IR 05000424/1986018
| ML20203N331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Embro E, Novak T, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203N320 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-86-18, NUDOCS 8609230319 | |
| Download: ML20203N331 (70) | |
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UNITE 3 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
- e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-424/86-18-Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket No.:
50-424 Construction Permit No.: CPPR-108 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 Module: No. 8, Structural Steel Reviews Conducted: November 18, 1985 - February' 14, 1986-On-Site Inspections Conducted:
December 9-13, 1985; December. 16-19, 1985;
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January 13-24, 1986; and February,10-14, 1986
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,NRC Offices Participating in Inspections / Reviews:
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Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), Bethesda,,MD l
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Bethesda, MD l
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Region II, Atlanta, GA
I Reviewers:
R. W. Parkhill Inspection Specialist, IE A. Unsal, Consultant, IE'(Harstad Engineering) _
Sai Chan, Project Engineer, NRR (.-
John Thompson, Project Engineer, NRR
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-Inspectors:
George A. Hallstrom, Reactor Inspector, Region II Charles G. Bruch, Consultant, Region II (EG&G Idaho)-
e K.
lier, Consultant, Region II (EG&G Idaho)
Approved by:
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e
- / /IN6d J
J.
laks', Chief (Module - All Sections)
Dite Signed te fals & Process Section iv,sion of Reactor Safety, Region II Y
Sfo
n E. Vt Embro,1Tief (Module - Sect n 7)
Dave Signed Licensing Section, Division of ality Assurance Vendor, a d Technical Training enter Programs, IE
e Y
2-AL w
r T. Novak, Deputy Director INodu)b - Section 3.0-3.4)
Dat4 Sigfied "
Division of PWR Licensing A, OfTice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f/
.s M. V. Sinkule, Thief Date SYgned/
Projects Section 3C Division of Reactor Projects, Region II i
W M K 05000424 9 860917 o
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CONTENTS Topic Page Summary
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Scope o'f-Review 1-
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Methodology r1 Evaluations
Findings-46
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Conclusions
References
Tables
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V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM MODULE 8 STRUCTURAL STEEL SUMMARY
.The Readiness Review Program is being conducted at the initiative of Georgia Power Company (GPC) management to assure.that all design, construction, and operational commitments have been properly identified and implemented at the
~ Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1.
Module 8, which was submitted on November 12, 1985, presents an assessment of the compliance of the Structural Steel contained in Category I structures with Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
commitments and regulatory requirements.
This evaluation was conducted to determine if the results of the program review of structural steel design,
-fabrication and installation presented in this Module represent an effective and accurate assessment of the requirements, that the requirements were properly implemented, and that the resolutions of the findings identified in Module 8 were correct.
-This evaluation was performed by NRC reviewers from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), and inspectors from Region II. The evaluation was accomplished -through a detailed examination of all sections of the Module by:
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Verifying that the structural steel commitments identified in the Module are correct and in accordance with FSAR commitments and regulatory requirements.
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Checking a comprehensive and representative sample of the documents reviewed by the Readiness Review Staff and an independent sample of documents selected by the inspectors.
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Inspecting a representative sample of structural components currently installed in~ Unit 1.
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Reviewing past NRC inspections at Vogtle 1 that pertain to Module 8.
During this examination, it was apparent to the NRC reviewers and inspectors that GPC management supported the Readiness Review by active participation in the development and implementation of the program. This evaluation also indicates that the licensee's program review was comprehensive and provides adequate assurance that plant structural steel components and systems will perform in accordance with NRC requirements and FSAR commitments (except for the findings which were identified by the NRC reviewers and inspectors).
These findings should be subject to continuing review and action until closed out in order to preclude the possibility of safety problem development. The findings identified during this evaluation are summarized in the fourteen items listed below:
Deficiency - Potential overtension in high strength steel bolts used
primarily for friction type connection of structural steel members.
(URI 424/86-03-03)
Deficiency - Missing design calculations for mid-height loads on containment polar crane under seismic loading conditions.
(URI 424/86-03-02)
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l Deficiency - Use of 25"4 of _ live load when combined with seismic loads for structural steel design.
(URI 424/86-18-06)
Deficiency - Space frame modeling accomplished with one and not two cranes being positioned within the same turbine building (IE Open Item 85-64R-05).
(URI 424/86-18-09)
Deficiency - Interaction of turbine _ pedestal and ' building structural steel with main steam piping anchors (IE Open _ Item 85-64R-06).
(URI 424/86-18-10)
Deficiency - Uncompleted computer analysis of category I structural framing for load distribution to members of the framework.
(IFI 424/86-03-01)
Deficiency - Follow up to assure that items generally related to Module 8 components and systems, but excluded from the Module 8 review by boundary definition, are picked up in other modules.
(IFI 424/86-07-02)
Deficiency - Follow up on correction of deficiencies reported by NRR for Commitments 981, 1606, and 1995.
(IFI 424/86-18-01)
Deficiency - Follow-up on the review of two calculations, one for vertical frame and the sacond for floor framing below the. operating level (IE Open Item 85-64R-01).
(IFI 424/86-18-03)
Deficiency - Follow-up on source of 15 psi criterion for fluid pressure and explanation of omission in calculation (IE Open Item 85-64R-02).
(IFI 424/86-18-04)
Deficiency - Follow-up on the review of two calculations for member sizing along with transfer of data to drawings.
(IFI 424/86-18-07)
Deficiency - Follow-up on proper incorporation of crane vendor input into design (IE Open Item 85-64R-04).
(IFI 424/86-18-08)
Deficiency - Connection details differing between design and drawing (IE Open Item 85-64R-03).
(IFI 424/86-18-05)
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Deficiency - Module presentation of information and data reflecting potential verification errors requiring resolution during the examina-tion in order to provide confidence in the licensee's review.
(DI 424/86-18-02)
It.does not appear that the foregoing represent significant programmatic weaknesses. This conclusion is made with the provison that the foregoing open items for Vogtle 1 can be satisfactorily closed out. Resolution of all matters concerning open items will be handled during future Region II j
inspections.
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V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM
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MODULE 8 STRUCTURAL STEEL 1. Scope of Review This review consisted of an examination of each section of the Module and was performed by reviewers from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-(NRR) and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) along with inspectors
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from Region II.
The IE review was assisted by one employee from Harstad
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Engineering Associates. The Region II review was assisted by two employees of EG&G Idaho, Inc., a prime contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Module Sections 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 5.0, 8.0 presented data on Module organization, project organization, program description, audits and special investigations, and conclusions. These did not require the review depth given to Module Sections 3.0, 6.0, and 7.0 which covered Commitments, Program Verification and Independent Design Review.
These latter three sections provide the more significant aspects concerning licensee commitments along with adequacy of commitment carrythrough into both program implementation and design execution.
Review of these three sections included an examination of content; review of findings, concerns and observa-tions; review of a sample of items reviewed by the Georgia Power Company (GPC)
Readiness Review Team (RRT); and an examination of an independently selected sample of records and field construction. The methodology used and an evalu-ation of each section are presented in the following.
2. Methodology a. NRR Review The review nnd evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
focused on the adequacy and accuracy of the commitments contained in Section 3.0 of the Module. This involved a detailed review of subsection 3.4 for commitment identification and accuracy to assure that all regulatory requireneats applicable to Vogtle 1 are represented and that each commitment faithfully represents its associated regulatory requirement.
The prinary review criteria for the foregoing included the acceptance
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criteria of NUREG-800 (Standard Review Plan) (SRP),
the Vogtle Uni.t 1 FSAR, and the Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Other criteria used included selected letter correspondence, NRC Regulatory guides, and related NRC staff positions.
b. IE Review The review and evaluation by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) focused on the Independent Design Review (IDR) performed by Stone and Webster which was reported in Section 7.0 of the Module.
The intent of this was to assess the thoroughness of the licensee's review.
The NRC examination was accomplished during an inspection of Vogtle 1 during December 16-19, 1985.
Activities included reading Section 7 of the Module for content, coherence and completeness.
The IDR findings were examined along with the licensee's corrective actions to verify validity and implementation.
Specific design calculations were selected and independently reviewed for proper approach and correct results.
Selected construction drawings were examined to verify correct transfer of design detai c. RegionLII Review Review'and evaluation by the Region II Evaluation Team was begun by reading the Module in its entirety in the offices of the team members upon receipt in mid November 1985. The total Module was reviewed for organization and content at that time. This was supplemented by the summary of the Module content and the RRT Module preparation methodology which was -presented by the Licensee at the Region II offices on November 18, 1985 and in further detail at the RRT offices on December 9, 1985.
The first inspection was made at Vogtle 1 during December 9-13, 1985.
Activities included:
Determining the RRT organizational element responsible for Module 8 and
interviewing key staff members Verifying the Module 8 review boundary
Making a general inspection of the Containment and Auxiliary Buildings m
to assess project status and view examples of Module 8 hardware Obtaining supplemental documentation required for review use.
A specific sample of 61 independently selected commitments was developed from the listing of 193 presented in Section 3.0 of the Module.
The selection method provided a range of commitment categories that embraced
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the significant aspects of Module 8 (Category I structural steel).
The sample was intended to provide the basis for initially verifying the data reported in Sections 3.0, 4.0, and 6.0 of the Module and to spot areas or items needing review depth. Certain Module data requiring clarification was encountered and this was referred to the RRT for response. Details for these are presented in the attachment to Report Number 50-424/85-58 dated January' 16, 1986.
Data had been gathered during the first inspection trip for office review prior to the second inspection trip. The sample commitments were traced backward into source documentation which was typically the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This was to check for proper RRT recognition of the actual commitments.
The commitments were traced forward into the subsection 3.5 Implementation Matrix to verify the implementation reported in the Module. Additional tracing of the sample commitments into the first order implementation documents (design criteria and procedures) and into second order implementation documents (calculations, drawings, specifica-tions, and vendor submittals) was made to the extent possible with the materials gathered during the first inspection.
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The second inspection at Vogtle 1 was made during January 13-24, 1986.
This inspection involved:
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Accomplishing general Module review activities
Evaluating RRT response to questions Continuing commitment tracing
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Performing Construction Program Verification review.
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The commitment sample was traced into selected design. calculations and into V
actual' hardware. This was done both for those items within the sample similarly traced by the RRT and for the additional items specifically selected outside of those looked at by the - RRT. The RRT response to the K '
clarification questions delivered at the end of the first inspection was used for continuing review purposes. Additional items requiring clarifi-cation were identified during this second inspection and referred to the RRT for response. Details for these are presented in the attachment to Report
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Number 50-424/36-03 dated March 10, 1986.
j Continued office review was made between the second and third inspection trips to evaluate data gathered, begin the interim Module Review Report, and to identify items requiring final field review and analysis.
The J
review plan, Module report, and examination data gathered to date were
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checked for potential gaps and incomplete items.
The third inspection at the Vogtle site was made on February 10-14, 1986.
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This inspection involved completing the sample commitment trace, program review activity, RRT response review, and specific attention to closing issues discovered during the previous inspection trips. Details of these activities are presented in Report Number 50-424/86-07 dated May 16, 1986.
u 3. Evaluations The evaluation of each Module section is provided in the following using a Module section-by-section format. Included are a description of the section, what was reviewed, the basis for acceptance, and a statement of any required followup or evaluation.
a. Section 1.0 - Introduction (1) Review Introduction and Section Examination
$ 1 This Section of the Module provides a description of the intent and
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content of Module 8.
Also provided is a description of the Vogtle 1 hardware covered within the Module, an overview of the project status
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and an outline of the Module organization. This Section was examined by
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'the inspectors for content, background and accuracy of information.
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Clarification of information concerning the Module boundary and project status was required.
This was obtained informally and by written
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response to questions, i'
(a)
Boundary Definition. The information given in Module Table 1.1-1 required clarification concerning the boundary between Module 8 and the other hardware modules for containment penetrations and for support / restraint anchorages.
Review by the inspectors disclosed that the actual hardware component effecting the containment penetration was included in Module 8 while the welds or fasteners used to attach system components to the penetration component were included in the Modules appropriate for the individual systems.
Further review disclosed that anchorage and
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restraining devices cast into Category I concrete (e.g.'.' embeds)
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cast into concrete was included in the Modules appropriate.for the
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systems so welded, bolted or otherwise attached..The attachment of anchorage and restraining devices to structural l steel _was included in Module 8 ;for design purposes, however.
The' actual welding or bolting'to structural steel was included in the Modules
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that. included the -items being welded, bolted or otherwise-s attached.
" Drilled in" anchors (e.g., rock bolts) were included c
.i in Module 8' for design purposes.
The actual anchors.and installation were included-in the Modules appropriate for the item being attached or anchored.
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(b)
Project Status.
The status shown in Module Table 1.2-l' ranges
from 95 to 100% with the exception of pipe whip restraints which
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are shown as 20%.
Examination by the inspectors: disclosed some
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anomaly in' the method 1used to arrive at these percentages.' This was the use of the percent complete of a related major category of construction such as concrete ' for the containment internal steel, embeds, steel ' framing, anchor bolts.and the containment liner. This differs from the " earned _value? accounting for each item group more typical in the construction ~ industry...The advanced stage of completion for Vogtle 1 makes this a moct/ point for all but the pipe whip restraints. These were listed as 20%
complete.
Module 8 contains the anchorage design and any anchorage item cast in Category I concrete for these. The actual pipe whip restraint components generally are included in either Module 11 (Pipe Stress and Supports) or Module 16 (NSSS)..-Thu s the Module 8 portion of the pipe whip restraints-should be reported
as being close to 100% since both embeds and design for anchorage.
are substantially complete.
Primary -loop component support'and pipe whip restraint hardware will require future NRC review.
(c)
Module Description. The Module description portion of the section was examined by the inspectors and no additional instance of
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inaccuracy or need for clarification was found.
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A specific question was asked concerning the existence of significant changes subsequent 'to the April 30, 1985 cutoff date for Module 8 data. The RRT response identified the following:
The project has developed and started a structural frame load tracking program that will include a hardware walkdown. The computer software for this is identified as the STRIVE Load Attachment Program.
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- The project has adopted Revision 2 of the Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria (VWAC) prepared under the sponsorship of the Nuclear Construction Issues Group and approved by the NRC.
Corrective action has been completed to remedy the absence of
"as built" data on certain construction drawings reported by Module 8 Finding 8-72.
The foregoing were accepted by the inspectors for inclusion in the Module 8 examination boundary.
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Inspection Results The explanations provided by the RRT for the anomalies noted above correlated with other information examined by the inspectors. The examination did not disclose significant verification errors or a basis-f or programmatic concern.
The percentage-complete anomalies
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contribute to the Deficiency Item 424/86-18-02 noted in Section 4 of this report concerning -data that potentially reflected verification errors. The RRT boundary decisions contribute to Inspector Follow-Up y~
Item 424/86-07-02 concerning primary loop component supports and pipe e
whip restraint hardware. Followup or additional evaluation of Module Section 1.0, other than noted above, is not required.
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b. Section 2.0 - Organization and Division of Responsibility (1)
Review Introduction and Section Examination u
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'This section of the Module provides a description of the organizations employed for project _ activities including design, field construction and procurement.
The integration of these into the total project management matrix for the subject of Module 8 also is provided. This section was reviewed by the inspectors for content and background information. The information presented agrees with that obtained by the inspectors during past inspections at Vogtle 1.
No instances of variance from the Section 2.0 information were found during the
course of the' total Module review.
(2)
Inspection Results The examination did not disclose significant errors or a basis for programmatic concern.
Followup or additional evaluation of Module Section 2.0 is not required.
c. Section 3.0 - Commitments (1)
Review Introduction pd Section Examination This section of the Module contains a listing of commitments and implementing documents which are displayed in two matrices.
The first is entitled " Commitment Matrix" and presents a comprehensive listing of commitments by the Georgia Power Company for Vogtle 1 along with the source document reference for each commitment. The second is entitled " Implementation Matrix" and presents a listing of source documents and requirement features referred to within each commitment along with the document reference where the feature has been implemented. The NRR identification review was directed at assuring that all regulatory requirements relating to Category I structural steel had been included in the Module 8 Commitment Matrix listed in Section 3.4.
The Region II review was directed at verifying the proper implementacion of the listed commitments. This latter was accomplished by selecting a sample of 61 individual commitments reflecting the full range of commitment topics.
The sample was examined by carefully checking the commitment source (typically the FSAR) for the exact requirement and verifying within the documentation listed in the Implementation Matrix that the requirement was accurately carried throug (a)
Identification Review.
Six discrepancies were noted by NRR during the identification review:
1 Commitment 154 - This concerns the use of RG 1.61 " Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants" and refers to FSAR 3.7.B.1 and 3.7.N.1 for clarification.
Amendment 19 of the FSAR provides that the ASME Code Case N-411 damping values are to be used for piping systems analyzed by the Response Spectra method.
Therefore, this commitment should also include the ASME Code Case N-411 in the matrix column entitled Document / Feature.
