IR 05000400/1999007
| ML18017A916 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1999 |
| From: | Landis K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Scarola J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| 50-400-99-07, NUDOCS 9910210094 | |
| Download: ML18017A916 (39) | |
Text
October 6, 1999
SUBJECT:
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/99-06
Dear Mr. Scarola:
On October 9, 1999, the NRC completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
The results of that inspection were discussed with you and other members of your staff on October 21, 1999.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one violation of NRC requirements occurred.
This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCVj, consistent with Appendix F of the Enforcement Policy. This NCV is described in the subject inspection report.
Ifyou contest the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
CP8L
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,". a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely, (Original signed by B. Bonser)
Brian Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.:
50-400 License No.:
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
REGION II==
Docket No:
License No:
50-400
Report No:
50400/99-06
Licensee:
Carolina Power 8 Light (CP8L)
Facility:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
Location:
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562
Dates:
August 29 - October 9, 1999
Inspectors:
J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Hagar, Resident Inspector
Approved by:
B. Bonser, Chief, Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARYOF FINDINGS
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/99-'06
The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection
Inspection findings were assessed
according to potential risk significance, and were assigned
colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that,
while not necessarily desirable, represent little risk to safety. WHITEfindings would indicate
issues with some increased risk to safety, and which may require additional NRC inspections.
YELLOWfindings would be indicative of more serious issues with higher potential risk to safe
performance and would require the NRC to take additional actions.
RED findings represent an
unacceptable
loss of margin to safety and would result in the NRC taking significant actions that
could include ordering the plant shut down. Those findings that cannot be evaluated for a direct
effect on safety with the Significance Determination Process,
such as those findings that affect
the NRC's ability to oversee licensees,
are not assigned
a color.
Cornerstone:
~
GREEN. The licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action under 10 CFR 50.65
(a)(1) when a maintenance rule (a)(1) performance goal was exceeded for the Target
Rock Position Indication performance monitoring group in system 9001, containment
isolation valves. The established goal of no more than one failure in 18 months was
exceeded
on June 11, 1999, but was not recognized by the licensee, and appropriate
corrective action was not taken until another functional failure occurred on August 17,
1999. This issue was characterized
as a Non-Cited Violation and was determined to
have low risk significance because failure of the Target Rock position indicators did not
prevent operators from determining valve positions, and other more time-consuming
methods were available.
Second, the failure to recognize that a maintenance
rule goal
had been exceeded did not affect the ability of any valve to operate (Section 1R12).
Re ort Details
The unit was at essentially 100 percent power until September 9, when power was reduced to
86 percent due to problems with the steam generator preheater bypass valves.
Power was
returned to 100 percent on September
11 and remained at 100 percent for the remainder of the
pe nod.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones:
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01
Adverse Weather Pre arations
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for Hurricane Floyd on
September
15, 1999.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
The inspectors reviewed the following emergent items, as described in the referenced
Work Request/Job
Orders (WRJOs) and/or Action Requests
(ARs)':
Reference
WR/JO 99-AGUP1
WR/JO 99-AGNX1
AR 004097004097AR 007914
Preheater bypass valve actuator air leaks
Boron totalizer replacement
Letdown pressure control valve (PCV 145) problems
SSPS relay problem during MST l0417
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R04
E ui ment Ali nment
The'inspectors performed reviews of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system when
the turbine-driven pump was inoperable for preventive maintenance,
and the control
room ventilation system during preventive maintenance.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings'were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R05
Fire Protection
The inspectors reviewed the condition reports (CRs), work orders, and impairments
associated with the fire suppression system.
The inspectors reviewed the status of
surveillance activities to determine whether they were current to support the operability
of the fire protection system.
The inspectors observed a fire drill associated with a direct
current (DC) battery charger in the B switchgear room.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R09
Inservice Testin
IS
of Pum
s and Valves
I
The inspectors reviewed the performance of the following IST tests:
Number
Rev.
Title
OST 1051
"Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding Emergency Exhaust System IST
OST 1038
"Sampling, Chemical Addition, and Main Steam Drain ISI Valve
,Test"
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R11
Licensed 0 erator Re uglification
The inspectors reviewed, licensed operator requalification simulator examinations for
operations crew C.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R12
Maintenance Rule Im lementation
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule
(10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the equipment issues described
in the following CRs and
Engineering Service Request (ESR):
CR
99-02358
Target Rock containment isolation valve position indication
CR
99-01918
Containment isolation valve 1AF-157 stroke time problems
97-00547
Essential Services Chilled Water nonessential
isolation valve
b
Observations and Findin s
The inspectors found that significant CR 99-02358 described two failures of Target Rock
valve position indicators under system 9001, containment isolation valves (CIV). The
description stated that the goats set forth in CR 97-03489 for the Target Rock Position
Indication performance monitoring group (PMG) under system 9001 had been exceeded.
The goal was for no more than one functional failure due to reed switch failure during an
18-month period starting at the completion of refueling outage (RFO)8 on December 2,
1998.
Some 20 valves which were not CIVs were added to the PMG which included
CIVs because the a(1) corrective actions had included a modification to upgrade the
position indicators.
