IR 05000528/1981005

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Repts 50-528/81-05,50-529/81-05 & 50-530/81-05 on 810302-27.Noncompliance Noted:Weld Not Stamped W/Welder Identification
ML17297A534
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 06/15/1981
From: Eckhardt J, Vorderbrueggen
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML17297A532 List:
References
50-528-81-05, 50-528-81-5, 50-529-81-05, 50-529-81-5, 50-530-81-05, 50-530-81-5, NUDOCS 8107010412
Download: ML17297A534 (12)


Text

~

~

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT N BIN)-os

~eport No.

50-530 81-05 Docket No 50-528,50-529,50-530 REGION V

No CPPR-141,CPPR-142 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Phoenix Arizona 85036 Facility Name:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generatin Station Units 1, 2, and

Inspection at:

Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:

March 2 - 27, 1981 Inspectors:

.

E. Vorderbrueggen enior Resident Inspector d r~ gi Dat Signed Date Signed pproved By:

c a

,

c sng ie

,

eactor ProjectsSection I Date Signed

@is eg Date Signed Summary:

Ins ection on March 2 - 27 1981 Re ort Nos. 50-528/81-05 50-529/81-05 and 50-530/81-05

<<id activities including:

Unit 1 reactor vessel internals; protection of installed reactor vessels; containment penetration welding; reactor vessel lateral restraint grouting; installation of safety related piping and pipe supports';

care and preservation of equipment; and general activities in progress at the site.

The inspection involved 62 inspector hours on-site by one NRC inspector.

Results:

One item of noncompliance was identified concerning a weld not having been stamped with the welder's identification.

(Paragraph 7).

RV Fnrm 919 (Pl

~

~

I

~

~

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted a.

Arizona Public Service Com an APS

  • E.

E.

Van Brunt, Jr.,

Vice President, Nuclear Project Management

  • J. A. Roedel, Quality Assurance Manager
  • J.

M. Allen, Nuclear Engineering Manager

  • D. B. Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager
  • R. J.

Kimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor

  • W. E. Ide, Site QA Supervisor
  • B. S. Kaplan, Quality Systems Supervisor
  • G. Pankonin, QA Engineer D.

E. Fowler, QA Engineer L. Souza, QA Engineer

  • J. Vorees, Nuclear Operations Support Manager
  • J. C. Solakiewicz, Operations QA Engineer b.

Bechtel Power Cor oratio'n Bechtel

  • W. J. Stubblefield, Construction Manager
  • S. M. Nickell, Project Superintendent
  • B. R. McCullough, Manager of Construction (Norwalk)
  • W. H. Wilson, Project Manager
  • W. G. Bingham, Project Engineering Manager
  • A. K. Priest, Project Field Engineer V. Narjarian, Assistant Project Engineer
  • D. R. Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor H. Seckinger, Unit

PSE Engineer E. Stone, Unit 3 Welding Engineer

  • R. M. Grant, Project QC Engineer J. White, QC Engineer S. Jennings, QC Engineer J. Sabol, Piping Engineer-Hangers c.

Combustion En ineerin CE P.

DeGreef, Internals Installation Superintendent Other persons contacted during the inspection period included, construction craftsmen, inspectors and supervisory personnel.

  • Denotes management meeting participants.

2.

Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Internals The circumferential weld joining the lower support structure/core shroud assembly to the core support barrel flexure flange was completed.

Dye penetrant examination of the finished weld was performed as required by V

~ ~~~ *t

&

~

-

p p 3,

~t'0

'<<%

paragraph 6.5.15 of CE Internals Instruction Manual No.

IG-14273-RCE-400 and indicated that the weld was acceptable.

The core support barrel was subsequently placed in the reactor vessel and measurements were made of the core support plate alignment with the reactor vessel centerlines as outlined in Section 6.6 of the CE manual referenced above.

A heavy plastic cover is kept in place over the core barrel assembly when work is not being performed on it to prevent the entry of-dust and debris.

Clean room procedures are maintained in the work areas.

It appeared that the procedures for installation and protection of the interanl components were being followed.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were',identified.

Protection of Installed Reactor Vessels Guarded access control to the Unit 1 reactor pool area continues to

'limit the entry of personnel

- equipment,&nels-and materials to those --

.

authorized.

When there is no work activity inside the vessel, a plastic protection cover is kept in place over the vessel flange to prevent entry of foreign objects and debris.

Nozzle welding and internal cladding operations continued on the Unit 2 reactor vessel.

The formed plastic covers were firmly fastened in place over the cold leg spool ends to protect them from adjacent construction activities and to preclude the entry of dirt and debris.

Work platforms and ladders inside the vessel were metallic or of. treated wood so as to minimize fire hazards.

The top of the vessel was covered to prevent the accidental entry of foreign objects and debris.

The inspector verified that the procedures for protection of the installed reactor vessels were being implemented.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

Containment Penetrations Tack welding of the flued head fitting to the containment sleeve for Unit 3 penetration NO.

33 was examined to ascertain compliance with, the requirements of specification 13-PM-204,.the ASME Code (Section III-1974 edition),

and Bechtel installation/inspection procedures WPP/gCI 100.0 and 101.0.

The penetration is to serve nuclear cooling water supply to containment (Line 3-NC-135-10").

Details of the penetration are tabulated on Drawing No.

13-P-ZCG-107, Containment Penetration Requirements for Flued Heads.

The piping specification, work procedures and drawing identified above were found to be technically adequate, current and properly approved.

e pn A

I

~

~

~

V

The tack welds (8) displayed good workmanship and the fit up dimensions'ere satisfactory.