2 Commitment 716 - The entry "FSAR 3.8.3.6.2.6" should read
"FSAR 3.8.3.6.2C" under the item entitled Remarks.
Also RG.I.55 deals only with concrete placement in Category I structures and should not be involved in Module 8 (Structural Steel).
3 Commitment 981 - This involves damping values which are higher than those listed in RG 1.61. The licensee has identified (in
. Table 3.7.B.1-1 of the FSAR) that electrical cable trays and supports should have the higher damping values specified in Figure 3.7.B.1-7 of the FSAR. Therefore, it is necessary that the commitment be extended to include Figure 3.7.B.1-7 and that in no case should the cable tray damping values exceed 15% of critical damping.
4 Commitments 1606 and 1995 - Section 1.9.57 of FSAR (pertaining to use of RG 1.57) refers to Section 3.8.2 for conformance in design limits and load combinations for Class MC components while Section 3.8.2.8 refers back to Section 1.9.57 for the Vogtle position on RG 1.57.
Clarification is required to define the content of these commitments.
5 Commitments 1114,1285, and 1289 - The NRC has not verified, checked, or endorsed any computer programs used for structural, seismic and geotechnical analysis, such as BSAP and MFRAME.
The licensee is responsible for the accuracy and correctness of calculations and analytical results.
6 Commitment 4142
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The entry "SRP 3.J.3" should read
"SRP 3.5.3."
The NRR review also noted nine additional commitments requiring clarification prior to assessing the adequacy thereof. These were forwarded to and responded to by the licensee as follows:
7 Commitment 1854 - The liquid penetrant method was substituted for radiography, ultrasonic and magnetic particle testing.
The licensee responded by noting that nondestructive examination (NDE) welding inspection methods are outlined in the FSAR.
Specific attention was directed to FSAR 1.9.19.2 which allows use of the liquid penetrant method of examination.
Further reference was made to Section 3.8.1 of
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the Vogtle Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which affirmed this deviation from the Regulatory Guide. The Licensee's Readiness
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Review was made from the point of view that liquid penetrant testing was allowed only when the other NDE methods were not feasible.
8 Commitment 1558 - The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.71 for welder qualification for limited accessibility area welding were omitted. The licensee responded by noting that exception was taken to these requirements in FSAR 1.9.71.2 and that engineering judgement would be used should situations arise requiring these qualifications.
This was affirmed in SER Section 10.3.6.
9 Commitment 1101 - The licensee appears to have used the 1974 ASME Code through Summer 1975 Addenda rather than the 1971 edition through Summer 1973 as specified in the FSAR for certain containment liner components at elevations 142'-6" to
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169'-0".
The licensee responded by noting that specification X2AG06 referenced the committed version of the ASME Code for the appropriate components and that the later version of the code applied to other items at the same general elevations.
10 Commitment 1968 - This involved the same clarification need and response as for Commitment 1854 noted in item 7 above.
11 Commitment 1970 - This commitment was for use of ASTM A593-72 for Charpy Vee Notch tests on the containment thickened liner plate. - A review of the ASTM references failed to disclose the existence of this standard.
The licensee responded by noting that the standard had been withdrawn by the ASTM in 1976 but had been properly implemented in-specification X2AG06.
12 Commitment 1971
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The commitment referenced FSAR Section-3.8.1.6.4.8 which was not found.
The licensee responded by agreeing to change the reference to 3.8.1.6.4B which is the correct commitment reference.
13 Commftment 1149 - The commitment required that fasteners exposed to fluid in the refueling canal be fabricated of type 304L stainless steel or equivalent.
FSAR Section 3.8.3.6.1 can be interpreted as indicating that some other material was used.
The equivalent of this should be verified.
The licensee responded by noting that the design
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avoided the use of fasteners exposed to the fluid.
The FSAR will be corrected to reflect this.
14 Commitment 2806 - The commitment requires fracture toughness testing for penetration sleeve assemblies to meet the requirements of the ASME Code through the Summer 1971 Addenda while installation appears to have followed the Summer 1975 Addenda. The licensee responded by pointing out the specific Addenda that the different elevations of the containment liner were constructed to and agreed to update the commitment matrices to clarify this.
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-15; LCommitment 1830 - Typographical errors were noted.as follows.
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The word "immediate":should be " intermediate" and the reference i
"IEB;80-80" should be "IEB 80-08." The-licensee ~ concurred and
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will publish a correction.
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The 'NRR1 review sample :also -included. the following commitments which were-found to be acceptable:
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.1570 1572
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'1826 11827 1828
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1855 1954 1955 1956.
1957 1958
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1959 1960 1969
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.1992.
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2080 2081 2082 2083 4694
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.(b)
Implementation Review.
The Region II. examination of Section 3.0
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started-with reading subsections 3.1, 3.2,.and 3.3 for content and
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veracity. - The preliminary examination of subsections 3.4 and 3.5 disclosed ~two anomalies in the RRT commitment data base:
1 Commitments' repeated in different Modules-had different
reference numbers.
2 Commitments listed -in formerly published Modules, as also being applicable to future Modules, did not always appear in those LModules.
The RRT explanation, that the data base was not set up on a
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unified numbering basis, was accepted for Item 1.
The RRT also
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explained ~ that each new - Module is prepared from an up-to-date data base and reflects current decisions f regarding commitment assignments. Changes, however,' can occur due to clarification of
the applicability of a given commitment during work on a future
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Module. This explanation was accepted for Item 2.
Sixty-one of the 193 individually ~ numbered commitments (listed in
subsection 3.4 Commitment Matrix) then were selected as a review i
sample..These were specially picked to cover the full range of
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commitment-topics presented within the Module and to exceed a 30%
sampling. The examination o' the sample consisted of:
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Verifying correspondence between the subsection 3.4 Commitment Matrix and the subsection 3.5 Implementation Matrix for each '
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commitment.
Reviewing the referenced commitment source-document citation
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for a clear statement of requirement for each commitment within i
the sample.
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Checking 'the fdocument listed' in, the l subsection 3.5 =
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> Implementation-Matrix for proper implementation of -the requirements embraced by the. commitment.
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.Thexindividual commitments reviewed along with the review results
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'are. listed.in Table 1 of~this report.
i-The review of the 61 commitments disclosed four inaccuracies
'and { anomalies.
These are discussed in paragraph 3.g(2)(b) of ~
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1this report since they relate to Design Program Verification.
(2)-. Inspection Results
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The identification review by NRR did not disclose _ significant regulatory omissions within the subsection 3.4. Commitment Matrix. -The-
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errors identified as Items 1, 2, 6,.12, 13, 14, and -15; by the' NRR e'
review noted in paragraph 3.c(1) preceding; are considered to.be editorial or typographical and do not-reflect' substantial verification
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errors. These contribute to -the Deficiency Item 424/86-18-02 noted
. in' -Section 14 of this report concerning data that potentially.
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L reflected : verification errors. The need for further NRC review-of
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. the discrepancies noted in Items 3'and.4 of the. NRR review resulted '
in Inspector Followup Item 424/86-18-01, Commitment Deficiencies,-
i listed in Section 14 of this report. :The licensee's explanation for items - 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the NRR review wasl accepted as-
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satisfactory clarification of the issues raised.
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The examination of Section 3.0 did -not disclose substantial
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verificatio'n errors, other than noted 'above, or programmatic-concerns. Followup or additional evaluation, other than noted above and in paragraph 3.g(2)(b), is not required.
d. Section 4.0 - Program Description
1(1)
Review Introduction and Section Examination This section of the Module describes' structural steel activities including work processes and control for design; materials management; l
personnel training.and qualification; fabrication, installation and inspection.
The project welding program is also included.
The t
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section was examined by the inspectors for content, background for the ' review of later sections (especially Section 6, Program Verifi-
':
cation) and for the veracity of the information presented.
(a)
pesign.
Subsection 4.1.2 entitled " Design Process" refers to Module 1 (Reinforced Concrete Structures) for a complete description of the design process used.
This was examined along
,
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with the August 12, 1985 report of the NRC review of Module 1.
No Deficiencies or Unresolved Items were listed in that report for
the design process. Credit was taken for.the NRC Module 1 review i
in the examination of this Module.
This was based on the similarity of the design process, the necessary integration of 4'
reinforced concrete and structural steel in the design, and the i'
close association of the design-discipline engineers involved j
within the design organization.
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.(b)
Materials.
Subsection 4.2 refers to Module 21 Appendices C and E entitled " Procurement" and " Material Control" respectively.
A detailed examination of the subject of those appendices was not performed by NRC due to absence of the material -from Module 8.
The Materials subsection was reviewed for content and conformance to commitments, however.
In addition, the commitment sampling review listed for Section 3.0 was carried into the corresponding procurement specifications, in several cases, to verify commitment implementation.
General agreement among the material progra:m description, commitments and implementation was found for all matters investigated under subsection 4.2.
(c)
Training and Qualification.
Subsection 4.3 was read for content and general conformance with the other information containea in the Module. A detailed examination of the subsection was not made by the inspectors since the material contained was largely descriptive and not in the nature of an assessment.
The subsection describes the project programs for training and qualification of design engineers, construction engineers, contractor staff, construction crafts, and project inspectors.
Discussion of the material contained in the Module with the RRT did not disclose information different from that presented in the Module or that gained by the inspectors during past inspections at plant Vogtle.
(d)
Fabrication, Installation and Inspection.
Subsection 4.4 was examined by the inspectors for content and general agreement with the Module 8 Commitments selected for review.
In addition, the many flow charts contained in this subsection were reviewed for general logic and accuracy. Several minor discrepancies were found within the latter.
These were attributed, by the RRT, to inaccurate graphics work as evidenced by misspelled words, omitted lines, etc.
The discrepancies proved to be minor in nature.
Program confidence was regained from the acceptable explanation offered by the RRT and from examining the original flow chart drafts available at the Readiness Review office. The foregoing provided general agreement between commitments and the activities covered by the Fabrication, Installation and Inspection program.
(e)
Project Welding.
Subsection 4.5 was examined by the inspectors for general content and agreement with the sampled commitments. A review of this subsection disclosed that information presented conforms to that gained ' by the NRC inspectors during past inspections of the Project Welding Program at plant Vogtle.
Additional examination of the Project Welding Program was conducted during the review of the Construction Program Verification reported in Section 3.h of this report.
(2)
Inspection Results The explanation offered by the RRT for the flow chart anomalies and evidence represented by the draft charts.was accepted by the inspectors for the discrepancies noted in paragraph 3.d(1)(d)
preceding.
The anomalies contribute to the Deficiency
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11 Item 424/86-18-02 noted in Section 4 of this report concerning data
-
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that potentially reflected verification errors.
The " materials"
'
reference to Module 21 Appendices C and E noted in 3.d(1)(b)
contributes to Inspector Followup Item 424/86-07-02, Module 8 Items Assigned to Other Modules. The section examination did not disclose verification errors other than noted above, or further basis for programmatic concerns. Followup or additional evaluation, other than noted above, is not required.
e. Section 5.0 - Audits and Special Investigations (1) Review Introduction and Section Examination This section provides a discussion of the audits of the Module 8 related items made by GPC Quality Assurance along with those performed by NRC, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and the Licensee's Self-Initiated Evaluation Team.
Also included is a discussion of eight past design and construction problems considered by GPC to be important and/or potentially reportable to NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
This section was examined by the inspectors to confirm the various processes and to assure correspondence of reporting with that observed in the past by NRC inspections.
Subsection 5.2 (NRC Inspections) was selected from the four audit categories presented in Section 5.0 for a detailed review in ' order to assess the thoroughness and accuracy of the section. The latest listing of the NRC Region II Outstanding Items File was used as a benchmark to check the Readiness Review Team data base for Audits and Special Investigations. The file contains some 527 items applicable to plant Vogtle. These were screened for Module 8 applicability. Of the 57 so identified, three appeared to have been over-looked by the RRT as they were not listed in the Module 8 data base. Investigation by the RRT disclosed that each of these three involved welding work by Pullman Power Products on the NSSS. The explanation, that each of these did not involve work covered by Module 8, was accepted by the inspectors.
No significant inaccuracy was found. Review of the eight past design and construction problems listed in subsection 5.5 of the Module did not disclose information differing from that previously obtained by the inspectors or indicate incc: rect evaluation by the RRT.
(2)
Inspection Results The examination did not disclose significant verification errors or a basis for programmatic concern.
Followup or additional evaluation of Section 5.0 is not required.
f. Section 6.0 - Program Verification This section of the Module describes the activities undertaken (1) to ascertain whether the design and construction work processes have been adequately controlled in order to ensure implementation of licensing commitments and (2) that the results of these work processes conform to project procedures and design requirements. The section is further divided
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into two subsections covering Design Program Verification and Construction Program Verification.
Both subsections received an in-depth review by the inspectors and are of such consequence as to be included under the following two major headings within this report.
g. Subsection 6.1 - Design Program Verification (1)
Review Introduction and Subsection Examination The Design Program Verification subsection of the Module focused on the programmatic aspects of design with the cbjective of determining whether the design control process functioned effectively and whether it insured proper implementation of licensing commitments.
The RRT verification was performed in two phases.
Phase I consisted of verifying implementation of all technical commitments that were within the scope of the Module.
These were reviewed for proper implementation into the project design criteria and the procedures which were referred to as first order design documents. A selected portion of the commitments were reviewed further by the RRT for implementation into specific second order design documents including calculations, drawings, specifications and vendor submittals.
Phase II consisted of the RRT review of selected second order design documents for compliance with project procedures and industry standards.
(2)
Phase I Examination The Phase I part of the Design Program Verification examination
started first with an NRC selection of a sample of 61 commitments from l
the 193 listed in subsection 3.4 of the Module. The selection was as described in paragraph 3.c(1)(b) of this report.
This sampling included 52 of the 181 commitments, being identified for design cognizance within the Module 8 subsection 3.4 Matrix. The commitment sample and the results of the review are listed in Table 1 of this report. The 28 commitments shown on Table 6.1-2 of the Module also were examined.
Eleven of these 28 also were represented in the sample of 61.
(a)
Fire Order Verification.
Seven of the 61 commitments within
,
the examination sample were not found in first order documents.
One, Commitment 1162, involved plastic design within the AISC Structural Steel Specification. Elastic design was selected by the designer for all structural work and accordingly plastic design was not incorporated into the design criteria.
The remaining six (1962,1963,1988, 2004, 3156 and 3515) involved commitments of single case application. The RRT explained that
^
only commitments having general application had been incorporated into design criteria.
Single case commitments, e.g., Containment Polar Crane support brackets (1962), were implemented directly into second order documents.
Proper implementation was found in second order documents for the six commitments and the RRT explanation was accepte _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Four instances of error in the Module information were discovered within the sample of 61 commitments.
Commitment 1961 listed paragraphs 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 vice paragraph 3.3.7 for implementation. Commitment 1339 listed " Fracture Prevention of Containment Pressure Boundary" vice " Provide Leak Tight Barrier Against Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity" as the commitment title.
Commitment 3518 referred to paragraph 4.4.1.7 of specification X4AL01 vice 4.4.17.
The foregoing three anomalies were accepted as editorial or typographical errors having no substantial verification consequence.
The fourth error found was in the implementation of Commitment 4694. This implements FSAR paragraph 3.8.3.6.1D which requires that NSSS embedded items above the basemat level conform to ASME SA-537 Class 1.
The first order implementation is found in document DC 2148 (Rev. 3) paragraph 3.3.3B.
This paragraph is entitled "Special Applications" and lists four specific steel specifications including SA-537 Class 1.
No guidance is provided within the document linking SA-537 Class 1 to NSSS embedded items above the basemat level. A further check was made by tracing two NSSS embedded items (1-5UIA and 4-2M1A) that had been checkr.d within the Construction Verification Program. The governing drawing for both these and similar embedded items was 1X2D48L001.
Note 1 of that drawing specified the correct material. This was accepted as suitable evidence that the designer was aware of the FSAR commitment and made proper selection of material for the NSSS embedded items, (b)
Second Order Verification. The second part of the examination of Phase I involved second order commitment verification. This started with the inspectors' review of five additional commitments (from the sample of 61) in second order documents.
These five were in addition to the six (of the 61) that had been found in second order documents only and in addition to the eleven (of the 61) that overlapped the 28 previously reviewed by the RRT. The results are listed in Table 1 of this report.
No cases of significant second order verification or commitment error were found by the inspectors within the commitments checked other than noted in the following paragraph.
An examination was made of the 28 commitment sample selected by the RRT for verification within second order documents (calculations and specifications). The 28 commitment sample was listed in Table 6.2-1 of the Module.
A review of the implementation using that table disclosed what appeared to be significant verification errors. In reading Section 6.1 of the Module 8 report, the inspectors gained the understanding that the 28 commitments listed in column 3 cf Table 6.1-2 of the Module 8 report were verified by the RRT as having been implemented in the corresponding second-order design cocuments listed n column 5 of the table.
