IR 05000424/1986132
| ML20210A444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1987 |
| From: | Jape F, Larry Nicholson, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210A360 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.108, RTR-REGGD-1.108 50-424-86-132, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, NUDOCS 8702060475 | |
| Download: ML20210A444 (9) | |
Text
'p OGug UNITED STATES
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[o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.. SulTE 2900
ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323
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Report No.:
50-4E4/86-132 Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket No.:
50-424 License No.:
CPPR-108 Facility Name:
Vogtle Inspection Condu.cted:
December 8-19, 1986
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Inspectors:
L. E. Nicholson
/Dat(Signed YCI L
Ihol17 M. Thomas
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Date Signed Approved by:
4GPl UN
//M82 F. Jape, Section Chief (/
Date Signed
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Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of preoperational test witnessing, test results review, followup on previously identified items, and IE Bulletin followup.
Results:
One violation was identified - Inadequate Documentation and Review of Remote Shutdown Panel Test Results - paragraph 6.
i 8702060475 870129 PDR ADOCK 05000424 G
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee Employees Contacted J. Aufdenkampe, Integrated Lead Test Supervisor
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
- R. M. Bellamy, Plant Support Manager
- E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager
- W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
- M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent
- H. A. Jaynes, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- W. F. Kitchens, Operations Manager
- A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manger Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Startup Manager-Bechtel B. Woodley, Fire Protection Coordinator - Bechtel
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 19, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new items were identified during this inspection.
Unresolved Item 86-132-01, Modification of Test Procedure Acceptance Criteria Without Adequate Review - paragraph 5.
Violation 86-132-02, Inadequate Documentation and Review of Remote Shutdown Panel Test Results - paragraph 6.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions.
One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.
5.
Preoperational Test Witnessing The inspectors observed portions of preoperational (preop) test 1-300-01, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Test, to determine if requirements were being met relative to NRC requirements such as contained in Regulatory Guides 1.68 and 1.108, and the FSAR. The following attributes were among those verified in this review.
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
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Latest revisions of the approved test procedures were available and in
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use by personnel performing the tests.
Test equipment required by the procedures was calibrated and installed.
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Test data were properly collected and recorded.
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Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
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Test prerequisites were met.
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Proper plant systems were in service.
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Temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked in
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accordance with administrative controls.
Problems encountered during testing were properly documented.
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The inspectors noted a concern that the acceptance criteria for the integrated safeguards test was being modified by the use of minor procedure changes.
Vogtle Startup Manual Chapter 12-C, Preoperational Test Implemen-tation, requires that any change to the acceptance criteria be processed as a major change.
The acceptance criteria for the above procedure states that the plant should respond to specific initiating events as specified in the appropriate data sheet. These data sheets contain the initial plant configuration and required subsequent component response following each actuation.
Several minor changes were written to alter or delete various component required responses.
Minor changes circumvent the full review process required for a major change. This item will be a subject for future inspections and identified as Unresolved Item 86-132-01, Modification of
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Test Procedure Acceptance Criteria Without Adequate Review.
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The inspectors followed up on some of the problems encountered during performance of Section 6.1 of the test.
These problems were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 424/86-118.
The following items were discussed with licensee personnel who stated that, although the problems were identified during Train A testing in Section 6.1, modifications were also made on Train B (prior to commencing Train B testing in Section 6.2) for those components which were applicable.
a.
Failure of the centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A to restart on a loss of offsite power (LSOP) following an ESFAS actuation was due to the length of the sequencer load shed time interval. The time interval was too long (1.0 seconds), which prevented the anti-pump feature on the CCP A pump breaker from clearing. This problem was applicable to three other breakers which are sequenced during the first time group.
The problem was solved by changing the sequencer load shed time interval from 1.0 second to 0.5 second.
This modification was made for both Train A and Train B.
The CCP A operated properly during Section 6.1
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retesting for Train A and Section 6.2 testing for Train B.
b.
Cycling off and on of the nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) pumps was caused by solid state timers associated with the pump discharge valves timing out too soon.
The solid state timers were replaced with Agastat timing ralays.
The NSCW pumps operated properly during Sections 6.1 and 6.2 testing.
c.
Failure of the ESF chiller to restart following the LSOP was due to the instability of the NSCW flow during pump start.
A five second time delay was added to the ESF chiller start signal in order to allow NSCW flow to stabilize. This modification was not tested during Sections 6.1 and 6.2 testing because both ESF chillers were out of service at the time.
Licensee personnel stated that chillers would be tested during
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dual train testing.
The dual train portion of the test had not been performed at the conclusion of this inspection.
d.
The problem of losing power to the emergency response facility (ERF)
computer during LOSP was to be resolved by placing the ERF computer on
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l a noninterrupted power source.
