IR 05000528/1981008
| ML17297A774 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1981 |
| From: | Bishop T, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17297A773 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-81-08, 50-528-81-8, 50-529-81-08, 50-529-81-8, 50-530-81-08, 50-530-81-8, NUDOCS 8109030088 | |
| Download: ML17297A774 (14) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-528 81-08 50-529/81-08 50-530/81-08 Docket Nos.
50-528 50-529 50-530 License Nos.
CPPR-141, CPPR-'142; CPPR-'143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Com an P. 0.
Box 21666 Phoenix Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generatin Station - Units
2 and
Inspection At: Palo Verde Construction Site
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Inspection Conducted:
June 1 - 26 1981 Inspectors:
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'rerbru ggen Senior Resident Inspector Wintersbur 'rizona n
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8/S(81 Date Signed T.
W. Bishop, C ief Reactor Project Section
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Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on June 1 - 26 1981 Re ort Nos. 50-528/81-08 50-529 81-08 and 50-530/81-08 A~Id:
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p of construction activities associated with: protection of installed reactor vessels (Units 1 and 2); reactor vessel internals; structural concrete; safety injection tank bolt tensioning; safety related components; structural foundations; Unit 1 containment post-tensioning; concrete void pressure grouting - Unit 2 control building basemat; safety related piping; pipe restraint embed bolt failures.
The inspection involved 77 inspector hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Com an APS b.
Be c.
Combustion En ineerin CE E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Projects Management J.
A. Roedel, Corporate,,Quality Assurance Manager D.
B. Fasnacht,,Site Construction'Manager W.
E. Ide, Site QA Supervisor R. J.
Kimmel, FieldEngineering Supervisor G. Pankonin, QA Engineer R. Forrester, QA'Engineer i
hl chtel Power Cor, oration Bechtel
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M. Nickell, Project-Superintend'ent
A. K. Priest, Project Field Engineer',
D.
R. Hawkinson, Project QA 'Supervisor,,
R.
M. Grant, Project QC Engineer J.
E. Pfunder, QA Engineer D. Haveg, Civil En'gineering Staff Specialist B. Rausch, Assistant Lead Civil Field Engineer C. Langley, Civil Field Engineer P. Relph, Rigging Engineer K. Lowther, QC Engineer J. Mathias, QC Engineer K. Hall, QC Engineer A. Robertson, QC Engineer J.
King, Consulting Civil Engineer S. Mager, Site Manager P.
De Greef, Internals Installation Superintendent d.
Western Concrete Structures Inc.
K. Guffey, Site Superintendent Other persons contacted during the inspection period included construction craftsmen, inspectors and supervisory personnel.
- Management Meeting attendees.
2.
Containment Post-tensionin
- Unit 1 Tensioning of horizontal tendon No. H13-020 at buttress No.
1 was observed to ascertain compliance with WCS procedure No.
PTP-8 and No. QCP-6.
The craftsmen demonstrated appropriate knowledge of the equipment and the procedural steps.
Good communications were maintained with the other crew members performing tensioning at buttress No. 3.
The measured tendon elongation at the specified maximum tension (7500 psig pressure on the hydraulic ram) was 20-inches which compares satisfactorily with the predicted
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value o',19.2-inches'.
Following,remova1~'of,the ram from the anchor head, a minor,problem.wa's"erjcountered':wit) the installation of the grease cap due to bolt" hole misalignme'nt however,~ the workmen succeeded in mounting the cap and obtaining"an adequate-seal.'.
>q","","'o deviations or items of noncompliance"'were identified.
I ft Protection of Installed Reactor'essels Units 1 and
1
'I Guarded access control to the Unit 1 reactor pool area, continues to limit the entry of personnel, equipment, tools and materials to-only those authorized.
When there is no work activity inside the vessel a plastic cover is kept in place over the vessel flange to prevent the entry of foreign objects and debris.
The Unit 2 reactor vessel has a heavy structural cover across the vessel flange to keep out for eign objects and debris.
The work platforms and ladders inside the vessel are metallic or made of treated wood to minimize fire hazards.
The inspector verified that the procedures for protection of the installed reactor vessels were being implemented.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Reactor Vessel Internals Units 1 and
During this reporting period the four alignment keys were installed and doweled into the keyways in the Unit 1 core support barrel upper flange; the machined inserts were installed in the 4 core support barrel guide lugs which align the lower fuel alignment plate of the upper guide structure in the core support barrel assembly, the upper guide structure assembly, and the reactor vessel head all set in place.
These operations were performed in accordance with Sections 6. 10, 6.11, and 6.12 of CE Instruction Manual No.
IG-14273-RCE-400 and the referenced procedures therein.
The components are kept covered and protected when work activities are not in progress in order to prevent the entry of dust and debris.
Clean room type procedures are followed when work is being performed.
It appeared to the inspector that the procedures for installation and protection of the Unit 1 vessel internal components were being followed.
The, Unit 2 vessel internal components remained in storage in the refueling pool storage areas.
The inspector verified that the protective covers for the components were in place.
