IR 05000456/2025001
| ML25120A387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/2025 |
| From: | Dariusz Szwarc NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB3 |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Corp, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2025001 | |
| Download: ML25120A387 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000456/2025001 AND 05000457/2025001
Dear David Rhoades:
On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Braidwood Station. On April 16, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Adam Schuerman, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Braidwood Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Braidwood Station.
May 1, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Dariusz Szwarc, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000456 and 05000457 License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Szwarc, Dariusz on 05/01/25
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Braidwood Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Correctly Install Essential Service Water Strainer Baskets Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000457/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.12 A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions,
Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to follow the prescribed and established work instructions and procedures for maintenance activities conducted on the 2B essential service water (SX) strainer. Specifically, work instructions provided by the licensee under safety-related Work Order (WO) 05585815, 2B SX strainer not rotating, specified that spacers are to be used and reinstalled within the 2B SX strainer when reassembling it as part of the maintenance activities. However, because of ambiguity in the procedure, maintenance personnel reinstalled set screws vice the spacer into the strainer assemblage. This condition was subsequently revealed on November 21, 2024, when the 2B SX strainer basket was unable to rotate during a manual backwash as the upper and lower baskets were impacting due to the set screws loosening and no longer maintaining space between the baskets.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000456,05000457/2024004-01 Failure to Correctly Install Essential Service Water Strainer Baskets 71111.12 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period operating at full power. With the exception of minor reductions in power to support scheduled testing activities and load changes requested by the transmission system dispatcher, the unit remained operating at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at full power. With the exception of minor reductions in power to support scheduled testing activities and load changes requested by the transmission system dispatcher, the unit remained operating at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather during abnormal cold weather conditions during the week ending February 22, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from potential severe weather during a tornado watch during the week ending March 22, 2025.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 common component cooling water (CC) train following maintenance during the week ending February 8, 2025 (2)2A emergency diesel generator (EDG) extent of condition walkdown as documented in Issue Report (IR) 4838683 during the week ending March 1, 2025 (3)2B auxiliary feedwater (AF) pump following ASME testing during the week ending March 8, 2025 (4)2A EDG with the 2B EDG out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending March 22, 2205
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 5.1-1; elevation 426', division 12 engineered safety feature (ESF)switchgear room
- (2) Fire Zone 5.4-1; elevation 451', division 12 miscellaneous electrical equipment room and battery room
- (3) Fire Zone 11.4A-1; elevation 377, Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater pump diesel
- (4) Fire Zone 5.5-1; AB elevation 426', Unit 2 auxiliary building general area
- (5) Fire Zone 5.3-1; elevation 451', Unit 1 non-ESF switchgear room
- (6) Fire Zone 8.3-2; elevation TB 401', turbine building grade level (northwest)
- (7) Fire Zone 11; elevation AB 426', auxiliary building general area (south)
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on February 25, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on March 5, 2025.
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Observation of the performance of a complex casualty graded scenario by a crew of licensed plant operators in the facilitys simulator on March 18, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Maintenance effectiveness review associated with the 1B DG governors during the weeks ending January 18 through March 29, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Review and evaluation of the risk and activities associated with the 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) operability run following a cold weather alert, as documented in Work Order (WO) 5612208 during the week ending January 25, 2025
- (2) Review and evaluation of the elevated risk associated with the 1CC01A work window, as documented in WO 5236515 during the week ending February 1, 2025
- (3) Review and evaluation of the elevated risk associated with the 2C steam generator power operated relief valve actuator work the week ending March 1, 2025
- (4) Review and evaluation of the elevated risk associated with the 1B auxiliary feedwater work window during the week ending March 15, 2025
- (5) Review and evaluation of the elevated risk associated with the 1B EDG work window, during the week ending March 22, 2025
- (6) Review and evaluation of the elevated risk associated with planned maintenance on the 2B RH cubicle cooler along with emergent work for the 2B OTDT circuit card replacement and emergent work on the 0B control room HVAC chiller system during the week ending March 29, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)1AF005F found outside neutral position during surveillance, as documented in IR 4837218
- (2) Evaluation of the operability of the 2A Diesel Generator, as documented IR 4838683 during the weeks ending February 22 through March 1, 2025
- (3) Evaluation of the operability of the 2B diesel generator, as documented in IR 4839214 during the weeks ending February 22 through March 8, 2025
- (4) Part 21 Interim Report of Potential Defect Circuit Board EN 57402, as documented in IR 04842347 during the week ending March 8, 2025 (5)2B chemical and volume control pump vibrations in the alert range, as documented in IR 4844198 during the week ending March 15, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Functional and operational testing of 1CC01A following a planned work window, as documented in WO 5236515-03 during the week ending February 1, 2025
- (2) Functional and operational testing of the Unit 2 steam generator power operated relief valve following actuator refurbishment during the week ending March 8, 2025
- (3) Functional and operational testing of 0VV23C following fan belt replacement, as documented in WO 5166506-01 during the week ending on March 8, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)2BwOSR 3.7.5.4-2; Unit 2 Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillance during the week ending February 15, 2025.