A properly filled out Field Welding Check List {WR-5 Form)

was present at the work location with hold points and NDE callouts specified.

The weld identification and material specifications, were in accordance with the requirements specified.

The WR-5 provisions were in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, 1974 edition.

Filler metal issue slips and the qualification records of the welder were examined and found to be acceptable.

The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance wer e being performed as required.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

Reactor Vessel Lateral Restraint Groutin The inspector observed the placement of grout inside the lateral restraint for Unit 3 reactor vessel south support columns at the 100 ft. elevation of the reactor cavity.

The restraints

{2) are large, prefabricated, box-like steel structures, centered on the reactor vessel N-S centerline.

They are constructed such that each. one forms a segmental portion of approximately 90 degrees of the cylindrical reactor vessel cavity.

Each restraint has an overall height of 4 feet, a depth of approximately

feet, and is embedded in the steel reinforced cavity wall concrete.

The grouting material was the non-shrink type as specified in Section 17.2 of governing specification 13-CM-365. It had been properly mixed such that it was free of lumps and flowed readily.

The grouting crew was composed of experienced workmen and the procedure being followed appeared well thought out and logical.

The work appeared to be under adequate supervision, and the assigned gC inspectors were present during the entire placement.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

Safet -Related Pi in Installations Various work activities associated with handling and installation of components in the Unit 2 main steam support structure (MSSS) were ob-served to ascertain compliance with specification 13-PM-204, the ASME Code, and PSAR requirements.

The systems involved were the main steam, main feedwater and steam generator blowdown.

Particular attention was given to the handling and supporting of system components, correctness of configuration, contro'j of welding records in the work area, use of specified materials, control of weld filler metal, absence of defects on component surfaces, and inspection performance by qualified personnel.

The inspector observed the welding of fit up lugs to 28 inch spool No.

S011 which was being fit up to main steam isolation valve No.

UV 170 (weld M015-line 2-SG-E-206-28").

A properly filled out Field Melding Check List (WR-5 Form) was present at the work location with hold points and-NDE

I C

'I D

~

~

call-outs specified.

The WR-5 provisions were in accordance with the requirements of ASME,Section III, 1974 edition.

Filler metal issue slips and the qualification records of the welder were examined and found to be acceptable.

The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance were being performed as required.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

'afet -Related Pi e

Su orts Two fixed pipe supports in Unit 2 auxiliary building and one spring hanger pipe support in the Unit 2 MSSS were examined to ascertain compliance with specification 13-PN-204, installation/inspection procedures WPP/gCI101.1 and 201.1, the ASHE Code, and the latest revision of the applicable in-stallation drawings.

The supports were:

(a)

Spring hanger 13-SG-205-H002 supporting spool S-001 in 24 inch main feedwater line -(same-number).

(b)

Fixed support 13-CH-149-H001 supporting spool S-021 in 20 inch chemical and volume control system line (same number).

(c)

Fixed support 13-SI-360-HOAE supporting spool N-OAM in 1 inch chemical feed line (same number) to the No.

2 containment spray pump suction 1 ine.

Items (a)

and (b) above were in the process of installation and item (c)

had been completed except for final gC acceptance inspection.

It was determined that in all three cases the work was in accordance with the latest revision of the installation drawing, and the procedure and specifi-cation identified above.

For item (b),

and adjacent motor-operated valve had been covered for protection from arc strikes or other accidental damage.

The records associated with all three supports confirmed that the weld locations/identification corresponded to the drawing and welding checklist requirements, the welding filler materials and other materials/

hardware components were as specified, the welders were qualified for the welding procedures used, and the required scope of gC inspection and NDE was being satisfied.

In connection with hanger item (c) above, the specified stop lugs had been welded to the pipe on either side of the pipe support member.

WPP/gCI 101.0, paragraph 5.10, requires the welder to place his identification symbol adjacant to the weld at the earliest possible convenience after initial deposit of filler metal and in all cases, prior to ceasing work for any reason on that particular weld.

The inspector could find no welder's symbol adjacent to the stop lug welds even days following the completion of the work.

This is an apparent item of noncompliance.

(50-529/81-05/01)

tp

I I

J

~

~

I (

~

~f;:Ct'> "(

'

~

~

~

~

From discussions that took place between the inspector and various construction and gC inspection personnel during the course of the hanger inspections, it became apparent to the inspector that some confusion existed in regard to the use of the Modification Change Notice (MCN).

There also appeared to be some confusion with the identification of when fit up inspection by gC inspectors should be performed on hanger installation.

These subjects were idscussed with the liecensee. It was agreed that a more definitive MCN procedure would be developed.

This inspector was informed that'evisions were already in progress on the project.

Welding Standard WD-l, entitled guality Control and Documentation Procedure for Welding and Nondestructive Examination for ASME Code,Section III Applications will be revised.

The revision is intended to clarify several matters, including (jC inspections on hanger component fit up.

The revision also involves minor changes to the Field Welding Check List form (WR-5A) which is used for supports.

The inspector will follow the progress of these two topics.

(50-529/81-05/02)

8.

Ins ection Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy components, tagging and identification of materials, adequacy of caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and presence of cribbing under stored pipe spools, valves and other components.

No welding electrode stubs were observed lying around the various work areas.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

9.

Mana ement Meetin s

Management meetings were held on March 13 and 27, 1981.

Licensee and Bechtel representatives in attendance at the meetings are identified in paragraph l.

During the meetings the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities, reviewed the inspection findings, and identified the item of noncompliance discussed in paragraph ~

~

~