IR 05000424/1986029
| ML20198K014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198K008 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0654, RTR-NUREG-654 50-424-86-29, 50-425-86-14, NUDOCS 8606030290 | |
| Download: ML20198K014 (12) | |
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[e 8ticg#'e UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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c ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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MAY 151986 Report Nos.: 50-424/86-29 and 50-425/86-14
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Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: CPPR-108 and CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2 Inspection Cond fe N pril 20 - May 2, 1986
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Inspector: /,/
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L~. ' C ningKam Dite $1gned-Accompanying Personnel:
B. C. Haagensen T. P. Lynch D. Schultz A. L. Smith G Wehm n A
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Approved by:
T. R. Decker, Chief Date signed Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the Vogtle near term operating license (NT0L) radiological emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
0606030290 860515 PDR ADOCK 00000424 g
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REPORT DETAILS i
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. Buckhold, General Manager - VEGP
- C. E. Belflower, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- J. N. Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- A. Desrosiers, Health Physics Superintendent
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- S. C. Ewald, Radiological Safety Manager
- D. H. Hallman, Chemistry Superintendent
- M. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent
- C. C. Miller, Plant Engineering and Services Superintendent
- C. W. Whitney, Legal Counsel
- D. Jiles, Senior Corporate Safety and Health Advisor
- I. A. Kochery, Engineering Supervisor
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- H. P. Walker, Unit Operation Manager j
- B. Quick, Document Control Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, enginer-s, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- J.
Rogge
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview j
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 2, 1986, with those j
persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas i
evaluated and discussed in detail the inspection findings defined herein.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
No previous emergency preparedness enforcement matters were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
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5.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions.
While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the States, counties, and local government agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.
The licensee made a significant commitment to training and personnel through the use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercise.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise; however, some minor prompting was noted by the inspectors. This item was discussed during the exercise critique.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Drill Scenarios (82301)
The scenarios for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's emergency plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
a.
The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill was explicit, and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite local emergency agencies.
The scenario provided sufficient information to the local support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the drill.
The licensee and offsite support agencies made a significant commitment to training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the drill.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the drill. It was noted however, that the controller assigned to the emergency facility at the offsite receiving hospital, consistently prompted the resident players from time of arrival of the injured person, to completion of the drill.
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prompting was excessive and unnecessary, since the players appeared to be fully cognizant of their duties and responsibilities.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-29-01, 50-425/86-14-01:
Consistent and unnecessary prompting by emergency facility controller assigned to offsite receiving hospital. This item will be reviewed during subsequent medical emergency drills.
Inspection also disclosed poor contamination control and health physics practices by players while assisting the injured person in response to the accident.
The following findings were identified:
the attending nurse used no protective gloves while examining the contaminated wound and determining the vital signs of the injured person; radiological survey of the accident zone was not conducted; receptacles were not provided within the accident zone for depositing contaminated clothing, bandages, and other items used in preliminary treatment of the injured person; decontamination and clean-up of the accident zone following transfer of the injured person to the offsite receiving hospital was not done.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-424/86-29-01, 50-425/86-14-01:
Poor contamination control and health physics practices attending preliminary treatment of contaminated injured person.
This item will be reviewed during subsequent medical emergency drills.
The above findings were fully discussed with the licensee prior to and during the exercise critique.
b.
The scenario developed for the fire drill was explicit, and adequately exercised the participating licensee organization and offsite local support agencies. The scenario provided sufficient information to the local support agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the drill.
Licensee and offsite support agencies made a significant commitment to training and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the drill.
The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the drill.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensec were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was
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t available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however,
because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous L
staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
i Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient numbers of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
l The inspectors also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations
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Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
At each response center, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing
Procedures.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing i '
to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.
The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel.
The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Station Manager.
l Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization j
and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the
scope of the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to assure that the following arrangements for
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requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant to i
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance
promulated in Section II.C of NUREG 0654, Revision 1, namely:
(1)
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accommodation of selected State emergency response representatives at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and (2) -identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned response.
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Representatives of the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and designated counties were accommodated at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Center (ENC).
Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
Assistance resources from States and local agencies were available to the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Emergency Classification System (83201)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section I.D of NUREG-0654, Revision 1, and guidance recommended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and properly classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.
Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.
Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for classification of the simulated accident sequences.
The emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Notification Methods and Procedures (83201)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established. This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.0 of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. Notification of the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and designated local offsite organizations was completed within 15 minutes following declaration of each emergency classification.
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Telephone notification of the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and local response organizations was promptly followed by transmission of hard copies of the respective notification.
Such copies included prevailing meteorological information, average release rate (source terms in uCi/sec)
where applicable, site boundary integrated dose projections, and recommended protective actions when necessary.
Confusion regarding initiating time for notification of the NOUE was observed in the Control Room, namely:
issuance of notification based upon identification of the causal event, or time of declaration of the emergency classification relating to the event. This observation was fully discussed with the licensee prior to and during the exercise critique.
It should be noted, however, notwithstanding the cited confusion, the subject notification was issued well within the required fifteen minute time ragime.
The time limit regarding notification is based upon declaration of the emergency classification. This item has been resolved.
The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure EPZ was not operational during the subject exercise. Design, operation, and acceptance of the PNS will be reviewed during subsequent exercises and inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt-communications among principal response organizations and emergency.
personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to-10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, and EOF), the licensee and offsite agencies, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the EOF. The inspectors also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.