This was done on a temporary basis in l
order to comph ;c ZZrTZ Latirg crJ design charge was issued to make l
this permanent after ESFAS is completed.
The ERF computer operated l
properly during Sections 6.1 and 6.2 testing.
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e.
The problem with the post LOCA containment purge fan was due to bearing failure.
The bearings were replaced and the fan operated properly during Section 6.1 retesting.
f.
The problem that occurred when an ESFAS only signal was initiated but a i
simultaneous LOSP also occurred and there was no load shedding of the
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emergency bus was due to a bad sequencer logic card which had been i
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taken from Unit 2 and installed in Unit 1.
The Unit 1 sequencer card had been removed because of the problem discussed in item (a) above. The Unit 1 sequencer card was reinstalled and no problems were encountered during retesting in Section 6.1.
In addition, the licensee and the emergency diesel generator (EDG) vendor performed an evaluation of the instantaneous loading on tho EDG.
It was determined that the loading will not affect the performance of the EDG.
The inspectors did not observe any major equipment or system logic problems during retesting of Section 6.1 or initial testing of Section 6.2.
The inspectors will review the final resolutions of the above problems, as well as the resolutions to other problems that occur during the test, during review of the completed test results package.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Preoperational Test Results Review The inspectors reviewed the results of the preop tests listed below.
The tes/ results were reviewed to verify that:
Test changes were approved in accordance with administrative proce-
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dures.
Test changes did not change the basic objective of the test.
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Actions required by test changes had been completed.
Test deficiencies had been resolved, including retesting where
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required.
Individual test steps and data sheets were completed properly.
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Test data were within the acceptance criteria specified.
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Evaluation and approval of the test results had been completed by appropriate engineering and management personnel.
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1-3AE-01, Main Feedwater System
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l 1-3EG-01, Component Cooling Water System I
1-3KJ-04, Diesel Generator Train B Switchgear, Control, and Auxiliaries l
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1-300-10, Remote Shutdown Panel l
Procedure 1-3KJ-04 was reviewed to verify that all the outstanding items
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remaining from the approved partial test results package had been completed and the test results had received final review and approval.
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The inspectors followed up on a question raised during a previous Inspection Report (50-424/86-118) which concerned documentation of the opera-tion and control of the plant from the Train B remote shutdown panel during performance of preop test 1-300-10.
While reviewing the data package, the inspectors noted that the data sheets for documenting transferring control of parameters to and from remote shutdown panel B were not completed. The data sheets were contained in Attachment G of abnormal operating procedure ( A0P) 18038-1, Operation From Remote Shutdown Panels, which was being performed in conjunction with the preop test.
The AOP was included in the completed data package.
The data sheets for documenting transferring contrcl of parameters to and from remote shutdown panel A were completed properly.
The inspectors discussed this item with responsible licensee personnel who stated that controls were transferred to and from remote shutdown panels A and B.
In addition, it was demonstrated that the plant coJld be Controlled from the B shutdown panel during the test.
It was speculated that the data sheets for remote shutdown panel B were overlooked during the test, which probably resulted in the data sheets not being completed.
Vogtle startup manual (SUM) procedure SUM-12-C, Preoperational Test Program Implementation, states that each blank space on a procedure shall be filled in with one or more of the following:
(1) N/A (abbreviation for not applicable); (2) Data; (3) Initial of the observer; (4) Signature of required personnel; and (5) Date of entry.
Licensee personnel failed to comply with the requirements of SUM-12-C when the data sheets for remote shutdown panel B were not completed.
In addition to the data sheets not being completed properly, the inspectors noted that the test results package had been inadequately reviewed in that it had been through the review cycle and received final review and approval without the incomplete data sheets being identified.
The inspectors informed the licensee that failure to follow procedure SUM-12-C and inadequate review of the test results package constitute a violation of NRC requirements.
This item will be tracked as Violation 424/86-132-02, Inadequate Documentation and Review of Remote Shutdown Panel Test Results.
No other violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
7.
Inspector Followup (92701, 92703)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (TFI) 86-65-01, Concerning Corrective Action for Stuck Shut Dresser R,TD Bypass Valves. Operations Deficiency Report (ODR) T-1-86-2639 noted problems with the RTD bypass valves sticking shut during hot functional testing.
This problem occurred af ter the corrective work to prevent this had been performed as outlined in a letter pursuant to the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e) dated February 25, 1986.
Subsequent disassembly revealed that an internal spring was sticking on the inside diameter of the guide cage.
Enlarging this cage to an I.D. of 2.00 inches eliminated this problem.
This item is considered closed.
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b.
(Closed) IFI 86-65-02, Concerning the Exhaust of the "C" Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Into the
"B" Diesel Building Emergency
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. Ventilation Intake.
