IR 05000400/1993022
| ML18011A255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1993 |
| From: | Christensen H, Darrell Roberts, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18011A254 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-93-22, NUDOCS 9312270226 | |
| Download: ML18011A255 (19) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report No.:
50-400/93-22 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
October 23 - November 19, 1993 Inspectors:
J.
edrow, ior esident Inspector Licensee No.:
NPF-63 Date Signed oberts t Ins ector Approved by:
. Christensen, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Date Signed ling D t Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, engineering, maintenance, fuel handling activities, plant support, and review of special reports.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
Two non-cited licensee identified violations were identified:
Failure to properly control special nuclear material, paragraph 7.a; and Failure to properly submit requests for conditional licenses due to medical status changes, paragraph 7.b.
Written documentation of equipment status during shift turnover meetings was considered to be deficient, paragraph 2.b.(2).
Plant housekeeping practices had declined, paragraph 2.b.(3).
Use of temporary shielding was considered to be a strength of the radiological protection program, paragraph 2.b.(4).
9312270226 931206 PDR ADOCK 05000400
Controls for the installation of temporary shielding were considered to be good, paragraph 2.b.(4).
Controls for the use of temporary supports and communication of design information into work packages were considered to be weak, paragraph 2.b.(4).
One unresolved item was identified for reviewing the engineering evaluation for CSIP suction piping overpressurization, paragraph 2.b.(8).
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- D. Batton, Manager, Work Control B. Christiansen, Maintenance Manager
- J. Collins, Manager, Training H. Hamby, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- D. HcCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- B. HcFeaters, Hanager, Emergency Preparedness J. Hoyer, Manager, Site Assessment
- R. Prunty, Manager, Licensing and Regulatory Programs
- S. Radford, Manager, Facilities Management W. Robinson, General Manager, Harris Plant W. Seyler, Manager, Project Management H. Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation D. Tibbitts, Manager, Operations
- B. White, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support
- H. Worth, Manager, Onsite Engineering Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Mode I) for the duration of this inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS)
and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
shift supervisor's log; control operator's log; night order book; equipment inoperable record; active clearance log; grounding device log; temporary modification log; chemistry daily reports; shift turnover checklist; and selected radwaste logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
The inspectors found the logs to be readable, well organized, and provided sufficient information on plant status and events.
Clearance tagouts were found to be properly implemented.
No violations or deviations were identifie b.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities in progress.
Some of these observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB); waste processing building; turbine building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms; electrical switchgear rooms; technical support center; and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1)
Nonitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
The inspector reviewed several shift turnover packages after attending the shift turnover meetings.
Although the inspector noted good verbal communications of plant/
equipment status, the written shift turnover checklists required to be completed by procedure ONM-002, Shift Turnover Package, did not always list major equipment which was out of service.
Specifically, the status of a pressurizer PORV block valve (1RC-113)
being closed, and a
control RCS loop average temperature circuit being bypassed, was not written down as equipment out of service on the applicable shift turnover checklists.
However, during the turnover meetings the inspector heard specific mention of the status of these items and noted that the written reactor operator plant status log sheet specified this equipment status.
Although the information of equipment status was communicated during the meeting, the inspector considered the written documentation of this process to be deficient.
This deficiency was discussed with licensee management.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas
throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
During tours of the emergency diesel generator building and the reactor auxiliary building the inspectors noted several housekeeping deficiencies.
Host of these deficiencies ranged from cotton/plastic gloves or paper towels improperly discarded to little bits of debris left on the building floors.
The inspector considered that these types of deficiencies would be corrected by routine janitorial services or by appropriate post job cleanup of affected work areas.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's previous good housekeeping practices had declined.
After being informed of the specific deficiencies, licensee personnel initiated cleanups of the specified areas.
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected radiation work permits to verify that controls were adequate.
On October 24, the inspector observed the installation of temporary shielding on "B" train RHR piping in support of coatings and equipment upgrades in the RHR pump room.
Due to the significant amount of time licensee personnel would be around RHR system piping and the associated projected exposure, licensee ALARA personnel requested lead shielding be installed around the system piping thereby lowering area dose rates.