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule database
to confirm the status of the
Target Rock PMG in system 9001. The inspectors confirmed that the PMG was in a(1)
status, that CR-97-03489-1 established the goals for the a(1) to a(2) transition, and that
the goal was no more than one failure in the 18-month period between RFO8 and RFO9.
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance
rute event log and found that functional
failures under the Target Rock Position Indication PMG had occurred on January 18,
1999 (CR 99-00164); June 11, 1999 (CR 99-00699); and August 17, 1999 (CR 99-
02358).
Only the last one identified that the goal had been broken.
None of these
functional failures involved a failure of the valves to perform their containment isolation
function. The inspectors questioned why the occurrence on June 11 (CR 99-00699) had
not been considered as the functional failure that caused the goal to be exceeded.
The licensee reviewed the associated
information and initiated significant AR
00008315, Failure to Recognize Exceeding a Maintenance Rule a(1) Goal, as a result of
their review. The AR identified that procedures ADM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance Rule
Program, and CAP-NGGC-0001, Corrective Action Management, require that when an
a(1) goal is exceeded,
a "significant adverse" CR is to be initiated for the purpose of
evaluating the need for additional corrective action.
10 CFR 50.65 a(1), Maintenance Rule, requires that when the performance or condition
of a structure, system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate
corrective action shall be undertaken.
As stated above, the licensee failed to recognize
that the established goal of no more than one failure in 18 months was exceeded
on
June 11, 1999, and therefore did not take appropriate corrective action based on that
until another functional failure occurred on August 17, 1999. This is considered
a
violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(1) for not taking appropriate corrective action when a
Maintenance Rule goal was not met. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited
Violation, consistent with Appendix F of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in
the licensee's corrective action program
as AR 00008315. The inspectors have
designated this violation NCV 50-400I99-06-01, Failure to Recognize That an a(1) Goal
Was Exceeded.
This issue had relatively low ("green") risk significance, for two reasons:
~, First, failure of the Target Rock position indicators did not prevent operators from
determining valve positions, because other, more time-consuming methods were
available.
~
Second, the failure to recognize that a maintenance
rule goal had been exceeded did
not affect the ability of any valve to operate.
1R13
Maintenance Work Prioritization 8 Control
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessments
of the risk impacts of removing
from service those components associated with the emergent work items listed in
Section 1R03.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R14
Nonroutine Plant Evolutions
The inspectors reviewed the operating crew's performance during the following non-
routine evolutions:
~
Unexpected shutting of all three steam generator preheater bypass valves on
September 9 and associated
power reduction to 86%.
~
The planned shutting of the preheater bypass valves at 100% power on
September
17.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R15 0 erabilit
Evaluations
The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations described in the following ESRs:
Essential Services Chilled Water Operability Evaluation for Shut
Non-Nuclear-Safety Isolation Valves
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R16 0 erator Work-Arounds
The inspectors reviewed an operator work-around associated
with the essential service
chilled water non-essential isolation valves.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R19
Post Maintenance Testin
The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance
tests:
Number
OST-1 077
OST-1085
EPT-33
Test Procedure
Title
"AuxiliaryFeedwater Valves
Operability Test Quarterly
Interval Mode 4-5-6"
"1A-SA Diesel Generator
Operability Test"
"Emergency Safeguards
Sequencer System Test"
Related maintenance task
Steam generator preheater bypass
valve air pump leak repair
Diesel generator preventive
maintenance
Sequencer relay calibration.
b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
1R22
Surveillance Testin
The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
Number'ev.
Title
FPT-3004
"Steam generator B Narrow Range Level (L-0485)Calibration-
ATWS portion"
"Main Fire Pump Flow Test, Annual Interval"
.b.
Observations and Findin s
No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA4 Other
Closed
LER 50-400/98-004-00 and 01: Design deficiency related to inadequate runout
protection for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. This LER did not involve a violation of
regulatory requirements and was closed.
4OA5 Mana ement Meetin s
Exit Meetin
Summa
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management
on
October 21, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the. licensee whether any of the material examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
NRC
B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
R. Laufer, Harris Project Manager, NRR
Licensee
D. Alexander, Regulatory Affairs Manager
C. Burton, Director of Site Operations
B. Clark, Harris Plant General Manager,
J. Cook, Outage Manager
R. Field, Nuclear Assessment
Manager
T. Hobbs, Acting Operations Manager
J. Holt, Outage and Scheduling Manager
M. Keef, Training Manager
G. Kline, Harris Engineering Support Services Manager
J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President
B. Waldrep, Maintenance Manager
E. Wills, Environmental & Radiation Control Manager
~Oened
50-400/99-06-01
Closed
50400/99-06-01
50-400/98-004-00
50%00/98-004-01
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Failure to recognize that an a(1) goal was exceeded
(Section 1R12)
Failure to recognize that an a(1) goal was exceeded
(Section 1R12)
LER
Design deficiency related to inadequate runout protection for the
Turbine Driven AFW Pump.
(Section 4OA4)
LER
Design Deficiency related to inadequate runout protection for the
Turbine Driven AFW Pump. (Section 4OA4)
0