IR 05000400/1999011
| ML18022B065 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18017A908 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-99-11, NUDOCS 9910120272 | |
| Download: ML18022B065 (42) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.:
50-400 License Nos.:
NPF-63 Report Nos.:
50-400/99-11 Licensee:
Carolina Power 8 Light Company (CP8 L)
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location:
5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 July 19 - 23 and August 2 - 6, 1999 Team Leader:
J. Lenahan, PE, Senior Reactor Inspector Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Inspectors:
W. Kleinsorge, PE, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector C. Smith, PE, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Coley, Reactor Inspector A. Hutto, Resident Inspector (August 2 - 6 only)
Approved By:
Kerry D. Landis, Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety iOi20272 990920 R
ADOCK 05000400 PDR ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/99-11 This inspection included a review of the licensee's calculations, analyses, performance test procedures and other engineering documents that were used to support design and performance of the low head and high head safety injection systems during normal and accident or abnormal conditions.
The inspection was performed in accordance with the new NRC regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selection of components and attributes for the inspection focus. The report covered a two-week period of inspection.
The inspection found that maintenance, testing, and operation of the low head and high head safety injection systems were consistent with the design and licensing basis.
During this inspection the licensee initiated several Condition Reports which are listed in the Appendix. No violations were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
CORNER STONES MITIGATINGSYSTEMS R21 SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN INTRODUCTION The objective of this Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection was to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses, other engineering documents, and maintenance practices that were used to support the performance of the low head safety injection (LHSI)function of the residual heat removal (RHR) system and the high head safety injection (HHSI)system during normal and accident or abnormal conditions.
The inspection was performed by a team of inspectors that included a Team Leader, four Region II Specialist Inspectors, and a Resident Inspector.
The systems, structures, and components (SSCs) examined during the inspection were selected by reviewing the licensee's probabilistic risk model to determine the dominant SSCs ranked by importance in their potential contribution to dominant accident sequences and/or initiators.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the NRC inspection team included the Shearon Harris Technical Specifications (TS), applicable sections of the updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section=11 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, industry initiatives implemented by the licensee, licensee procedures, and the design bases for the systems.
Prior to this inspection, the licensee performed a self-assessment which included review of the design and licensing basis of the LHSI and HHSI systems.
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS WATER SOURCE The team conducted a walk down inspection of the "A"train RHR and "B"train safety injection (Sl) systems to verify that a sufficient quantity of borated water willbe available and unimpeded during accident/event conditions for the HHSI and LHSI systems.
The team reviewed the calculations for sizing the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and establishing various level requirements in the RWST to verify that sufficient quantities of water are available for accident and normal operating conditions, and calculation SC-N-157 which established RWST level instrumentation setpoints.
The team also reviewed the results of monthly surveillance tests performed in accordance with OST -1107 which verifies that the ECCS piping is full of water, thereby reducing potential for occurrences of a water hammer during system initiation, and tests performed in accordance with MST-1004 which demonstrate that RWST level transmitters calibrations are accurate.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
ELECTRICALPOWER SOURCE POWER SUPPLY TO PUMP MOTORS Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed the pump performance curve forRHR pump 18-SB to verify that the LHSI pump motors had been adequately sized based on process system parameters.
