IR 05000528/1981001

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IE Insp Repts 50-528/81-01,50-529/81-01 & 50-530/81-01 on 810105-23.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Activities Re Containment post-tensioning Tendon Installation & General Activities in Progress
ML17297A420
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 04/08/1981
From: Kirsch D, Vorderbrueggen, Vorderbruggen
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML17297A419 List:
References
50-528-81-01, 50-528-81-1, 50-529-81-01, 50-529-81-1, 50-530-81-01, 50-530-81-1, NUDOCS 8105210270
Download: ML17297A420 (14)


Text

U. S.'UCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEME'.iT t

50-528/81-01 50-529/81-01

. ~50-500 1-0

REGION V

Licensee:

Arizona Public Service Com an P. 0.

Box 21666.

Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2 and

Inspection at: Palo Verde Construction Site, Mintersburg, Arizona Docket No. 50-528 50-529 50-53Q.icense No.

CPPR-141/-142/-143Safeguards Group Inspection conducted:

January 5-23, 1981 Inspectors:

L. E. Vorderbrueggen.,

Resident Reactor Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:

S usta ry:

. F. Kirsch, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Section

Date Signed

'-i- ):0--

Date Signed

~,

Ins ection on Januar 5-23 1981 Re ort.Nos.

50-528 50-529 50-530 81-01)

Areas Ins ected:

Routine, unannounced'inspection by the Resident Inspector o

construction activities associated with: co'ntainment post-tensioning tendon.

installation, welding of containment liner and structural steeT, 'protection of installed reactor vessels, installation of Unit 1 reactor vessel internals, installation of reactor coolant pressure boundary and other safety related piping, containment electrical penetrations, safety related components, and general activities in progress at the site.

The inspection involved 50 inspector hours on-site by one NRC inspector.

Results:

Ro deviations or items of noncomp1iance were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted a

b.

C.

Arizona Public Ser vice Com an APS)

  • E. E.

Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Projects Management

~J.

A. Roedel, Manager, guality Assurance

  • W. E. Ide, Site gA Supervisor

~G. Pankonin, gA Engineer

  • D. E. Fowler, gA Engineer

.

L. Souza, gA Engineer R.

D. Forrester, gA Engineer

  • J. N. Allen, Nuclear Fngineerihg Manager

~A. C. Rogers, Nuclear Engineering Manager

  • D. B. Fasnacht, Site Construction Manager
  • R. J.

Kimmel, Field Engineering Super'visor Bechtel Power Cor oration Bechtel)

  • W. J. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager
  • S.

M. Nickell, Project Super intendent

  • J.

D. Houchen, Assistant Project Manager

  • R. R. Stiens, Project Engineer

"A. K. Priest, Project Field Engineer

  • R. L. Patterson, Division gA Manager
  • D. T. Krisha, gA Manager - Projects
  • D. R. Hawkinson, Project gA Supervisor
  • R. M. Grant, Project gC Engineer C. llelson, Civil Engineer - Unit 1 T. Prickett, Electrical Engineer - Unit 2 E. Stone, Welding Engineer - Unit 3 W. Brown, gC Engineer S. Jennings, gC Engineer Western Concrete Structures Inc.

d.

K. Guffey, General Superintendent T. Patel, gC Supervisor Western Stress Inc.

S. Bell, Site Supervisor Other persons contacted during the inspection period included construction craftsmen, inspectors and supervisory personnel.

  • Management meeting attendee //

'

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2.

Unit I Containment Tendon Installation The inspector observed the work activities associated with preparations for pulling in the first horizontal tendon sheath.

The tendon was No.

H32-040 and runs between buttresses 2 and 3.

When the visqueen weather protection was removed, the inspector observed that the tendon wires were covered with a heavy coating of preservative and there was no evidence of any deterioration.

The workmen exercised reasonable care in handling the tendon reel, installing the pulling grip on the end of the tendon, and placing the reel in position on.the uncoiling winch on buttress No.

3 traveling platform.

Liberal quantities of lubricant were applied to the tendon surfaces as it entered the sheath throughout the installation.

This was the first of three tendons planned for installation for the purpose of craftsmen training and equipment checkout.

Equipment performance was satisfactory and the tendon was installed in accordance with the subcontractors installation procedure No. PTP-6.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

3.

Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar and Safet Related Pi in Installation a.

Com onent Installation Activities Various work activities associated with handling and installation of components in the Unit 2 containment and auxiliary buildings were observed to ascertain compliance with specification 13-PH-204, the ASNE code, and PSAR requirements.

The systems involved were

.

the safety injection piping from tank 2A and the RHR discharge piping from train B shutdown cooling heat exchanger.

Particular attention was given to the handling and supporting of system components, correctness of, configuration, control of welding records in the work area, use of specified materials, control of weld filler metal, absence of defects on component surfaces, and inspection performance by qualified personnel.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

b.

In-rocess Weldin Activities The inspector examined two in-process welds in Unit 2 containment building to ascertain compliance with the requirements of specification 13-PM-204, the ASHE code (Section III-1974 edition), and Bechtel installation/inspection procedures WPP/gCI 100.0, 101.0 and 102.0.

The welds were:

Partially completed weld No.

W-002 joining spool S-001 to motor operated valve UV-614 in safety injection tank 2A discharge line No. 2-SIE-160-14".

Fit-up and final pass welding on weld No.

001 joining spool 001 to check valve V-215 in safety injection tank 2A discharge 1 ine No. 2-SIA-159-14".

PT examination and final repair welding on weld No. M-002 joining spool S-001 to steam generator No.

2 outlet line No.

2-RC-084-30" to pump Ho.

2B suction.

(The PT was to confirm that an unacceptable

"slag-line" indication in the weld had been successfully ground out.)

A properly filled out Field Melding Check List (HR-5 Form) was present at the work location of each weld with hold points and NDE call-outs specified.

The weld identification, material specifications, and interpass temperature were in accordance with the requirements specified on the NR-5 Form.

The WR-5 provisions were in accordance with the requirements of the ASNE Code,Section III, 1974 edition.

Filler metal issue slips and the qualification records of the personnel involved were examined and found to be acceptable.

The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance were being performed as required.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

c.

Examination of Com leted Pi e Runs The inspector examined two essentially completed piping runs to ascertain if the installations were in accordance with the latest approved drawings and construction specifications.

They were:

Unit 1 - shutdown cooling loop No.

1 overpressure relief system, from line 1-SIA-241-16" to the west sump in the containment building.

The line is complete except for the flanged relief valve and the sump flow sparger.

The applicable drawing is Ho. 13-P-SIF-151, Rev.

2.

Unit 2 - shutdown cooling heat exchanger No.

2 outlet line No. 2-SIB-072-20" from the heat exchanger to the junction of motor operated valve No.

HV-696 and the tee connection for line No. 2-SIB-134-10", all located in the auxiliary building east valve room, level B.

The applicable drawing is No.

13-P-SIF-208, Rev.

11.

For both runs, the applicable specification is Ho.

13-PH-204.

Ho deviations or items of noncompliance were identifie d.

Postweld Stress Relievin Stress relieving operations on Unit 2 reactor coolant system piping was examined for compliance with approved contract specifications, procedure and code requirements.

The two welds undergoing heat treatment (Ho. W-001) join the reactor vessel hot leg outlet nozzles to steam generators 1 and 2 (lines 2-RC-032-42" and 2-RC-063-42").

The heat treatment and related inspection were being performed in accordance with procedures PHT-501 and WPP/OCI-103.0.

Eight thermocouples had been installed around the circumference of each weld, and all T/C's were observed to be reading upscale on the temperature recorders.

At the. time of the inspection,

~ne weld had reached an average temperature of approximately 980 F and the othe'eld approximately 1040 F.

A holding temperature of 1100-1175 F for a period of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> had been specified.

The rate of temperature increase for each weld as shown by the subcontractor's manually-recorded (every 20-minutes)

temperature data log, ranged between 70 a~d 80 F per hour, well within the maximum specified value of 100 F per hour. It was later verified that the holding-=

time and cool-down rates were within the specified limits.

Ho deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

4.

Protection of Installed Reactor Yessels Guarded access control to the Unit 1 reactor pool area continues to limit the entry of personnel, equipment, tools and materials to those which are authorized.

When there is no work activity inside the vessel, a plastic protective cover is kept in place over the vessel flange to prevent the entry of foreign objects and debris.

