IR 05000482/1990004
| ML20012B184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1990 |
| From: | Barnes I, Ellershaw L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012B168 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-90-04, 50-482-90-4, NUDOCS 9003130739 | |
| Download: ML20012B184 (8) | |
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S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' '
REGION IV
i (NRC Inspection Report: 50-482/90-04 Operating License: NPF-42
ll Docket: ' 50-482 - - "' Licensee: Wolf. Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation-(WCNOC) l , b
- P.O. Box 411
'! -Burlington, Kansas 66839 ) facility'Name:: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) a.9 " - Inspection At: Burlington, Kansas .l u, ? ' Inspection Conducted: February 5-9, 1990 1' ' s
. ld M Id- ' I Inspe'ctor:: b ' ' , V.. E. Ellershaw, Reactor Inspector Date' Materials a~nd Quality Programs Section . -Division of Reactor Safety ' LApprovedi d--- 2./s.3 /tg I. Barnes, Chief, Materials and .Date
Quality Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety + i' Inspeetion' Summary i
~ ! - Inspection Conducted February 5-9, 1990 (Report 50-482/90-04) _ s . , , Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced' inspection of licensee's actions on: -previous inspection findings, followup on licensee's actions on NRC:Information j , . Notices,'and welding material-control.
' (Results: - Followup on six previous inspection findings revealed that:the... o i licensee had addressed the issues and implemented the necessary actions. to- ~W ' allow the closure of these items. They included: a violation regarding the' - . failure to obtain and review vendor technical information; a violation ' ' regarding the failure to establish a required fire' watch; a violation;regarding'
the failure'to' perform a technical specification surveillance' requirement; an unresolved item dealing with not establishing the underlying cause that allowed unqualified 0-rings to be installed;'an open item associated with drain holes" - e - " = not-being installed in certain terminal boxes; and an open item dealing with, hafnium rod cluster control rods.
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i 9003[30739900305 i " PDR ADOCK 03000482-Q-PDC , ,
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~ - l l V .The licensee appears to have established an effective program for the control of NRC Information Notices.. The controlling procedure adequately described the scope and responsibilities. Review of records revealed that the program was b~ being effectively implemented.
Review of the~ licensee's program for the control of welding filler materials ' revealed a well defined program. Storage of welding _ material was noted to be .in_accordance with program requirements, with the documentation associated with the stored material being readily retrievable and in compliance with the welding' material specifications. There was virtually no safety.related welding [ being performed during this inspection,.therefore the inspector was u,able to F ascertain'the adequacy of the overall welding program in terms of con trol of - inprocess welding and welding material issue and maintenance by the we'ders, -This area will require additional review during a subsequent inspection.
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, n , h, DETAILS q , b 1._ PERSONS CONTACTED j W l l* WCNOC' '
- G'.- D. Boyer, Plant Manager-
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- J.M. Pippin; Manager,NuclearPlantEngineering(NPE)
- D. G..Mosebey, Supervisor, Operations
- 1*M.--G. Williams, Manager, Plant Support H
- C.' M. Sprout, Section Manager, NPE-Wolf Creek.
- R. W. Holloway, Manager, Maintenance and Modifications
/*C, E. Parry, Director Site Quality ' .*C, W. Fowler,7 Manager, Instrumentation & Controls
- T.-F. Deddens, Jr., Outage Manager
'*W.'B. Norton, Manager, Technical Support
- S. G. Wideman, Senior Engineering Specialist
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- 0. L. Maynard, Manager, Regulatory Services J..E.: Fletcher, Senior Maintenance Engineering Specialist D.-Dullum,; Compliance Engineer j
'D. L. Underwood, Engineering Specialist ~ P. D. Adam, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering . NRC-
- M. E. Skow, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview held on February-9, _1990.-
The! inspector ~also contacted other licensee personnel during this. inspection.
, ' 2.
FOLLOWUP ON LICENSEE ACTIONS ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS' (92701 and'92702), ' al 2.1~ (Closed) Violation (482/88200-04):- This. violation dealt with WCNOC's failureto-obtainthreeServiceInformationLetters(SILs)and'thefailureto- ' ' review or evaluate five other received SILs, all affecting the Emergency Diesel ' "; ' Generators (EDGs).. Procedure KGP-1311,_" Industry Technical Information .. Program" (ITIP), was-the procedure which established the requirements for-the ' - review and analysis: of received industry technical information. The procedure n 2/? g
- has beenLrevised to clarify the processing of ITIPs and to elevate the level'of-
- f managerial review. WCNOC established Supplier Quality Procedure SMQP 7.10, !- " Supplier l Problem / Service Information' Bulletins," which was. issued'on j December 5, 1988.~ This procedure established the program for obtaining vendor " , o
- information and provides.a method for periodically contacting equipment vendors J
' b on the.WCNOC Supplier Information List to determine if they have issued - f ' letters / bulletins which could impact components or systems.