The team performed alternate calculations in order to verify that the HHSI pump motors had been adequately sized and the plant electrical distribution system would be adequate for motor operation during a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Using applicable design input information from Calculation E-6000, AuxiliarySystem Load Study, the team performed alternate calculations to evaluate the capability of the plant electrical distribution system to support operation under the most degraded voltage condition and to verify that the plant electrical distribution system would be adequate for LHSI and HHSI motor operation during a LOCA.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
CONTROL SYSTEM CHARGING / SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM OPERATION
'
Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed design output documents and calculations to verify that the control system
'logic generated by the volume control tank (VCT) level switches and the engineered safeguard "S" signal enabled the charging/safety injection pumps (CSIPs) to take suction from the VCT during normal conditions and from the RWST during accident conditions. The team reviewed the logic for the VCT level transmitters 1-LT 112 and 1-LT115 which provide the control signals which automatically realign the suction of the from the VCTto the RWST by closing motor operated valves (MOVs) 1CS-165 and 1CS-166.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
COLD LEG RECIRCULATION PHASE Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed design output documents and calculations to verify that the control circuit protection logic which provide control signals to open containment sump isolation valves 1SI-
300, 1SI-301, 1SI-310, and 1SI-311 and align the two RHR pumps to take suction from the containment sump during the recirculation phase following a design base accident were adequate.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
TRANSITION FROM INJECTION TO RECIRCULATION PHASE Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed design output documents and calculations to verify that the control systems provide desired control during transition from the injection phase to the recirculation phase during accident conditions. The team reviewed the electrical interlock of the RHR to CSIP isolation valves 1RH-25 and 1RH-63 to verify that controls permitted the operators to manually isolate the RWST from the RHR pumps and align them to deliver flowto the CSIP suction header as specified in system description SD-111.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
OPERATOR ACTIONS The team reviewed operating procedures for transferring emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) from injection phase to cold leg recirculation phase, and between cold leg and hot leg recirculation, to verify that the procedures specify correct operator actions, and can be performed in the time required as described in the UFSAR. The team performed a walkdown of the reactor turbine gauge board (RTGB) in the control room to verify that instrumentation and alarms for RWST level, VCT level, Sl and RHR flows and pressures were available and adequate for the operators to make the necessary decisions during performance of the emergency operating procedures (EOPs), and that placement of controls and indications allowed operators to perform the required actions in the times specified in the USFAR.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
ENVIRONMENTALQUALIFICATION Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed environmental qualification data packages (EQDP) No. 3.3, Motorized Valve Operators, Revision 15, for motor operated valve (MOV) numbers 1CS-165, 1CS-166, 1CS-291, 1CS-292 1SI-1, 1SI-2, 1SI-3, 1SI-4, 1RHR-25 and 1RHR-63 to verify the MOVs met the qualification requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
The team also reviewed EQDP No. 4.10, Pump Motors, Revision 12, to verify that RHR pump motors P1A-SARH and P1B-SBRH and centrifugal charging pump motors P1A-SA, P1B-SB, and P1C-SAB were qualified to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
EQUIPMENT PROTECTION FREEZE PROTECTIOhl Ins ection Sco e
The team conducted a walk down inspection of the RWST and associated piping subject to freezing, and reviewed the UFSAR, system descriptions, vendor manuals, licensee procedures, and design basis calculations to verify that freeze vulnerable portions of the high head injection flow path (RWST to the Reactor Vessel (RV) via'the CSIPs) and the low head injection flow path (RWST to the RV via the RHR pumps) were protected from freezing, Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
FLOOD PROTECTION Ins ection Sco e
The team conducted a walk down inspection in the reactor auxiliary building and the service water tunnel and examined the LHSI and HHSI systems to verify equipment were not subjected to damage resulting from internal flooding (e. g. pipe breaks).
The team reviewed the internal flooding analysis design calculations performed to demonstrate that safety related equipment in the reactor auxiliary building was not vulnerable to internal flooding. The team also reviewed the design basis for the plant site to veriy that the reactor auxiliary building and service water tunnel was not vulnerable to external flooding events.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
HEAT REMOVAL LHSI SYSTEM Ins ection Sco e
The team conducted a walk down inspection of the "A" RHR pump room, the "A" RHR heat exchanger room, the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system train "A"loop (the cooling source for the RHR heat exchangers),and reviewed the UFSAR, system descriptions, vendor manuals, licensee procedures, and design basis calculations to verify that adequate provisions have been made to remove heat from the low head injection flow path.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
HHSI SYSTEM The team conducted a walk down inspection of the CSIP rooms, the Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation (ESFV) system (the cooling source for CSIP rooms) and the Essential Services Chilled Water (ESCW) system (the cooling source for the ESFV system), and reviewed the UFSAR, system descriptions, vendor manuals, licensee procedures, and design basis calculations to verify that adequate provisions have been made to remove heat from the high head injection flow path.
Observations and Findin s During review of procedures and alarm setpoints, the team made the following observation:
The high temperature alarms for the CSIP rooms were set at 104 'F. An instrument uncertainty of 3.4 'F existed for the instrumentation.
When considering instrument uncertainty, it is possible that the alarm may not actuate until the temperature is actually above the 104 'F limitset in PLP 114, Attachment 4. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program in CR HNP 99-02173.