(2)1BwOSR 5.5.8.CS-3A; 1A Containment Spray Pump Surveillance during the week ending February 8, 2025.
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)2BwOSR 5.5.8.RH-5B; Group A IST Requirements for Residual Heat Removal Pump 2RH01PB, as documented in WO 05601584 during the week ending January 25, 2025.
(2)2BwOSR 5.5.8.AF-3B; Group A IST Requirements for Unit 2 Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump during the week ending March 8, 2025.
(3)1BwOSR 5.5.8.SI-10A; Unit 1 1A Safety Injection Pump Inservice Test during the week ending March 1, 2025.
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
- Annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period of April 1, 2023, through January 31, 2025
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through March 31, 2024)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through March 31, 2024)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2024, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2024, through March 31, 2024)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2023, through January 31, 2025 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 1, 2023, through January 31, 2025 EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER) (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2025, through February 28,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Correctly Install Essential Service Water Strainer Baskets Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000457/2025001-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.12 A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to follow the prescribed and established work instructions and procedures for maintenance activities conducted on the 2B essential service water (SX) strainer. Specifically, work instructions provided by the licensee under safety-related Work Order (WO) 05585815, 2B SX strainer not rotating, specified that spacers are to be used and reinstalled within the 2B SX strainer when reassembling it as part of the maintenance activities. However, because of ambiguity in the procedure, maintenance personnel reinstalled set screws vice the spacer into the strainer assemblage. This condition was subsequently revealed on November 21, 2024, when the 2B SX strainer basket was unable to rotate during a manual backwash as the upper and lower baskets were impacting due to the set screws loosening and no longer maintaining space between the baskets.
Description:
On November 21, 2024, in preparations for a 2B SX surveillance, operations attempted to manually backwash the 2B SX strainer. Operations personnel identified the sheer key was broken and the motor was spinning, however, the shaft for the strainer did not rotate.
Before the attempt, the thermals for the strainer motor were found tripped and needed to be reset. The licensee declared the 2B SX system inoperable due to the inoperability of the backwash function of the strainer and entered a 72-hour action for limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.8. The subsequent investigation revealed set screws that hold the upper and lower baskets of the strainer apart became undone and allowed the baskets to impact each other resulting in a mechanical lock of the strainer system. Maintenance procedure BwMP 3300-107, Adams Vertical Automatic Strainer Inspection, used for the SX disassembly, inspection, and reassembly during repair efforts states in step 4.4.8 spacer (if applicable) as a component to be reinstalled as part of the reassembly of the strainer. The vendor instructions for the style of the 2B SX strainer required a spacer to be installed vice set screws. The strainer was repaired with a spacer installed instead of set screws.
The licensee performed a corrective action program evaluation of the issue, and it was found that the use of set screws was a legacy change to the approved vendor design that deviated from the vendor manual. Specifically, the vendor manual states under no circumstance should the spacer be omitted or changed. There was no direct documentation for when the set screws were installed on the SX strainer assembly and were likely a result of legacy original installation issues. The licensee had previously performed corrective maintenance on the 2B SX strainer during A2R24 on October 10, 2024, and on October 21, 2024.
