IR 05000220/2022003
| ML22308A055 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/2022 |
| From: | Erin Carfang Division of Operating Reactors |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2022003 | |
| Download: ML22308A055 (1) | |
Text
November 4, 2022
SUBJECT:
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000220/2022003 AND 05000410/2022003
Dear David Rhoades:
On September 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. On October 20, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Peter Orphanos, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Erin E. Carfang, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000220 and 05000410 License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000220 and 05000410
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000220/2022003 and 05000410/2022003
Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-003-0036
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Location:
Oswego, NY
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2022 to September 30, 2022
Inspectors:
G. Stock, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Kline, Resident Inspector
B. Sienel, Resident Inspector
J. Ambrosini, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector
B. Pinson, Reactor Inspector
J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Erin E. Carfang, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000410/2022-001-00 Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Low Reactor Water Level During Maintenance 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 2, 2022, reactor power was reduced to 40 percent in response to a degrading 'A' recirculation pump upper seal.
After a drywell entry to inspect the seal, the reactor was shut down on September 4, 2022.
Following the seal replacement maintenance outage, Unit 2 was returned to rated power on September 19, 2022. On September 24, 2022, the unit was downpowered to approximately 60 percent for a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to rated thermal power later that day.
Unit 2 remained at or near rated thermal power for the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 containment spray system 122 on July 14, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 core spray system 111 on August 24, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 'B' residual heat removal system on September 21, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 control rod drive system on September 22, 2022
Complete Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 high pressure core spray system
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1 reactor building 318' east, fire area 318-01, on July 11, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 reactor building 318' west, fire area 318-02, on July 11, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 diesel generator building 261', fire area 28, on August 3, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 diesel generator building 261', fire area 29, on August 3, 2022
- (5) Unit 2 control building 288', relay room, fire area 24, on August 25, 2022
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed Unit 2 operations personnel during the reactor shutdown for a maintenance outage on September 4, 2022.
- (2) The inspectors observed Unit 1 operations personnel during containment spray 111 testing on September 26, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed a Unit 2 simulator evaluation that included a service water pump trip, a steam flow instrument failure, an electrical fault on a safety-related 4160-volt bus, and high primary containment pressure which required a reactor pressure vessel blowdown on July 28, 2022.
- (2) The inspectors observed a Unit 1 simulator evaluation that included an earthquake, a loss of offsite power and diesel generator failure, fuel failure, and a secondary containment leak on August 2, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 2 service water system
- (2) Unit 2 instrument air system
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) The commercial grade dedication of the breaker operating mechanism for the Unit 1 emergency service water pump 12
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk during planned maintenance on containment spray system 122 on July 12, 2022
- (2) Unit 2 elevated risk during emergent work on the 'C' instrument air compressor during the week of August 1, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 elevated risk during emergent work on the control rod drive control system on August 23, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 elevated risk during 'B' residual heat removal system outage window on August 30, 2022
- (5) Unit 2 elevated risk during reactor cavity floodup for a planned maintenance outage on September 7, 2022
- (6) Unit 2 elevated risk during reactor cavity drain down for a planned maintenance outage on September 10, 2022
- (7) Unit 1 elevated risk during diesel fire pump maintenance on September 20, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 containment following torus-drywell vacuum breaker dual indication following testing on July 22, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 103 following turbo oil pump failure on August 30, 2022
- (3) Unit 2 control rod drive system due to excessive stabilizing valve leakage to atmosphere on August 31, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 main steam isolation valve 7D following failure to slow close on September 7, 2022
- (5) Unit 1 electric fire pump due to inaccurate calculations in surveillance procedure on September 15, 2022
- (6) Unit 1 containment isolation following traversing incore probe ball valve unexpected response on September 16, 2022
- (7) Unit 2 control room ventilation system following control room chiller service water supply valve failure to close on September 19, 2022
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (1) Unit 1 static battery charger 161B following 10-year preventive maintenance on July 12, 2022
- (2) Unit 1 containment spray 122 following planned maintenance on July 13, 2022
- (3) Unit 1 torus-drywell vacuum breaker BV-68-03 following corrective maintenance on July 25, 2022
- (4) Unit 2 'C' instrument air compressor following corrective maintenance on August 13, 2022
- (5) Unit 2 'B' residual heat removal system following planned maintenance on August 30, 2022
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 maintenance outage N2M10 activities from September 4, 2022 to September 14, 2022.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) N2-OSP-ICS-Q@002, RCIC Pump and Valve Operability Test, on August 11, 2022
RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) N1-ST-SO, Shift Checks, on September 14, 2022
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) S-PM-003, FLEX 450 KW Portable Diesel Generator Test, on July 19, 2022
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Constellation's maintenance and testing of the Nine Mile Point alert and notification system on August 8 through August 12, 2022, for the period of September 2021 through July 2022.