There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
SYSTEM CONDITION AND CAPACITY INSTALLEDCONFIGURATION Ins ection Sco e
The team conducted walk down inspections of selected portions of the RHR, ESFVS, ESCW,,
CCW, Sl, and Containment Spray (CS) systems, and reviewed the UFSAR, system descriptions, vendor manuals, licensee procedures, and design basis calculations to verify the
high head and low head injection flow paths installed configuration complied with design requirements and willsupport system operation under accident condition. The Team also reviewed the in-service inspection (ISI) program to verify that weld integrity was monitored by the licensee for suction piping from the RWST to the CSIPs and the RHR pumps, common failure mode piping welds and injection piping connected to the reactor coolant (RC) system that would be susceptible to thermal stresses were also examined.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
NIAINTENANCE CHECK VALVES Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed the maintenance work history and the surveillance test results for the last three years for risk significant check valve numbers 1CS-294, 1CS-775, 1CS-776,
!RH-34, 1RH-70, 1SI-320, 1SI-321, 1SI-346 and 1SI-347 to verify the valves were operable and would perform their intended safety function.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
MANUALVALVES The team reviewed the work history and completed surveillance test procedures OST-1814, OST-1008 and OST-1092 for the last five years for manual valves RH-19 and RH-57 (RHR pump discharge valves) to verify these valve were operable and would perform their safety function.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
AIR OPERATED VALVES Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed the maintenance work history for the previous three years for air operated valves ( AOVs) numbers 1RH-20, 1RH-30, 1RH-58, and 1RH-66. The team also reviewed the maintenance work history for the instrument air system supply for these AOVs.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
SYSTEM OPERATION The team conducted walk down inspections of selected portions of the HHSI and LHSI systems.
During the walk down, valve positions were examined and compared to drawings and the control room indication to verify system alignment was in accordance with operational requirements.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
DESIGN ISSUES The team reviewed corrective actions developed by the licensee for condition reports (CRs)numbers HNP98-02211, HNP98-02267, and HNP96-00889 to verify that the root cause analysis, extent of condition review, and developed corrective appropriately resolved design issues.
The team also reviewed the results of the licensee's pre-inspection self-assessment of the LHSI and HHSI systems, self-assessments performed within the engineering organization, and Nuclear Assessment Section reports to verify assessment findings were documented and dispositioned within the licensee's corrective action program.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
TESTED PARAMETERS SURVEILLANCETESTING Ins ectionSco e
The team reviewed surveillance test procedures to verify that requirements for boration flow path, safety injection time response, and ECCS subsystem operability were incorporated correctly in the test procedures and to verify that test acceptance criteria were consistent with the TS and UFSAR requirements.
The inspection team also reviewed completed surveillance test data to verify that selected risk significant components in the RHR/LHSI system and the chemical and volume control (CVCS)/HHSI system were capable of performing their safety function within the time specified.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
INSERVICE TESTING OF PUMPS Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed surveillance test procedures and test data for the CSIP numbers 1A-SA, 1B-SB, and 1C-SAB and RHR pumps 1A-SA and 1B-SB to verify that the pumps and valves test acceptance criteria were in accordance with the licensing and design basis requirements and that quarterly operability tests were performed satisfactorily for the pumps.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
INSERVICE TESTING OF VALVES Ins ection Sco e
The team reviewed surveillance test procedures and test data for MOVnumbers 1CS-165, 1CS-166, 1CS-291, 1CS-292, 1RH-25, 1RH-63, 1SI-300, 1SI-301, 1SI-310, 1SI-311, 1SI-340, and 1SI-341 to verify:
that the MOVs were included in the licensee's Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 MOV program and were being maintained and tested in accordance with the guidance specified for the GL 89-10 MOV program.
that MOVsetup calculations appropriately considered the most limiting design basis conditions (including degraded voltage, motor torque requirements, and maximum differential pressure)in the sizing of the MOVactuators.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
COMPONENT INSPECTION DEGRADATIONMECHANISMS S
The team performed an in-depth inspection of the RWST; Train A CCW heat exchanger, Train A RHR heat exchanger; charging pump 1A-SA, area cooling unit AH-9(1A-SA); chargihg pump SAB area cooling unit AH-10(1A-SA); charging pump SA area cooling unit AH-9(1B-SB); and charging pump ASB area cooling unit AH-10(1B-SB), and reviewed the UFSAR, system
descriptions, vendor manuals, licensee procedures, and design basis calculations to verify the high head and low head injection flow path piping and components had been maintained to verify that design assumptions have been maintained and potential degradation mechanisms were monitored or prevented.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
SEISMIC QUALIFICATION Ins ection Sco e
The team examined 14 pipe supports on the LHSI and HHSI piping systems between the RWST and RHR and charging pumps to verify the supports were installed in accordance with applicable design requirements and that seismic qualification of the piping systems was being maintained.
The team also reviewed engineering service request (ESR 97-00676) and verified that a modification which resulted in an increased valve w'eight on the HHSI piping was evaluated and approved by the designer, Westinghouse.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
CONFIGURATION MOTOR OPERATED VALVES The. team performed alternate calculations for AC MOVactuator motors in order to determine the minimum available motor output torque assuming motor control center (MCC) minimum transient voltage and the minimum available motor output torque assuming MCC minimum steady state voltage. The results from the alternate calculations were compared with the licensee's calculations.
