IR 05000220/2005007

IR 05000220-05-007 IR 05000410-05-007 on 10/17/2005 - 11/04/2005 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (Nmpns), Units 1 & 2; Resolution Inspection Report

ML053420411
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	12/08/2005
From:	James Trapp Reactor Projects Branch 1
To:	Spina J Nine Mile Point
References
IR-05-007
Download: ML053420411 (21)

Text

ber 8, 2005

SUBJECT:

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000220/2005007 AND 05000410/2005007

Dear Mr. Spina:

On November 4, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station (NMPNS) Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with you and members of your staff at an exit meeting on November 4, 2005.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. Relatively few deficiencies were identified by external organizations that had not been previously identified by your organization. Audits and assessments were generally thorough; however, the inspectors did identify a few missed opportunities to identify issues during internal assessments.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs), in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator Region 1; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Nine Mile Point facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

James M. Trapp, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-220, 50-410 License Nos. DPR-63, NPF-69

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000220/2005007 and 05000410/2005007 w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

REGION I==

Docket Nos: 50-220, 50-410 License Nos: DPR-63, NPF-69 Report Nos: 05000220/2005007 and 05000410/2005007 Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS)

Facility: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2 Location: Lake Road Oswego, NY Dates: October 17 - November 4, 2005 Team Leader: T. Walker, Senior Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects Inspectors: B. Fuller, Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point A. Rosebrook, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects S. McCarver, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects Observer: A. Ziedonis, Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects Approved by: James M. Trapp, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000220, 05000410/2005-007; 10/17/2005 - 11/04/2005; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2;

Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems. A violation was identified in the area of fire brigade training.

This team inspection was performed by three region-based inspectors and one resident inspector. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection and was classified as a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Identification and Resolution of Problems The team determined that Constellations Nine Mile Point (NMP) Nuclear Power Station was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP).

Relatively few deficiencies were identified by external organizations (including NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee. Audits and self-assessments were generally thorough; however, the inspectors did identify a few missed opportunities to identify issues during internal assessments. Once entered into the CAP, issues were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria. Items entered into the CAP were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance. The causal evaluations for equipment and performance issues were complete, and proposed corrective actions addressed the identified causes. Corrective actions were generally effective and typically implemented in a timely manner. However, corrective actions for previous fire brigade drill failures were incomplete and untimely.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) for failure to take complete and timely corrective actions for fire brigade drill failures in May 2004. The inspectors found that a proposed corrective action to develop qualification standards for fire brigade leaders and brigade members had not been completed, and a corrective action to develop performance based assessment tools was not completed until September 16, 2005. These corrective actions would have addressed some of the identified causes for a drill failure in September 2005. The inspectors also identified that effective corrective actions had not been taken for fire brigade performance issues that resulted in a drill failure in 2003. The actions taken were limited to reinforcing existing assembly practices and did not address brigade member concerns about lack of familiarity with plant access and egress routes.

ii

Corrective actions are planned to develop objective standards for fire brigade performance and to revise the drill assessment tools to reflect those standards.

The failure to take complete and timely corrective actions to address fire brigade performance issues was more than minor because it affected the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone in that it adversely impacted manual fire suppression capability. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and is determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green). Although the lack of fire brigade performance standards and evaluation criteria contributed to several drill failures, the finding was of very low safety significance because fire brigade performance has been satisfactory during the majority of drills. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution in that it was related to incomplete and untimely corrective actions. (Section 4OA2.3)

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the CAP. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

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REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (Biennial - IP 71152B)

Effectiveness of Problem Identification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team reviewed the procedures, listed in the Attachment to this report, describing the corrective action program (CAP) at Constellations Nine Mile Point (NMP)

Nuclear Power Station. Constellation identifies problems by initiating Condition Reports (CRs) for conditions adverse to quality, human performance problems, equipment nonconformances, industrial or radiological safety concerns, and other significant issues. The CRs are subsequently screened for operability, categorized by priority and significance (1 through 4), and assigned for evaluation and resolution. The station uses the electronic Corrective Action Program (eCAP).

The team considered risk insights from the NRCs and Constellations risk analyses to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk-significant systems and components.