This proved to be' true for only a of the 11 commitments originally examined within the sample of 61 noted in Table 1 of this report. RRT personnel explained that the information presented in Table 6.1-2 was intended to show that the second-order documents listed in column 5 implemented the corresponding subjects in column 1, but not necessarily the
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specific commitments listed in column 3.
The RRT explanation that (1) the table should not be read line-by-line'and (2) that the documents listed in column 5 pertained to subjects listed in column 1 on a collective basis and not to commitments listed in column 3, was not accepted. Reverification was accomplished
~
for each of the 28 commitments. A replacement for Table 6.2-1 was constructed to clearly show a second order implementation for each of the 28 individual commitments. This is enclosed as
' Table 2 of this report.
It was noted that approximately 1/4 of the commitments listed in the subsection 3.5 Implementation Matrix cited second order documents. The balance of these, which were not within the samples previously examined, were checked by the inspectors to verify proper. second order implementation.
The foregoing efforts ultimately resulted in no verification -
errors being found within the 28 item sample or within the second order document references listed in the subsection 3.5 Implementation Matrix. Significant discrepancies were noted in the Table 6.1-2 data presentation, however.
(3)
Phase II Examination Phase II of the RRT Design Program Verification involved a detailed review of the following seven hardware design categories:
1 Embeds 2-Containment Internal Steel 3 Structural Steel Framing 4 Equipment Anchorage 5 Pipe Whip Restraints 6 Liner Plates, MC Components and Polar Crane Brackets 7 Cranes.
This was supplemented by additional review of the following activities and documentation:
8 Field Change Requests 9 Deviation Reports 10 Field Walkdown 11 Specifications
' 1,2 Findings.
All of the foregoing Module topics were examined and are reported as follows:
(a)
Embeds. The following calculation packages were selected from the 10-listed in Table 6.1-4 of the Module.
These were examined by the inspectors for general completeness, conformance to applicable design criteria and proper signoff by required individuals.
X2CJ4.2.2 Containment--Steam Generator Support Embeds X2CJ2.7.6 Containment--Pipe Rack Basemat Liner Embeds
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Embed Drawing IX2048L001 was examined in connection with commitment 4694 as described in the first paragraph of 3.g(2)(b)
of this report to verify that ASME SA-537 Class 1 steel had been specified for NSSS embeds above the basemat level as
,,.*
required by FSAR 3.8.3.6.10.
Additional drawings were selected from those listed in Module Table 6.1-5 as follows. These were examined for the items noted on the RRT drawing verification checklist and for proper reference to embeds.
AX2001C018 &
Auxiliary Building Elevation 143 ft-6 in.,
AX20F018 Area 3G1 AX2008C009-Auxiliary Building Elevation 124 ft-8 in.,
Stairway #4 1X2001C002 Containment Wall and Dome Inserts AX2011C014 Control Building Wall Inserts, Level B AX2D11C071 Control Building. Wall Inserts, Level 3 It was noted during the examination that the last nine drawings on page 4 of Module Table 6.1-5 were not in the document file offered as evidence of the review by the RRT.
The RRT explained that the missing drawings described refueling canal liner plate, are not appropriate for Embed Verification, and are shown (with correct titles) in Module Table 6.1-14.
This explanation of editorial and typographical error was accepted by the inspectors. The foregoing embed examination did not disclose other verification errors.
(b)
Containment Internal Steel. The following calculation packages were selected outside the sample of three listed in Table 6.1-6 of the Module. These were examined for general completeness, conformance to applicable design criteria and proper signoff by the required individuals.
X2CJ4.1.4.1 Internal Structural Steel Sizing X2CJ4.1.4.2 Internal Structural Steel Column Load Seismic Analysis Beam 5404-84 was selected from calculation package X2CJ4.1.4.1 for design review.
This beam had been included in the RRT walkdown made as a part of the Construction Program Verifi_
cation.
Observations made by the inspectors for the beam design include:
- Load combinations used were in accordance with DC-2148 (Rev. 3) Table 2, except that the live load was factored by 0.25 in the seismic load combination.
Stress allowances used were in accordance with the AISC Manual of Steel Construction, Seventh Edition, as committed by the FSAR.
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The specified member size resulting from the calculations
(W24X94) had been installed.
The shear capacity o. the bolted connections exceeded the
design maximum shear load (including seismic loads) at the connections.
The foregoing Containment Internal Steel examination did not disclose verification errors except for the live load-reduction in the seismic load combination, which is detailed in 3.i(1)(a), Item 3, of this report.
(c)
Structural Steel Framing.
The following calculation packages were selected by the inspectors from the sample of 19 listed in Table 6.1-7 of the Module. These were examined for general
completeness, conformance to applicable design criteria and proper signoff by the required individuals.
X2CK2.4.2 Control Building Structural Steel at Elevation 200 ft X2CK2.2.2 Control Building Structural Steel at Elevation 240 ft X2CK2.0.2 Control Building Structural Steel at Elevation 301 ft X2CK4.9.3 Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Platforms, Level C X2CK4.9.4 Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Platforms, Level B The following calculation package was selected outside of the sample listed in the Module and examined in the same manner.
X2CK4.3.5 Vent Stack Analysis and Design In addition, the following drawings were examined to verify that member sizes were correctly translated from four of the calculation packages listed above.
Drawing Calculation Package AX2D11F008 X2CK2.4.2 AX2011F017 X2CK2.2.2 AX2D11F033 X2CK2.0.2 AX2008F033 X2CK4.9.3 The foregoing Structural Steel Framing examination did not disclose verification error (d)
Equipment Anchorage.
Equipment anchorage had been reviewed
.by the RRT with emphasis on ascertaining. the extent of interdisciplinary coordination, proper design, and appropriate documentation. No findings resulted and a conclusion of-full requirement conformance was reached.
The. inspectors noted, from the audit examination (reported in paragraph 3.e(1)
preceding), that the NRC Region II Outstanding -Items File recorded six entries since 1983 under Inspector Followup Items or Unresolved Items pertaining to expansion type anchor bolts.
It also was noted within subparagraph 4.1.4.1.2 of the Module that expansion type anchor bolts were used to attach surface plates'that could not be designed at the time that embeds were required to be installed for concrete placement. The expansion anchor aspect of equipment anchorage was selected by the inspectors for further examination.
The examination was made by inspecting procurement and' installation procedure documents along with a followup on action taken pursuant to IE Bulletin 79-02 (Rev. 2). This latter had resulted in Inspector Followup Item 424/85-21-01 pursuant to the NRC inspection made at Vogtle during May and June of 1985. The incomplete action on this resulted in a question concerning Commitment 1825 which had implemented the requirements of the IE Bulletin. This was relative to the apparent lack of recognition of the manufacturer advised limitations by either DC-1000-C (Rev. 3) or by Calculations X2CQ5.2.7 and X2CK4.1.8.19 relative to the reduced pullout loads published in the April 1984 Phillips atalog. The RRT response during the NRC investigation made prior to Module 8 review had advised that Bechtel engineering personnel (in Los Angeles) were aware of the revised pullout loads at that time and were revising calculation X2CQ5.2.7 accordingly.
Preliminary evaluation had shown that a safety factor of four would be maintained despite the reduced pullout load allowances.
The RRT response to the inspector's question included the revised calculation X2CQ5.2.7.
This showed that when the minimum embedment requirements of the project construction specifications were acknowledged, the safety factors for all Phillips Redhead wedge concrete anchors (both WS and NWS)
exceeded the design required value of four.
This resolution of the technical concern was accepted by the inspectors for Module 8.
The RRT response regarding the assignment of Commitment 1825, reported in Inspection Report 50-424/86-07 dated May 16, 1986, indicated the need for additional assessment of this during the Module 11 review.
The examination of equipment anchorage design did not disclose verification errors within Module 8.
(e)
Pipe Whip Restraints.
Pipe Whip Restraint Design was examined
'
by selecting two of the ten calculation packages (reviewed by the RRT) for an assessment of technical adequacy.
The assessment was made in greater detail than that accomplished by the RRT. This was done in order to evaluate broader aspects of the Module 8 design and installation effort.
The following packages were evaluated:
X2CK18.DP1 Pipe Whip Restraint, Design Methodology
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X2CK18.01BD1 PWR Containment Building Level B Quad D Structural Design PBR-193.
These were examined in conjunction with one another which enabled the inspectors to determine whether the design calculations in the latter implemented the requirements of the former.
The _ examination focused on assessing whether design commitments (either as specified in the FSAR or.in X2CK18.DP1) were implemented in a technically acceptable manner.
The following observations were made during this examination:
The load combinations used were in accordance with design
criteria DC-1000-C, as was specified in X2CK18.DPl.
The dynamic increase factors used for axial, flexural, and
shear loads were in accordance with Table 4-3 of X2CK18.DPl.
The GENERAL FRAME computer program was used for the frame
analysis. GENERAL FRAME is a Bechtel program that was used until September 1985 to perform planar frame analyses. The program had been verified for accuracy by c.omparing results with BSAP (Bechtel's version of the widely-used SAP program).
- The seismic loads used were in accordance with those specified in X2CK18.DPl.
- The correct member size for the restraint frame was specified on the associated drawing IX2D69F193.
- The impact load used was in accordance with Bechtel Memo BB24812 File No. XXBB06.
The examination of Pipe Whip Restraint design did not disclose verification errors.
(f)
The Liner Plates, MC Components and Polar Crane Brackets.
This element of the RRT review was exami.ned by inspecting two calculation packages within the four listed in Table 6.1-14 of the Module and two outside of the RRT sample as follows:
X2CJ2.7.1 Containment Building, Dome Liner Plate X2CJ2.7.2 Containment Building Steel Liner Plate, Cylinder Wall X2CJ2.7.5 Polar Crane Brackets X2CJ2.8.3 Small Penetrations Analysis, Containment.
The foregoing were checked by the inspectors for completeness, conformance to design criteria and signoff by required individuals.
The examination did not disclose verification errors.
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(g)
. Cranes The. inspectors checked the design calculation X2CJ4.5 for the crane girders to verify that wheel loads were properly transferred from the vendor's calculation AX4AL01-46-0 for the polar crane to the crane girder design. This check revealed that the correct wheel loads were recognized by the calculation.
Two calculation packages and the design specification associated with the polar crane also were checked for technical adequacy.
The packages checked were calculation AX4AL01-54, " Structural Design Calculation and Trolley Seismic, 225/50 Ton Capacity Containment Building Polar Crane" and AX4AL01-46-2, " Summary of Seismic Analysis and Supplementary Calculations, Containment Building Polar Crane." These were reviewed in conjunction with specification X4AL01. This enabled the inspectors to assess whether the vendor-supplied calculations met the requirements of the project design specification. The review was primarily focused on determining whether the requirements in the speci-fication were implemented in a technically acceptable manner.
Observations made relative to the AX4AL01-54 examination include:
The standards CMAA-70 and AWS DI.1 were used for the 225-ton operating and 475-ton construction lift design in accord with X4AL01.
The allowable stresses used for seismic loading in the trolley seismic calculations were in accord with X4AL01.
The seismic acceleration factors used were properly obtained from the seismic report AX4AL01-46-2.
Each sheet of the analysis was signed by both an analyst and a checker.
The package was sealed by a Registered Professional Engineer and approved by Bechtel.
Observations made by the inspectors relative to calculation AX4AL01-46-2 included:
The damping values used for Operational Basis Earthquake (0BE) and Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) were in accord with X4AL01.
The ANSYS program was used for the analysis. This provided conformance with the X4AL01 requirement that a non-linear finite element program be used.
The ANSYS program has had wide use in non-linear finite element analysis.
The vibration modal responses were combined in accord with X4ALO1.
The analysis package does not show that all of the loading
variations of trolley position and load height prescribed in X4AL01 were considered in establishing the worst loading condition for OBE and SSE. Of the eight loading variations required in X4AL01, two conditions were not reflected in the analysis package. These were (b) trolley at center and full load at mid height and (e) trolly at end and full load at mid heigh * -The specification X4AL01 required that only three vertical loading heights ' (top, mid, and bottom) be analyzed to determine a worst loading situation.
This raises a concern i
that the three selected positions may not reflect the most severe: loading condition.
The review of Calculations AX4AL01-54 and AX4AL01-46-2 disclosed that the. design commitments were implemented in a technically-acceptable manner with the exception of ~the.last two items above. The inspectors requested RRT response to these concerns.
This was accomplished by providing ;the RRT 'with a written 1 ing' iry related thereto.
This was also attached to Report u
Number 50-424/86-03 dated March 10, 1986. The inquiry requested the following:
'
" Load cases 'b'. and 'e'
are not included 'in the seismic design ' calculation package (Bechtel Log Number AX4AL01-46-2).
provided by the polar crane supplier, Whiting Corporation.
Please explain this discrepancy.
Also, please provide justification that identification of the worst vertical loading condition'will be obtained from analysis of enly three positions, i.e., that a significantly more severe loading situation will'not occur at'some vertical position intermediate to the top, mid, or bottom position."
RRT parsonnel referred the foregoing question to the licensee's i
design organization for response.and comment.
The ' response provided the following explanations:
.
The "up" position is the most critical loading position. The
f-vertical natural frequency of the rope with load in the
"up"' position is approximately 2 Hz, which is essentially at the frequency of the peak response acceleration within the seismic response spectra. - Thus' any lowering of the load would reduce the natural frequency and consequently reduce-the structural response.
.
The crane girder seismic stresses are essentially unaffected by the lifted load. The stress, as listed in the table on page'A4-1 of the seismic calculation AX4AL01-46-2, indicates that the removal of the load has virtually no effect on the seismic stresses in the crane girder relative to the cases j
of the load in either the "up" or "down" positions.
The inspectors noted that the RRT's conclusion, that the crane girder stresses are unaffected by the lifted load, is not consistent with the explanation that the vertical natural frequency of the rope with load in the "up" position corresponds to the peak acceleration of the response spectra.
The RRT position was not accepted since it requires that a significant.
!
vertical seismic load in the rope in some way not be transferred to the crane girders.
The inspectors noted that the vertical natural frequency of the rope and load combination appears to be in a sensitive area (peak) of the response spectrum curve.
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21 Should the natural frequency of this combination actually be higher than that coinciding with the peak acceleration, a lowering of the load would increase the seismic acceleration rather than decrease it as indicated by the design organization response.
The licensee has been requested to provide the following additional information:
An explanation for the apparent inconsistency in the effect
that the lifted load will have on seismic stresses in the crane girders..This should particularly address the stresses listed on page A4-1 of calculation AX4AL01-46-2, which indicate that removal of load has virtually no effect on the seismic stresses in the crane girder.
A calculation that backs up the position that the natural frequency of the lifted load in the "up" position is 2 Hz.
1An explanation.also.should be provided to show how the potential for increasing the vertical seismic acceleration through reductions in this frequency (or lowering of the load) is accounted for in the polarL crane. time-history seismic analyses.
(h)
Field Change Requests.
Fourteen Field Change Requests were selected at random from the 110 listed in Table 6.1-16 of the Module for examination:
C-FCRB Number Title / Description 1439 Relocate embedment 1884 Straighten bent stud on Unistrut 2312 Lengthen embedment plate anchors 2770 Substitute W10X33 for W10X30 due to availability 4507 Provide alternate structural support for missing detail 4557 Substitute beam for one specified 4973 Move secondary beam interfering with connection 5327 Modify embed plate due to rebar interference
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5470 Substitute W12X65 for W12X58 due to availability 6158 Relocate beam, refabricate beam to required length 6185 Modify turn-of-nut procedure for polar crane brackets and rail girders 6309 Substitute material for radwaste sump liner plate
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2 C-FCRB Number Title / Description 6531 Substitute maxi-bolts for. rock bolts 6890 Provide an optional detail on drawing since rock bolts could not be used.
These were examined for attributes that included the following:
Disposition being responsive to need
Appropriate rationale used in: change Structural modifications backed up by calculations Proper approval signoff
Drawing changes reflected in Document Change Notices (DCNs)
Verification errors were not found during the examination of the above sample.
(i)
Deviation' Reports.
Ten Deviation Reports were selected at random from the 71 listed in Table 6.1-17 of the Module:
CD-0640 CD-5140 CD-6259 CD-0645 CD-5298 CD-6639 CD-0845 CD-5995 CD-7108 CD-5064 These were examined for attributes that included:
Disposition being responsive to need Correlation to RRT checklist marking
Proper approval signature.
Verification errors were not found during the examination of the above sample.
(j)
Field Walkdown. This element of the Design Program Verification was performed by the RRT on a minimal basis. It was noted that a field walkdown is properly a part of the Construction Program Verification discussed later in this report. Accordingly, the result of "no Verification errors" reported by the RRT was accepted by the inspectors, without further examination, for purposes limited to Design Program Verification.
(k)
Specifications.
The specification review made by the RRT was minimal and no findings resulted from this element of the Design Program Verification.