Alternate calculations were performed for the following MOVs:
Boron injection tank inlet and outlet isolation valves 1SI-1, 1SI-2, 1SI-3, and 1SI-4 RHR to CSIP suction isolation valves 1RHR-25 and 1RHR-63.
RWST to CSIP valves 1CS-291 and 1CS-292 VCT outlet isolation valves 1CS-165 and 1CS-1 66
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
CONTAINMENTSUMP The team reviewed a minor modiTication performed in accordance with Engineering Service Request No. 97-00429 to verify that design attributes I assumptions not verified by testing had been determined through inspection or. maintenance activities to insure that this modification did not change the drain grid design criteria.
In addition, the team reviewed the sump inspections conducted in accordance with CP8L procedure OST-1803 to verify that the sump was inspected each refueling outage and any other time the sump is opened for work.
Observations and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
COMPONENT INPUTS/OUTPUTS Maintenance history and test procedures were reviewed to verify adequate pump flowfor both the HHSI and LHSI pumps.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
PROCURENIENT, The team reviewed procurement documentation for replacement of the shaft, suction impeller, intermediate impeller and several small piece parts such as shaft keys on the B CSIP which had previously experienced vibration problems.
This work had been performed during refueling outage 8.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE The team reviewed NRC Information Notices (IN) numbers 97-76 and 98-22 to verify that the licensee appropriately considered impact of operating experience problems on the affected components.
Observation and Findin s There were no findings identified and documented during this inspection.
V. MANAGEMENTMEETINGS EXIT MEETING SUMMARY The Team Leader discussed the progress of the inspection with licensee representatives on a daily basis and presented the results to members of licensee management and staff at the conclusion of the inspection on August, 6, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Alexander, Manager, Regulatory Affairs B. Clark, General Manager, Harris Plant A. Cockerill, Superintendent, I&C Electrical Systems J. Eads, Supervisor, Licensing and Regulatory Programs G. Kline, Manager, Harris Engineering Support Services S. O'onnor, ECCS Supervisor J. Scarola, Vice President, Harris Plant J. Turner, HHSI System Engineer V. Stephenson, Mechanical Engineering Superintedent M. Wallace, Senior Analyst, Licensing M. Worth, LHSI System Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, Nuclear Assessment personnel and administrative personnel.
NRC:
h J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector R. Hagar, Resident Inspector K. Landis, Chief, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 71111.21, Safety System Design and Performance Capability LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED OR DISCUSSED NONE
APPENDIX PROCEDURES LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
EGR-NGGC-0101, Electrical Calculation of Motor Output Torque for AC and DC Motor Operated
Valves(MOVS), Revision 3.
EGR-NGGC-0106, AC and DC Over Current Protection and Coordination, Revision 2
EGR-NGGC-0203, Motor-Operated Valve Performance Prediction, Actuator Settings, and
Diagnostic Test Data Reconciliation, Revision 7
Sl Termination, Revision 10
EOP-EPP-010, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Revision 11
EOP-EPP-011, Transfer Between Cold Leg and Hot Leg Recirculation, Revision 10
EPT-033, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test, Revision 20
EPT-054, Essential Services Chilled Water Flow Balancing (Individual AirHandler Throttle Valve
Settings), Revision 10
EPT<04, Charging Safety Injection Pumps Curve Verification Test, Revisions 3 8 4
EPT-835, Temporary Procedure for Charging Safety Injection Pump B-SB Performance
Verification Test, Revision 0
EST-206, ECCS Flow Balance, Revision
EST-301, Engineered Safety Features Response Time Evaluation Safety Injection
EST-313, Engineered Safety Features Response Time Evaluation Switchover to Recirculation
EST-316, Emergency Sequencer System 1A-SA Response Time Test, Revision 14
"HNP-IST-002, HNP IST Program Plan - 2~ Interval, Revision
ISI-800, Inservice Testing of Pumps, Revision 10
ISI-801, Inservice Testing of Valves, Revision 15