Maintenance Work Order 18617591 was written and worked to remove the pump exhaust in this area.
This item is considered closed.
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c.
(Closed)IFI 86-65-04, Concerning the Documentatien of Deficiencies When Using Operations Procedures to Satisfy Preoperational Tests.
The
licensee stated that it is the test supervisor's responsibility to
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A concern was i
discussed that a viable mechanism does not exist in the test program to document and resolve minor problems as they occur during the. perform-
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ance of a test.
The licensee stated that it is the test supervisor's i
responsibility to include in the test log any deficiencies that exist i
and the specific closure documents (i.e., maintenance work orders).
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) IFI 86-65-05, Concerning a Revision to the FSAR to Specify a
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Variable Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Setpoint. The inspectors reviewed Amendment 29 to the FSAR with the above revision
included. This item is considered closed.
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i e.
(Closed) IFI 86-65-06, Concerning a Safety Injection (SI) Actuation that Occurred During Hot Functional Testing When Transferring Control
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E from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panels.
The licensee discovered that the control transfer switches were break-before-rcake, thus interrupting the SI block circuit when a transfer is made. Change Control Package B10305E has been issued to change the transfer switches
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to make-before-break switches. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) IFI 86-88-07 Concerning Operator Training and Staffing for j
Fire Response. The inspectors reviewed operator fire response training plan LO-H0-43201 and discussed the status of operator training with the i
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licensee. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) IFI 86-88-08, Concerning the Incorporation of Various
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Identified Items into the Fire Preplan Procedures.
The licensee has
incorporated all the expected operator actions into a single procedure i
17103-C.
The inspectors reviewed this procedure to verify all l
previously omitted items have been incorporated.
One new concern was
that potential spurious actuations with very short time constraints may
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warrant immediate operator actions.
These actions were separated as i
innediate concerns under the old procedure format, yet are integrated
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into the total list of actuations in the new format.
The licensee bas agreed to further evaluate the identification of immediate operator actions. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) IFI 86-88-09, Concerning the Administrative Controls Required to Ensure the Operability of Fans that Provide Cooling to the Diesel
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A letter from Bechtel to the licensee, dated
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T December 8, 1986, states that based on further calculations this control is no longer required. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) IFI 86-88-10, Concerning Deficiencies Noted in Plant Labeling.
The inspectors verified labels have been. corrected to agree with the
appropriate procedures. This item is considered closed.
j (Closed) IFI 86-88-13, Concerning Access to the AFW Fced Pump Turbine
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Valve HV-3009.
A field change was issued and performed to provide a
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ladder and platform to the subject valve.
This item is considered
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closed.
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(Closed) IFI 85-30-08, Concerning the Incorporation of All Applicable
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Regulatory Guides in Each Readiness Review Module as Pertains to Appropriate Quality Assurance Controls.
Modules issued subsequent to this finding include the appropriate controls.
This item is considered
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i closed.
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1.
IE Bulletin 85-01 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response dated October 15, 1986, to IE Bulletin 85-01, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The
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inspectors reviewed the following items discussed in the response:
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l (1) Plant Standard Operating Procedure (S0P) 13610, Auxiliary Feed-water System, which addresses symptoms of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system steam binding and corrective actions to restore the AFW system to operational status following steam binding, i
l (2) Procedure 11882-1, Operations Department Outside Area Rounds l
Sheet, which addresses monitoring AFW system fluid conditions when AFW is required to be operable.
This will be accomplished by
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operations personnel who will check the temperature of the AFW pump suction and discharge piping by touching the piping at least j
orice every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
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Both of the procedures have been approved and issued for use.
In addition to reviewing the above procedures, the inspectors also reviewed training
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system steam binding.
These items are addressed in lesson plan LO-LP-20101-C for licensed operators, and lesson plan NL-LP-236C for non-licensed
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j operators.
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Independent of the effort, NRC personnel also inspected the AFW system and
performed a walk-thru of S0P 13610 with plant operations personnel.
As a l
result of this effort, a concern was identified where high point vents appear to be missing from the AFW system.
There are no provisions in S0P
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13610 to prevent water hammer in the AFW system by venting between the i
second and third check valves in the pump discharge piping.
This concern
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and the related inspection effort are documented in NRC Inspection Report
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50-424/86-117.
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J Based on the above inspection efforts, the inspectors determined that the licensee's response of October 15, 1986, to IE Bulletin 85-01 adequately addressed the requirements of the bulletin.
The procedures appear to be adequate which address monitoring of AFW system temperatures, recognizing steam binding should it occur, and recovering from a steam binding event.
The material provided for operator training also appears to be adequate.
The item discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-424/86-117, concerning possible water hammer in the AFW system due to the lack of adequate venting will be tracked independently.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
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