Hozzle welding operations were continuing on the Unit 2 reactor vessel.

Hozzle openings not being worked were covered for protection from adjecent construction activities.

Work platforms and ladders inside the vessel were metallic or of treated wood so as to minimize fire hazards.

The top of the vessel was covered to prevent the accidental entry of foreign objects and debris.

The inspector verified that the procedures for protection of the installed reactor vessels were being implemented.

5.

Unit I Reactor Yessel Internals Shim work on the stabilizing lugs on the lower wall of the reactor vessel continued during this reporting period.

Preparations were nearing completion for starting the flexure weld which joins the lower core support structure to the core support barrel.

The internal components are being kept covered and protected except to provide access for work activities.

It appeared to the inspector that the procedures for installation and protection of the vessel internal components were being followe Containment Structur al Steel Installation of platform structural steel above the 80 ft. elevation in the southeast region of the Unit 3 containment building was examined by the inspector.

The materials, installation details, and tolerances were as specified in the latest issues of the governing documents (Specification 13-CM-320, Drawings 13-C-OOA-001, 13-C-ZCS-528, and 13-C-ZCS-529).

Bolted connections were tight but not all of them had been torqued.

Approximately 20 of the bolts that had been torqued (turn-of-the-nut method was used)

were examined and found satisfactory.

Beam clip welds were in accordance with the AWS standards and the workmanship appeared satisfactory.

Inspection was being performed and inspection records maintained in accordance with WPP/gCI 58.0.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

Unit 3 Containment Liner Weldin The top seam weld joining main steam penetration panels 3MS-5 and 3MS-6 to the containment I/4-inch liner plate was examined for conformance with the applicable specification, code, and procedural requirements.

The weld was examined in the in-process and completed conditions.

The welder's qualification records showed that he was qualified for the specified procedure being used (P1-A-Lh).

The specified weld filler metal and cover gas were being used.

Weld contour and general workmanship appeared good.

Inspection and supervisory personnel were present at the work location.

Filler material was being adequately protected prior to use and used rod stubs were being properly discarded into the bucket provided.

The governing documents were Specification 13-CM-370 and WPP/gCI 61.0.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

Containment Electrical Penetrations The inspector observed'the installation of electrical penetration No. 66 in Unit 2 containment to ascertain compliance with specification and procedural requirements.

Specification 13-EM-036, WPP/gCI 258.2, and Conax Company Installation Manual Ho.

13-10407-E035A-36 are the applicable documents.

These documents were reviewed and were found to be properly approved and current; they also appeared to be technically adequate.

The installation activities involved: (1) cleaning of the containment sleeve flange; (2) application of sealant material; (3) placement of the 0-rings on the penetration flange; (4) bolting the penetration assembly in place using the specified sequence for torquing the bolts, and (5)

pressurizing the unit with nitrogen to 50 psig.

The torque wrench was observed to carry a current calibration sticker.

Inspection data was recorded on the back of the computerized

"Control and Tracking System Installation Card" as intended.

The penetration internals were wrapped with a heavy plasticized'lanket material to provide protection from physical damage and construction debris.

All materials used were as specified.

The inspector also spot-checked inspection records, including leak-rate data, for several previously installed penetrations; no discrepancies were observed.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identifie.

Safet Pelated Com onents Several times during this reporting period the plant site was toured to observe general housekeeping conditions, fire prevention and protection conditions, and the care, handling, and preservation of equipment.

Particular attention was given to the handling of heavy pipe spools and valves during placement and fitup, presence of covers over installed equipment for protection from adjacent work activities, adequate caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and adequacy of cribbing under stored valves, pipe spools and other components.

Installed electrical panels and control centers were observed for adequacy of 'covers and energized heaters to prevent damage-from dust and moisture condensation.

Melding electrode control was seen to be under proper storage conditions and no electrode stubs were seen lying around the various work areas.

In equipment storage areas, particular attention was given to the presence and adequacy of protective covers, coatings, equipment identification and segregation of nonconforming items, lubrication and rotation of operating shafts, storage position of valves with automatic operators and adequacy of cribbing for air circulation.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

10.

Hang ement Meetin s

On January 9 and February 5, 1981, the inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1 to sugar ize the scope of the inspection activities and review the inspection findings as described in this report.