This conclusion was accepted by the inspectors without further check since other examination efforts
involved specification checking relative to commitment verification and to calculation package review. The RRT minimal efforts did not disclose verification errors.
The results of the other NRC specification examinations are presented in Sections 3.c and 3.g of this report.
(1)
Findings. _ Six RRT findings resulting from the Design Program Verification are reported _in subsection 6.1.4 of the Module as follows:
8-68 Missile Barrier Thickness 8-70 Derated Embed Plate Drawing Notation 8-71 Drawing Revision Signature 8-82 Design Input Translation 8-91 Installation Ahead of Design Calculation 8-94 IE Information Notice 85-15.
These were examined by the inspectors for attributes that include:
Problem Statement clarity
Response Statement adequacy RRT Conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC information.
Two of the six findings listed in subsection 6.1.4 of the Module were selected for detailed examination.
These were 8-68 pertaining to containment steel missile barrier thickness and 8-70 pertaining to derated embed plates.
The examination of the six findings and the detailed examination of two of the six did not disclose verification errors. It was noted, however, that action on 8-91, pertaining to Civil / Structural calculations, was incomplete.
The RRT findings statement of "no safety significance and no safety concern" reported in subsection 6.1.5 of the Module was accepted by the inspectors as being adequately supported by the RRT Design Program Verification.
(4)
Inspection Results The examination of the Design Program Verification subsection resulted in Unresolved Item 424/86-03-02 Polar Crane Design, reported in Section 4 of this report. This involved the incomplete calculation set and seismic response concern for the Containment Polar Crane as discussed in paragraph 3.g(3)(g). Additional contribution was made to Deficiency Item 424/86-18-02 noted in Section 4 of this report
- oncerning data that potentially reflected verification errors. This
-_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
was for.the commitment listing and referencing errors discussed in 3.g(3)(a), the table errors discussed in 3.g(2)(b), and the mislabled and mislocated drawings discussed in 3.g(3)(a) of this report. The response to the Phillips Redhead wedge anchor pullout load question discussed in 3.g(3)(d) preceding was satisfactorily resolved for Module 8 but remains an open issue until reviewed for Module 11.
Accordingly, this contributes to Inspector Follow-Up Item 424/86-07-02 noted in Section 4 of this report.
The incomplete action on Finding 8-91 resulted in Inspector Followup Item 424/86-03-01, STRIVE Load Attachment Program, discussed in 3.g(3)(1) of this report. The subsection examination did not disclose substantial verification errors, other than noted above, or further basis for programmatic concern. Followup or additional evaluation, other than noted above is not indicated.
h. Subsection 6.2 - Construction Program Verification (1)
Review Introduction and Subsection Examination The Construction Program Verification subsection of the Module focused on the programmatic aspects of construction.
It had the objective of determining whether the construction control process functioned effectively and whether it ensured proper implementation of licensing comeitments.
The RRT verification was performed -in three phases.
Phase I consisted of verifying the implementation of s
'
all construction commitments that were within the scope of the Module.
These were reviewed for proper implementation in the appropriate construction process documentation.
Phase II was a technical review of the construction records to ascertain whether the necessary documentation requirements were verifiable and to establish confidence in the quality of the work done. Phase III consisted of a field walkdown of selected hardware items and components to verify that each was in conformance with the appropriate design drawings, construction specifications and installation procedures.
The Project Welding Program was reviewed as an additional part of the Construction Program Verification.
Specifically reviewed were the receipt and control of weld filler material along with a review of the Weld Procedure Specification and the Procedure Qualification Record development.
(2)
Phase I Examination The Phase I part of the Construction Program Verification was examined by the inspectors using the 61 commitment sample selected as described in paragraph 6.a(2) and checked as described in paragraph 10.b of this report.
This sampling had included nine of the total of 25 commitments listed for construction cognizance within the Module 8 subsection 3.4 matrix. This examination resulted in no verification errors being found within the nine commitments examined and which had been listed for construction responsibility.
l
.
.
l
-
(3)
Phase'II' Examination Phase II of the RRT Construction Program Verification involved a
. detailed documentation review for the following three hardware categories:
1 Liner Plate Systems 2 Structural Steel 3 Embedments.
Category 2 preceding was reported in the following four subsections:
1 Erection 2 Polar Crane Girder and Rail 3 Drilled-in Anchors 4 Embeds, Supports and Restraints Inside the Containment.
The RRT review for these Module topics was examined and is reported in the following paragraphs.
(a)
Liner Plate Systems.
The RRT review of liner plate systems involved selecting the containment liner for detailed checking.
Included in this selection was a decision to limit the review sample.to carbon steel components and not perform checks of stainless steel items.
The rationale for this was that the special controls relative to stainless steel (including halogen contamination and welding process) had been imposed on a site-wide basis. These are to be covered in other Modules as well as in the welding subsections of Module 8.
All other aspects of stainless steel liner plate installation were identical to those for carbon steel liner components. The containment liner had the greatest variety of components and related items along with ASME Code pressure-boundary considerations. Thus it was the logical choice for checking. The objective of the RRT review was to verify that quality control documentation demonstrated that specifications were met-and that both CB&I construction procedures and quality assurance provided a proper installation. This was addressed by assembling and reviewing documentation within assessment packages for 17 separate hardware pieces.
These had been selected from 10 diverse components of the containment liner system as listed in subsection 6.2.3.1 of the Module.
The RRT review of Liner Plate Systems documentation was examined by reviewing the assessment plan and essociated checklists presented in the seven pages of Module 8 Figure 6.2-2 entitled
" Containment Liner Plate System Assessment Plant (sic) and Checklist." The liner plate fabricators and installer's (Chicago Bridge and Iron) procedures and Quality Assurance Manual were
. _ _
examined along with Construction Specifications X2AG06 and X2AG07.
The inspectors then made a random selection of 7 assessment-packages from the 22 originally assembled by the RRT as follows:
1 Assessment 5 - Thickened Floor Liner Plate piece marked 53-B-R which was a column plate located 180 ' south of the secondary shield.
2 Assessment 7-Basemat Embed piece : marked _62-A which was installed for a NSSS Type A restraint and is the eastern most embed on the south side.
3 Assessment 9 - Container Polar Crane bracket piece marked 283-A-7 located at azimuth 210.
~
4 Assessment 10 - Containment dome plate assembly piece marked 412-2 located in the third ring at azimuth 180.
5 Assessment 11 - Containment dome plate assembly piece marked 462-A which is the broken piece located at azimuth 70.
6 Assessment 12 - Penetration Sleeve Number 50 piece marked 312-A located at Elevation 202'-6".
7 Assessment 13 - Southern Main Steam Penetration Assembly piece marked 330-A.
All of the foregoing packages were composed of a checklist per Module 8 Figure 6.2-2 sheets 5 and 6 along with the following general documentation as applicable to the specific component:
- CB&I Stores Release for item or material Certified Material Test Report for material CB&I Shop Checklist for fabrication and/or assembly activities
CB&I Shop Drawing for item or assembly
CB&I Record Drawing Table for field welds
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) for welds
Welder Qualification Record for craftsman involved.
The specific documents examined are listed in Table 3 of this report.
The examination included:
Verifying the correctness and completeness of the checklist
entries Assuring that all required documents were included and
reflected correct informatio The examination of Assessment Package Number 13 disclosed that the CB&I Shop Checklist for Assembly, piece marked 300-B-2 (a subassembly of piece marked 330-A) incorporated the Penetration Sleeve piece marked 302-3-1.
The shop checklist did not include the necessary quality assurance documentation related to the fabrication, welding and NDE of this latter piece.
Three RRT Findings resulting from the Construction Program Verification are reported in subsection 6.2.3.1 of the Module as follows:
8-2 Shop Checklist Signature 8-3 Polar Crane Bracket Impact Test Results 8-5 Specification Reference Table Discrepancy.
,
These were examined by the inspectors for attributes that
,
included:
- Problem statement clarity
Response statement adequacy (.
RRT conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC information.
The examination of the three findings did not disclose verification errors.
(b)
Structural Steel.
The examination of structural steel documentation was started by selecting Structural Steel Erection (installation) from the four structural steel sub-items included in Module subsection 6.2.3.2.
This was selected based on the consideration that the other three (Polar Crane Girder and Rail; Drilled-in Anchors; and Embeds, Supports and Restraints inside the containment) were receiving basic review elsewhere in the examination and that the erection sub-item had the largest number of components.
The RRT review of Structural Steel Erection involved selecting 22 individual steel framing members from the Auxiliary, Containment, Control, and Fuel Handling buildings.
This sample was supplemented with six members selected from open items in the removal request log to assess the removal request procedure. The objective of the RRT review was to verify that quality control j
documentation demonstrated that specifications were met and that both the fabrication and installation were properly accomplished.
This was done by assembling and reviewing documentation applicable to each structural member which included:
- _ - _ - _ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _,
.-
- Receipt Documentation
- Receiving Inspection Report
,
Material CMTR (file copy)
-
- Certificate of Conformance to Coating Specification X2AG03 Outside Fabrication (Ingalls Ironworks)
Inspection Report
-
Heat Identification Number
-
- Welder's Identification and Qualification
Weld Rod Issue Log
-
-
Installation
- Daily Inspection Reports
Welding Inspection Reports
-
Measuring and Testing Equipment Calibration Records
-
- Joint Status Reports
- Stud Welding Inspection Records
The RRT ' review of structural. steel was examined by the NRC revin
of the assessment plan and associated checklists presented in the
20 pages of Module Figure 6.2-1.
The inspectors then made a
random selection of three members from the 22 originally selected
by the RRT for their primary assessment sample as follows:
1 Control
Building beam piece marked M96-103 located at
' Elevation 196 feet
2 Containment
beam
piece
marked
5073-B1
located
at
Elevation 180 feet
3 Control
Building beam piece marked M22-151 located at
Elevation 237 feet.
The inspectors also selected three members at random outside of
the samples of 22 and 6 selected by the RRT. This outside sample
is as follows:
4 Containraent
beam
piece
marked
5404-B4
located
at
F.levation 220 feet.
5 Auxiliary
Building
platform
beam
piece
marked
M080-5277B located at Elevation 185 feet.
6 Auxiliary
Building
monorail-beam M54-427
located at
Elevation 209 feet.
The examination of documentation listed in Table 4 of this report
for the RRT assessment of the members identified as 1, 2, and 3
preceding along with the independent assessment of 4, 5, and 6
disclosed the following:
I
-
Item 4 - The quality records for beam 5404-84 disclose that the
quality inspector who inspected the bolted joints for this
member was not properly certified to perform such inspection in
accord with procedures existing at the time (December 1982).
Checking provided evidence that the inspector had received
proper training
and the certification was delayed in
administrative process. This case was similar to that reported
under Finding 8-10 documented in Module subsection 6.2.3.2.1.4
for the inspection performed by another inspector in the same
time frame.
The evidence and explanation was conditionally
. accepted depending on the resolution of a broader issue of
potentially overtorqued bolts in structural members detailed
later in this report subsection 3.h(3)(b).
Item 5 - The quality records for beam piece marked M08G-52278
disclose that ASTM A325 bolts were substituted for the A307-
bolts specified by the design.
A325 bolts are routinely
specified for applications requiring higher tensile strengths.
This substitution was properly documented and is not an item of
NRC concern.
Nine RRT findings resulted from the Construction Program
Verification
for structural
steel
and are
reported
in
subsection 6.2.3.2 of the Mcdule as follows:
8-8
Column Base Plate Discrepancies
8-15
Column Base Plate Connection Inspection
8-16
Structural Connection Discrepancies
8-48
Polar Crane Rail Splice Inspection
8-9
Missing Drawing
8-10
Steel Inspector not Certified
8-17
Incorrect Number for Inspection Tool
8-84
Procedure Inadequacy
8-50
Missing Receiving Inspection Report.
These were examined by the inspectors for attributes that included
the following:
Problem statement clarity
Response statement adequacy
RRT conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC informatio 's
,
J[
ll
-The examination of the nine findings did not disclose verification
u
errors.
Review of the Quality Control inspector certification for the
bolted connections for Beam 5404-B4 reported above disclosed
,"
verbal reports that some High Strength Steel Bolts (ASTM A327
and/or A490) may have been installed with overtension in friction
' joints during the early 1980s. This was attributed to turn-of-nut
method match marks being painted on the bolt end and the nut face
after ~ the nut-tightening operation had been completed. This was
in violation of the American Institute of Steel Construction
(AISC) " Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A325 or
A490 Bolts" approved by the Research Council on Rivited and Bolted
Structural Joints of the Engineering Foundation (Research Council
on Structural Connections) and dated Apri' 26, 1978. The part of
the AISC specification procedure tl at was applicable at Vogtle
consisted of the following five steps-for turn-of-nut tightening:
1 Assemble joint with specified bolts, washers and nuts
,
2 Bring enough bolts to " snug tight" condition to assure
-that the joint parts are brought into good contact
3 Add bolts to any remaining holes and bring all bolts to snug
tightness
4 Paint match marks on bolt end and nut face to represent a 0
indexing
5 Turn each nut the amount of rotation relative to the bolt that
is specified within Table 4 of the above AISC specification.
The adequacy of the bolt tightening is verified by the following
steps from the AISC specification procedure that was implemented
at Vogtle 1:
,
s
1 Calibrate a direct reading torque wrench for three typical
s;
bolts of the diameter to be checked using a properly
functioning
Skidmore-Willhelm
direct-bolt-tension
device.
'
Bolts shall be torqued using the fastener tension listed in
Table 3 of the AISC specification.
2 Apply the calibrated torque wrench to a minimum of 10% but not
less than two bolts in each joint. Pull wrench to calibrated
torque and observe if the nut or bolt turns.
3 Accept joints where neither the nut nor the bolt turns.
The persons interviewed agreed that the foregoing was applicable
and intended.
GPC Construction Procedure CD-T-16 entitled
';
_
" Structural Steel and Q-Decking" (Rev. 8) dated October 25, 1985
reflects the foregoing procedures in Sections IV.C.6,7 and IV.D.4.
This conforms to the current specification that is published
in the 8th Edition AISC Manual (specification dated April 26,
1978).
_ - -
_ _ - - - _ - _ - - _
A
~
31
. Concern exists for the bolted joints at Vogtle 1 because of the
following eight. observations:
1 GPC Quality personnel ~ interviewed indicated that the bolting
workmanship and inspection quality have undergone continuing
improvement since turn-of-nut was instituted for joint
assembly.
l,
2 Some GPC Quality persons interviewed had discovered and taken
b^
- steps to correct "after the fact" match marking practices by
N
craftsmen.
3 Anomalies-in
inspector qualification certification were
'
disclosed during both the RRT and the NRC efforts in the
Readiness Review.
4 A common perception, on the part of a wide variety of the GPC
l
individuals interviewed ' relative to High Strength Bolted
Joints,' was that the AISC Specification Commentary infers that
bolts not breaking during tightening will not fail in service
after tightening.
5 ' The AISC Manual (7th edition) committed in the FSAR has a
bolting
specification
dated
April 18,
1972
that
has
significantly different nut-turn rotations and joint-loading
allowances from the specification dated April 26, 1978 and
published in the current Manual (8th edition).
6 The AISC specification is. performance oriented and the
commentary thereto provides a broad overview.
Individuals
making decisions relative to bolting at Vogtle did not appear
to have reviewed the literature footnoted in both the AISC
specification and the commentary thereto.
7 The
initial
" snug tightening"
is intended to develop
approximately 15% of the desired bolt tension with ~ the
specified nut-turn bringing the bolt to desired. tension. The
snug tightening performed with an impact wrench (reported as
typical at Vogtle) could result in more than 15% initial
tension if not done carefully. Correct nut-turn would add any
" snug tightening" overtension to the nut-turn tension.
8 The calibrated torque wrench method employed at Vogtle to
sample bolt tightening is intended to disclose undertension but
not overtension.
In view of the foregoing, a further review of the High Strength
Bolting part of the Readiness Review is required on the part of
the licensee.
(c)
Embedments.
The RRT review of Embedments involved a check of
embedded items not installed as a part of the NSSS.
The
28 calendar quarters comprising the years of 1978 through 1984
were selected to serve as base periods for target date
,
selections. One target date was selected at random from each of
'
_.
_ _ _ _. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _.
.
+/
the calendar' quarters.
The 28 dates so selected were used in
-
turn to select concrete placements representing a cross section
of buildings within the power block.
These then were used to
finalize the selection of 28 specific placements for review.
Each selected placement was assessed for conformance to the.
applicable procedure for material-receipt, embed fabrication and
installation documentation.
A specific embed generally was
selected from each placement for detailed review.
The pour
package for the installation of the embed was inspected to assure
inclusion of applicable documents along with legibility and
administrative completeness.
Material receipt and fabrication
' documentation also was reviewed for the selected embed.
The
foregoing reviews were made following the Assessment Plan and
check list format displayed in Figure 6.2-6 of the Module.
The RRT assessment of Embedment documentation was examined by a
NRC review of the assessment plan and associated. check lists
presented in the Module.