Both instances of corrective maintenance involved using BwMP 3300-107. During both of those instances, the licensee had the opportunity to identify that a spacer should have been installed per the vendor manual. However, the procedure step, as written, left ambiguity for maintenance personnel to continue using the set screws that were installed in the strainer and not challenge or question the direction to install a spacer. Therefore, set screws were reinstalled in the 2B SX strainer, and the set screws subsequently failed resulting in the inoperability of the 2B SX system on November 21, 2024. This issue was previously documented as an URI in Braidwood quarterly inspection report 2024004 (05000456,05000457/2024004-01, ADAMS Accession Number ML25031A097).
Corrective Actions: In addition to the licensee replacing the set screws with a spacer on 2B SX Strainer, an extent of condition was performed and the review of IRs and work orders found that no other strainers had a shear key break due to the use of set screws instead of spacers. All other strainers were inspected for use of set screws instead of spacers and found that 1A SX strainer, 0A WS strainer, and 0B WS strainer had set screws installed. IRs have been generated to ensure spacers are installed on these strainers during the next respective work window.
Corrective Action References: - 04808500; OSP-A 2B SX Strainer not rotating; 10/10/2024
- 04810985; OSP-A 2B SX Strainer not backwashing; 10/21/2024
- 04818984; 2B SX Strainer Not Rotating; 11/21/2024
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to specify vendor requirements into the maintenance procedure requiring spacers vice set screws was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, set screws were installed contrary to the requirements of the vendor manual causing the strainer to be inoperable when the set screws failed. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was within the licensees ability to foresee and should have been prevented due to recent corrective maintenance on the strainer.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensees failure to install spacers in the 2B SX strainer in accordance with step 4.4.8 of BwMP 3300-107, in accordance with the approved vendor design, contributed to the subsequent moving and impacting of the strainer baskets leading to the 2B SX system being declared inoperable.
The inspectors also compared the finding with the examples listed in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Example of Minor Issues. Example 3.e was found to be similar.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
The inspectors answered No to Question 1 under Section A of Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. Therefore, the finding was screened as having very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the functional parameters of the Unit 2 SX system were not adversely affected due to the strainer inoperability. Flow and pressure requirements remained unchanged since the unit restarted from the A2R24 refueling outage.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, licensee personnel never questioned why set screws were found installed in the strainer when the procedure step states to install a spacer (if applicable). The procedure was utilized recently with the licensee never questioning the step, since personnel became accustomed to having strainers with either set screws or spacers installed.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances, and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established BwMP 3300-107 Adams Vertical Automatic Strainer Inspection as the implementing procedure for maintenance to the essential service water strainer, an activity affecting quality. Step 4.4.8 of procedure BwMP 3300-107 states Reinstall following: Sheer Key Collar, Spacer (if applicable), Bearing, Hex Nuts.
