IR 05000413/1997002

Insp Repts 50-413/97-02 & 50-414/97-02 on 970106-10.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support

ML20138J546
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	01/31/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138J541	List: IR 05000413/1997002 ML20138J535
References
50-413-97-02, 50-413-97-2, 50-414-97-02, 50-414-97-2, NUDOCS 9702070344
Download: ML20138J546 (7)

Text

- - - - . . - . - . - . - - - . - - - - . - , .

. ,

.

i-i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i REGION ll Docket Nos: 50-413, 50-414 i License Nos: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 50-413/97-02, 50-414/97-02 i

Licensee: Duke Power Company i

!

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 i Location: 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Dates: January 6 - 10,1997 i

inspectors: W. W. Stansberry, Safeguards Specialist i Approved by: P. E. Fredrickson, Chief, Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety l l

l l

l l

Enclosure 9702070344 970131 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000413 PDR I J

.- - .. _ _ _ _ _ - - . - - . .- -- .- -- . ..._ . .

! .

.

.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-413/97-02, 50-414/97-02

i This safeguards inspection included aspects of licensee plant support. The report covers a ;

week period of an announced routine inspection by a regional safeguards specialist  ;

inspecto Plant Suoooit

!

-

The evaluation of the vital area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles

'

'

verified that the criteria in Chapters 5 and 8 of the Physical Security Plan (PSP) were carried out. Violations of regulatory requirements were not identified in this are The licensee was complying with the alarm station and communication criteria in Chapters 8 and 10 of the PSP and Nuclear Station Security Procedure Nos. 404 and ;

413. Violations of regulatory requirements were not identified in this area.

,

-

The licensee's protected area intrusion detection systems were functional and met l licensee commitments. Vulnerabilities in the protected area were not identifie Violations of regulatory requirements were not identifed in this area.

'

l l

1

<

l Enclosure i

e

_ .

t

-

.

.

- ,

l

!

REPORT DETAILS

!

'

IV. Plant Support S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment s l

S2.1 Vital Access Controls i Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector evaluated the licensee's program to control access of packages, personnel, and vehicles to the vital areas according to criteria in Chapters 5 and 8 of the Physical Security Plan (PSP). This was to ensure that the licensee had positive access controk of personnel, places where packages and materials can enter the vital areas, and vehicles entering and within the vital area Observations and Findinas The security force searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices. The search equipment was adequate and appropriate for its intended function. Personnel, hand-carried packages or material, delivered packages or material, and vehicles were searched before being admitted to the vital areas. These searches were either by physical search or by search equipment. Security personnel searched certain delivered packages and materials, approved by NRC and specifically designated by the licensee, within vital areas. This was for reasons of safety, security, or operational necessity. Vehicle searches included a search of the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage and cargo area ;

A coded, numbered, picture badge identification system was used for licensee l personnel who were authorized unescorted access to the vital areas. Visitors '

authorized escorted access to the vital areas were issued a badge that showed an escort was required, and were escorted by licensee-designated escorts while in the vital areas. Access to vital areas was limited to personnel who required such access to do their duties. Security personnel controlled access to the reactor containment when frequent access was necessary to assure that only authorized personnel and material entered the reactor containment. The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperative access control and search equipment. The licensee had procedures for controlling access to protected area Access control program records were available for review and contained sufficient

'

information for identification of persons authorized access to the vital areas. The licensee maintained access records of keys, key cards, key codes, and other related equipment for the period of a persons employment or for the duration of use of these j item j Enclosure

A - a - -sa - - a. - . - , _ m ,.a >, .- s - - .

, ,

s .

.

-

.

Security personnel confirmed the authorization of, and also identified packages and material at access control portals before allowing them to be delivered to the vital

'

areas. The licensee used security force personnel to identify and confirm the authorization of material before allowing it to enter reactor containment. Search equipment clearly annunciated detection alarms at the access portal. The licensee also had compensatory measures for defective or inoperative search equipmen Individuals who controlled the admittance control hardware that allowed vehicle

!

access to the vital area were in a bullet resistant enclosure. Armed security force personnel escorted vehicles within the vital area. The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperative venicle search equipmen The inspector also evaluated the licensee's program for control and protection of i

locks, keys, and key cards. Locks, keys, key cards, and related equipment used to control access to the vital areas were protected and controlled to reduce the possibility of compromise. The licensee changed them when there was evidence that they may have been compromised; when an employee, having access to or control over a key or key card was terminated or transferred; and when a master key or a cylinder in a mastered system was lost or compromised.

Conclusions

'

This evaluation of the vital area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles

.

verified that the enteria in Chapters 5 and 8 of the PSP were carried out. Violations of I regulatory requirements were not identified in this area.