Emergency communications were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.
Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the
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Control Room (CR), OSC, TSC, and the EOF.
a.
Control Room - Use of Unit 1 Control Room was supplemented by the near-site reactor simulator throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed that following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.
Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.
Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those personnel assigned routine and special operational duties.
Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.
The Shif t Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.
These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and declare the proper emergency classification.
It was observed that data and information provided during the course of the exercise sequence and conditions placed no demands upon the Emergency Director and the Control Room staff in implementing appropriate actions in a timely manner.
The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions.
It was noted that a bound log of the facility Emergency Coordinator's activities was maintained during the exercise.
The apparent confusion regarding notification of the NOUE is discussed in Paragraph 11, above.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly staffed following notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.
The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operations at the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.
The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff. TSC security was promptly established and maintained.
Security maintained a log or otherwise accounted for all personnel entering and exiting the facility.
During operation of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as required.
Status boards and related visual aids were strategically
located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff.
Dedicated
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communicators were assigned to the facility and all required notifications were promptly implemented.
Inspection disclosed the following additional _
findings, namely:
(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored into problem solving exercises; (2) assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was
definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the TSC to EOF was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, and consistent with changes in plant status and related e'mergency conditions; and (5) accountability, including identifying missing personnel, was readily i.?plemented within the accepted time regime and was consistent with the scenario scope.
c.
Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was promptly, staffed
following activation of the emergency plan by the Emergency Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and dispatched. A health physics technician accompanied each team. The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.
During operation of this facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The EOF is located in the applicant's training center, approximately two miles from the plant site. The facility was adequately staffed and equipped to support the required emergency response consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.
E0F security was promptly established and was included as a routine requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.
Status boards and other related visual aids were strategically located and were readily accessible for viewing by the EOF staf f.
Dedicated communicators were assigned to the facility, and all required notifications were promptly made.
The EOF principal staff freely interacted with State representatives assigned to the facility.
The subject representatives were routinely informed of plant status, and were consistently factored into the decisionmaking process addressing required and proposed protective measures actions, and recovery / reentry planning.
The Emergency Director frequently consulted the E0F technical support staff. These meetings were usually announced, and included representatives of the cited offsite agencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
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consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status to provide recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention of releases of radioactive materials, and termination of the emergency condition.
Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.
An inplant group was effective in estimating the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume. Radiological effluent data was received in the EOF.
The EOF dose calculations were computed and compared on a timely basis with results received from the TSC and offsite monitoring groups.
The licensee's dose assessment group freely interacted with the assigned State dose assessment specialist resident in the EOF.
Dose assessments and projections were compared with the TSC and State data.
All resultant data agreed within acceptable limits.
c Routine inventory and verification of the contents of monitoring kits issued to offsite radiation monitoring teams' personnel was conducted.
It was noted that the required contents of each kit were provided and were consistent with assigned inventories.
No instrument or radio failures occurred during offsite surveys and monitoring. Monitoring instruments were calibrated and checked against dedicated radiological standards.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Protective Response This area was observed to determine that guidelines established for protective actions consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and that protective actions for emergency workers including evacuation of non-essential personnel, are promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The protective measures decisionmaking process was observed by the inspectors.
Recommendations implemented by the EOF staff were timely, effective, and consistent with the abave criteria.
Protective measures recommendations were provided by the licensee to the States of Georgia and South Carolina, designated counties and local offsite organizations. It was noted that all protective action responses recommended by the EOF stat f represented input and concurrence by State representatives assigned to that facility.
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16. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determined that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for
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emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response facilities.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions. Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available for use as required.
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Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate.
Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief survey teams prior to their deployment.
Dosimetry was available and was used.
High range dosimeters were also available in case they were needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
17.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise'.
The information included details on how the public would be notified and the initial actions which should be taken in an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.
The licensee activated and fully staffed the Emergency News Center (ENC).
The facility was used by the licensee for preparation, coordination and dissemination of emergency news information. Written press releases were prepared and issued from the ENC.
Releases issued were timely, and adequately reflected plant emergency conditions. A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefings.
The briefings were technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by laymen.
Visual aids were provided and effectively used.
Question and answer sessions were held after each briefing.
Interaction and direct cooperation of the licensee with the State and counties was effective.
Representatives of State, county and Federal agencies were accommodated at the ENC.
The cited representatives fully participated in the composition of news releases.
In essence, each news
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release was the product of the integrated activity of the licensee and the
above cited support groups.
Similarly, State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the ENC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercise.
Operation and management of the ENC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with the emergency plan requ0 sments and approved implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
18.
Recovery Planning (82301)
This area was reviewed pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13),
Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
The licensee conducted a detailed recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise.
Licensee planners discussed and established the following:
administrative and logistical support, manpower and
engineering services; radiological surveillance; development and assignment of a recovery organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status
was conducted.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exercise Critique (82301)
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine
that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654, Revision 1.
A formal critique was held on May 2,1986, with exercise controllers and
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observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.
Findings
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identified during the exercise designated for licensee corrective action
were discussed.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed
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during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was detailed, and
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addressed both substantive findings and indicated improvement items. The conduct and content of the critique were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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20.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by
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separate correspondence.
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