MST-I004, Calibration of Refueling Water Storage Tank Level, Revision. 5
'
OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, Revision 3
OP-107, Chemical and Control System, Revision 24
OP-110, Safety Injection, Revision
OP-111, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 16
OP-161.01, Operations Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance Systems, Revision 10
OP-172, Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding HVAC System, Revision 14
OST-1007, CVCS/Sl System Operability Train A Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, Revision 17
OST-1008, 1A-SA RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3, Revision 11
OST-1021, Daily Surveillance Requirements Daily Interval Mode 1, 2, Revision 27
P
OST-1022, Daily Surveillance Requirements,
Revision 25
OST-1041, A Train HVACSafety Related ERCW TCVs IST Operability Test Quarterly Interval
Modes 1-6, Revisions 4 & 7
OST-1044, ESFAS Train A Slave Relay Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, Revision 13
OST-1092, 1B-SB RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3, Revision 7
OST-1093, CVCS/Sl System Operability Train B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4, Revision 14
OST-1094, Sequencer Block Circuit and Containment Fan Cooler Testing Train A Quarterly
Interval Allmodes, Revision 6
OST-1095, Sequencer
Block Circuit and Containment Fan Cooler Testing Train B Quarterly
Interval Allmodes, Revision 8
OST-1107, ECCS Flow Path and Piping Filled Verification Monthly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4-5,
Revision 14
~
OST-1108, RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Mode 4, 5, arid 6, Revision 9
OST-1505, Boric Acid Flow Path Check Valve IST Test Quarterly Interval, Revision 7
OST-1506, Reactor Coolant System isolation Valve Leak Test,
Revision 7
OST-1508, Operability Test for 1CS-167, 1CS-775, 8 1CS-776, Revision 6
OST-1513, Operability Test for 1CS-294,
'1 CS-775, and 1CS-776, Revision 1
OST-1801, ECCS Throttle Valve, CSIP, and Check Valve Verification 18 Month Interval Mode 6,
Defueled, Revision 15
OST-1803, Containment Sump Visual Inspection, Revision
OST-1813, Remote Shutdown System Operability 18 Month Interval Modes 5, 6, of Defueled,
Revision 14
OST-1823, 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test 18 Month Interval Modes 5 8
6, Revision 12
OST-1824, 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test 18 Month Interval Modes 5 8
6, Revision 15
I'
OST-'1825, Safety Injection: ESF Response Time, Train A 18 Month Interval on Staggered Test
Basis Mode 5-6, Revisions 9 8 10
OST-1826, Safety Injection: ESF Response
Time, Train B 18 Month Interval on Staggered Test
Basis Mode 5-6, Revision 13
OST-1852, Backseat Testing of 1SI-320 and 1SI-321, Revision 2
PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report,
Revision 20
PLP-112, Motor Operated Valve Program, Revision 13
PLP-114, Relocated Technical Specifications and Design Basis Requirements - Attachment 4
Area Temperature Monitoring, Revision 7
PMM-014, Limitorque Inspection and Lubrication, Revision 16
RST-201, Boron Concentration Surveillance of Boric Acid and Refueling Water Storage Tank,
Revisions 7 8 8
TMM-133, Sl Thermal Stratification Monitoring Program, Revision 0
TMM-406, Analysis and Trending of NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Applicable Motor Operated
Valves, Revision 8
DRAWINGS
Drawing No. 0354-00212-013,
Revision 3, General Purpose Head, Hex Nipple, thermocouple,
Mounting Bracket
Drawing No. 20625-HT-18751A, Sheet 18, Revision 1, Heat Tracing System Freeze Protection
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Drawing No. 20625-HT-18751ASheet
17, Revision 5, Heat Tracing System Freeze Protection
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Drawing No. 20625-HT-18751A, Sheet 16 Revision 4, Heat Tracing System Freeze Protection
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Drawing No. 20625-HT-18751N&P, Sheet 1, Revision 4, Heat Tracing System Freeze
Protection Refueling Water Storage Tank
Drawing No. 20625-HT-18751N&P, Sheet 2, Revision 5, Heat Tracing System Freeze
Protection Refueling Water Storage Tank
'
Drawing No. 20625-HT-18751N&PSheet
3, Revision 4, Heat Tracing System Freeze
Protection Refueling Water Storage Tank
Drawing No. 2165-G-116, Revision 13, Containment Spray Piping Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding
Plan - El
190.00'rawing