,

S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications

) Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector evaluated the licensee's alarm stations, assessment aids, and l i communication equipment to ensure application of the criteria in Chapters 8 and 10 of the PSP and Nuclear Station Security Procedures (NSSP) No. 404, Revision 3, dated i 3/21/94 and No. 413, Revision 4, dated 9/6/3 Observations and Findinas l The inspector verified that annunciation of protected and vital area alarms occurred

!

audibly and visually in the alarm stations. The licensee equipped both stations with

.

CCTV assessment capabilities and communication equipment. Alarms were tamper-l Mdicating and self-checking, and provided with an uninterruptable power supply.

'

These stations were continually manned by capable and knowledgeable security operators. The stations were independent yet redundant in operation. Alarm station's

,

interiors were not visible from the protected area, and no single act could remove the l capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. Alarm j

'

stations walls, doors, floors, and ceilings were bullet-resistant at the high-powered rifle l rating (UL752). l

<

Enclosure ;

.

. .

-

!.

.

t 4- 3

The licensee provided means for monitoring and observing, by human eye or closed

circuit television (CCTV), persons and activities in the isolation zone and exterior j areas within the protected area. These means provided for assessing intrusion

,

alarms for possible threats occurring in tb isolation zone and exterior areas within the j protected area. The alarm stations could not shnultaneously monitor scenes viewed by CCTV cameras used for intrusion alarm assessment due to the video switcher at j the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) not functioning. The transmission and control lines used ir, the CCTV intrusion alarm assessment system had line supervision and i

tamper indication. The licensee had implemented appropriate compensatory

measures for loss of assessment aids in the SAS. The inspector noted that there

were nine regulatory compensatory measures in effect during this inspection with

! dates ranging from August 1996 to January 1997. The security force personnel and

. alarm station operators were effectively monitoring compensatory measures and i meeting corresponding PSP and procedural commitments.

l

The inspector evaluated the equipment, operation, and maintenance of intemal and extemal security communication links, and determined that they were adequate and appropriate for their intended function. Each security force member could communicate with an individualin each of the continuously manned alarm stations, who could call for assistance from other security force personnel and from local law enforcement agencies. The alarm stations had the capability for continuous two-way voice communication with local law enforcement agencies through radio as well as the conventional telephone service. The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperable communication equipmen Conclusions Based on this evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee was complying with the criteria in Chapters 8 and 10 of the PSP and NSSP Nos. 404 and 41 Violations of regulatory requirements were not identified in this are S2.3 Protected Area Detection Eauipment Inspection Scope (81700)

Based on the commitments in Chapter 8 of the PSP, the inspector evaluated the licensee's protected area intrusion detection systems to verify that they were functionally effective and met licensee commitments. This evaluation was also to ensure that there were no vulnerabilities that could be oxploited to avoid detectio Observations and Findinas The licensee had installed intrusion detection systems that could detect attempted penetrations through the isolation zone, and attempts to gain unauthorized access to the protected area.' Systems had a diversity to assure maintenance of the system's capabilities. The licensee segmented the intrusion detection systems into enough Enclosure J

.. - .

- - . - - .

.

,

• l

, ., l

- j l

, alarm zones to provide adequate coverage of the protected area perimeter barrier and I

isolation zones Review of the licensee's documentation of the Seven Day Tests of j the protected area alarm zones verified testing of the tamper alarm operability. The inspector identified through observation that the licensee had installed detection and/or surveillance sub-systems for the protected area. They consisted of micro wave and other sensoring devices to discover and assess unauthorized activities and ,

l conditions. These systems communicated alarm conditions to response force  !

j personnel though the alarm stations, allowing for response force personnel to assess )

and correct the conditions.

Conclusions Based upon the above evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee's protected area intrusion detection systems were functional and met Fcensee commitments. Vulnerabilities in the protected area were not identified. Violations of

{ regulatory requirements were not identified in this area.

,

W l

I

1

Enclosure

.

. . . - -- .. -. . - _ . . .-, .

. .

• 9

5

'

V. MANAGEMENT MEETING X1 Exit Meeting Summary I

The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of l the inspection on January 9,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this

,

report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

,

Licensee

. i W. Byers, Security Manager M. Durser, Compliance Specialist B. Emmons, Organizational Effectiveness Manager M. Kitlan, Regulatory Compliance Manager T. Lowery, Security Technical Specialist W. McCollum, Catawba Site Vice-President l B. Williams, Security Technical Specialist

.

NRC j i

I i R. Freudenberger, Senior Resident inspector

, INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 8 i700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

'

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED NONE Enclosure

-

J