It requires, after ' the initial vendor contact, an annual repeat contact, all of which is ' J documented in conjunction with the annual supplier evaluation.
Upon receipt of l' supplier letters / bulletins, a copy is forwarded to the designated persons le responsible for' performing evaluations under the ITIP program. Since , b ' a - - . . m - u
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. , , ! ! -4-l , implementation of $MQP 7.10, the Supplier Qualty organization has sent out 186 questionnaires, which requested all applicable letters / bulletins not previously
received by WCN00, and also a description of the vendors' programs for
notifying customers. Of the 186 initial contacts, 102 vendors responded.
- WCNOC's review of the 84 vendors that did not respond indicated a need to recontact 74, which is currently being performed. The inspector requested a i ' printout showing all ITIPs associated with vendor information since January ' 1988. The inspector selected 15 ITIPs for review in order to verify that the ' items were statused, that documentation files existed, and for those that were still open, that the requirements associated with due dates were being complied with, it appeared that the program was being well controlled and implemented.
2.2 (Closed) Violation (482/88200-06): This violation addressed the fact that WCN00 failed to establish the required fire watch for a certain penetration after an engineering disposition did not establish that the . penetration would meet fire protection requirements.
In this particular instance, WCNOC, when informed of the condition, established an hourly fireman patrol and replaced the existing penetration closure material. The cause was determined to be personnel error and the involved individuals were counseled.
Additionally, the circumstances surrounding this violation were placed in the Maintenance Department's required reading file and the applicable procedures were reviewed by NPE and Maintenance personnel.
Review, by the inspector, of records subsequent to the identification of this violation, did not reveal any similar conditions being identified.
2.3 (Closed) Violation (482/8824-02): This violation addressed the f6ct that ! the requirements of Procedure ST5 CR-001 regarding the "per shift" channel
check requirements for auxiliary feedwater suction pressure loss were not being implemented because-incorrect instruments were identified in the procedure, and that this condition had existed from May 2, 1985, through August 21, 1988.
WCN00 initiated a tem)orary procedure change to correct the procedure on August 22, 1988, whici was subsequentbf incorporated as a permanent change . (i.e.. Revision 9datedNovember 13,1988). The inspector verified the ! arocedure change and also reviewed selected shift surveillances performed ' 5etween July 14 through July 27, 1989, and January 11 through January 26, 1990.
- WCNOC also comitted to perform a complete review of all Technical e Specification (TS)surveillancerequirementsandtheirbases. This effort was documented as being complete on August 18, 1989. The inspector performed a review of selected sections and compared the TSs and bases with the TS surveillance procedure. No discrepancies were identified during this review.
2.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item (482/8819 02): This unresolved item dealt with a potential environmental qualification issue which was identified during a ~ , Quality Verification Functional Inspection (QVFI) performed during June 6 and documented in Insp(88-200-1a) stated that the-ection Report 50-482/88-200 as a through June 17, 1988, potential enforcement finding.
The finding , licensee had not determined the underlying cause that permitted 0-rings that were not environmentally qualified to remain installed in the post-accident sampling system containment isolation valves. The report further stated that this issue is addressed in NRC Region IV Inspection Report 50-482/88-19 as an ' - -. .. . .. -
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s ' [.A., 5-unresolved item, and would be followed up by Region IV. The unresolved item stated that the licensee discovered non-environmentally qualified 0-rings in thesolenoidoperatorsofpostaccidentsamplingsystemcontainmentisolation , ! ' valves during the performance of a plant modification request (PMR). During the PMR, a maintenance crew mistakenly disassembled the wrong valve. The crew realized their error and also recoghized that the solenoid operator contained t' type EPR 0-rings, which are not qualified for that application. The licensee issued a Defect / Deficiency Report (DDR) and requested an engineering evaluation to determine the impact of the nonqualified 0-rings on the subject valves.
-This resulted in work requests being issued to inspect similar valves and replace 0-rings as necessary. At the time the unresolved item was written, i these actions had been completed.