It appeared to the inspector that the procedures for protection of the vessel internals were being followed.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Structural Concrete
-. Unit 2 Containment Dome Concrete curing operations associated with dome placement No.
2C120 at elevation 256-ft, were examined six days after the placement had been made.
The form,work was still tightly in place and the top surface of the concrete was covered with water soaked burla J
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Reinforcing steel and tendon sheathing being installed for dome placement No.
2C121 from elevation 256-ft. to elevation 262-ft..were examined.
The size, grade, and spacing of the reinforcing steel was as specified and appeared free of any surface materials that would adversely affect the concrete bond.
Tendon, sheathing.was clean, undamaged.,
and was being securely fastened in the specified locations.
Activities associated with dome"concrete placement'No.
2C122 from elevation 262-ft. to elevation 267-ft. were also examined.
The form work joints were seen to be tight.
The forms were securely anchored to preclude movement during concrete placement and were positioned such that the specified cover for the reinforcing steel would be obtained.
Tendon sheathing appeared clean and securely fastened in place.
The junctions of the trumpet extensions and the tendon sheaths in the buttresses appeared to be taped sufficiently to prevent the entrance of mortar.
Trumplate openings in the buttresses were plugged to prevent the inadvertent entry of concrete.
The construction joint had been cleaned of miscellaneous debris and moistened to accept concrete.
The pre-placement checklist had been properly completed and signed off as required by WPP/gCI No. 52.0.
Batching operations and concrete testing at the batch plant were observed and found to be in accordance with require-ments.
The placing crew was of sufficient size and was composed of experienced personnel.
They were adequately supervised to avoid damage to the tendon sheathing while consolidating the concrete.
The inspector observed concrete samples being taken for temperature and slump measurement, and the casting of cylinders for compression strength measurements.
Two gC inspectors were observed monitoring the placement activities.
The governing specifications are 13-CH-371, Post-Tensioning Trumplate Assemblies and Sheathing, and 13-CM-375, Placing of Reinforcing Steel.
Applicable drawings are 13-C-FCS-175 through -181, Containment Building Prestressing Requirements.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Unit 2 Safet
'In 'ection Tank Installation The inspector observed the tensioning of four of the eighteen anchor bolts which anchor Safety Injection Tank 1B to its support pedestal inside the containment building.
The'bservation was made in order to verify that work and inspection procedures were being followed and that the specified bolt elongations were obtained.
The bolts observed were Nos. 3, 4, 12, and 13.
The requirements were specified in WPP/ACI No. 350.82-2, Special Construction Inspection Planning for NSSS Equipment.
The bolts were tensioned in the specified sequence and the operations were performed under the cognizance of the assigned gC inspector who recorded, on the record sheet provided, the bolt elongation values achieved.
The bolts were left in an elongated condition within the specified range of 0.062 to 0.068 inches.
The inspector also checked the calibration status of the dial indicators being used to measure bolt elongation and the pressure gage on the hydraulic pumping unit.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identifie ~~
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7.
Unit 2 Control Buildin Basemat Conc'rete-Void"" "
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gci Discovery, size evaluation',...cause'and remedial,action pertaining to a void in the vicinity of the, west 'sbmp,in".;the 'control'uilding basement were described in IE Inspeotioli Report",,No".'"50=529/81-06';.,Paragraph No. 6.
On June 12, 1981,, the vo'i'd was" pressure grouted,"using a pr'ocedure developed by a Bechtel consultant who "has.'extenso'.ve,,experience'-with concrete void problems of similar nature.,~The',material"'selected-for';,use was a fine silica aggregate, non-ferr'ous;-. nori-shrin'k;grout 'having.a 28-day compressive strength of 6000 psi
,-The-'consultant was-p'resent 'to-direct the entire operation, and before bulk grout mixing began he established the water/grout ratio to provide the -s'pecified fluid consistency of "24 + 3 seconds using the CRD-C79 flow,cone.
The-holes previously core drilled to define the void region were identified-by'umber on the floor surface to indicate the sequence of grout introduction.
The grout injected into the void was observed to be of uniform consistency and-free of lumps.
The inspector observed the entire operation during which approximately 7~ cubic yards of grout were pumped into the void.
Eighteen test samples were taken of the grout for 28-day compression strength measurements.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were, identified.
8.
Safet Related Pi in Installation a.
Com onent Installation Activities In order to ascertain compliance with specification 13-PM-204, the ASME code and SAR requirements, various work activities associated with handling and installation of components in the Unit 3 containment and auxiliary buildings were observed.
The systems involved were the low pressure safety injection system, shutdown cooling system and containment spray system.
Particular attention was given to the handling and supporting of system components, correctness of configuration, control of welding, records in the work area, use of specified materials, control of weld filler metal, absence of defects on component surfaces, and inspection performance by qualified personnel.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
In-Process Meldin Activities The inspector examined three in-process welds in the Unit 3 systems identified above to ascertain compliance with the requirements of specification 13-PM-204, the ASME Code (Section III-1974 edition), and Bechtel installation/inspection procedures WPP-gCI 100.0, 101.0 and 202.0 The welds were:
(1)
'36-inch fluid 'head weld to containment penetration sleeve at the 89'-9~", 110o azimuth of the" containment building (Line SI-155-12").