The inspector reviewed pre and post radiological survey results of the affected area and noted a
substantial reduction in area dose rates after the temporary shielding was installed.
This effort was considered by the inspector to be a strength of the licensee's radiological protection program.
However, this reduction necessitated the installation of approximately 120 pounds/foot of temporary lead shielding.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for the control of lead shielding and discussed the process with licensee ALARA and NED personnel.
Procedure HPP-015, Use of Temporary Shielding, provides instructions for this process and contains a generic evaluation for amounts of lead shielding which may be applied for a given span of piping between pipe supports.
Since this generic evaluation only allowed approximately 20 pounds/foot of temporary shielding, licensee ALARA personnel requested that an engineering evaluation be performed to determine the maximum amount of weight which could be added to the system piping.
Licensee engineering personnel performed calculation HNP-C/STRS-1050, Lead Shielding Evaluation for 'PCR-6765 at Elevation 190, to
determine the maximum loading of this piping.
The inspectors reviewed this calculation which concluded that system supports and piping could carry the additional load without affecting system operability.
The temporary shielding process provided for a safety evaluation of the system being affected and for the installation and removal of the temporary shielding.
The inspector considered the licensee's controls for installing temporary shielding to be good.
On further review of the engineering package, the inspector noted that a temporary support was specified to be installed beside existing support SI-H-1283 which would be capable of carrying a load of 1200 pounds.
This condition was discussed with licensee NED personnel who stated that the temporary support was needed only to protect the existing spring support from potential damage during the addition of the dead weight load from the temporary shielding and that the temporary support was not required to support system operation.
The inspector's review of procedure HPP-015 did not identify any controls associated with the addition and removal of temporary supports.
Of the other procedures checked by the inspector, only procedure MOD-206, Temporary Modifications, contained requirements for the use of temporary supports.
However, this procedure was intended to be used when the temporary supports were used to replace existing'upports and this was not applicable for this application.
The inspector therefore concluded that licensee controls for the use of temporary supports for the application of shielding to be weak.
The inspector observed that two temporary supports had been installed in the field; one on each side of the existing support.
The work package which installed these temporary supports was then reviewed by the inspector to determine how these items were controlled and documented.
Work package WR/JO 93-ALNL1 was used by licensee personnel to install the temporary supports and stated that NED would provide the design.
When the inspector requested the design input, he was informed that this work was accomplished under verbal directions from the NED engineer.
The inspector considered this informal communication of work instructions to be weak.
The inspector was later informed that this work consisted of installed jacks under the associated piping and was classified as non-safety related work.
No welding or other attachments had been applied to system piping.
The inspector therefore concluded that no safety concerns existed for this work.
Security Control - The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included:
protected and vital area access
controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of closed circuit television monitors, the intrusion detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
Containment Isolation Lineup - The inspectors verified that selected containment penetrations were properly lined up to ensure containment integrity.
The material condition of the penetration and containment wall was also checked.
This inspection included penetrations located on the 261, 236, and 216 elevations of the RAB.
The inspectors found the associated penetration containment isolation valves to be properly positioned and the material condition of components to be good.
In response to the inspectors observation of higher than normal s'uction pressure on the "B" CSIP discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-17, licensee engineering personnel collected preliminary data and determined that the suction piping was slightly overpressurized.
The licensee's system engineer documented his review of this event in an internal memorandum to licensee management.
The inspector discussed this matter with the system engineer and reviewed system design documents to identify 'specific piping/
component design.
The suction piping design operating pressure rating was listed as 220 psig at 200 degrees F with a hydrostatic pressure rating of 275 psig.
Actual suction'ressure was observed to be at 285 psig.
Licensee personnel considered that the slight excessive pressure experienced by the suction piping did not result in any damage to the system.
In support of this, the normal operating temperature of this system was listed as 110 degrees F with similar piping at this design operating temperature rated at 300 psig.
The inspector agreed with licensee personnel that a safety concern did not exist with the present operation of the system.
The inspector asked licensee management if this information would be captured as part of a formal engineering evaluation.
The inspector was informed that an engineering evaluation would be developed to document acceptable system operatio URI (400/93-22-01):
Review the licensee's engineering evaluation for CSIP suction piping overpressurization.