Based on review of the potential enforcement findings addressed in the QVfl L report, Region IV, by letter dated October 19, 1988, issued a Notice of Violation, but did not-include this item because it had already been referenced as an unresolved item. Subsequently, Region IV, by letter dated February 1, 1989, stated that this issue was considered to be another example of Violation A, " failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions," in the Notice sent on October 19, 1988, and to which the licensee had already adequately responded.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions with respect to Violation A in order to determine their applicability to the unresolved item which was based on the potential enforcement finding. WCH0C restructured their daily planning L meetings to focus management attention on problems and corrective actions rather than on work status, and a representative from NPE was added as a member L of the onsite Plant Safety Review Committee. WCNOC acknowledged that the- ~ reason certain equipment failures and malfunctions had not been promptly corrected was directly traceable to a lack of overall progranmatic guidance with respect to defining and controlling the root cause evaluation process. As a result, WCNOC established a formal root cause analysis program for hardware deficiencies, with documented training provided to all assigned personnel, c-These actions should allow for more prompt corrective actions and the
determination of underlying causes for identified nonconforming conditions.
2.5(Closed)OpenItem(482/8816-01): This open item addressed a discovery,
made by the licensee on June 29, 1987, that four terminal boxes (tbs) associated with^the reactor vessel head vent valves located inside containment , did not have the specified drain holes required for equipment qualification (EQ) purposes.
-The identification of this finding was a result of an EQ audit performed at the Callaway Plant which was observed by a WCNOC representative. The audit
identified that certain tbs did not have the required drain holes. After returning to Wolf Creek, a review of the applicable design documents identified 25 tbs which were required to have drain holes. Work Request (WR) 02080-87 dated June 11, 1987, was initiated in order to inspect the 25 tbs and to make any necessary corrections. On June 29, 1987, a plant trip occurred and an electrician and QC inspector performed the inspection and identified that four
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reactor vessel head vent valve tbs and one other TB, required drain holes to be ' drilled. This work was performed and the WR was closed out af ter final QC review on July 6,1987. WR 02449-87 dated July 8, 1987, was initiated to address the condition and to request an operability evaluation of the five tbs.
It further requested that the applicable drawings for the tbs be revised to show the drain holes. NPE performed an evaluation and concluded that it could be postulated that a flooding event could have rendered the head vent valves ,L inoperable. The WR was closed out and the evaluation dated January 23,1988.
i A reportability evaluation was requested on March 30, 1988, and >erformed on April 4, 1988. The conclusion made by the evaluation was that tie condition was not reportable since it was identified and corrected within the TS 3.4.11 action statement 30-day limit. DDR 88-015 initiated on March 30, 1988, described the abcVe events either directly or by reference.
It also provided for notification being made to the NRC resident inspector on April 5, 1988.
WCNOCProgrammaticDeficiencyReport(PDR)NP88-13wasinitiatedonMay27, 1988, as a result of the identification of the missing drain holes from the tbs and the fact that Operating License Condition 2.0 (4) requires all electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49 to be qualified by November 30, 1985 _This PDR resulted in an extensive evaluation which determined the e ' underlying root cause to be an inadequate execution of establishing and documenting the design criteria within higher tier design documents.
It was identified during a 1982 walkdown of several Class IE tbs inside containment that required drain holes were missing.
Further investigation revealed that all tbs were furnished standard without drain holes and that installation of the holes required field modification. The corrective action was to document the design criteria only on the design drawings pertaining to the subject tbs installed at that time. This action failed to consider subsequent design changes in which tbs might be added, such as the four tbs for the reactor vessel head vent valves which were added in 1985. The PDR established the actions to be taken in order to preclude recurrence as being the revision of TB design drawings by incorporating generic information concerning drain holes into the TB General Notes. This would ensure that the addition of required drain holes would be accomplished on Class IE TDs subsequently installed as a result of any required design changes. These actions appear to adequately address the problem; therefore, this open item is considered closed.
2.6 Closed (0penitem) 482/8835-02: This item addressed abnormal wear and swelling identified in full length Hafnium rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) while performing eddy current examination (ET) and profilometry measurements during refueling outage number III, which started during October 1988.
To alleviate any immediate concerns WCNOC replaced all 53 RCCAs during that outage. Subsequent actions included extensive investigation by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC), the nuclear steam supply system manufacturer. The NRC, on January 30, 1989, requested WEC to develop inspection / examination guidelines with respect to hafnium RCCAs. The guidelines were compiled based on industry information and forwarded to WCNOC by letter dated March 17, 1989.
Tk *.nformation was received and entered into WCNOC's ITip program and is being
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tracked under ITIP No. 961, which addresses the need to examine the RCCAs during refueling outage number IV, which is scheduled to begin during March 1990.
