket No.
50-530 REGION V
CPPR-141, CPPR-License No.
142 CPPR-143 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Com an P.
0.
Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Faci] ity Name.
Palo Verde Nuclear Genera tin S ta tion Units 1, 2,
and
Inspect'ion at:
Palo Verde Cons truction Site Wintersbur Ari o a
Inspection conducted:
November
December
1981 Inspectors:
H. Vorderbruegge Senior Resident inspector Dat Signed Date Signed Approved By:
I,)v. I T.
W. Bishop, hief Reactor Projects Section
Date Signed Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on November
December
1981 (Re ort Nos.
50-528/
81-24 50-529/81-17 and 50-530/81-17)
Areas 'Tns ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities associated with protection of installed reactor vessels Units 1 and 2; reactor vessel internals installation Units 1 and 2;
NSSS vessel storage protection Units 3; leak in under-ground temporary fire protection line in Unit 1; reactor coolant pressure boundary and other safety related piping; Unit 2 pipe supports; emergency lighting; care and pre-servation of equipment; follow-up of licensee action on previous inspection findings; and general activities in progress at the plant site.
The inspection involved
inspector-hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
'Re'suits:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
agpi f<<ppp37 81 l2 PDR AOOCK 0 oo PDR
RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Com an APS xE.
E,
- J. A.
D.
B.
- W. E.
- R. J.
R.
Fo P.
Mo D. Wi b.
Becht
- W. J.
- S.
M.
R.
M.
- M. A.
- D. R.
J.
E.
W. A.
R.
Ra R.
Ro R.
We 0.
Os Van Brunt, Jr.,
Vice President, Nuclear', Projec Roedel, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager.,
Fasnacht, Site',Construction Manager Ide, Site Quality,'A'ssurance Supervisor,,'"~-
Kimmel, Field Engine'erj.ng~'~Supervisor,'rester, QA Engineer>
ore, QA Engineer ttas, QA Engineer
"
i t
el Power Cor 'oration, Bechtel il
,J Stubbelfield,'Field Construction'Managex-"
Nickell, Proj'ect. Superintendent Grant, Project QC Engineer Rosen, QC Supervisor Hawkinson, Project QA'upervisor Pfunder, QA Engineer Miller, Assistant Project Field Engineer ndels, Field Engineer binson, Pipe Hanger Engineer
,Unit'
lier, Lead Piping Engineer Unit
tereich, Welding Engineer Unit
ts Management c.
Combustion En ineerin CE S. Mager, Site Manager C. Farley, Unit 2 Internals Superintendent Other persons contacted during the inspection period included construction craftsmen, inspectors and supervisory personnel.
2.
~Management Meeting attendees.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a.
Closed Noncom liance Item 50-529/81-05/01):
Welders Identification S mbol Missin From Weld The corrective action identified in the licensee response letters dated July 8, 1981 and September ll, 1981, was re-viewed.
Bechtel's reindoctrination program for the pipe-fitter welders in all three units was well documented and appeared to include all assigned welders.
This item is close I
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(0 en Unresolved Item 50-529/81,-12/01~),:
Possible Cold Workin of Pi e
S ool Ends Durin Fitu I'I The inspector met wi(h,licensee and 'Bechtel field engineering representatives on November 17, 1981, for further discussion of this matter.
As 'a result of the meeting,,Bechtel home office welding person'nel drafted a respons'e to resolve the matter; however, it was considered by the lice'nsee and the inspector not to be fully relevant to the expressed concerns.
This item remains unresolved.
Unit 1 Leak In Under round Tem orar Fire Protection Line During the latter part of September, 1981, a leak in a 4-inch diameter steel pipe in the temporary fire protection system was discovered by Bechtel personnel.
Before discovery, the leak developed to the extent that an estimated 2 to 3 cubic yards of soil had washed into the seismic separation space between the Auxiliary and Control Buildings at Elevation 74'-0".
This indicated that the structural soil backfill in that area had been disturbed.
The water source was isolated and the temporary fire lines were abandoned.
The situation was doc-umented on NCR No.
CY-2909, Deficiency Evaluation Report No. 81-35 was initiated, and the matter was identified to the NRC as a
potential 50.55 e reportable item.
The inspector has been following the development and initial implementation of a program by Bechtel and the licensee to determine thh location of the pipe leak, and the location and extent of the soil di.sturbance.
The effort to date appears to be well organized and under proper licensee control.
The inspector will continue to follow the resolution of this sit-uation.
(50-528/81-24/01).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Protection of Installed Reactor Vessels Units 1 and
A security guard maintains control of access to the reactor refueling pool areas.
Entry of personnel, equipment, tools and materials are limited to only those that are authorized.
When there is no work in progress inside the vessel it is kept covered to prevent the entry of foreign objects and debris.
Housekeeping conditions in the pool areas of both units appeared satisfactory.
The inspector verified that the procedures for protection of the installed reactor vessels were being implemented.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie I IL I I I
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Reactor Vessel Internals Installation Units 1 and
Installation of the vibration monitoring components on the Unit 1 internals structure is essentially completed.
The in-ternals assembly is "parked" on its storage stand in the re-fueling cavity and clean room type procedures are followed when work is being performed.
In Unit 2, the shims were installed in the snubber lugs on the core barrel and the core barrel/core shroud assembly was lowered into position in the reactor'vessel for measurement oX the off-sets in the vessel instrument thimbles.
-- The,,components are kept covered when work is not actually in,progress.
It appeared to the inspector that the procedures. for 'protection'f the vessel internals were being 'followed.