The inspectors found plant housekeeping and material condition of components to be satisfactory.
The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, fire protection requirements, and TS requirements in these areas was satisfactory.
3.
Haintenance (61726, 62703)
'a ~
Surveillance Observation Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
~
HST-I0023 Steam Generator A Narrow Range Level (L-0474)
Calibration HST-10178 Component Cooling Surge Tank - Tank 1 (L-0670)
Calibration HST-I0270 Lo-Lo T., P-12 Interlock (T-0432) Operational Test
~
OST-1027 ECCS Accumulator Valve Breaker Verification The performance of these procedures was found to be satisfactory with proper use of calibrated test equipment, necessary communications established, notification/authorization of control room personnel, and knowledgeable personnel having performed the tasks.
No violations or deviations were observed.
b.
Haintenance Observation The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits were issued and TS requirements were being followed.
Haintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
Troubleshooting and repair of faulty indications on the AHSAC control panel.
Replace leaking lube oil low and high pressure tube fittings inside "A" ESCW chiller compressor pane ~
Perform procedure PIC-I058, Calibration Check and.Stroking of a Milliampere Hydramotor Actuator, on pressure control valve ISW-1055.
~
Replace inboard and outboard seals on spent fuel pool cooling pump 1A in accordance with CM-M0010, Goulds Pumps 3405 Disassembly and Maintenance.
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation of removed components and independent verification of the reinstallation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Fuel Handling Activities (71707)
The inspectors observed fuel handling activities on November
associated with the unloading of a spent fuel cask received from the licensee's Brunswick facility.
Proper implementation of fuel handling procedures was verified.
Although iron oxide crud was observed to be freely falling off of the Brunswick spent fuel assemblies during movement, the crud was prevented from entering the regular Harris refueling areas by conducting the fuel transfer directly from the cask unloading pit to the "B" spent fuel pool.
This action avoided Brunswick spent fuel movement in the fuel transfer canal and the "A" spent fuel pool where the Harris core will be offloaded during the next refueling outage.
The inspector noted that portions of three different procedures were still utilized by licensee personnel to perform the cask offload.
As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/92-15 the inspector concluded that the implementation of this many different sections of procedures was not ideal and could result in an important section not being performed due to confusion.
The inspector noted that for the fuel movement on November 10, the senior reactor operator in charge of fuel movement was very knowledgeable on the procedure requirements and properly implemented the applicable sections of the various procedures.
Procedures utilized by licensee personnel included FHP-005, Spent Fuel Handling Tool Operation, FHP-014, Fuel and Insert Shuffle Sequence, and FHP-020, Fuel Handling Operations.
The spent fuel movement was completed without incident.
The inspector concluded that the fuel handling procedures could be consolidated better.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action for ACR 93-314.
This ACR reported that on August 18 four Brunswick fuel assemblies were observed not to be fully seated in the fuel racks.
The four assemblies were fully reseated on August 23.
The licensee determined that the addition of a flow channel on the fuel assemblies snagged the edge of the spent fuel storage cell and resulted in the assemblies being approximately four inches from fully inserted.
Licensee corrective actions included visual inspections of the spent fuel assemblies in the
"B" pool.
This identified one additional fuel assembly not fully
seated.
Additionally, a revision to procedure FHP-005 was made which clarified the position of the BWR fuel handling tool when a
BWR fuel assembly is fully seated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Engineering (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met approved acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of 'modifications and/or testing in progress.
Engineering evaluation PCR-7096 reviewed the environmental qualification for Target Rock solenoid operated sample valves for the containment hydrogen monitoring system.
The system utilizes six valves in each of the two safety trains to monitor containment atmosphere under post accident conditions.
The sampling points are cycled on an approximate five minute frequency so that each valve is cycled approximately every 30 minutes.
Licensee engineering personnel reviewed the total number of cycles on these valves and components and compared this with Environmental Qualification (EQ) documentation.
The EQ test reports documented that the subject valves functioned properly after being cycled 18,000 times.
Assuming the 30 minute cycling interval above, actual valve cycles can approach 26,000-30,000 between refueling outages and presently have a
total number of cycles between 132,000 and 152,000.