Also examined was the Bechtel Power
Company (BPC) Project Review Manual (Rev.1) dated February 24,
1984, Appendix 2, Section 13 entitled " Project Field Engineering
Control of Piping and Tubing Embed Plates." Examination proceeded
to the documentation assessment packages developed by the RRT.
The packages selected for this included embeds installed in the
Containment, Auxiliar, Building, Control Building, Fuel Handling
Building and Main Steam Tunnel. Additional checking included an
examination of the check lists and documentation contained in four
of the 28 assessment packages developed by the RRT for embed
assessment as follows:
1 Assessment 7 - Auxiliary Building Level D plate Type MK-08B and
piece marked D020-2 not previously traced by the RRT.
2 Assessment 15A - Control Building Level B plate Type MK11-TT
and piece marked 8027-15 (not discovered missing by RRT) and
plate A-754 not included in the RRT review.
3 Assessment 23A - Containment Level 1 anchor bolts Type 01-H8BSQ
piece numbered C125-2021 and C125-2024.
4 Assessment 28 - Auxiliary Building Level D derated embeds.
The documentation examined (in addition to the assessment
checklists) is listed in Table 5 of this report and was generally
composed of the following:
Design Drawings
- Fabrication Forms
Certified Material Test Reports (CMTRs)
Paur Packages
Welder Qualifications
Deviation Reports.
'33
)
Examination of the foregoing included assuring that all required
documents were included and reflected correct information.
The examination did not disclose significant verification errors
attributable to the Phase II review of embedment documentation.
Anomalies were discovered when the packages were used in
conjunction with the Phase III Walkdown examination and these are
discussed in paragraph 3.h(4)(c) of this report.
Fifteen RRT Findings resulting from the Phase II Construction
Program Verification are reported in Subsection 6.2.3.3 of. the
Module as follows:
8-21
Identification Differences Between Inspection Summary and
Installation Log
8-23
Inspection Check List not Initiated by Inspector
8-24
Installation Pour Package not Found
8-25
Inspection Reports not Referenced on Inspection Check
List
8-26
Pour Package Missing Drawings for Boundarie: and Einbeds
8-27
Piece Count D1fference Between Inspection' t ummary and
Drawing
8-29
Unistrut Embed Documented in Inspection Report but not in
Installation Check List
8-30
Incorrect Entries in Weld Inspection Report
8-32
Plate Orientation not Identified on Inspection Report
8-36
Drawing did not Show Stamp Identifying Support Attachment
to Derated Embed Plate
8-37
In:orrect Drawing Numbers Listed for Embeds to Inspection
Report
'
8-38
Incorrect Heat Number on Weld Inspection Report
8-39
Incorrect Heat Number on Weld Inspection Report
8-40
Weld Electrode Difference Between Weld Specification
and Inspection Report
8-47
Omitted Final Inspection of Embeds and Evidenced by
two Civil Deviation Reports
.
These were examined by the inspectors for attributes that included
the following:
_
_-
_
__
-
._.
._
,-
~
.
r,
- Problem statement clarity
Response statement adequacy
RRT conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC information.
Five of the fifteen Findings listed in Subsection 6.2.3.3 of
the Module also were selected for detailed examination. These
were 8-29, 8-32, 8-36, 8-37, and 8-47.
The general examination of the 15 Findings and the detailed
examination of five of the 15 did not disclose verification
errors.
(4)
Phase III Examination
d
Phase III of the RRT Construction Prcgram Verification involved a
detailed walkdown review of the Structural Steel and the Embedments
hardware categories.
This was done to ascertain whether the
installation was made in accord with the design drawings, construction
specifications and erection procedures.
The RRT walkdown did.not include the liner plate system installation.
The justification cited for this decision included the following:
- GPC maintained a Quality' Control Surveillance section that
monitored the CB&I Quality Control efforts throughout the liner
plate phase of the project.
Visual inspection of the completed and -painted installation was
not a practical way to observe geometric errors since painting had
obliterated survey markings.
Visual inspection of welding quality was substantially precluded
by painting.
- Past independent examination of weld radiography provided
confidence for welding quality.
(a)
Liner Plates System.
The RRT decision not to include a liner
plate walkdown in the Readiness Review was examined in the
light of the inspectors' general walk through in all areas of
the containment.
Specifically observed were the polar crane
girder, rails and support brackets along with the general
liner system fitup.
No deficiencies were noted and the RRT
position of deleting the liner plate walkdown was accepted.
(b)
Structural Steel.
The RRT walkdown of structural steel included
an assessment of four categories. These were structural steel
erection; polar crane girders and rails; drilled in anchors; and
embeds, supports and restraints inside the containment building.
The samples walked down generally were the same as those selected
by the RRT for the Phase II documentation review previously
_ _.
._.
.
.
.
.
E
described in 3.h(3)(b). The exception was that the structural
member sample was limited to the original 22 selected for
documentation check. The additional six previously selected for
removal documentation check were not included for walkdown
since the RRT selection was for system check purposes.
The structural steel erection category was _ selected for NRC
inspection from the four categories reviewed by the RRT.
This was on the basis of representing the largest number of
items within s+.ructural steel and having five of the six RRT
findings.
The inspectors' walkdown involved the same six
structural members for which documentation was examined under
the Phase II review.
This included three beams within the
RRT sample and three selected by the inspectors outside of
the sample. The six are listed in 3.h(3)(b) of this report.
The walkdown involved a field examination of the selected
beam for proper installation including the following attributes:
Section conformance to design drawing
Joint makeup conformance to design drawing
Condition conformance to that described in a Module Finding
that pertained to the beam.
The inspectors discovered that the nonstandard copes reported
for beam piece marked M22-151 in Finding 8-13 had been modified.
Each of the two copes had been ground to the 1/2 inch radius
required by the AISC specification. This had been done despite
the promulgation of Civil Deviation Report (CD)-07894 dated
June 11, 1985 which allowed the nonstandard copes.
The_ rework
was discovered to have been documented within CD-07671 dated
April 25, 1985. No evidence was found indicating that beam
rework, such as noted in CD-07671, had been discovered by the
RRT in the preparation of the Module which had a cutoff date of
April 30, 1985.
This was despite the investigation made
pursuant to Finding 8-13 noted on Module page 6.2-39.
The inspectors also discovered that the connections to Monorail
beam piece marked M54-427 had been reworked.
Examination of
the documentation record disclosed that the monorail was
replaced later with beams of larger section starting with a
removal request dated May 28, 1985 and completing with an
inspection report dated August 26, 1985. The beam-design piece
mark prefix was changed from M19 to M54 on the drawings to
reflect the new beam sections.
The structural steel erection walkdown did not disclose
verification errors other than noted above.
Five RRT Findings resulting from the Phase III Construction
Program Verification are reported in Module Subsection 6.2.4.2
for structural steel erection as follows:
8-11 Joint Status Report Errors
.8-12 Significant Beam Mill Imperfection
8-13 Incorrect Beam Cope Radius
8-14 Bolt Threads not Fully Engaged
8-86 Welding not Meeting Visual Acceptance Criteria
8-51 Maxi-Bolt Edge Distance and Location Tolerance
Violations.
None of the foregoing resulted from the Polar Crane Girder and
Rail walkdown., One Finding resulted from the Drilled-in
Anchors and none resulted from the Embeds, Supports, and
Restraint (inside containment) walkdowns.
The Findings were
examined by the inspectors for attributes that included:
Problem statement clarity
Response statement adequacy
RRT conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC information.
Three of the five Erection and the one Drilled-in-Anchor
Findings were examined in detail by the inspector. These were
8-12, 8-13, 8-51 and 8-86.
The examination of the six Findings and the detailed examina-
tion of four of the six did not disclose verification errors
other than those related to Finding 8-13.
(c)
Embedments.
The RRT walkdown of Embedments was conducted for
embedded items that were not installed as a part of the NSSS.
The walkdown objective was to evaluate Embed Pour Package
completeness.
One placement from each year was selected with
the added goal of a sample that reflected each building in-
volved in Module 8.
Four additional slabs also were selected
to provide anchor bolts for the sample. The foregoing resulted
in 32 assessments from which 10 were selected for walkdown.
Walkdown was also conducted for 14 derated embeds selected at
random from the nearly 140 within the Module 8 scope.
The RRT walkdown review was examined by NRC using the same
embed sample used by the inspectors for the documentation
examination under Phase II.
The embeds and anchor bolts
examined under the four assessment packages are listed in
3.h(3)(c) of this report. A discrepancy was found in package
number 15A. One specific embed described in the documentation
did not cross check with the component observed in the field.
A 100% reverification of associated field components was made
to check the embed assessment packages.
The reverification
walkdown involved a field examination of the
selected embeds for proper appearance including the following
attributes:
Located where described on drawing
Physical appearance as described on drawing
- Condition conformance to that described in any Module
Finding pertaining to the embed.
The inspector discovered that a 4 x 11-1/2 x 1-1/4 inch shim
plate had been installed in addition to the normally required
nut and washer for anchor bolt C125-2024. The addition was not
listed in Assessment Package Number 23A.
Review of additional
documentation not included within the Assessment Package
(FCRB 9192 and CD-4902) disclosed that slotted holes were
required in the 1-3/4 inch base plates of the Reactor Head
Support Assembly in order to match the four anchor bolts as
installed.
The shim plate was needed due to these slotted
holes.
The five RRT Findings resulting from the Construction Program
Verification for the embed walkdown are reported in Subsec-
tion 6.2.4.3 of the Module as follows:
8-28 Three Pour Packages not Found
8-35 Non-Correspondence Between Inspection Reports and Embeds
8-42 Incorrect Pour Boundary Notation
8-44 Non-Correspondence Between Field Change Request and
Quality Control Documentation
8-72 Incorrect As-Built Notations.
These were examined by the inspectors for attributes that
included:
Problem statement clarity
Response statement adequacy
RRT conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC information.
All of the foregoing findings were examined in detail by the
inspectors.
This detailed examination disclosed a discrepancy
similar to that resulting in Finding 8-72.
This finding
addressed deviations between embed drawings and installations
that were not properly covered by Design Change Notices or
i
l
!
-
properly dispositioned Deviation Reports. The RRT advised that
significant changes in administrative practice occurred after
the Module data cutoff date of April 30, 1985 relative to
Finding 8-72.
Included in these was the requirement for field
verification of all as-built conditions prior to change docu-
mentation finalization.
This change in field practice was.
documented in the Bechtel Power Company's Project Review Manual
change effective December 9,~
1985.
Deviation Report CD-8487
had been issued covering the discrepancy found by the quality
inspector.
Review of the foregoing by the NRC inspectors
resulted in acceptance of the action taken and restored confi-
dence in the documentation element.
The detailed examination of the five findings did not disclose
verification errors.
(5)
Project Welding Program
The Project Welding Program RRT review involved checking tic follow-
ing three aspects of general project welding:
1 Receipt of weld filler material
2 Control of received weld filler material
3 Development of the Weld Procedure Specification (WPS) and Proce-
dure Qualification Record (PQR) documents.
The foregoing made use of the check list format displayed in
Figure 6.2-7 of the Module.
Neither examination of in process welding nor structural welding was
included in the RRT project welding review. The RRT considered that
examination of end process welding activities had been performed in
conjunction with documentation checks and hardware walkdowns -for
specific components within this Module or as a part of the review for
other Modules.
The decision not to make a general review of structural welding was
examined by the inspectors. Support for this decision was found by
noting that a comprehensive review of welding to the American Welding
Society Stuctural Welding Code had been conducted as a part of the
recently completed GPC Quality Control Audit GD08-84/87. Ali find-
ings from that audit have been closed out. The inspectors reviewed
the audit and verified closure on a sample of three of the audit
findings (725-111, 727-111 and 728-111). The foregoing was accepted
by the_ inspectors as sufficient justification for the decision not to
review welding process on a project wide basis as a part of the
Module 8 review.
(a)
Material Receipt. The RRT review of weld filler material
receipt involved selecting 20 purchase orders from the total of
58 used for procurement.
The documentation for each selected
.
-
.
..
.
.
purchase order was checked for a receipt inspection report and
a CMTR..The CMTR was verified against the applicable material
specification and purchase order requirements for one heat and
lot number. The review covered coated and uncoated rods along
with the nine different material types listed in Module sub-
section 6.2.5.1.
A total of 12 Receipt Inspection Reports and
12 CMTRs were checked within the 20 purchase orders.
No
findings resulted from this RRT review.
The RRT review of receipt documentation was examined by select-
ing three of the nine material types for reverification as
follows:
Purchase
Material
Electrode
Heat /
Order
Type
Size
Lot Number
PAV 2852
E7018
1/8
02-1-E929T
PAV 2652
E7018
1/8
02-2-E929T
PAV 9123
ER-309L
.
1/16
X49264
PAV 9123
ER-Ni-Cr-M03
1/16
HNX04E3AK
Credit was taken for the past NRC inspections of the Project
Welding Program outlined in subsection 5.2 of the Module.
These are listed in greater detail on pages 9 through 15 of the
Module Section 5 Audit Matrix and include the following specif-
ic reports of welding inspections:
78-09
80-02
80-13
81-02
81-04
81-08
81-10
82-05
82-10
82-23
82-24
82-29
83-16
84-05
84-12
84-17
84-22
84-26
84-30
84-36
85-01
85-03
85-08
85-14
The past inspections generally included verification of receipt
documentation.
The foregoing examination, with one exception, did not disclose
verification errors. The RRT records were found to be inade-
quate to support the original RRT verification of receipt-
documentation for Lot 02-2-E 929T.
(b)
Material Control.
The RRT review of weld filler material
control involved reviewing 14 issue logs and the qualification
certification for 14 welders who drew materials as evidenced by
entries in the logs. The review also included checking 10 weld
material distribution centers operated by GPC and four contrac-
tors.
These were checked for oven temperature, type / lot
separation and material control. Ten welders were interviewed
to determine the extent of their knowledge of the applicable
control procedures. No discrepancies or findings resulted from
this revie i
This part of the Readiness Review was examined by making a spot
check of the check lists filled. out by the RRT along with
examining representative examples of supporting documentation.
including welder qualification records. One of the inspectors
had made many of the past NRC welding inspections referred to
in paragraph 3.h(5)(a) preceding.
Credit was taken for the
interviews and examinations of similar data which led to
satisfactory conditions after closecut of findings.
(c)
Welding Procedures Specifications.
The RRT review of the
Welding Procedure Specification and Procedure Qualification
Record development involved selection of Pullman. Power Products
(PPP) from among the four compar.ies involved in the project
welding progras Pullman /Kenith Fortson (PKF) and GPC had been
included in the GPC audit discussed in paragraph 3.h(5) preced-
ing. CB&I had been subject to an internal Quality Program that
was monitored by GPC as described in paragraph 3.h(3)(a)
preceding.
Eight of 60 PPP Welding Procedure Specifications
were selected for examination. These were verified to assure
that.they were supported by the applicable Procedure Qualifi-
cation Records for each variable on the Readiness Review
checklist and for conformance to ASME requirements.
This part of the Readiness Review was examined by making a spot
check of the checklists filled out by the RRT along with
examining representative examples of' supporting documentation.
The inspector had made many of the past NRC welding inspections
referred to in paragraph 3.h(5)(a) preceding. Credit was taken
-for those examinations of similar information and which led to
satisfactory conditions after closecut of findings.
!
The RRT Finding 8-85 resulting from the WPS/PQR review and
reported in subsection 6.2.5.3.1.2 of the Module was examined-
by the inspector for attributes that included:
Problem statement clarity
Response statement adequacy
RRT conclusion logic
Finding conflict with other NRC information.
f
The foregoing examination of the review performed by the RRT
and of Finding 8-85 did not disclose verification errors.
(6)
Inspection Results
The examination of the Construction Program Verification subsection
resulted in Unresolved Item 424/86-03-03, High strength bolted
connections. Details for this are presented in paragraph 3.h(3)(b).
The examination also resulted in Deficiency Item 424/86-18-02, Module
Data Deficiencies.
Details for this are presented in para-
graphs 3.h(3)(a), 3.h(3)(c), 3.h(4)(b) and 3.h(4)(c). The subsection
.
-. -.
- -, _
__.
--
.-
_
examination did not disclose substantial verification errors, other
than noted above, or further basis for programmatic concern.
Follow
up or additional evaluation, other than noted above, is not required.
1. Section 7.0 - Independent Design Review
(1) Review Introduction and Section Examination
This section of the module presents Revision 1 of report of Stone and
Webster Engineering Corporation dated October 7, 1985.
It is a report
of that firm's review of the Module 8.related design for Vogtle 1 by the
Bechtel Power Corporation. The report' includes a review of the Southern
Company Services reanalysis of the Turbine Building which is not a part
of the Category I structui-al steel addressed by Module 8.
The report
was organized into six subsections described as follows:
7.1
Introduction - Provides background information.