It also states that Reactor Engineering is planning to perform ET during the outage and that inspection during subsequent outages will be dependent on their continued use of hafnium RCCAs, inspection results, and WEC recommendations.
Inaddition,EngineeringEvalustionRequest(EER)90-XX-01 dated January 12, 1990, was initiated for the purpose of establishing additional acceptance criteria to address the concerns relative to swelling of the hafnium absorber. On January 31, 1990, WR 541-90 was initiated with respect to performing ET of the RCCAs during outage IV. Adequate time had not elapsed for the acquisition of all approval signatures.
The inspector requested information relative to the performance of nondestructive examination (NDE) of the RCOs and was provided a copy of purchaserequisition(PR) 801832 with chan s notice 001 dated January 8, 1990.
The PR provides all of the technical and quality requirements for the performance of NDE and shows that Combustion Engineering, Inc., (CE) has been selected to provide these services.
It was CE who performed the ET and profilometry during the previous outage which led to the identification of the problems. WCNOC also informed the inspector that the requirements of the PR were incorporated into purchase order 535058 which was sent to CE for acceptance and acknowledgement signature on February 1, 1990.
It would appear that WCNOC has acted responsibly and taken the necessary steps to minimize any potential problems; therefore, this item is considered closed.
3.
FOLLOWUP DN LICENSEE ACTIONS REGARDING NRC INFORMATION NOTICES (92701) The inspector reviewed this area to determine if an adequate program existed and was effectively implemented for assessing NRC Information Notices (ins).
The program is described in Procedure KGP-1311. " Industry Technical Information program," Revision 1, dated March 30, 1988. The procedure clearly established responsibilities for receipt, initial review, evaluation, tracking, reporting, effectiveness review by nuclear safety engineering, review by the Plant Safety Review Committee, and records. The inspector requested a printout showing all ins entered into ITIP since January 1987.
Each IN is assigned a controlling ITIP number and is filed accordingly. The inspector selected 14 ins that were issued within this timeframe. The ITIP coordinator provided the 14 files which were then reviewed. Each file, with the exception of one which had not been completed, exhibited the necessary cocumentation to reflect the required reviews, evaluations, and dispositions. The printout provided the listing of ins in numerical order, which allowed for a quick assessment with respect to any missing ins between number one in a given year and the last one listed for that year.
It would appear that WCNOC has established and implemented an effective program for acting upon NPC issued ins. There were no violations or deviations identified in this area of the inspectio, . ~ , s . .. ' . . . . -8-4.
WELDING MATERIAL CONTROL (55050) The inspector conducted a review to determine that a procedure had been established with respect to storing, disbursing, and handling of welding materials. Administrative Procedure ADM 08-302, " Welding Filler Material Control," Revision 7 dated November 28, 1989, delineated the requirements and ' responsibilities associated with welding material control. The procedure aapeared to be adequate and appropriately addressed the elements necessary for t1e control of welding materials.
L In order to verify the implementation of the procedure, the inspector observed the storage of weld filler material and reviewed the documentation associated 'with the material (i.e., certified material test reports (CMTRs) and field
welding material requisitions FWMRs). Welding filler material is issued from one of four ovens located in the rod storage area. The inspector noted that the holding ovens were being maintained at temperature ranges between 190 and 225 degrees Fahrenheit. Each oven was clearly labeled as to its contents; (i.e., classification, size, manufacturer'sheat/lotnumber,andaWolfCreek assignedlotnumber). The inspector observed and sampled the contents of each
oven to verify that the contents were as stated. The inspector requested and obtained copies of the welding material CMTRs and performed a review in order to verify.that the material was in accordance with the applicable welding material specifications.
TheinspectorreviewedtheoneFWMR(No.13951)thathadbeenissuedthatday for safety-related welding.
It had been properly filled out and indicated that no material had yet been returned by the welder. The inspector went_to the fabr.ication shop to observe the welder and to verify the welding material that he had in his possession. The material, stored in a portable oven, was as stated on the FWMR; however, the welder had completed his welding activities.
No other safety-related welding activities were performed during the rest of this inspection.
, While no deviations or violations were identified, there was not enough , activity to warrant the closure of this inspection procedure; therefore,_ this area will be reviewed again during a subsequent inspection.
, 5.
EXIT lNTERVIEW An exit interview was conducted on February 9, 1990, with those personnel , denoted in paragraph 1.
At the exit interview, the inspector summarized the inspection findings. No information was presented to the inspector that was identified by the licensee as proprietary.
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