Licensee personnel determined that only two valve components, the solenoid coil and rectifier, are susceptible to cycle aging effects.
Licensee personnel concluded that the solenoid valves had been cycled significantly more than the amount tested/qualified for.
However, the licensee's evaluation concluded that the valves were still capable of performing the intended safety function based on the following data:
The solenoid coils were replaced during the last refueling outage and had operated for two fuel cycles without any failures.
A total of 24 coils have been subjected to approximately 60,000 cycles during plant operation without any failures.
The rectifiers installed in the valves are solid-state devices and were successfully tested at 100,000 cycles.
The rectifiers were tested at a higher temperature (105 degrees F)
than actual conditions experienced and at a higher frequency (3-6 cycles per minute).
There have been no rectifier failures in
installed solenoid valves.
Licensee personnel concluded that the rectifiers would function properly during increased cycling at lower temperatures.
~
The valve testing was performed in a system pressurized to 2485 psig whereas the installed valves will be subjected to a normal pressure of atmospheric and an accident pressure of 41.3 psig.
Licensee personnel initiated a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO No. 93-02) to address the operability of the containment hydrogen monitoring system.
This JCO was presented to the PNSC on November 10, 1993, and was subsequently approved.
The inspectors requested assistance from NRC Region II specialists in reviewing the engineering analysis.
In addition, the licensee failed to provide any compensatory action in case of valve failure.
These items were discussed with licensee management who stated that actions would be taken to address these comments.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Support (82207)
The inspectors observed the performance of the licensee's quarterly emergency drill conducted on November 12, 1993.
Licensee activities in the EOF were witnessed by the inspectors with particular emphasis on emergency communication/notification of the state and county organizations in participation.
The licensee action to address a
previous exercise weakness was observed.
a ~
b.
(Closed)
Exercise Weakness 400/93-18-02:
The EOF staff failed to demonstrate the adequacy of providing offsite dose assessment.
During the emergency drill on November 12, the inspectors observed the calculation of four dose assessments and the reporting of two dose projections to the state and counties.
Calculations were performed in accordance with procedure PEP-343, Automation of Dose Projection -
IBM PC, and communications performed in accordance with procedure PEP-301, Notification of Non-CPSL Emergency Response Organizations.
Licensee dose projection calculations were verified by the inspectors to coincide with estimates generated by licensee drill evaluators.
The inspectors found that both calculations and reports were generated in a timely manner appropriate dose projections were provided to state and county facilities.
The inspectors also attended the licensee's post drill critique held on November 15.
Licensee drill evaluators likewise found the dose estimations and projections to be properly performed.
During discussions with operating shift personnel, the inspector was informed that the drill operating shift has participated in the last five drills.
No other operating shifts have had the privilege of participating in an emergency drill.
The inspector
discussed this item with licensee management who confirmed the operator's statements.
Although the inspector considered the use of one specific operating shift to prepare for a graded exercise to be necessary, the development of shift supervisor communication skills during other drills was appropriate.
Licensee management agreed with the inspectors comments.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Review of Special Reports (90713)
'a ~
The licensee issued a special report dated October 27, 1993, regarding a loss of special nuclear material.
At ll:00 a.m.
on October 4, 1993, the licensee declared a loss'of special nuclear material following an exhaustive search for ten incore fission detectors with a total combined weight of less than 0.03 grams.
These ten detectors were part of a group of thirteen that had been approved by an offsite permanent waste burial facility to be shipped there.
In the process of preparing the shipment, the licensee accounted for three of the thirteen detectors and three additional detectors.
However, the ten missing detectors, all of which had been slightly irradiated prior to November 1989, could not be located.
These detectors contained a total of approximately 0.05 microcurie of uranium isotopes U-235, U-236, U-237 and U-238.
All of the detectors were supposedly stored in a locked high radiation room in the Waste Processing Building.
The licensee believes the last time the ten detectors were actually seen in this storage room was Hay 1, 1990.
The detectors were not conspicuously labeled as Special Nuclear Haterial, but were placed in a yellow plastic bag, tagged, and left in the room along with other radioactive waste.