7.2
Scope - Outlines the review scope which included the technical
aspects of the Civil / Structural design of structural steel, steel
liners, embedments, structural welding, deviation evaluation /
_
dispositioning, and reportable deficiency analysis.
7.3
Review Methodology - Details-the review methodology, sample
selection and justification for samples selected.
7.4
Review Summary - Summarizes the review and review results.
7.5
Review Findings'- Lists the review findings (concerns and observa-
tions), project response and the Independent Design Review (IDR)
assessment of the response.
7.6
Conclusions - Presents the overall evaluations and conclusions of
the IDR team with respect to the work reviewed.
The report was supplemented with the following Appendices:
A Review Plan
B Team Members
C Documents Reviewed
D Personnel Contacts.
(a)
IDR Review. The licensee's Independent Design Review was examined
by the IE reviewers with the intent of determining if a thorough
review had been performed and if appropriate corrective action had
been outlined where necessary. This was accomplished by reviewing
Section 7 of the Module for content, coherence and completeness.
Specific design calculations were selected and independently
reviewed for proper approach and correct results.
Selected
drawings. were examined to veri fy correct transfer of design
detail.
The foregoing resulted in the following seven specific
observatio..s and requirement l
.
1 Auxiliary Building Calculation X2CK4.9.6 - Sheet 10 of this
calculation, for Level 1 of Miscellaneous Steel Platforms,
reflects the use of 15 psi for fluid pressure. The source of
this design criterion was not referenced and - the lack of
reference was not disclosed by the IDR. The justification for
use of the criterion is required.
2 Auxiliary Building Calculation X2CK4.9.6 - Steel
connection
details from Drawing AX2008G029 (Rev. 3) for Miscellaneous
Steel Platforms reflect non-correspondence with design calcula-
tion for the sizes of angles as follows:
Detail
Calculation
Drawing
7 x 7 x 1/2
6 x 4 x 1/2
8x6x1
8 x 6 x 1/2
An assessment of the foregoing non-correspondence and generic
implications inherent therein is required.
Internal Structural Steel - Category 1 Structure Designs
Involving Use of 25 Percent of the Design Live Load - Examina-
tion disclosed that only 25 percent of the design live load was
used when combined with earthquake loads. No justification was
given for the reduction from 100 percent of the design live
load. A meeting with Georgia Power Company and Bechtel Power
Corporation was held on July 23, 1986, to clarify this issue.
Applicant actions resulting from this meeting involved:
(1)
clarify the FSAR definition of " design live load", in particu-
lar the distinction between " pre-fuel live load"
(" maximum
design" live load) and the " post-fuel live load" (" maximum
anticipated" live load during operations), (2) clarify the FSAR
table to correlate the
"L" value in the table with the written
definition, and (3) respond to the staff's July 10, 1986,
request for additional information on the subject.
The staff
anticipated that these corrective actions will satisfactorily
resolve this issue and that they should be consistent with the
FSAR and Regulatory commitments.
4 Internal Structural Steel Sizing Calculations
X2CJ4.1.4.1
-
Examination of a similar calculation disclosed that preliminary
sizing of the steel members originally had been performed using
hand calculation methods.
Later, a computer model was devel-
oped and used for calculation X2CJ4.1.4.2 (Rev. 1).
Each
member was then checked against it's capacity to determine
structural
adequacy,
in
calculations X2CJ4.1.4.3 through
X2CJ4.1.4.10. It was noted during the inspection that the
latter calculations were not reviewed by the IDR team.
A
thorough review of two of these calculations is required. This
should start with input verification and continue through
design drawing comparison for each.
The selection of the
calculations should be as described in observation No. 7.
-
5 Polar Crane Ping Girder X2CJ4.5 (Rev.1) - Examination of this
calculation disclosed that input was obtained from the. crane
vendor (Whiting Corporation) calculations which were logged as
AX4AL01-46-2 (Polar Crane Seismic Report).
Examination also
disclosed that the.IDR did not check whether these design
inputs were correctly interpreted and transferred to structural-
calculations by the designer.
Verification of the correct
interpretation of this input data for the polar crane ring
girder calculation is required.
6 Turbine Building Structure Interaction - Examination - of data
from the licensee's reanalysis of the building structure
pursuant to Module 8 Findings 8-73 and 8-79 resulted in two
additional issues.
These relate to interaction on adjacent
Category I structures.
(1)
Justification was not provided for why two turbine
building cranes were not modeled in the calculations
associated with Seismic Analysis of Turbine Building and
Turbine Building Space Frame Analysis, since there
appears to be no physical or procedural restrictions
preventing both cranes from being in one turbine
building.
(2)
The Licensee did not address the consequences of interac-
tion between the turbine pedestal and turbine building
structural steel on the main steam piping analysis. This
should include an assessment of its impact upon the the
design adequacy of piping anchors separating the turbine
building from Category I structures.
7 Containment Internal Structural Steel - Examination disclosed
that the IDR was broadly scoped in combination with the imposed
time restraints.
Two additional calculation reviews are
required to assure that relevant design considerations are
covered by the IDR for Containment Internal Structural Steel.
The calculations are to be selected by the licensee to cover
(1) the design of a vertical frame and (2) the design of a
floor frame below the operating deck.
The design calculation
review should include input data verification, calculation
review, and design drawing comparison.
(b)
Findings Review.
A total of 19 findings are listed in subsec-
tion 7.5 of the Module as follows. Eight of these were listed as
" concerns" and eleven as " observations."
8-58 Concern 1 - Prying Action on Embedments
8-62 Concern 2 - Headed Concrete Anchor Capacity
8-64 Concern 3 - Torsion Secondary Effects
8-57 Concern 4 - Encroachment of the Isolatien Gap Between the
Containment Liner Plate and the Interna; Structural Steel
8-73 Concern 5 - Turbine Building Interaction Between the Turbine
Pedestal and the Structural Steel
8-74 Concern 6 - Misapplication of the Velocity Pressure Co-
efficient C in the Turbine Building Tornado Design -
q
8-77 Concern 7 - Incomplete Stress Evaluation of Several Turbine
Building Columns
8-79 Concern 8 - Lack of Conformance to the Design Criteria by
Southern Company Services
8-56 Observation 1 - Volumetric Examination of Containment Liner
Plate Repair Weld in Accordance with DRs CD-734 and CD-735
8-59 Observation 2 - Material Traceability Requirement of Speci-
fication X2AH01
8-60 Observation 3 - Voided Deviation Report CD-974
8-61 Observation 4 - Improper ASTM A563 Nut Grade Designation
8-63 Observation 5 - Material Traceability Documentation for DR
CD-501
8-65 Observation 6 - Verifying Concrete Expansion Anchor Embed-
ment Depth
8-66 Observation 7 - Effective Issue of AISC Specification
8-67 Observation 8 - Structural Welding
8-76 Observation 9 - Turbine Building Calculation Addresses but
does not Reference Loading Combinations
8-75 Observation 10 - Improper Design Location of the Tornado on
the Turbine Building
8-78 Observation 11 - Superseded Portions of Calculations are not
Identified.
The more significant of the foregoing 19 findings and corrective
actions were examined by the IE reviewers to verify validity and
implementation.
Other than the Turbine Building Issues (two
cranes analysis and interaction consequences with Category I
structures), no verification errors were found in the examination
of findings.
(2).
Inspection Results
The examination of the Independent Design Review resulted in the
following eight requirements for action:
._.
-
-..
-
1 Inspector Follow-up Item 424/86-18-04 - Unreferenced Fluid Pres-
sure for Auxiliary Building Structural Steel - Follow-up on source
of 15 psi criterion for fluid pressure and explanation of omission
in calculation- (IE Open Item 85-64R-02). Details for this are
provided in 3.1.(1)(a) Item 1.
2 Deficiency Item 424/86-18-05 - Beam Connection Angle Discrepan-
'cies - Connection details differing between design and drawing (IE
Open Item 85-64R-03). Details for this are provided in 3.1.(1)(a)
Item 2.
3 Unresolved Item 424/86-18-06 - Live Load Reduction - Use of 25% of
live load when combined with seismic loads for structural steel
design.
Details for this are provided in 3.i.(1)(a) Item 3.
4 Inspector Follow-Up Item 424/86-18-07 - Structural Sizing Calcula-
tion Review - Follow-up on the review of _ two calculations for
- member sizing along with transfer of. data to drawings.
Details
for this are provided in 3.1.(1)(a) Item 4.
5 Inspector Follow-Up Item 424/86-18-08 - Polar Crane Ring Girder
Calculations - Follow-up on proper incorporation of crane vendor
input _ into design (IE Open Item 3.n.(1)(a) Item 5. Details for
this are provided in 3.i.(1)(a) Item 5.
6 Unresolved Item 424/86-18-09 - Turbine Building Crane Modeling
Location - Space frame modeling accomplished with one and not two
cranes being positioned within the same turbine building (IE Open
Item 85-64R-05). Details for this are provided in
3.1.(1)(a)
Item 6.
7 Unresolved Item 424/86-18-10 - Turbine Building Main Steam Piping.
Interaction - Interaction of turbine pedestal and building struc-
tursl steel with main steam piping anchors (IE Open Item
Details for this are provided in 12.a(1), Item 6.
8 Inspector Follow-Up Item 424/86-18-03 - Frame Calculation Review -
Follow-up on the review of two calculations, one for vertical
frame-and the second for floor, framing below the operating ' level
Details for this are provided in
3.i.(1)(a) Item 7.
The section examination did not disclose substantial verification
errors, in addition to the foregoing, or further basis for program-
matic concern.
Followup or additional evaluation, other than noted
above,- is not required.
j. Section 8.0 - Program Assessment / Conclusions
(1)
Review Introduction and Section Examination
This section of the module provides a summary of open corrective
actions, five certifications from review managers or participants,
and mini-resumes for the various RRT members.
The information
presented and the lack of explanation of its significance relative to
,
__.
._
section.titlef is not in keeping with the generally descriptive
lead-in contained in the other. sections of the Module.
The examinatien of the section by the inspectors involved a reading
for content.and background information. The open corrective action
presents finding 8-91 which relates to subsection 6.1, Design Program
Verification. This lists the following three actions with targeted
completion dates.
1 Revise procedures to require that Civil / Structural design calcula-
tions be issued prior to release of associated drawing for con-
struction - October 30, 1985.
2 Provide QA surveillance that the requirements of item 1 preceding
are met - action is on going.
3 Veri fy
design
loads
through
the
load
tracking
program - July 1, 1986.
Examination disclosed that item 1 preceding was completed and has
been implemented. Item 3 was observed as being in progress using the
BPC STRIVE computer program.
Preliminary results were shown to the
inspectors during February 1986.
(2)
Inspection Results
Inspector followup Item 424/86-03-02, STRIVE Load Attachment Program,
was opened to provide for later review of the currently incomplete
load tracking effort listed within subsection 6.1.4 of the Module 8
under Finding 8-91.
The section examination did not disclose sub-
stantial verification errors or the basis for programmatic concern.
Follow up or additional evaluation, other than noted above,- is not
required.
4. Findings
The following fourteen findings were identified during the NRC evaluation of
the Module. All of the deficiencies noted are considered to have minimal
safety significance at this point of review but should be evaluated further to
preclude safety problems.
These have been identified as Unresolved Items
(URI), Inspector Followup Items (IFI) or Deficiency Items (DI) depending on
the nature of the followup action required.
These will be addressed by the
NRC during the routine inspection program unless designated as closed in the
finding.
W
1 Deficiency (URI 424/86-03-03) - High Strength Bolted Connections - Poten-
tial overtension in high strength steel bolts used primarily for friction
type connection of structural steel members. Details for this are provided
in 3.h(3)(b) of this report.
2 Deficiency (URI 424/86-03-02) - Polar Crane Design - Missing design calcu-
lations for mid-height loads on containment polar crane under seismic
loading conditions. Details for this are provided in 3.g(3)(g) of this
report.
.
__
_
_
_ _ _. _. _
_ - - _ _ _ _ _
3 Deficiency. (URI 424/86-18-06) - Live Load Reduction - Use of 25% of live
load when combined with seismic loads for structural steel design. Details
for this are provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 3, of this report.
4 Deficiency (URI 424/86-18-09) - Turbine Building Crane Modeling Loca-
tion - Space frame modeling accomplished with one and not two cranes being
positioned within the same turbine building (IE Open Item 85-64R-05).
Details for this are provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 6, of this report.
5 Deficiency (URI 424/86-18-10) - Turbine Building Main Steam Piping Interac-
tion - Interaction of turbine pedestal and building structural steel with
main steam piping anchors (IE Open Item 85-64R-06). Details for this are
provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 6, of this report.
6 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-03-01) - STRIVE Load Attachment Program - Uncom-
pleted computer analysis of category I structural framing for load distri-
bution to members of the framework.
Details for this are provided in
3.a(1)(c) and 3.g(3)(1) of this report.
7 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-07-02) - Module 8 items assigned to other modules.
Follow up to assure that items generally related to Module 8 components and
systems, but excluded from the Module 8 review by boundary definition, are
picked up in other modules.
Details for this are provided in 3.a(1)(b),
3.d(1)(b), and 3.g(3)(d) of this report.
8 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-18-01) - Commitment Deficiencies - Follow up on
correction of deficiencies reported by NRR for Commitments 981, 1606, and
1995. Details for this are provided in 3.c(1)(a) of this report.
9 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-18-03) - Frame Calculation Review - Follow-up on the
review of two calculations, one for vertical frame and the second for floor
framing below the operating level (IE Open Item 85-64R-01).
Details for
this are provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 8, of this report.
10 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-18-04) - Unreferenced Fluid Pressure for Auxiliary
Building Structural Steel - Follow-up on source of 15 psi criterion for
fluid pressure and explanation of omission in calculation (IE Open Item
85-64R-02). Details for this are provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 1, of this
report.
11 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-18-07) - Structural Sizing Calculation P.eview -
Follow-up on the review of two calculations for member sizing along with
transfer of data to drawings. Details for this are provided in 3.i(1)(a),
Item 4, of this report.
12 Deficiency (IFI 424/86-18-08) - Polar Crane Ring Girder Calculations -
Follow-up on proper incorporation of crane vendor input into design (IE
Open Item 85-64R-04). Details for this are provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 5,,
of this report.
13 Deficiency (DI 424/86-18-05) - Beam Connection Angle Discrepancies -
Connection details differing between design and drawing (IE Open Item
Details for this are provided in 3.i(1)(a), Item 2, of this
report.
_ -.
- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
14 Deficiency (DI 424/86-18-02) - Module Data Deficiencies - Module presenta-
tion of information and data reflecting potential verification errors
requiring resolution during the examination in order to provide confidence
ia the licensee's review.
Details for this are provided in 3.c(1)(a),
3.d(1)(d),
3.g(2)(a),
3.g(2)(b),
3.g(3)(a),
3.h(3)(a),
3.h(3)(c),
3.h(4)(b), and 3.h(4)(c) of this report.
5. Conclusions
Based upon the the review within the scope of this module, the NRC has reached
the following conclusions for structural steel for Vogtle Unit 1.
a. Summary of Specific Conclusions
With the exceptions l f those items / areas discussed earlier the following
o
has been determined to be acceptable.
(1)
Boundaries - The content of Module 8 and the boundaries between other
modules as given in Section 1.0 were reviewed and found to be com-
plete and definitive. However, further NRC review is needed for the
STRIVE Load Attachment Program and Module 8 type items assigned to
other modules as identified in Section 4.
(2)
Organization - The description of the organization and responsibili-
ties for project activities as given in Section 2 was reviewed and
found to be accurate and to include the pertinent activities for
design, field construction, and procurement.
(3)
Commitments - The commitments as given in Section 3.0 were reviewed
and determined to be complete.
With exception of deficiencies
identified in Section 4 for commitments 981, 1606, and 1995, the
licensing commitments and implementing documents were determined to
be in compliance with the FSAR, the SRP, Regulatory Guides, and
industry codes and standards.
(4)
Program - The description of the program as given in Section 4.0 was
reviewed. The following areas were examined:
- Design Control
- Material Procurement
- Training and Qualification
- Fabrication, Installation and Inspection Project Welding
The program description was determined to be generally correct and in
agreement with FSAR and project requirements.
However, potential
module data deficiencies were identified as reported in Section 4.
(5)
Audits and Special Investigations - Section 5.0 on audits was re-
viewed and determined to be an accurate presentation of the audit
process and previously identified construction problems and NRC
inspection result _
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(6)
Program Verification - GPC performed a program verification in two
parts; a design process verification and a construction program
verification.
Construction verification included a walkdown of
hardware items within the scope of Module 8 and a review of the
project welding program.
The design process verification examined the implementation within
the design documents of all licensing commitments which were identi-
fied as having design cognizance. This was completed in two phases.
Phase I include verification of all commitments into project design
criteria or other procedures considered as first order design docu-
ments. A selected portion was further reviewed for implementation
into specific second order design documents including calculations,
drawings, specifications and vendor submittals.