The team reviewed CRs selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the CAP for evaluation and resolution. The team selected items from the maintenance, operations, engineering, emergency planning, security, radiological protection, and oversight programs to ensure that the licensee was appropriately considering problems identified in each functional area. The team used this information to select a risk-informed sample of CRs that had been issued since the last NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection, which was completed in October 2003. In accordance with IP 71152, the instrument air and fire protection systems were selected for an expanded review covering the last five years.

In addition to CRs, the team conducted plant tours and selected items from other processes at Nine Mile Point to verify that problems identified in these areas were entered into the corrective action program when appropriate. Specifically, the team reviewed a sample of work requests, engineering requests, operator log entries, control room deficiency logs, operator work-around lists, operability determinations, engineering program and system health reports, temporary modifications, and training requests.

The documents were reviewed to ensure that underlying problems associated with each issue were appropriately considered for resolution via the corrective action process. In addition, the team interviewed plant staff and management to determine their understanding of and involvement with eCAP. The CRs and other documents reviewed, and a list of key personnel contacted, are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The team reviewed a sample of the licensees Quality and Performance Assessment (Q&PA) audits and surveillances, including the most recent audit of the CAP, quarterly assessment reports, and departmental self-assessments. This review was performed to determine if problems identified through these assessments were entered into eCAP, and whether the identified issues were dispositioned appropriately commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The effectiveness of the audits and self-assessments was evaluated by comparing audit and self-assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified findings, and current observations during the inspection.

b. Findings

and Assessments No findings of significance were identified.

The team concluded that Constellation was generally effective at problem identification at Nine Mile Point. The station staff had appropriate knowledge of eCAP and the corrective action program, and entered identified problems into the program at an appropriate threshold. There were approximately 5800 CRs initiated in 2004 and approximately 4400 in 2005 at the time of the inspection. Station staff promptly initiated CRs, as appropriate, in response to deficiencies or issues raised by the inspection team.

The team did not identify any significant issues in the maintenance, engineering, or operations tracking systems which did not have a CR associated with them.

Relatively few deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, that had not been previously identified by the licensee. Audits and self-assessments were generally thorough; however, the inspectors did identify a few missed opportunities to identify issues during internal assessments. For example, a Radiation Protection self-assessment in November 2003 failed to identify program and procedural problems related to control of high radiation areas (HRAs) and HRA work control. In early 2004 there were numerous high radiation area work control issues (i.e., entry into a HRA without being signed onto a HRA radiation work permit (RWP) and a locked HRA being left unlocked). The self-assessment conducted in late 2003 was a missed opportunity to identify and correct these issues before they occurred. The programmatic and procedural problems resulted in a number of HRA control deficiencies. Additionally, Q&PA audits in late 2004 and mid 2005 failed to identify that fire brigade training on fire hazards was not being conducted as required by Appendix R. (This issue was a licensee identified violation and is discussed in Section 4OA7.)

Each department is responsible for reviewing identified issues to look for trends. This program has generally been effective in identifying trends relating to conditions adverse to quality, particularly within the last 6 months.

2. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team reviewed the CRs listed in the Attachment to assess whether Constellation adequately evaluated and prioritized the identified problems. The team selected the CRs to cover the seven cornerstones of safety identified in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process. This review included Constellations evaluation of problems associated with these systems, including incorporation of industry operating experience information for applicability to the facility.

The CRs reviewed encompassed the full range of the licensees evaluations, including root cause analyses, apparent cause evaluations, common cause evaluations and human error cause evaluations. The review included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of the resolutions. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the team reviewed the licensees corrective actions to preclude recurrence. The team observed CR screening meetings, in which Constellation managers reviewed incoming CRs for prioritization and evaluated preliminary corrective action assignments, analyses, and plans. The team also reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition (EOC) reviews for selected problems. The team assessed the backlog of corrective actions for selected areas, including the maintenance department backlog, to determine, individually and collectively, if any represented an increased risk due to delays in implementation.

The team performed in-depth reviews of two Category 1" root cause analyses for fire protection program issues to assess the licensees identification of causes for the program deficiencies and proposed corrective actions. One of the evaluations addressed fire brigade performance issues that resulted in a drill failure on September 13, 2005. The other evaluation addressed an adverse trend in resolving fire protection equipment and performance issues identified by Q&PA assessment activities in 2005.