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of Constellation's emergency preparedness organization on August 8 through August 12, 2022, for the period of September 2021 through July 2022.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
- 21-09, EP-AA-1013, Addendum 3, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Emergency Classification Technical Basis, Revision 6 and EP-AA-1013, Addendum 3, Appendix 1, NMP Unit 1 EAL Wallboard, Revision 2
- 21-10, EP-AA-1013, Addendum 4, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Emergency Classification Technical Basis, Revision 5 and EP-AA-1013, Addendum 4, Appendix 1, NMP Unit 2 EAL Wallboard, Revision 2
- 21-64, 21-09, EP-AA-1013, Addendum 3, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Emergency Classification Technical Basis, Revision 7 and EP-AA-1013, Addendum 4, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Emergency Classification Technical Basis, Revision 6
This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Constellation's maintenance and testing of the emergency preparedness program on August 8 through August 12, 2022, for the period of September 2021 through July
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022
EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022
EP03: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) IR 04454780 - Scaffold Configuration Control Issues
- (2) IR 04448532 - Operating Experience (OPEX) Extent of Condition Review for Loss of uninterruptable power supply (UPS) 162A Event
- (3) IR 04465419 - Review of Corrective Actions and Preventive Maintenance Strategy Following a Half Scram Condition on Unit 1 Reactor Protection System Channel 11
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a weld failure on the 'A' feedwater bypass line drain pipe requiring a downpower to 65 percent and the licensees response on September 24, 2022.
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000410/2022-001-00, Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Low Reactor Water Level During Maintenance (ADAMS Accession No. ML22159A196). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000410/2022-002. This LER is closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Minor Performance Deficiency: Scaffold Configuration Control Issues 71152A Minor Performance Deficiency: During the Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection in October 2021, the inspectors identified two separate scaffolds in direct contact with safety-related equipment. Specifically, the inspectors found that the scaffolding directly contacted residual heat removal heat exchanger piping insulation and emergency diesel generator service water piping insulation. As a result, Constellation initiated corrective action issue reports (IRs) for these conditions adverse to quality. Constellation determined that these scaffolds did not have the required minimum 3-inch gap around plant equipment called for by their procedures and that the required engineering evaluations and 50.59 reviews for scaffolding installed greater than 90 days had not been performed, documented, or approved.
(See NRC inspection Report 05000410/2021012 for more details). In response, the licensee performed an extent of condition review on other scaffolding and found four additional scaffolds that had been installed greater than 90 days but that had not received a 50.59 review. These reviews are called for by licensee procedures to show that the requirements of 10CFR50.59 were met. Subsequently, the licensee removed the scaffolding that was in contact with safety-related equipment and performed 50.59 reviews for scaffolding installed greater than 90 days.