Phase II consisted
of the examination of selected second order design documents for
compliance with project procedures and industry standards.
The
design verification identified six findings which were categorized on
the basis of their individual significance and cumulative program-
>
matic effects.
The construction program verification was completed in three phases.
Phase I consisted of the examination of the implementation of all
licensing commitments which were identified as having construction
cognizance.
Phase II was a technical review of the construction
records to verify that necessary documentation requirements were met
and to establish confidence on the quality of the work done.
Phase III consisted of a field walkdown of selected hardware items to
verify their conformance with appropriate design drawings, construc-
l
tion specifications, and installation procedures.
The project
'
welding program was reviewed as an additional part of the construc-
tion verification.
Thirty-nine findings were identified during
'
construction program verification.
These were categorized on the
basis of their individual and programmatic significance.
The review conducted by the Readiness Review staff for the design and
construction verification programs was determined to be comprehensive
and adequate.
Findings were of minor significance in that the
violations of licensing commitments, project procedures or engineer-
ing requirements which were identified did not have attendant safety
concerns.
The resolution of the findings was determined to be
adequate. Quality records indicated that they were representative
evidence of quality control for work within the scope of the module
and that the work was being controlled in accordance with applicable
requirements.
The project welding program was determined to be
comprehensive and in compliance with applicable requirements.
The
NRC field examinations completed for this section further support the
above determinations.
However, the NRC review of this section
resulted in the identification of potential programmatic deficiencies
with regard to high strength bolted connections and polar crane
design. These are identified as as unresolved items in paragraph 4.
Additional potential module data deficiencies were also identified as
reported in Section 4.
l
l
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
(7)
Independent Design Review - GPC contracted an outside organization,
Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, to perform an Independent
. Design Review (IDR) for Module 8.
This review was. performed to
assess the technical adequacy of.the Module 8 related design for
Vogtle 1.
With the exception of these items and the possible generic
implications thereof, identified in Section 4, the NRC concluded that
the IDR program for Module 8 was comprehensive and adequate. The NRC
agrees with the findings and their disposition except for those items
listed in Section 4.
b. General Conclusions
The examination performed by NRC indicated that this module presents an
adequate assessment of the GPC process for design, fabrication, installa-
tion and inspection of structural steel for Vogtle 1.
GPC's management supported the Readiness Review by active participation and
adequate resources. There was no evidence of coercion or attempt to dilute
either the effort or the findings.
The Readiness Review Staff displayed
the requisite, competence and professionalism for a review of this nature.
The review performed by the Readiness Review Staff was determined to be
sufficiently comprehensive in scope and depth to identify problem areas,
and the dispositions of findings determined to be adequate. The procedures
for design, engineering,- construction, and quality control were determined
to be consistent with commitments and are acceptable. Based on the review
of this module, it appears that construction was performed in accordance
with the appropriate procedures and that records reflect the quality of
that construction.
With exception of the unresolved items reported in Section 4,
the NRC
findings appear to have minor significance and do not appear to represent
significant programmatic weaknesses. The unresolved items must be further
evaluated to determine their significance and need for any subsequent
corrective actions.
Pending resolution of the findings identified above, the NRC concludes that
the Vogtle program for structural steel components and systems complies
with NRC requirements and FSAR commitments. This conclusion is based on
information currently available to the inspectors and reviewers.
Should
subsequent contradictory information become available it will be evaluated
to determine what effect it may havt on the above conclusion.
6.. References
1. Vogtle Electric Generating Plcnt, Readiness Review, Module 8, Structural
Steel.
2. November 12, 1985, letter from D. O. Foster, Vice President and Project
General Manager, Vogtle Project, Georgia Power Company forwarding Module 8
for NRC evaluation.
3. January 24, 1986, letter from D. O. Foster forwarding revisions to the
l
projects response on finding 8-72.
l
!
!
l
..
4. April 30, 1986, letter from D. O. Foster forwarding corrections in the
commitment and implementation matrices.
_
_
_ - -. _ _
. -..
. -
-
- - - -
-.
-
..
.
..
.
.
.
TABLE 1
COP 9tlIMENT VERIFICATION
Commitment Crnamitment
Verifleil Ftrst
Ref No.
Sourc e
Section
Comaltment Subject
Doctanent Feature
Order Document
verfified Second Order Document
360
9.1.5.1
Spent Fuel Cask Bridge
Yes
Yes
Crane Design
185
F 544
3.1.1
Conformance With NRC
10 CFR 50 App. A
Yes
General iksign
CDC-2
j
Criteria, Overall
l
Requirements
l
l
193
ISAR
3.l.2
Conformance With NRC
10 CIR 50 App. A.
Yes
l
GDC, Protection By
I
Multiple Fission
Product Derriers
Bil
F SAW
3.1.5
Conformance With NRC
10 CFR 50, App. A,
Yes
GDC, Reactor
Containment
l
815
F 5AR
3.1.5
Conf ormance With NRC
10 CFR 50, App. A,
Yes
'
GDC, Reactor
f.DC-53
ContalinenL
cn
886
3.2.2-1
Principal Codes and
AISC-69
Yes
Yes (Note 3)
"
Standards for
l
'
i.3.2.2-1
965
3.6.2.3
Pipe Whip Restraints
A Rebound Factor of
Yes
Analysis and Design
1.1 15 Applied to the
,
Jet ihrust Force
1012
3.7.B.3.1
Cat. I Subsystems and
Modal Response
Yes
Components
Spectrum or
.
Equivalent Static
l
Load Method
l
1026
3.8.1.2
Containment Design
10 CfR 50, App. A.
Yes
1028
3. 8.1. 2
Containment Design
10 CFR 50, App. A.
Yes
1051
3.8.l.4
Concrete Containment,
BC-IOP-l
Yes
Yes
Design and Analysis
Procedure, Liner
Plate and Anchor
System
,
u--___
,.
._. _ -.
-
_
_ _.. _ _ _.
-.
.
TABLE I (continued)
-
Comt!TMENT VERIFICATION
Commitment Commitment
Vertfled First
Ref No.
Source
Section
Caumitment Suldect
Document Feature
Order Document
Jrfif ted Second Order Docissent
1099
3.8.1.6
Containment Liner
ASME SA-516, Grade 70
Yes
Plate Greater than
1/4 in.
,
,
1910
3.8.1.1
Containment Shell
Attachments to the
No (Note,)
Yes (by inspection of
r
Shell Such as
6 construction drawings in
Brackets for
aJJltion to Module listing)
Flectrical Supports
are Anchored into the
Shell Concrete
'
Ill7
3.8.2.8
Standard Review Plan
Yes
Evaluation
NE-3000
1120
3.8.3.2
Containment-Internal
10 CFR 50 App. A.
Yes
Structures
1841
3.8.3.4.9
Containment-Internal
AISC-1969
Yes
Yes (Notes 3. 4)
Structure,
Intermediate Slabs and
Platforms, Steel Design
c1
1846
3.8.3.4.10
Containment-Internal
AISC-1969
Yes
Yes (Notes 3, 4)
(a)
Structure, Polar Crane
Runway Box Girders
1161
3.8.4-1
Other Cat. I Str. Stl.
Steel Load Comb. for
Yes
Yes (Note 3)
Load Comb. for Elastic
Elastic Design Methnd.
Method
(AISC-1969)
1162
3.8.4-2
Other Cat. I Str. Stl.
Steel Load Comb. for
No (plastic design
Load Comb, for Plastic
Plastic Design Method
notused)
Method
(AISC-l%9)
ll10
ISAR
3.8.4.2
Othcr Seismic Category
10 CFR 50, App. A.
Ves
I Structures, General
GDC 2-
Design Criteria
1179
ISAR
3.8.4.3
Other Cat. I Structures,
AISC, Part I, Elastic
Yes
Yes (Note 3)
Load Comb., Stl.
Idorking Stress Methods
Structures
1295
3.C.P.2
Design of Structure
Equation 2-1 in FSAR
Yes
for fornado Missile
3.C.2.2. Min. Steel
lupact, Steel Elements
Thickness for Missile
impact
_.
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ ___,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _..
_, _
.
'
.
TA8LE I (continued)
00pmIIMENT VERIFICAf10N
Comenttment Conusliment
Vertfled First
.
.
Ref No.
Source
Section
Commiltment Subject
Docisment Feature
Order Ibcisment
__Verfif ted Second order Docunient
1299
3.C.2.2
Design of Structure
lhe Threshold Value
Yes (Note 6)
for fornado Missile '
is increased by 251
Isipact Steel Elements-
To obtain the besign
Thickness
1325
6.2. 1-1
Containment Design
Contaleanent Calc.
Yes
Limits and Calculated
Peak Design Pressure
Containment Peak Pressure 52 psig. -3 psig
.
and Temperature
Design Temperature
400 Degrees F.
1339
6.2.7.1
Fracture Prevention
10 Cf R So, App. A.
Yes (consultment
of Containment Pressure
subject incorrect
Boundary.
In matrix)
1492
I.2.12.1
Integrity and teak
Contaltunent is
Yes
Testing of Containment
Designed to Allow
Periodic Integrity
and leaktightness
Testing
um
1558
I.9.71
Welder Qual's For
ASME IX--
Yes
-*
Areas of timited
Accessibility
1570
1.9.85
Material Code Case
RG 1.85, Rev. 20
Yes
Accept. ASME III,
(Nov. 82)
Div. I
1572
1.9.85
Material Code Case
ASME III, Div. I
Yes
Accept. ASME III.
Div. I
1825
1.E.B.
C-79/12/28 Pipe Support Base Plate
"A Report on Pipe
Yes
Yes (Note 1)
Corres.
Designs Using Concrete
Support Base Plate
Concrete Espansion
Designs Using
Anchor Bolts
Concrete Expansion
Anchor Bolts"
,
Response of 12 28-79
1826
I.E.B.
C-80/06/26 Flued llead Containment
ASME Sec. III, 1977
Yes'
Corres.
Penetrations Fabrication
Ed. Including Addenda
and Inspection
Through Sunener 1978
, - -
r
. -
- -..
..
- _ _ -
.
.
TA8tE 1 (coctinued)
00pe4IIMENT VERIFICATION
Commitment Commitment
Verified First
Ref No.
Source
Section
Commitment Subject
Document Feature
Order Ducjament
Verfified Second Order Document
1827
I.E.8.
C-80/06/26 Flued HeaJ Containment
ASME Sec. Ill,1977.
Yes
Corres.
Penetrations, Installation Edition including
Addemia ihromjh
Winter 1977
'
1828
I.E.8.
C-80/06/26 Flued Head Contalsament
Welds Suject to 1005
Yes
Corres.
Sleeve to Flued Head
Radiography at Vendor
Weld For Penetrations
Shop in Accordance
With Intermediate
With NC-5200 and
Acceptance I.A.W.
NC-5320
1830
I.E.8.
C-80/06/26 Welding of Penetration
Welds Examined in
Yes
Corres.
Sleeve to Flued Head
Accordance with ASME
(or immediate Sleeve
Sec. Ill, Subsection
For Flued Heads Equipped
NE, Class MC, Which
With Intermediate Sleeve) Calls for 1005
,
Radlography
1854
FASR
1.9.19
Non-Destructive
RG 1.19, Rev.1
Yes
Examination of Primary
08/72
us
Containment Liner Welds
u1
i
1855
iSAR
1.9.31
Control of Ferrite
RG 1.31. Rev. 3
Yes
'
Content in Stainless
04/78
Steel Weld Metal
j'
1954
3.8.1.6
Containment Liner.
ASTM A108
Yes
Nelson Concrete
Anchor Stads Type H4
1%1
ISAR
3.8.1.6
Polar Crane Support
ASME SA-516, Grade 70
Yes (Implementation.
Bracket
Matrix should read
j
3.3.7 vice 3.3.6)
1%2
3.8.1.6
Polar Crane Support
ASME, Sec. Ill, Div.1
No (Note 5).
Yes
Brackets Exceeding.
Subs, NE. Subparagraph
,
$/8in. Thickness
NE-2321.2
1%3
3.8.1.6
NSSS Embeds Below
ASTM A 588. FY=50 KSI
No (Note 5)
Yes
8asemat Top and
Min.
'
Penetrating Pressure
Boundary
,
J
,
-
!
4
j _... -
-,
_ _ _ _
._
.
-
-
.
IABLE I (continued)
COMMIIMENT vtRIFICATION
Comenitment Connitment
Verified First
Ref No.
Source
Section
Commitment Subject
Document Feature
Order Document
Verfified Second Order Document
1%4
3.8.1.6
Containment Penetration
ASMC SA-333, GR 1 or.
Yes
6 or ASME SA-516,
GR. 10
1968
3. 8.1. 6
Nondestructive Exam.
of Containment Liner
1975
3.8.1.6
Containment QC
Liner Plate Erect.
Yes
Tolerances
,
1981
3.8.2.4
Stl. Cont., Equipment
Yes
Yes (Notes 3, 4)
llatch and Personnel
3000, 1974 Thru Summer
Lock Assembly, Design
1975 Addenda
1983
3.8.2.4
Steel Containment,
ASME Subsection NF,
Yes
Yes (Notes 3, 4)
Fuel Transfer Tube
1974 Thru Winter
Supports, Design
1976 Addenda
1981
3.8.2.2
Steel Containment,
10 CFR 50. Apsu J
Yes
Appilcable Codes,
Standards and
- '
Specifications
1988
3.8.3.6
Quality Control
Location of Embedded
No (Note 5)
Yes
Backing Bars i or -
1/2 in, of Horizontal
and Vertical Design
Locations
1999
ISAR
3.8.3.3
Containment-Internal
Load and Load
Yes
Yes (Note 3)
Structures
Combinations
i
2004
3.8.3.4.2
Containment-Internal
AISC-1969 ASME III,
No (Note 5)
Yes
!
Structures. Steam
Dib. 1. Sub. NF
Generator Support
,
System Embeds
2034
6.1.1.1
ESF Materials Integrity
Yes
of Safety Related
Components
2077
6. 7. 7
Fracture Prevention
10 CFR 50, App. A.
Yes
of Contaltunent Pressure
Boundary
i
.
!.-
_
_.___ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _.
.
.
TABLE I (continued)
COMMITMENT W RIFICAll0N
Cassettaent Caussitment
Verifled First
Ref No.
Source
Section
_Couenttment Sub. ject
Document Feature
Order Mument
Verfified Second Order Document
2083
6.2.7.2.C
Equi. Hatch, Personnel
ASME Sect. Ill, Div.
Yes
Yes
Lock and Escape Lock
I, Subs. NE 1974 Thru
Fracture Toughness
Suunner 1975 Addenda -
l
1esting
Fracture Toughness
Testing
3518
'FSAR
9.1.5.2
Contalrunent Polar Crane
A) Holding Brake
No (Note 5)
Yes (implementation section
Rated at 1255
should be 4.4.17 vice 4.4.1.1)
of Motor Full Lead
3712
NRC Quest.
Q210.45
Design of. Component
ASME Sect. Ill,
Yes
Yes (Notes 3, 4)
Corres.
Supports Embedded
Subsection NF and
Anchor Bolts and
NE.
.,
Concrete Expansion
'
Anchors
3113
NRC Quest.
Desigen of Component
Selected from
Yes
Corres.
Supports Ea6edded
Materials Listed in
Anchor Bolt Material
Appendia I of ASME
Sect. Ill, Div. I,
or Requested in
un
N
Accordance with
NA/NCA-1140
3130
F SAR
9.1.5.2
Structural Components
Designed For a. Full
Yes
Yes
capacity of 225 Tons
3740
9.1.S.2
Containment Polar Crane
225 Ton Capacity for
Yes
Yes
- Structural Components
Normal Plant
- Maulanus Holst Loads
Operation
in Design
!
4142
NRC Quest.
Q220.9
' Allowable Ductility
NUREG-0800, SRP 3.J.3
Yes
Corres.
Ratios for
App. A
Structural Steel
4694
3.8.3.6
Materials NSSS Embedded
SA-537. Class 1
Yes (taplementation
Yes (Notes 3, 4)
.
Items
is not specific for
I
required material)
<
,
.
a..
a
-_--. _ _ _ - -,._ -___ _ _____. -
. _ _ - _
. _..
.
_,
.
.
,
t
.
T ABLE ' I (continued)'
Cap 9tlTMENT VERIFICAfl0N
..
Commiltment Comunitment
Verified First
,
Ref No.
Source
Section
Comunitment Sub. lect
Document Feature
Order Document-
Verfified Second Order Docineent
"
4904
9.1.5.1
Safety Design Bases
IBUNEG-0612. Sect. 5.1
Yes
For OHtHS System
4986
NRC Quest.
Q210.21.
Pipe Whip
Dynamic increase
Yes
Corres.
Restralnts-Dynamic
Factors Tabit 210.21-1
Factors-Design
,
a
1.
The first five columns of this table are f rom the Section 3.4 Ceaunttment Matrix.
2.