No. 2165-G-117, Revision 12, Containment Spray Piping Reactor Auxiliary Building
Plan - El 236.00'
Drawing No. 2165-G-151, Revision 22, RHR & Safety Injection Piping Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding
Plan - El 190.00'
216.00'rawing
No. 2165-G-250, Revision 20, Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding Tank Area Plans
Drawing No. 2165-G-805, Revision 22, Flow Diagram Chemical & Volume Control System
Drawing No. 2165-G-819, Revision 22, Flow Diagram Component Cooling Water System
Sheet
Drawing No. 2165-G-820, Revision 11, Flow Diagram Component Cooling Water System
Sheet 2
Drawing No. 2165-S-1305,
Revision 16, Simplified Flow Diagram Chemical & Volume Control
System
Drawing No. 2165-S-1308,
Revision 10, Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System
Drawing No. 2166-B-041, Revision 10, Sheet 188602, Power Distribution & Motor Data 480V
MCC 1D12
Drawing No. 2166-B-041, Revision 5, Sheet 814, Power Distribution & Motor Data FPP
HT-1875IN
Drawing No. 2166-BQ01, Revision 10, Sheet 2766, Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump SA
Area Cooling Unit AH-9(1B-SB)
Drawing No. 2166-BQ01, Revision 7, Sheet 2765, Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump SA
Area Cooling Unit AH-9(1A-SA)
Drawing No. 2166-B-401, Revision 8, Sheet 2767, Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump SA
Area Cooling Unit AH-10(1A-SA)
Drawing No. 2166-B-401, Revision 10, Sheet 2768, Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump SA
Area Cooling AH-10(1B-SB)
Drawing No. 2166-B-430, Revision 4, Instrument Schematics and Logic Drawings, Sheets
3185A3, 3185B3 3185A4, 3185A6, 3185B4 and 3185B6
Drawing No. 2651C63, Sheet 12, Revision 10, Level Systems Installation Schematic Refueling
Water Storage Tank
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-105, Revision 8, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-126, Revision 6, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-137, Revision 8, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-139, Revision 9, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-156, Revision 8, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-157, Revision 6, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CC-171, Revision 9, Component Cooling Water System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CS-115, Revision 5, Chemical &Volume Control System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CS-128-01, Revision 0, Chemical 8 Volume Control System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CS-131, Revision 8, Chemical 8 Volume Control System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CS-134, Revision 7, Chemical 8 Volume Control System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CS-142, Revision 7, Chemical 8 Volume Control System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CT-14, Revision 8, Containment Spray System
Drawing No. ISO 1-CT-16, Revision 7, Containment Spray System
Drawing No. ISO 1-RH-2, Revision 8, Residual Heat Removal System
A
Drawing No. ISO 1-RH-25, Revision 7, Residual Heat Removal System
Drawing No. ISO 1-RH-35, Revision 6, Residual Heat Removal System
Drawing No. ISO 1-SI-1-02, Revision 0, Safety Injection System
Drawing No. ISO 1-SI-13, Revision 10, Safety Injection System
Drawing No. ISO 1-SI-13-01, Revision 0, Safety Injection System
Drawing No. ISO 1-SI-14, Revision 9, Safety Injection System
Drawing No. W 2447D55, Sheet 8, Revision 4, Interconnecting Wiring Diagram
Drawing No. 2165-S-0550, Revision 14, Containment Spray System Flow Diag. Unit 1,
Drawing No. 2165-S-1305, Revision 16, Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diag. Unit1,
Drawing No. 2165-S-1308, Revision 10, Sheet 1, Safety Injection System Flow Diagram
Drawing No. 2165-S-1310, Revision 11, Sheet 3, Safety Injection System Flow Diagram
Drawing No. 2165-S-1324, Revision 11, Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diag.
Drawing No. CAR-2166-G029, Revision 13, Main and 6900 VoltAuxiliaryOne Line Wiring
Diagram
Drawing No. CAR 2166-G-030, Revision 17, 480 VoltAuxiliaryOne Line Wiring Diagram
Control Wiring Diagrams - Drawing No. CAR-2166-B-401; Sheets 242, 244, 245, 307 and 309;
Drawing No. CAR-2166-BQ01, Sheets 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 932, 1039 and 1040; and
Drawing No. CAR 2166-BQ01, Sheets 317, 318, 319, 320, 323, 324, 325,326,327, 328, 329,
330, 414, and 415.