The inspectors reviewed the Constellation corrective action program, scaffold database and files, and a sample of scaffold 50.59 screens; and performed a risk-informed walkdown of Unit 1 and Unit 2 scaffolds located in close proximity to safety-related SSCs to assess Constellations corrective action effectiveness with respect to the scaffold control performance deficiencies previously identified. Based on sampling, the inspectors observed that Constellations assigned corrective actions were adequately tracked, appropriately documented, and completed as scheduled. The inspectors did not identify performance deficiencies regarding corrective action timeliness or seismic clearance issues (where the scaffold could not be erected and maintain the required minimum 3-inch gap to plant equipment). However, the inspectors concluded that Constellations corrective actions were not fully effective in addressing the performance deficiency associated with performing 50.59 screens for scaffolding installed greater than 90 days. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 Scaffold Older Than 74 Days scaffold database report and noted that there were 26 scaffolds installed for over 74 days without a 50.59 review, 12 of these were already overdue (installed beyond 90 days without a 50.59 review), and an additional 6 were within four days of going overdue and responsible engineering staff had not been notified of the need to perform a 50.59 review. Based on a subsequent review, maintenance personnel determined that only 6 of the 12 were actually overdue for a 50.59 review in accordance with licensee procedures. Maintenance personnel stated that in response to inspector questions, that all 6 scaffolds were removed, and 50.59 screens completed for the remaining scaffolds close to their 90 day installed date. The inspectors noted that, prior to September 2022, engineering staff had performed six 50.59 screens for scaffolds installed for greater than 90 days since November 2021.
Based on a scaffold walkdown and review of the scaffold database and files, the inspectors also identified that the scaffold coordinator had unintentionally reset the 50.59 review clock in the database following scaffold re-inspections and/or modifications resulting in the 50.59 review going overdue as the scaffolds were not accurately tracked in the 74-day report. The five examples were associated with the following scaffolds: 2-RB-289-21, 1-RB-237-14, 1-RB-237-15, 1-RB-237-65, and 1-RB-237-103. In response, engineering personnel initiated corrective action IR 4523450 and subsequently removed scaffold 2-RB-289-21 which was no longer needed. In addition, mechanical maintenance staff planned to perform a focused self-assessment on the scaffold control program.
The inspectors determined that the scaffold program performance deficiencies discussed above were minor in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, as they did not represent a programmatic breakdown and there was no adverse impact on the availability, reliability, and capability of the associated systems. In addition, the performance deficiencies were minor because they did not lead to a more significant safety concern and they were not a precursor to a more significant event. Specifically, the deficiencies did not result in reasonable doubt about the scaffold effect on the equipment's seismic qualifications. In addition, the inspectors concluded that based on the installed configurations, none of the scaffolds with overdue 50.59 reviews would have likely required a complete 50.59 safety evaluation and/or NRC approval and no adverse impact on the regulatory process. The inspectors independently evaluated the deficiency for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. The inspectors determined that the deficiency was not of greater than minor significance and therefore are not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Operating Experience (OPEX) Extent of Condition Review for Loss of UPS 162A Event 71152A The inspectors completed an annual problem identification and resolution inspection sample regarding Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) staffs extent of condition evaluations following the loss of UPS 162A from September 2021. In reviewing the available corrective action program documents regarding the Loss of UPS-162A Event, the inspectors identified several relevant areas of interest to focus the inspection efforts to ensure applicable attributes of Section 02.02, of Inspection Procedure 71152, were appropriately evaluated. In particular, the original IR 04448532 and its many assignments were selected for review, which included the corrective action program evaluation (CAPE). Following review of these documents, the inspectors questioned NMPNS staff regarding the activities conducted under the CAPE to verify the adequacy of corrective actions relevant to the original failure. Additionally, the licensee had identified OPEX, both internal and external, may have contributed to the original event, or were considered missed opportunities previously not identified or addressed.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action program assignments for IR 04448532, which included the CAPE, and determined, in general, assignments were identified, completed in a timely manner, and addressed attributes of the original failure that were germane to the development of corrective actions that were appropriate for the circumstances. One such example were the activities conducted under Assignments 19 and 21, which directed the NMPNS staff to develop and document crew learnings from the Loss of UPS 162A Event. The inspectors verified that NMPNS staff identified several OPEX events, similar to the UPS failure event, that could have been evaluated and resulted in either a prevention of the September 2021 Event, or established a better understanding of the subsequent failure.
The inspectors also noted that during the preparation and performance of this focused inspection, NMPNS staff performed additional reviews of the corrective action program documentation that was generated for the Loss of UPS 162A Event. As a result, NMNPS staff generated IR 04518739, to address two additional corrective action program actions associated with
- (1) correction of SOC notes regarding Level 2 requirements being met, from PI-AA 120, "Issue Identification and Screening Process," Revision 12, because the Event was considered reportable, and
- (2) addition of Assignment No. 24 for the performance of an effectiveness review, which is now scheduled.