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j No items of noncompliance',or, deviations were identified.;
N I
I NSSS Vessel Protection Unit
ii The reactor vessel and one steam generator have arrived on site and are stored in the laydown area east of the Unit
The inspector examined the storage conditions of the two vessels on several occassions.
The interior of both vessels is under a positive inert gas pressure and the supporting cribbing for both appears sturdy and adequate.
The area surrounding each vessel appears to be adequately roped off to prevent vehicular access and possible damage therefrom.
It appeared to the inspector that the pro'cedures for protecting the vessels in outdoor storage were being followed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar and Safet Related Pi in Installation a.
Com onent Installation Activities Various work activities associated with handling and installation of Unit 2 piping components were observed to ascertain compliance with the ASME Code, PSAR and specification requirements.
The systems involved were the essential spray piping serving the cooling system of diesel generator A, and the pressurizer surge line which ties into reactor vessel hot leg RC-032.
Particular attention was given to the handling and supporting of components, use of specified materials, control of weld filler metal, absence of defects on component surfaces,
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control of welding records in the work area, correctness of configuration, and inspection performance by qualified personnel.
The 10-inch diesel cooling piping was a por-tion of lines 2-SPA-065 and -080 underground west of the diesel generator building and is shown on Drawing 13-P-ZYA-928.
The 12-inch pressurizer surge line is in the 1A coolant pump bay, line 2-RC-028, and is shown on Draw-ing 13-P-RCF-101.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
In P'rocess Weldin Activities Weld W-004 in the 14-inch safety injection line to reactor cold leg 1B was examined to ascertain compliance with the requirements of specification 13-PM-204, the ASME Code (Section III, 1974 edition)
and Bechtel installation/
inspection procedures WPP/QCI 100.0, 101.0 and 202.0.
The weld joins spool S-003 of the injection line (2-SIE-223)
to the 14xl4x12-inch reducing tee which brings to-gether the safety injection pump discharge line (2-SIE-221)
and the outlet line (2-SIE-223)
from the 1B safety injection line.
The applicable drawing was 13-P-SIF-103 and the welding procedure specification was P8-AT-Ag.
The weld had been completed through approximately 50 per-cent of the wall thickness (1.4 inches)
and the workman-ship appeared satisfactory.
'V A properly filled out'Field
~ Welding Check List" (WR-5 Form)
was present at the wor'k lo'cation'.
" Filler metal, issue records (WR-6 Form) which, i'dentified the welder;and the filler metal used were also 'present.
The WR-5 'Form iden-tified the weld number,. the system, a'nd t'e, applicable drawing number.
Also specified were 'the welding p'r'ocedure to be used, the material speci54~cation',
preheat and. inte'rpass temperatures, and NDE requirements,.",The, inspector',ve'rified'hat" the WR-5 provisions were in acc'ordance with the,requirements of the ASME Code,Section XII,"1974 edition.
The qualification record of the welder was examined.and found.'to"be acceptable.
The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance'were being performed to an appro-priate degree.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Under round Lines Installation The inspector continued to follow the installation of the Unit 2 train A diesel generator cooling water lines (2-SPA-065 and -080).
Activities examined were the replacement
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ff of the temporary flange bol'ts-.',wi.th the,;spec'if'.ed'olts (A 325 high strength),,',coatin'g'of the,"flanges wi.th rust preventive mastic, and hydrotesting ofthe lines'rior to backfilling, and,'sealing of the penetration; of, the lines through the diesel generator building.-'he" hydro-test data showed that the test had been
'conducted at'he required 190 psi pressure (1.25 x design) for the speci-fied 10-minute period and with currently calibrated gauges.
No pressure loss occurred demonstrating a leak tight system.
d.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Il Examination of Com leted Pi e
Run In order to ascertain that the installation was in accordance with the latest approved drawings and construction speci-fication, an examination was made of the completed safety injection line from injection tank 2A through the installed check and control valving and other tie-ins to the 30-inch reactor cold leg (Line 2-RC-079).
The applicable drawing was 13-P-SIF-136 and the governing specification was 13-PM-204.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Pi e
Su orts Unit
Installation activities associated with structural hangers for main steam line snubbers at the 140-foot elevation in the con-tainment-building were observed.
The hangers were Nos.
2-SG-036-H015 and 2-SG-042-H015 for the main steam lines of the same numbers.
The attachment welds to the concrete embeds were the specified sizes and the 'workmanship appeared very good.
A segment had been cut out of the web of the support beam of hanger-042 to accommodate a 6-inch electrical conduit inter-ference; an approved FCR had been issued for that modification.
The governing specification was 13-PM-204 and the applicable drawings were numbered identical to the hangers.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Emer enc Li htin The inspector noted from a review of the electrical drawings that the emergency lighting for the control rooms is not con-sistent with the description in the FSAR.
This matter had also been identified by licensee QA personnel and had been referred to Bechtel engineering for resolution.
One of the principal
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concerns is that the'emergency lighting battery banks (2) are in the same battery rooms as the safety related batteries.
The inspector will follow the resolution of this matter (all units/81-24/02).
Ins ection Tours of Plant Site't various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the'plant,skte in, order to observe general housekeeping conditiond,'care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy co'mpo'nents,
'tagging 'and identification of material, adequacy, ofca'ps oyer pipe.openings not being worked on, and presence of-cribbing under'- stored pipe spools, valves, and other component's.
No,welding electrode stubs were observed lying around the",vario'us,w'ork"areas.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Mana erne'nt Meetin s
A meeting was held on December 4,
1981.
Licensee and Bechtel representatives in attendance at the meeting are identified in paragraph 1.
During the meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this repor K S
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