Drawing No. 500-E49178, Revision 0, Pacific Pumps Drawing
Drawing No. 1-ISI-SI-6, Revision 0, Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal Systems
Drawing No. 1-ISI-SI-25, Revision 0, Safety Injection and Reactor Coolant Systems
Drawing No. 1-ISI-SI-26, Revision 0, Safety Injection System
Drawing No. 1-ISI-CT-7, Revision
0, Containment Spray System
Drawing No. 1-ISI-CT-8, Revision 0, Containment Spray System
Drawing No. 1-ISI-RH-1, Revision 0, Residual Heat Removal, Safety Injection, and Containment
Spray System
Drawing No. 1-ISI-RH-2, Revision 0, Residual Heat Removal, Safety Injection, and Containment
Spray System
Drawing No. 1-ISI-CS-1, Revision 0, Chemical 8 Volume Control, Containment Spray, and
Residual Heat Removal Systems
Drawing No. 1-ISI-CS-21, Revision 0, Chemical 8 Volume Control, and Residual Heat Removal
Systems
Drawing No. 1-RH-26, Revision 3, Southwest Fabrication 8 Welding Co. Piping/Support
Isometric
Drawing No. 1-Sl-2-02 Revision 0 Southwest Fabrication 8 Welding Co. Piping/Support
Isometric
Drawing No. 1-CT-16, Revision 7, Southwest Fabrication 8 Welding Co. Piping/Support
Isometric
Drawing No. 1-RH-27, Revision 1. Southwest Fabrication 8 Welding Co. Piping/Support
Isometric
Drawing No. A-1-190-1 SI-H-1573, Safety Injection Pipe Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-1-216-1-CT-H-245, Containment Spray Pipe Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-209, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-274, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-219, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-218, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-265, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-216, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-220, Containment Spra'y Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-253, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-252, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-250, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. 1-216-1-CT-H-267, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
Drawing No. A-3-216-1-CT-H-211, Containment Spray Piping Support Drawing
UFSAR Section 5.4.7, Residual Heat Removal
UFSAR, Section 6.3.1, Design Bases
UFSAR Section 6.3.2,
System Design
UFSAR Section 6.3, Emergency Core Cooling System
UFSAR Section 6.3.2.2.8, Residual Heat Exchangers
UFSAR, Section 6.3.3, Performance Evaluation
UFSAR Section 9.2.2, Component Cooling Water System.
UFSAR Section 9.2.8, Essential Services Chilled Water System
UFSAR Section 9.4.3, Auxiliaryand Radwaste Area Ventilation System
UFSAR Section 9.4.5 Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System
UFSAR Section 15, Accident Analysis
TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS
3.1.2.2, Reactivity Control Systems Flow Paths - Operating
3.1.2.5, Borated Water Source - Shutdown
3.1.2.6, Borated Water Sources - Operations
3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation
3.4.1.3, Reactor Coolant System Hot Shutdown
3.4.1.4.1, Reactor Coolant System Cold Shutdown - Loops Filled
3.4.1.4.2, Reactor Coolant System Cold Shutdown - Loops Not Filled
3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems -Tavg Greater Than or Equal to 350'F
3.5.3, ECCS Subsystems
-Tavg Less Than 350'F
d
3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank
'3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System
3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System
CALCULATIONS
Calculation No. E-6003, Minimum and Maximum operating Voltages Required for Class 1E
Buses, Revision 3
Calculation No. E2-0005.09, Degraded Grid appropriately considered the most limiting design
basis conditions Voltage Protection for 6.9KV Busses 1A-SA 8 1B-SB, Revision 1.
Calculation No. E-6000, AuxiliarySystem Load Study, Revision 6.
Calculation No.:E5-0001, Analysis of Motor Output Torque for AC Motor Operated Valves,
Revision 4.
Calculation No. EQS-2, Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Setpoint, Revision 6.
Calculation No. HNP-I/INST-1046, Volume Control Tank Pressure
Level, Revision 1.
Calculation
Calculation
No. CC-0020, Component Cooling Water System Performance,
Revision
No. CT-'30, Containment Spray Switchover Calculation, Revision 2
Calculation No. ESQ-2, Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Setpoint, Revision 6
Calculation
Revision 2
No. NSSS-38, RHR Heat Exchanger and Pump Cooling Water Outlet Temperature,
~
Calculation No. NSSS-0056, Post -LOCAContainment Sump Boron Concentration, Revision 0
Calculation No. PRA-F/E-4, RAB Unit 1 Etev. 190 and 216 Flood Analysis
E
Calculation No. PRA-F/E-5, RAB Unit 1 Compartment Flood Analysis, Elev. 236
Calculation No. PRA-F/E-6, RAB Unit 1 Compartment Flood Analysis, Elev. 261
Calculation No. PRA-F/E-7, RAB Unit 1 Compartment Flood Analysis, Elev 286
Calculation No. Sl-0043, RHR Pump NPSH Evaluation, Revision
Calculation No. SI-0057, RHR/Sl Check Valves to Cold Legs and Hot Legs Testing, Revision 0
.
Calculation No. SD-17, Containment Sump Screen Design Velocity, Revision
Calculation No. Tank-4, Refueling Water Storage Tank Capacity, Revision
Calculation No. Tank-16, Head Requirement to Prevent Vortex in RWST, Revision 0
Calculation No. SI-45, Maximum Reactor Coolant System Pressure
For CSIP Minimum Flow,
Revision
Calculation No. SI-0049, Minimum NPSHA For Charging/Sl Pumps, Revision 0
Calculation No. SC;N-157, RWST Level L- 0990 (Scaling Calculation), Revision 3
Siemens Engineering Calculation E-5850-592-3, Revision 1, Disposition of Events for Harris
Cycle 9 for Changed HHSI Curve
Desi
n Bases Documents
DBD-202, Plant Electrical Distribution System, Revision 6.