(2)
Meld W-007 joining spool S-005 in the low pressure safety injection pump No.
1 discharge to the 20" inlet hea'der to shutdown cooling heat exchanger No.
1 (Line SI-078-10').
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-6-Structural Foundations Installation of the lower,curtain of, reinforcing steel" in the west sump and basemat of the Un'it;3"diesel gerber'atorbuildi'ng was, examined.
The bar size, grade, and spacing were 'seen qto:be,'as, specified; and the bars were free of scale or,'ther'~surface mat'eria]s,-that*would,interfere with concrete bonding.
Bar>'overlap ~at splice poin'ts exceededthe minimum allowable distance and the b'ars
--were adequately
"tied'."-..The> governing specification was 13-CM-375 a'nd"the.:appl'icable drawing was 13-C-ZGS-104.
kt No deviations or items of~noncompTiance w'ere",identified-'.,
h ASTM A354 BD Pi e Restraint Bolt Failures Concrete embed assemblies for large pipe whip restraints employ ASTM type 354, BD bolts for anchoring the embed plates in the concrete.
During normal handling from storage to the installation,", location in Unit 3, two 14" x 2'
9" bolts in separate embed plates fr'actured in the 9" long threaded section.
These failures were documented" on nonconformance reports (0-C-2643'and - 2693),
a Stop Work Notice was issued (No. 81-SW-4),
and the licensee verbally notified the NRC that a potential 50.55(e) situation existed.
The licensee initiated a testing program along with the bolt supplier to determine the cause of failure, and to establish a correlation between hardness measurements and tensile strength upon which previously embedded bolts may be accepted or rejected.
The licensee intends to make the hardness measurements of the installed bolts using an Equotip Portable Hardness Tester.
The inspector observed the Equotip tester being initially used to qualify the operator and to demonstrate the feasibility of the evaluation program.
The bolt samples used were those which had been hardness and tensile tested by an independent testing laboratory.
The Equotip portable tester produced hardness values which agreed reasonably well with the test laboratory measurements.
This testing program and the resolution of this problem will be followed and reported in subsequent IE Inspection Reports.
(50-528/81-08/01)
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Ins ection Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy components, tagging and identification of materials, adequacy of caps over pipe openings not being worked on,'nd presence of cribbing under stored pipe spools, valves and other components.
No welding electrode stubs were observed lying around the various work areas.
13.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Mana ement Meetin s
A meeting was held on June 26, 1981.
Licensee and Bechtel representatives in attendance at the meeting are identified in paragraph 1.
During the meeting the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this repor II I
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Weld W-003',joinipg sp'ool4S.-002;to'otor-operated valve No. HV-695
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in the supply line 'to..containment spray header No.
2 from shutdown
., 'eat 'exchanger,No..2ioutlet header (Line SI-134-10").
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'I For weld"'No.,(1); the applicable. drawing was 13-P-ZCG-107.
The weld was being'-made
'using 'an'.automatic, machine.
The inspector observed a portion of one weld pass-'at abou't'/4 wall thickness.
The weld surface was in accordance with visual acceptance
'standards.
The machine settings for voltage,,current, travel speed, Hiller metal wire feed speed, oscillation frequency and amplitude were veri,fied to be within the ranges listed in the welding procedure specification (P8,P1-T-Ag-oe-CVN).
For weld No. (2),, the applicable drawing was 13-P-SIF-207.
The inspector observed the "next to last layer being applied by the SMAW process.
The workmanship appeared very good.
The welding procedure specification was P8-.,AT-Ag.
For weld No. (3), the applicable drawing was 13-P-SIF-208 and the welding procedure specification also was P8-AT-Ag.
The tack welds (4) for fit-up and cleanliness acceptance by the code authorized inspector, the first TIG root pass was observed by the inspector and the welding machine settings of current and voltage were checked.
The workmanship appeared excellent.
For all three welds a properly filled out Field Welding Check List (WR-5 Form) was present at the work location.
The forms had hold-points and NDE call-outs specified.
The weld identification, material specification, shielding gas flow rate, and interpass temperature were in accordance with the requirements specified on the WR-5 Form.
The inspector verified that the WR-5 provisions were in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, 1974 edition.
Interpass cleaning was being performed with stainless steel wire brushes.
Filler metal issue slips and the qualification records of the welders involved were examined and found to be acceptable.
The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance were being performed to an appropriate degree.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Safet Related Com onent Installation Hoisting of the Unit 3 train B essential cooling water heat exchanger from the transport trailer and its placement on its support pedestals at the 100-ft. elevation of the auxiliary building was observed by the inspector.
The craftsmen performing the operation were adequately supervised and appro-priate care was given to protect the heat exchanger and the pedestal anchor bolts from damage.
Prior to the placement, pipe-fitters were observed installing leveling shims on the pedestals.
The shims on the center pedestal were checked for levelness by the inspector and found satisfactory.
The rigging engineer was present and followed the progress of the work to assure that the provisions of WPP/gCI No. 15.0 were satisfied.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified,
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