The inspectors also noted that NMPNS staff identified a gap in the performance of OPEX review documentation in the system health report program ENGAGE Health, to ensure periodic reviews are documented, as detailed in IR 04512201. This documentation is noteworthy for the valuable insights gained by plant personnel to identify and enhance the management of future issues on systems and components. The inspectors verified that NMPNS staff generated a 6-month recurrent action to perform and document OPEX reviews in ENGAGE Health, consistent with the requirements of ER-AA-2030, "Conduct of Equipment Reliability," Revision 27.
The inspectors evaluated the corrective actions regarding OPEX extent of condition reviews that were identified and implemented by NMPNS staff, following the Loss of UPS 162A Event from September 2021, and no performance deficiencies were identified.
Observation: Review of Corrective Actions and Preventive Maintenance Strategy Following a Half Scram Condition on Unit 1 Reactor Protection System Channel 11 71152A The inspectors reviewed Constellations evaluation and corrective actions associated with the failure of average power range monitor 13s associated flow control trip reference card on December 8, 2021. The flow control trip reference card failure led to a half scram condition on reactor protection system channel 11, and required replacement to restore average power range monitor 13 to operable status. Specifically, inspectors evaluated Constellations corrective actions and associated failure analysis. Additionally, inspectors considered previous work that was performed on the system and Constellations preventive maintenance strategy.
In April 2021, the average power range monitor 13 flow control trip reference card was calibrated and tested as part of a required preventive maintenance activity. During the calibration, some voltages associated with the card were out of the desired procedural guidance, but remained within Technical Specifications required values. The work activity was completed and the system was restored to operable. These voltage deviations were documented in IR 04416303, and replacement or repair of the card was documented as a recommended corrective action. In September 2021, replacement of the card was scheduled, but the new card could not be calibrated properly, and as a result, the original card was placed back in the system and restored to operable. The calibration issues with the new card were not captured within the site corrective action program, and were instead captured in a work order note and in the work scheduling system. A work order to replace the card was in the planning process when, on December 8, 2021, the installed card failed and led to a half scram condition on reactor protection system channel 11.
A vendor failure analysis that was performed on the failed card was reviewed, and inspectors discussed the failure and follow-up actions with Constellation system engineers. The vendor analysis determined that a capacitor within the flow control trip reference card circuitry had failed, which led to the card failure. The vendor analysis and Constellation follow-up did not determine a specific cause for the capacitors failure, and did not identify any previous similar failures.
As part of the review, inspectors did not determine that any performance deficiencies exist as a result of the work performed or the failure of the flow control trip reference card on December 8, 2021. Inspectors did provide Constellation with observations of some minor work documentation quality issues and challenges with organizational communication between the operations, maintenance, and engineering departments. Specifically, the issues with the calibration of the replacement card in September 2021 were not fully captured within the work order package, and instead were documented within the work order planning process vice the corrective action program. Inspectors determined that this was within Constellations process, but did not provide for clear and consistent understanding of the work that was performed and the impacts of the deficient flow control trip reference card.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 12, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to Alex Sterio, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 29, 2022, the inspectors presented the scaffold configuration control issues inspection results to Peter Orphanos, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Peter Orphanos, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
C-18007-C
Reactor Core Spray P&ID
C-18012-C, Sheet
Reactor Containment Spray Raw Water System
C-18012-C, Sheet
Reactor Containment Spray System