Between Hay 1, 1990 and October 4, 1993, several personnel entries were made into the storage room.
These entries were made to transport waste from the room to a transportation box located outside the Waste Processing Building.
The licensee speculates that the ten detectors erroneously made it offsite in one of the shipments made since Hay 1, 1990.
While the ten detectors were visually accounted for in Hay of 1990, the licensee otherwise relied on a paperwork review process to maintain inventory of these detectors.
Fuel Hanagement Procedure FHP-108, Special Nuclear Haterial Inventory, only required that licensee personnel determine the quantity of discharged detectors and compare that number to the quantity referenced on Small guantity Record Cards and Component Record Cards.
However, no means was specified for determining the quantity of discharged detectors and therefore no physical/visual inventory was performed, only the paperwork review.
This procedural deficiency, along with deficiencies in the labeling and segregation of the detectors from other radioactive waste, was considered to be a major contributor to the detectors being los The licensee initiated an Event Review Team to review the activities associated with the event and recommend corrective actions to plant management.
Corrective actions taken in response to this event included the assignment of a new SNH custodian and the designation of a separate locked storage area for the non-fuel SNH.
Also the licensee has revised the SNH Accountability Plan (FHP-108) to clearly define inventory requirements.
The inspector toured the storage area and noted clear postings and controlled access.
The licensee is presently revising the SNH program to provide unique postings for SNH and personnel responsibilities regarding SNH.
Additionally, training will be provided to appropriate personnel (health physics, 18C technicians, technical support personnel)
who interact with SNH.
CFR 70.51(c) requires, in part, that licensees establish, maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures that are sufficient'o enable the licensee to account for SNH.
The licensee's inadequate method for accounting for SNH is contrary to this requirement and is considered to be a
violation.
This violation is not being cited because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet criteria specified in Section VII.B of the enforcement policy.
Non-cited Violation (400/93-22-02):
Failure to properly control SNM.
On November 5, 1993, the licensee reported that three licensed operator requests for conditional licenses due to medical status changes were not forwarded to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 55.25 and
CFR 50.74.
This situation was identified by licensee personnel on October 25 during a comprehensive review of licensed operator records following NRC identification of similar problems at the licensee's Brunswick and Robinson facilities.
The medical restrictions involved corrective lenses necessary to correct vision.
The change in restrictions were applicable for the operators following medical examinations in 1989, 1990, and 1991, however no notification was made to the NRC.
The licensee determined that since several different groups were involved in maintaining the licensed operator records, the root cause for this event was due to inadequate personnel accountability
.
The licensee's corrective action included the assignment of single point accountability for these records and the governing procedure (NGGH-402, Administration of Medical Requirements for NRC Licensed Operators)
is being revised to reflect this.
Therefore, this violation is not being cited because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet criteria specified in Section VII.B of the enforcement polic Non-cited Violation (400/93-22-03):
Failure to properly submit requests for conditional licenses due to medical status changes.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 19, 1993.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the non-cited violations addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
No dissenting comments from the licensee were received.
Item Number Descri tion and Reference 400/93-22-01 400/93-22-02 URI:
Review the licensee's engineering evaluation for CSIP suction piping overpressurization, paragraph 2.b.(8).
NCV:
Failure to properly control SNH, paragraph 7.a.
400/93-22-03 Acronyms and Initialisms NCV:
Failure to properly submit requests for conditional licenses due to medical status changes, paragraph 7.b.
AC ACR ALARA-ANSAC-ATWS BWR CFR CSIP ECCS EQ ESCW JCO NCV NED NRC NRR PCR PNSC PORV PSIG RAB RCS/RC-Alternating Current Adverse Condition Report As Low As Reasonably Achievable ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry Anticipated Transcient Without Scram Boiling Water Reactor Code of Federal Regulations Charging Safety Injection Pump Emergency Core Cooling System Environmental gualification Essential Services Chilled Water Justification for Continued Operation Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Engineering Department Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Plant Change Request Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Power Operated Relief Valve Pounds per Square Inch Gauge Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant System
Residual Heat Removal Special Nuclear Material Technical Specification Unresolved Item Work Request/Job Order
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