The latter evaluation addressed multiple fire protection program issues including:

equipment issues and maintenance backlogs; failure to meet administrative requirements; fire penetration issues; surveillance and preventive maintenance procedure problems; and lack of recognition of the aggregate consequences of degraded fire protection features.

b. Findings

and Assessments No findings of significance were identified.

The team concluded that Constellation prioritized CRs based on the safety significance of the issue. Operability determinations and reportability assessments were made promptly when issues were entered into the CAP. In screening the CRs, managers considered the potential for repetitive issues, adverse trends and generic implications.

Significant conditions adverse to quality were classified as Category 1 and received a formal root cause analysis and an EOC review. All Category 2 CRs received a cause evaluation, and the most probable cause was identified for many Category 3 CRs.

Category 4" CRs were written for tracking and trending purposes. The majority (>99%)

of the CRs written were for less significant Category 2, 3," and 4" issues.

Evaluations were generally completed in a timely manner, particularly after the CAP process was revised to establish a standard 30 day deadline for all CR evaluations.

Clear guidance has been developed for performing cause evaluations, and multi-level review of completed evaluations has resulted in generally high quality evaluations with proposed corrective actions that addressed the identified causes. However, the team identified that the evaluation of a fire brigade drill failure in June 2005 didnt address that previous corrective actions were incomplete or ineffective. Consequently an opportunity was missed to identify problems that contributed to the drill failure in September 2005.

Specifically, in response to a fire brigade drill failure in June 2005, Q&PA identified that corrective actions for previous drill failures in 2004 (CRs 2004-2463 and 2004-2628)were either ineffective or had not yet been completed (CR 2005-2505). Nonetheless, the evaluation for CR 2005-2505 did not address the failure to complete the corrective actions for the previous drill failures. As a result, the identified causes did not address the performance issues that led to the recurrent failures of the brigade crew and the corrective actions were narrowly focused on the drill evaluation process.

The team determined that the recently completed root cause analyses for the fire protection issues were thorough, and independent inspector observations validated most of the identified causes. In general, the proposed corrective actions appeared to address the identified problems. However, the team noted that the proposed corrective action to develop a methodology to assess the aggregate significance of fire protection issues did not clearly include consideration of fire protection issues other than system and equipment problems. (The licensee entered this into the CAP in CR 2005-4435.)

The team also observed that, although corrective actions were proposed to increase the effectiveness of the fire protection high impact team (HIT) by ensuring attendance of key stakeholders and senior management, the fire protection department was not represented and a General Supervisor did not attend the HIT team meeting the week of October 31, 2005.

The team also noted a few cases in which previous corrective actions were not sufficiently specific to ensure their effectiveness. For example, a Change Management Plan was developed to reduce the fire protection maintenance backlog. This plan was not effective because it did not contain specific performance indicators and requirements for sufficient management oversight. Additionally, corrective actions to enforce the use of human performance error prevention tools in response to multiple scrams were not specific and, as a result, were interpreted and implemented differently between the two units. Specifically, the use of barriers to identify protected equipment trains during maintenance has been effective at Unit 2; however at Unit 1 additional events, such as the scram on August 18, 2005, demonstrated that this tool was not being properly utilized.

3. Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the corrective actions associated with selected CRs to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The team reviewed CRs for repetitive problems to determine whether previous corrective actions were effective. The team also reviewed the licensees timeliness in implementing corrective actions and their effectiveness in precluding recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality. The team reviewed the CRs associated with selected non-cited violations and findings to determine whether Constellation properly evaluated and resolved these issues. The team also assessed the fire brigade and fire protection program issues addressed in the Category 1" CRs to determine if the issues should have been identified and addressed sooner.

b. Assessments Overall, the team concluded that Constellation has improved the CAP to ensure that corrective actions are timely and implemented as intended. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure corrective actions are completed as scheduled and reviews are performed to ensure the actions were implemented as intended. In most cases, the team found that corrective actions were appropriate, effective and completed in a timely manner. However, the team noted a few instances in which corrective actions were not effective in addressing conditions adverse to quality. With the exception of the finding noted below, the licensee self-identified the ineffective corrective actions.