PID-30B
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Control Rod Drive
Hydraulic System
PID-31E
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Residual Heat Removal
System
PID-33A
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Core
Spray System
PID-33B
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure Core
Spray System
Procedures
N1-OP-14
Containment Spray System
04800
N1-OP-2
Core Spray System
03900
N2-OP-30
Control Rod Drive
N2-OP-31
Residual Heat Removal System
N2-OP-33
High Pressure Core Spray System
N2-OP-33-
Lineups
High Pressure Core Spray System Lineups
Fire Plans
N1-PFP-0101
Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plans
N2-FPI-PFP-0201
Unit 2 Pre-Fire Plans
Procedures
N1-FST-FPE-
A001
Fire Protection Equipment Annual Inspection
71111.11Q Procedures
N1-ST-Q6A
Containment Spray System Loop 111 Quarterly Operability
Test
2000
N2-OP-101C
Plant Shutdown
04100
N2-OP-29
Reactor Recirculation System
03400
Corrective Action
Documents
04378182
04385096
04481795
04482582
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
04483845
04485867
04513670
04513743
Miscellaneous
Procurement Requirement Evaluation Form 28736
Unit 2 Service Water Maintenance Rule Basis Document
Procedures
N1-EPM-GEN-
153
Inspection and Testing of AD-15/25 Breakers and Associated
Motors
01100
Work Orders
C93713941
C93731154
C93738281
C93825512
Corrective Action
Documents
04518252
Procedures
N2-OP-19-
Lineups
Instrument and Service Air Systems
N2-PM-082
RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] Flood Up/Draindown
2000
N2-SOP-101D
Rapid Power Reduction
01100
Protected Equipment Program
OP-AA-201-012-
1001
Operations On-Line Fire Risk Management
OP-NM-108-117
Protected Equipment Program at Nine Mile Point
00500
OP-NM-201-012-
1001
Operations On-Line Fire Risk Management at NMP
200
OP-NM-201-105
Compensatory Measures for Inoperable Fire Protection
Systems and Components
00500
Corrective Action
Documents
04474278
04512373
04519890
04520131
04520144
04520210
04520749
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
N1-OP-39
Traversing Incore Probe
2100
N1-OP-45
05100
N1-PM-C3
Electric and Diesel Fire Pump Performance Tests
01700
N1-ST-M3
Torus-Drywell Vacuum Breaker Exercising
01601
N2-OP-1
Main Steam System
20
N2-OSP-SWP-
Q004
Division 2 Service Water Operability Test
01100
Work Orders
C93790445
C93872240
Procedures
ECP-20-000468
Installation of a Hydrogen Generation Unit
Corrective Action
Documents
04514556
Procedures
N1-EPM-SBC-
001
Static Battery Charger Cleaning and Transfer
01600
N1-ST-Q6D
Containment Spray System Loop 122 Quarterly Operability
Test
N2-OSP-RHS-
Q@005
RHR System Loop B Pump and Valve Operability Test,
System Integrity Test, and ASME XI Pressure Test
016
Work Orders
C93780597
C93790623
C93854108
C93855008
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
04521635
Miscellaneous
Reactivity
Maneuver Plan
NM2C19-SU
Procedures
Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits
N2-OP-101A
Plant Start-up
05400
N2-OP-38
Spent Fuel Cooling and Cleanup System
2700
Personnel and Equipment Tagout Process
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Reactivity Management
OU-NM-103-101
Shutdown Safety Management Program
00700
Procedures
N1-ST-SO
Shift Checks
03100
N2-OSP-ICS-
Q@002
RCIC Pump and Valve Operability Test
017
S-PM-003
FLEX 450 KW Portable Diesel Generator Test
6T1
Miscellaneous
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Generating Station and James A.
Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Public Alert and Notification
System Design Report
Revision 2
Miscellaneous
Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan
Revision 33
Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Nine
Mile Point Station
Revision 8
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
04479221
04505189
Miscellaneous
N1-MSPI-001
Nine Mile Point 1 MSPI Basis Document
N2-MSPI-001
Nine Mile Point 2 MSPI Basis Document
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Corrective Action
Documents
04454047
04454780
04483207
04485695
04496033
04523404
04523450
04523602
04523757
Engineering
Evaluations
5059-2017-352
Scaffold 1-SCAFFOLD-RB-318-018 to Remain as Permanent
09/18/2017
5059-2017-353
Scaffold 1-SCAFFOLD-RB-318-019 to Remain as Permanent
09/18/2017
5059-2022-052
Scaffolds to be in Place Greater Than 90 Days at Power
04/12/2022
Procedures
Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Removal Request
Process
MA-NM-796-024-
1001
Scaffolding Criteria for NMP
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Issue Identification and Screening Process
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure
Procedures
N2-OP-3
Condensate and Feedwater Systems
060T1