DBD-104, Safety Injection System Design Basis Document, Revision 5
DBD-105, Residual Heat Removal System Design Basis Document, Revision 3
DBD-137, Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding HVACSystems, Revision 12
DBD-131, Component Cooling Water System, Revision 7
DBD-314, Plant Parameters
Document, Revision 4
S stem Descrl tions
SD-107, Chemical,and Volume Control System, Revision 9.
SD-110, Safety Injection System, Revision 5.
SD-111, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 9.
SD-112, Containment Spray System, Revision 8.
SD-155.02, Emergency Safeguard Sequencer System, Revision 6.
SD-145, Component Cooling Water System, Revision 5
Vendor Documents
RHR Pump 1B-SB Performance Curve No. N-880, Revision 0.
Charging Safety Injection Pump 1B-SB Performance Curve No. 262-NH003939
ENGINEERING SERVICE REQUESTS
ESR 9700620, Revision 0, "B" CSIP Vibration Trending to High, Replace Rotating Element
ESR 9700620, Revision 1, "B" CSIP Vibration Trending to High, Replace Rotating Element
ESR 9700429, Revision 0, Containment Recirculatioh Sump Modification
ESR 9700676, Revision 0, Capping of 1CS-497
BULLETINSI INFORMATIONNOTICES
NRC Bulletin 88-08, Thermal Stresses
in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems
NRC Information Notice 97-76, Degraded Throttle Valves in Emergency Core Cooling Systems
Resulting from Cavitation-Induced Erosion During a Loss-of-Coolant Accident
NRC Information Notice 98-22, Deficiencies Identified During NRC Design Inspections
CONDITION REPORTS
HNP 98-02752, B CSIP/EPT 404 Problem
Check Valves Identified as Requiring Seal Weld Repairs
HNP 98-02911, 1CS-480 Failed Stroke Time in OST-1106
HNP 97-05070, SI Accumulator Fill IST Concerns
HNP 96-03857, RHR Pump 1A-SA in Alert Range
HNP 99-01739, Inadequate Documentation of HHSI NPSH Calculation Design Inputs and
Source Documents
HNP 99-02020, DBD-105 Calculation References
CONDITION REPORTS INITIATEDAS A RESULT OF THE INSPECTION
HNP 99-01938, ECCS Flow Balance Procedure
HNP 99-02051, Temporary Service Water Pipe Hanger
HNP 99-02060, CSIP Motor Vendor Manual Discrepancy
HNP 99-02169, FSAR Discrepancy
HNP 99-02173, CSIP Room High Temperature Alarm Setting
'r
HNP 99-02187, Error in CCW Calculation CC-0020
HNP 99-02197, RWST Switchover Valve Stroke Time
HNP 99-02202, Material did not Conform to Purchase Specification
HNP 99-02325, Short Circuit Calculation Discrepancy
SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORTS
ENG-E-97-004, Safety AC Power
CES-98-004, Plant Modification / Configuration Control
CES-98-005, Calculation Maintenance and Categorization
ENG-99-002, Calibration Setpoint
ENG-99-007, HHSI and LHSI Design Bases
NUCLEAR ASSESSMENT SECTION REPORTS
H-NED-97-01, Harris Engineering Support Section
H-ISI-98-01, Harris In-Service Inspection Assessment
Report
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
SIS-LP-3.0/5.0, Revision 7, Safety Injection System Lesson Plan
Specification 678815, Revision 2, Westinghouse Electric Corporation Equipment Specification
for Class 2 Pumps
HNP Periodic System Review, Dated May 13, 1999, Chemical and Volume Control (CVCS)/ Hi
Head Safety Injection ( HHSI)
CP8L Letter, Serial No NLS-90-005, dated January 26, 1990, Response to Generic Letter 89-13
Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment
CP8L Letter, Serial No. NLS-91-154, dated June 17, 1991, Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment
Instruction Manual For Thermon Freeze Protection Control Panel Typical for 30 and 20 Circuit
Units
Westinghouse Instruction Manual for AuxiliaryHeat Exchangers (VLD-WEST-0020)
Westinghouse Letter 95-COL-25 Pertaining to Excess Shell Side Flow - RHR Heat Exchanger