Human performance has been a long-standing problem at Nine Mile Point, and a significant number of corrective actions have been taken to address human performance errors which led to reactor scrams or near misses. Overall performance has improved, as evidenced by the Reactor Scram Performance Indicator (PI) returning to green from white in 2003 and Unit 2 having no scrams over the plants latest operating cycle. However, self assessments, effectiveness reviews, and adverse trend follow up investigations for scrams and near misses at Unit 1 indicate that corrective actions have not been fully effective. For example, Unit 1 scrammed on August 18, 2005, when a vital bus was not protected during planned testing. In another case, corrective actions for an inadvertent Unit 1 Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) entry on January 14, 2005, (involving reactor building ventilation and emergency diesel generators) did not prevent a subsequent unplanned Unit 1 TS LCO entry on October 13, 2005, for a similar plant configuration. In both cases, human performance error prevention tools were not utilized to alert operators of this condition.

Additionally, corrective actions for an untimely emergency action level declaration in 2004 did not prevent multiple mis-classifications or untimely declarations during subsequent emergency preparedness (EP) drills. Specifically, following an untimely EAL declaration during an actual event in January 2004, corrective actions were developed to improve training for key operators and emergency response organization members on identification of EAL entry conditions. From early 2004 to mid 2005, there were 6 additional untimely declarations or mis-classifications during evaluated training evolutions, resulting in a decline in the Emergency Preparedness Drill/Exercise PIs.

This declining trend was self-identified by the licensee in July 2005 and the resulting root cause analysis identified that corrective actions had been ineffective.

Constellation also conducted in-depth effectiveness reviews for significant issues to determine if the corrective actions were effective in resolving the issue. In several cases, the licensee appropriately self-identified ineffective or improper closeout of corrective actions and reentered the issue into the CAP for further action. For example, the licensee identified, in an adverse trend report in March 2005, that the effectiveness review for CR 2004-1160 for reactor scram issues focused more on whether corrective actions were completed than on effectiveness of the actions.

c. Findings

Introduction:

The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) for failure to take complete and timely corrective actions for fire brigade drill failures in May 2004. These corrective actions would have addressed some of the identified causes for the drill failure in September 2005.

Description:

Fire brigade performance during a drill on September 13, 2005, was evaluated as unsatisfactory due to problems with communications, command and control, and interface with offsite responders. The licensee performed a root cause analysis for the drill failure and identified that training of fire brigade members did not ensure consistent performance by all brigade members and the drill assessment process failed to identify weaknesses in the knowledge and ability of fire brigade members. The inspectors found that proposed corrective actions for previous drill failures, which would have addressed the contributing causes for the unsatisfactory brigade performance in 2005, had not been completed in a timely manner. Specifically, to address two previous fire brigade drill failures in May 2004, the licensee had proposed corrective actions to develop: 1) qualification standards for fire brigade leaders and brigade members (Action #2 of CR 2004-2463); and 2) performance based assessment tools (Action #6 of CR 2004-2463). The inspectors identified that the action to develop fire brigade qualification standards was closed in December 2004 with no action taken. The inspectors also noted that, although performance based assessment tools were developed, the action was not completed until September 16, 2005, after the drill failure on September 13, 2005.

Further, the inspectors identified that effective corrective actions had not been taken for fire brigade performance issues associated with a drill failure in 2003. Specifically, during the NRC triennial fire protection inspection in 2003, the inspectors identified that the licensee had failed to take prompt corrective actions to address fire brigade performance deficiencies which led to a fire brigade drill failure on June 18, 2003. At the time of the fire protection inspection in 2003, the licensee had failed to take timely, effective corrective actions to address problems with fire brigade familiarity with plant access and egress routes (NCV 50-410/03-07-01). During this inspection, the inspectors found that the evaluation for the drill failure in 2003 (CR 2003-2778) did not address the previous failure to take corrective actions for lack of familiarity with plant areas. The corrective actions were limited to reinforcing the existing practice for brigade assembly and eliminating the minimum brigade response time criteria. The inspectors noted that, although fire brigade members expressed continuing concerns about lack of familiarity with plant access and egress routes, plant familiarization tours were not part of the formal fire brigade continuing training program and were only conducted as time allowed (approximately once a year).