Contrary to the above, between October 11, 2024, through October 27, 2024, the licensee failed to prescribe step 4.4.8 of procedure BwMP 3300-107 which was consistent with vendor requirements. Specifically, the procedure allowed ambiguity for maintenance personnel to reinstall set screws vice a spacer in the safety related SX strainer.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI:
05000456,05000457/2024004-01.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 16, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Adam Schuerman, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 21, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Don Hudak, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Sodium Bisulfite tank vent frozen
2/14/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
2C FW PP LO Cooler Outlet Temp Low
2/18/2025
0BwOA ENV-1
Adverse Weather Conditions Unit 0
26
0BwOA ENV-7
Adverse Cooling Lake Conditions Unit 0
Procedures
OP-AA-108-111-
1001
Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
BwOPCC-1
Component Cooling Water System Startup
Procedures
BwOPCC-13
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Fill and Vent
Braidwood Fire
Pre-pan #47
SWGA 451' Division 12 MEER and Battery Room
Fire Plans
Braidwood Fire
Preplan #41
FZ 5.1-1 SWGA 426' Division 12 ESF Switchgear Room
Miscellaneous
20.25.03.04
Fire Drill Scenario
03/05/2025
BwAP 1100-3
Fire Chief (Designated Field Supervisor) Implementing
Procedure
BwAP 1110-1
Fire Protection Program System Requirements
Fire Drill Performance
Procedures
Pre-Fire Plan Manual
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 CC Heat Exchanger Eddy Current Examination Final
Report
01/31/2025
25-020
Magnetic Particle Examination Data Sheet
01/28/2025
Magnetic Particle Examination Data Sheet
01/28/2025
Work Orders
MM 1SX03A-30" - Perform Base Metal Repair
01/29/2025
1B EDG Mechanical Governor Hunting During Cooldown
06/10/2020
1B DG Abnormal Surging After MCR Sent Stop Signal
08/09/2023
1B EDG Mechanical Governor Hunting During Low Load
11/08/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
1B EDG Mechanical Governor Hunting During Low Load
01/13/2025
Procedures
BWMP 3100-086
Diesel Generator Governor Actuator Replacement
MM 1DG250B Replace DG Governor Actuator and Booster
2/16/2019
Work Orders
- EM: 1PL08J Replace Governor Devices 65GOV, 65DRU,
65MPU, 65PWR
10/08/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
LR-OP IST-1B D/G Operability Monthly
01/14/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Create WR to Perform Repair on 1SX03A
04/04/2023
Procedures
2, RICT Record
Work Orders
LR-OP IST-2B D/G Operability Monthly
01/24/2025
1AF005F Handwheel Disengaged
11/25/2024
1AF005F Found Outside Neutral Position During
Surveillance
2/14/2025
1AF005F in Mid Position following Stroke from RSDP
2/14/2025
2SX169A Appears to Have Leakby
2/19/2025
NRC Identified Temperature Abnormality 2A EDG
2/19/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
EN 57402 Part 21 Interim Report Potential Defect of Circuit
Boards
03/06/2025
Drawings
M-152
Manufacturers Supplemental Diagram of Diesel Generator
Jacket Water Schematic Units 1 & 2
06/24/1985
Procedures
BwOP DG-11
Diesel Generator Startup and Operation
Unexpected Ann. 0-34-E8 Common HVAC Panel Trouble
(0VV23C)
03/03/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
4.0 Critique - 0VV23C Broken Belts Crew Response
03/04/2025
1BwOL 3.77
LCOAR Component Cooling Water (CC) System
Tech Spec LCO 3.7.7
1BwOSR 3.7.7.2
U-1, U-0 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Essential
Service Water Availability Surveillance
2BwOL 3.7.7
LCOAR Component Cooling Water (CC) System
Tech Spec LCO 3.7.7
Procedures
2BwOSR
5.5.8.RH-5B
Group A IST Requirements for Residual Heat Removal
Pump 2RH01PB
2MS018C - Rebuild Actuator
OP ASME Surv on Unit 1 Train A Containment Spray
(1CS01PA)
2/04/2025
IST SX174/8, AF001B/3B 2AF01PB ASME Quarterly
Surveillance
03/06/2025
0VV23C Contingency to Replace Belts
03/03/2025
Work Orders
LR-OPS PMT 1CC01A Verify Proper Operation
01/31/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OP ASME Surv Requirement for 2B Residual Heat Removal
Pump
01/24/2025
Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan
Procedures
Constellation, Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for
Braidwood Station
Miscellaneous
N/A
ERO Staff Training Records: 23 Records
Various
Procedures
Addendum 1
Braidwood Station On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis
Miscellaneous
NOSA-BWD-24-
Emergency Preparedness Audit Report for Braidwood
04/03/2024
Procedures
Addendum 2
(KLD TR-635,
Rev. 0)
Evacuation Time Estimates for Braidwood Generating
Station, Plume Exposure Pathway, Emergency Planning
Zone
Emergency Response Facilities & Equipment Performance
Indicators Guidance
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indictor - ERO Drill
Participation
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - Drill
Exercise Performance
71151
Procedures
Monthly Data Elements for NRC ROP Indicator - ANS
Reliability
6