The foregoing comunitments were verified for correct identification within 'the comunitment source and for correct implementation in first order
documents (design criteria). Additional verification was made as noted in second order documents such as procurement specifications, vendor -
,
sutunittals, construction drawings.
3.
Eleven conesitments listed above received.second order document verification pursuant to verifying the implementation listed in Table 6.1-2 of -
!
Module 8.
4.
Satisfactory second order implementation per Module Table 6.1-2 was inadequate. Second order implementation was varifled during leRC esamination
and the reconstruction of the data shown on Table 2 of this report.
U
5.
Comunilments for single case requirements were not entered into f trst order design criteria documents but directly into second order docussents.
6.
Design Criteria DC-1000-C specifies 251 while Reference 5 thereto specifies 151. Module Finding 8-68 resolved issue by showing that actual -
,
design used the required 251 increased thickness.
7.
Yes in last two columns means that comunitment was verified in the appropriate documents. No means that the comenttment could not be verified in
.
the appropriate documents.
!
i
.
I
i
,
4
-
i
!
7
I
w wm.s, m=
--+
i
- - -
-
..
r.
.
TABLE 2.
REVISED MODULE TABLE 6.1-2
. Second Order
Commitment
Source
Sub.iect
laplementation
Title
886
FSAR 3.2.2-1
AISC-1969
Calc. X20K2.4.2 (Rev.1) Structural Steel El.
pg. Ib, le, 20
200 f t. Control Building
,
36 5
FSAR 9.1.5.2
AISC-69, Spent Fuel Cask Bridge
Spec. X4ALO3 (Rev. 5)
Spent Fuel Cask Bridge
Crane
pg. 3, 7
Crane
375
FSAR 9.l.5.2
AISC-69, Polar Crane Design
Spec. X4ALOI, (Rev.1)
Cont Building Plear
pg. 3, 8
Bridge Crane (12/14/78)
1141
FSAR 3.8.3.4.9
AISC-69, Cont. Intermediate Slabs
Calc. X2CJ4.1.4.2
Int. Structural Steel
'
and Platforms
pg. 6
Column Load Seismic Anal
j.
Calc. X2CJ4.1.4.1
Internal Structural
,
M.157 134 (vertical
Steel Sizing
i
bracing
1146
FSAR 3.8.3.4.10
AISC-69, Polar Crane Runway Box
Calc. X2CJ4.5
Crane Girder Design
Girders
pg. 2 (ref),13,16,17
1155
FSAR 3.8.3.6
AISC-69 Cont. Int. Strs.,
Spec. X2AG03 (Rev. 6)
Category 1 Structural
i
Materials and QC
pg. 1, 2
Steel (8/26/83)
Ln
'
Specs on page 4, 5 are
"3
per AISC materials.
f abrication
!
.,
1175
F SAR 3.8. 4. 2
AISC-69, Supps 1, 2, 3, Other.
Spec. X?AG03 (Rev. 6)
Catey)ry i Structural
Category 1 Structures Codes and
Stees(8/26/83)
i
.
Standards
Aux 111ary Building -
!
Calc X2CK4.9.4
Miscellaneous Steel
pg. 8 (culumn
Platforms. Walkways
allowable) page 61
level 8
(AISC specified)
1888
ISAR 3.8.4.5
AISC-69, other Category 1
Spec. X2AG03 (Rev. 6)
Same as 1875 -
Structures, Design of Structural
Calc. X2CK.4.9.4
Same as 1175
'
'
'
Steel
l
1023
FSAR 3.8.1-1
Cont. Load Combs. and toad Factors.
Calc. X2CJ2.8.3
Small Penetrations
pg. 33
Analysis, Containment
i
8
.. -..
.
.
.
.
- -.
-
.
.
TABLE 2.
(Continued)
REVISFD MUDULE TABLE 6.1-2
Second order
Commitment
Source
Subject
laplementation
Title
ll61
FSAR 3.8.4-1
AISC-1%9, Steel load Combinations
Calc. X2CK4.9.3 (Rev.1) Misc Steel Platforms,
for Elastic Design Method -
pg. 19
Waltways, Stairways
Level C. Aux. Bldg.
1979
FSAR 3.8.4.3
AISC-1969, Steel Load Combination
Calc. X2CK4.9.3 (Rev.1) Misc Steel Platform,
for Elastic Design Method
pg. 19
Walkways, Stairways,
tevel C. Aux. 81dg.
880
FSAR 3.2.2-1
Principal Codes and Standards for
Spec. X2AG07 (Rev. 2)
Personnel Lock Equipment
1.3.2.2-1 ASME Class 1, 2, 3 or
pg i
Hatch
MC, NF, or CS (egpt. hatch,
Spec. X2AG06 (Rev. 8)
Containment Liner Plate
personnel lock, liner plate,
pg. 3
System
penetration sleeves, and fuel
Spec. X2AH08 (Rev. 3)
Fuel Transfer Tube
transfer tube)
pg. I
Housing Exp Bellows also
Comitment 1982,1983)
,
1981
FSAR 3.8.2.4
Equipment Hatch and Personnel Lock
Spec. X2AG07 (Rev. 2)
Same as 880
Assembly. Design ASME Sub. NE,
pg.1, 8
l
Art 3000
1982
FSAR 3.8.2.4
Fuel Transfer Tube and Housing
Spec. X2AH08 (Rev. 3)
Scme as 880
,.
Bellows Assembly, Design ASME Sub.
pg. 1, 4
c3
NE, Art 3000
1990
FSAR 3.8.2.5
Stl. Cont., Str. Acceptance
Spec. X2AG07 (Rev. 2)
Some as 880
Criteria, Class MC ltems ASME *lli,
pg. 1
Division 1, NE (Sli to be accom-
Spec. X2AH08 (Rev. 3)
Same as 880
.
plished in future)
pg. I
i
3112
FSAR 3.9.8.3.4
Design of Components Supports
Calc. X2CJ4.2.2 pg.1
Steam Generator Support
hRC Q210.45
Enhedded Anchor Bolts, Concrete
anchor bolts specified
Embeds
Exp Anchors ASME lit. MF and NE
to AMIE SA-540 823
1919
FSAR 3.8.2.3
Cont.. Load and Load Combs. for
Spec. X2AH08 pg. 4
Same as 3712
.
Class MC Items
Sec. 3.4
'
1983
FSAR 3.8.2.4
Cont., Fuel Transfer Tube Supports,
Spec. X2AH08 pg. 4
Same as 3712
.
Design
Sec. 3. 4pg. 3
Sec 3.1 includes
"
supports
J
I
'!,-.._.
v
-.
-
-
, -
--
-
,
.
.
.,
e
,
,
i
' TABLE 2.
(Contirmed)
REVISED MODULE TA8tE 6.1-2
' Secomi Order
Comunitment
Source
Subjec t
laplementation
iltle
1985
FSAR 3.8.2.2
Cont., Appilcable Codes and Stan-
Spec. X2AH08
Same as 3112
dards ASME Ill Div.1 NE NF
Spec. X2AG05
Same as 3712
Spec. X2AG06
Same as 3712
Spec. X2AG07
Same as 3712
1997
FSAR 3.8.3.2
Cont. Internals, Codes and
Spec. X2AG05 (Rev. 4) '
Same as 3712
Standards, ASME Ill, Subsectfuns
pg. I
. MF 1977 w/1977 Addenda
815
FSAR 3.2.2-1
Codes and Standards for T.3.2.2-1,
Calc. X2CJ2.7.6 pg. I
Pipe Rack Base Mat
ASME Div. 2 Art CC-3000
Liner Embeds,
i
1024
FSAR 3.8.1.2
Containment Design ASME Div. 2
Calc. X2CJ2.8.3,
Small Penetrations-
Art CC-3000
pg. 33, load table
Analysis, Contalrument
,
1 051
F S AR 3. 8.1.4
Sechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-1
Calc. 12CJ2.7.1
Dame and Cylinder Wall
pg. 65
Liner Plate Analyses
g
Calc. X2CJ2.7.2
'.
pg. 38, 40
154
F SAR I.9.6.1
' Reg. Guide').61 Damping Values
Calc. X2CK4.g.3, -
. Aux. Building Miscel-
pg.14A 41 damping 08E
taneous Steel platforms,
,m
'
j
for platform
Walkuays, Stalrways,
-
i
. pg. 42 45 00E plations
Level C
j
pg. 62 Incorporate Reg.
'
Guide 1.61 values in
)
all cases
.
981
ISAR 3.7.8.1.3
Reg. Guide 1,61 Damping
Calc. X2CJ4.1.4.2-
Int Strue. Steel Column
pg. 252 Damping 45 OBE
Load Selsmic Anal
,
75 SSE (acceptable per
Reg. Guide 1.61) for.
'
bolted steel structures
1289
FSAR 3.B.1.11
Computer Prograss UseJ for struc-
Calc. X2CJ4.3.5
Vent Stack Analysis and -
tural, seismic, and geotechnical-
pg. 7, states MfRAME
Design
analysis MFRAME
will he used in FE
analysis
pg. 106-108 MIRAME is
used,
,
a
10
l
'
i
- ----~--
. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - _. _ _. _ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _. _. _ _. _ _. _ _ _
__ _ -.
.
,
,
_
- ~
o
i
P
TA8LE 2.
(Continued)
i
REVISED MODULE TABLE 6.1-2
'
Second Order
Commeltment
- Source
Sub. ject
implementat ion
Title
1825
FSAR IE8-79-02
Concrete Expansion Anchors Response Calc. X2CQS.2.7 includ-- Prequallfled Concrete
C-19-12-28
to IE8 79-02. Rev 2
Ing Rev. 2
Expansion Anchors
P9
1. 2
1999
FSAR 3.8.3.3
Contalanent Internal Structure..
Calc. 22CJ4.1.4.1
Containment Internal
Loads and Load combinations
pg. 7. 53, 54
Structural Steel S!:Ing
Calc. X2CJ4.1.4.2
Internal Structural
pg. 526. 528. 530
Steel Column toad
Seismic Analyses
1.
Most ASME comenttments above were specified in specification documents by Bechtel for vendor-supplied items.
Consnitments are implemented in sendor's calculations. Page numbers indicated for specificatinns are in the Technical
,
Provisions.
$
n
-
__ _
_ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _
_ _ _,, _.. -
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.... -. - _. - __ _ _ _ _ _
..
.
D
TABLE.3
' LIST OF LINER PLATE DOCUMENIATION EIAMINED '
,
RRT
Material.
CMIR
C8&l Dwg.
. ND[ Examination Report Number
Deviation
Assessment
Release
Heat
C8&l Dwg.
C881 Shop Ck.
Table (for
Welder
.
Ultrasonic
Report
Number
(Pier.e Mark) Number
Number
. List (Assy.f) Field weldsL Certified
Vac. Box Mi R ad iogr_aphic
69E 728
R-10 (Rev. 2)
53-8-R
I20 to 121
RJD
41
Plate.
48 (Rev. 5)
121 to 122
DRM
2818490'-
63-4
650227
R-5
62-A
1115(62)
SWM
73
63-5
660290
9
288-3
75A518
R-16
283-A-7
283-A-7(159)
107
CD-7731
280
CD-7665
i
i4
"412-2-1
126028
R-25
None (fleid
R 3-1 (186)
DL
154
400
job)
R 3-5 (185)
171
403
.R 3-4 (185)
,
R 2 to R 3
,fmw.
"
,
410-1-46
1260234
R-21
462-A
462A(171)
RJH
184
R-24
422A(172)
160
400
168
Y
RI to R2
142
76. 77
RI-N(181)
148
12
325-3
184159
R-15
183-A
4K (19)
RE8
4L((79)119,120)
18
3-4
4-5 (121)
20
302-81
462087
R-15
,3A
330A(150)
RE B.
30
300-82
12
<
.......
- - - -.
..
.. -
,
-
.o:
- ;
-
h
s,
TABLE 4
LIST OF SIRUCTURAL STEEL ERECTION imCIMENTAil0N EXmINED
Off Site Fabrication
On Site Fabrication -
Heat
' Coating-
Rec.
Steel
Mass Fab.
Joint
Steel
item
Number
Spec.
Insp.
' Fab.
-& Heat Id.
Welder Status
Welder..
Eqpt. ~
Inspector Removal
Piece Mark
Drawings
Record CMIR
Cert.
Report
Fonn_
Report
Cert.
Report Certified Calibrate _d
Certified Reports
M96-101
AX2D11F 001
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
MA
H00
C-1150[
Mann
MA
MllG-5103
C-1507
5013-81
IX2048F102
ECR2
IX24G03-Ill6
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
NA
147
IX
C-802
Mann
MA
148
GD
C-lCI
Carson
153
Lane
199-
Heath
Cusik
M22-151
AX2DllF021
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
C-621
~ Gunter
NA '
M116-5151
C-1501
5404-84
I X2D4'8F il 2
Yes
Yes
Yes-
Yes
NA
NA
NA
135
IRR
C-1588
Harpole -
NA
3 cn
I X2 AG03-1441-1
139
C-1501
Whitthuhn
%
IX2AG03-1449-1
140
Note (1)
146
214
231
M08G-52718 AX20086023
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
NA
117
IV
NA
' lane
NA
118
Note (2)
MonG-5271
M54-421
AX200M018 -
NA
NA
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
IGG
110
CG
C-1591
Hill-
Yes.
AX2008f079
Ill
DO
C-1507
Dickerson Note (3)
114
'
116
,
1.
Whlt'thuhn had not received certificate for bolted joint inspection at the time of inspection due to paperwork delay.
2.
Torque verification not required for A-307 bolts.
3., Beam Removal Request dated 5-28-85, Removal Inspection Feport dated 8-16-85, and New 8eam inspection Report dated 8-26-85.
4.
General Note- "Ves" means that appropriate documents were examined and found acceptable.
"NA" means that documentation was not examined because
operation indicated had not taken place.
...
.
-
-
q
O
.,
%~
TABLE'S
LIST OF EMBEDMENT DOCUMENTATION EXAMINED
RRi
Unique item
Assessment
Heat
Welders
Pour
Deviation
Number
J pes
Numbers
Numbers
Drawing Numbers
Certified
Packages
Reports
Other Documentation
MK-08B
D020-2
73243
AX2008A002 (Rev. 21)
AQ
08D020
CD-480
Note (1)
L80531
AX2000C005 (Rev. 6)
Note (2)
II
B027-15
7441358 AX2DilA051 (Rev. 8)
A-IIR-0278
C0-8487
FCRB C8-1360
A-754
($1H382 AX20llA003 (Rev.16)
.E-FCRB 2833. C-FCRB 6214. DCN 22
748302
AX20llA001 Rev.12
662H603 AX2DilA001 Rev. 21
23A
Dl-Hasq C125-2024
8071206 IX2048A101 (Rev. 6)
1-01C-1251113 CD-4902
Fab. Form 7352
Note (3)
0125-2021
IX2D48A106 I Rev. 6)
Fab. Form 7591
IX2D48A1031 Rev. 9)
C-FCRB-9164
1X2D48A052 IRev. 4)
IX2048A012 1;nev.10)
.
IX2048A0131,Rev. 8)
trs
(All below)
AX2D94V028 (Rev. 0)
Note (4)
(All below)
AX2D94V028 (Rev.1)
30. 173, 174
AX2008A001 (Rev.18)
59, 60. 61
AX2000C004 (Rev. 13)
AX2008C014 (Rev.13)
MD-8029
176, 177. 178
AX2008A006 (Rev. 5)
1.
This assessment was associated with use-as-is Deviation Report per Table 6.2-7 of Module 8.
No unique item had been selected by the RRI
for in-depth documentation review.
2.
Plate 8027-15 was not verified by RRT. Reverification by inspectors showed no verification error.
3.
This assessment was associated with Module 8 Finding 8-44.
Ileat number found incorrectly listed on Fabrication Form 1352 as 8077806.
4.
Plate 50 was assocated witt,4todule 8 F Indin9 8-36.
_.. -
L
American Institute of Steel Construction-
-
ANSI
-
American National Standards Institute
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
-
AWS
-
American Welding Society
. BPC
-
Bechtel Power Company
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
-CB&I
-
Civil Deviation Report
CD
-
Crane Manufacturers Association of America
CMAA
-
-
Certified Materials Test Report
-
Design Criteria (Bechtel)
-
Disposition Report
DR-
-
FCR
'
Field Change Request
-
-
Final Safety Analysis Report
General Design Criteria
GDC
-
GPC
-
Georgia Power Company
IDR.
-
Independent Design Review
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
-
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin
IEB
-
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
-
-
Non Destructive Examination
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
-
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
-
-
Nuclear Steam Supply System
-
Operational Basis Earthquake
-
Procedure Qualification Record
-
Pipe Whip Restraint
-
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
-
RRF
-
Readiness Review Finding
RRT
-
Readiness Review Team
Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria
.VWAC
-
WPS
-
Welding Procedure Specification
- ,
x
-
e
--e
,
,
-
rw~ww
-r--
-