Planned corrective actions for the September 2005 fire brigade drill failure include development of objective standards for fire brigade performance and revision of the drill assessment tools to reflect those standards.

Analysis:

The failure to take complete and timely corrective actions to address fire brigade performance issues was more than minor because it affected the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone in that it adversely impacted manual fire suppression capability. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and is determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green). Although the lack of fire brigade performance standards and evaluation criteria contributed to several drill failures, fire brigade performance has been satisfactory during the majority of drills, and actions have been taken or were planned to remediate brigade leaders and members who did not perform satisfactorily. The cause of this finding was related to incomplete and untimely corrective actions; therefore, the finding is associated with the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution.

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50.54(a)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee implement the quality assurance program described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).

Section B.16.2.5 of Appendix B to the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 USAR requires, in part, that conditions adverse to fire protection such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances are promptly identified, reported, and corrected.

Contrary to this requirement, the licensee had not promptly corrected fire brigade training and evaluation deficiencies that impacted fire brigade performance. Because the failure to promptly correct these deficiencies is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program (CR 2005-4482), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000220, 410/2005007-01, Incomplete and Untimely Corrective Actions for Fire Brigade Performance Issues.

4. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During the interviews with station personnel, the team assessed the safety conscious work environment at the Nine Mile Point station. Specifically, the team assessed whether people were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The team reviewed Constellations Employee Concerns Program (ECP) to determine if employees were aware of the program and had used it to raise concerns.

The team also discussed selected issues with the ECP manager and engineering department management to compare insights from the inspection with Constellations reviews.

b. Findings

and Assessments No findings of significance were identified.

The inspectors determined that personnel are willing to raise issues, and the team found no direct evidence of an unacceptable work environment. All of the personnel interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP. No employees indicated that they personally would not raise a concern; however, within the fire protection organization there were a number of employees who felt that others would be hesitant to raise issues. The licensee has observed similar issues and is taking actions to assess the situation and address precursors.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

On November 4, 2005, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. James Spina, Nine Mile Point Site Vice President, and other members of the Nine Mile Point staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information reviewed during the inspection was retained.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a NCV.

• 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.I.1 requires that the fire brigade training program include classroom instruction on the type and location of fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant, as well as the proper use of lighting.

Contrary to this, the licensees fire brigade training did not address in-plant fire hazards and locations, or the use of lighting. This was identified by the licensee and is in the CAP as CR 2005-4160. This finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in significant fire brigade performance deficiencies.

ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information In addition to the documentation that the inspectors reviewed (listed in the attachment), copies of information requests given to the licensee are in ADAMS, under accession number ML053390049.

ATTACHMENT -

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

L. Backus, Training

J. Blasiak, System Engineer

W. Bush, Fire Protection Program Manager

R. Corieri, System Engineer

L. Dick, Q&PA

M. Downs, Fire Protection Supervisor

S. Eckhard, Equipment Qualification Program Manager

T. Fiorenza, General Supervisor, Plant Engineering Design

C. Fisher, Maintenance Rule Coordinator

J. Gerber, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Godley, Manager, Operations

R. Green, System Engineer

W. Holston, Director of Engineering

M. Jaquin, U2 Operations Assistant Manager

J. Jones, Emergency Preparedness Manager

P. Kehoe, Relief Valves Program Manager

P. Lucason, Fire Protection Engineer

D. Newman, Operations Training

T. OConnor, Plant General Manager

J. Oxford, Q&PA

V. Patel, System Engineer

D. Pierce, Security Supervisor

G. Polinsky, Security

J. Raby, Program Manager, App. J Containment Leak Rate Testing

D. Richards, Operations Support

F. Ringwald, Operations Support

G. Stowers, Operations Performance Improvement Manager

T. Syrell, Nuclear Regulatory Matters

D. Topley, Manager, Assessment and Corrective Action

D. Vannamee, General Supervisor of Maintenance Training

P. Walsh, U2 Shift Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000220, NCV Incomplete and Untimely Corrective Actions for Fire Brigade

05000410/2005007-01 Performance Issues