IR 05000400/1993002
| ML18010B037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1993 |
| From: | Robert Carrion, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010B035 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-93-02, 50-400-93-2, NUDOCS 9303080022 | |
| Download: ML18010B037 (22) | |
Text
. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 866!
tI P 833 Report No:
50-400/93-02 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P;
0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 License NoeI NPF-63 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Inspection Conducted:
January 25 - 29,
Inspector:
>
ries.'~'0
/4 R.
P, Carrion, Radiation Spe ialist Approved by:,".~Li< /7 T.
R. Decker, Chief Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards p /g/ Cg Dat Signed 42/
D te igned Branch SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of organization of the Chemistry Department and the Radioactive Waste Shipping Unit; plant water chemistry; process and effluent monitors; the post accident sampling systems (PASS); the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
clean up status; contaminated ventilation ductwork; and shipping and handling of radwaste and spent fuel.
Results:
The licensee's organization of the Chemistry Department and Radioactive Waste Shipping Unit was stable and satisfied requirements of the Technical Specifications (TSs)
(Paragraph 2).
Plant water chemistry was maintained well within TS limits (Paragraph 3).
Process and effluent monitors were well-maintained and calibrated and liquid and gaseous releases were well within TS limits (Paragraph 4).
The licensee had continued to make progress in resolving problems with the PASS (Paragraph 5).
The clean up of SFPs C and D continues (Paragraph 6).
9303080022
'pI30224 PDR ADOCK 05000400
The licensee was making good progress in the resolution of the issue of the contaminated ventilation ductwork (Paragraph 7).
The Radiation Control (RC) staff involved with the radwaste and spent fuel shipments was competent and carried out its duties in,a professional manner (Paragraph 8).
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. Andrews, Specialist, Environmental and Radiation Control (E&RC)
H. Boone, Radiation Control (RC) Supervisor
- J. H. Collins, Operations Manager P.
L. Doss, Senior Specialist, Chemistry C.
S. Hinnant, General Manager
- Harris Plant
- J. L. Kiser, Radiation Control Manager
- E. M. HcLean, Senior Engineer
- Nuclear Engineering Department B. A. Heyer, E&RC Manager
- A. D. Poland, E&RC Support Manager K. Rogers, Radiation Control Technician I
- H. G. Wallace, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
- T. J. Wait, Senior Specialist
- Nuclear Assessment Department (NAD)
'. White, Environmental and Chemistry (E3C) Manager
- W. R. Wilson, Spent Nuclear Fuel Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- D. J.
Roberts, Resident Inspector
- J. Tedrow, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and Initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Organization (84750 and 86750)
Technical Specification (TS) 6.2 describes the licensee's organization.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's organization, staffing levels, and lines of authority as they related to -the Chemistry Department and Radioactive Waste Shipping Group to verify that the licensee had not made organizational changes which would adversely affect the ability to control radiation exposures or radioactive material.
The Chemistry Department was one of four which comprised the E&RC Organization.
The other three included the ALARA, Radiation Control Operations, and E&RC Support Departments.
The Chemistry Department was organized into three groups; E&C Technical Support (which included procedures and administration),
E&C Plant Operations (which included in-line instruments and calibrations),
and the E&C Count Room (which included the labs, effluents, radwaste, and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCH)).
The Radioactive Waste Shipping Group was one of four
which comprised the RC Operations Department.
The Chemistry Department and the Radioactive Waste Shipping Group had both been stable since the last inspection (Inspection 92-25 of October 1992).
The only change in the Chemistry Department was the leaving of one technician and the filling of that vacancy.
There had been no changes in the Radioactive Waste Shipping Group.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's Chemistry Department and the Radioactive Waste Shipping Group satisfied TS requirements and noted that the respective organizations had maintained their ability to function effectively.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Water Chemistry (84750)
During this inspection, the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)
was in its fifth fuel cycle and was producing power at 103 percent of its nominal rated electrical capacity.
The inspector reviewed the plant chemistry controls and operational controls affecting plant water chemistry since the last inspection in this area.
a.
Primary Water Chemistry TS 3.4.7 specifies that the concentrations of chloride and fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
be maintained below 0. 15 parts per million (ppm),
and 0. 15 ppm, respectively.
TS 3.4.8 specifies that the specific activity of the primary coolant be limited to less than or equal to 1.0 microcuries/gram (pCi/g) dose equivalent iodine (DEI).
These parameters are related to corrosion resistance and fuel integrity.
The chloride and fluoride parameters are based on providing protection from halide stress corrosion.
The specific activity parameter is based on minimizing personnel radiation exposure during operation and maintenance.
Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed a monthly report which summarized chloride and fluoride concentrations, and specific activity of the reactor coolant for the month of December 1992 and determined that the parameters were maintained well below TS limits.
Typical values for chloride and fluoride were less than three parts per billion (ppb).
Typical DEI values at steady-state conditions ranged from 9.34E-3 pCi/g to 4.23E-4 pCi/g.
The licensee thought that the activity levels indicated a possible fuel defect.
However, confirmation had not been possible since restart because no power changes had occurred to allow for observation of characteristic iodine spikin b.
Secondary Water Chemistry The inspector toured the licensee's new Secondary Chemistry Sampling Station.
In-line state-of-the-art instrumentation was being installed to give the licensee the ability to have accurate, real-time information about parameters such as pH, cation conductivity, specific conductivity, and dissolved oxygen concentrations for the secondary systems such as feedwater, steam generator blowdown, and condensate polishers.
Ion chromatographs sensitive to 200 parts per trillion (for'ation conductivity, for example).were being installed.
Five data loggers were being set up to automatically feed the information collected to personal computers in the Chemistry Laboratory for review.
It was expected that the installation of the new, sophisticated systems would yield sup'erior corrosion co'ntrol of principal secondary components.
The inspector concluded that the Plant Water Chemistry (both Primary as well as Secondary)
was well-maintained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Process and Effluent Monitors (84750)
a.
Status of Monitors TSs 3/4.3'. 1, 3/4.3.3. 10, and 3/4.3.3. 11 define the operation and surveillance requirements for monitor's of radioactive (or potentially radioactive)
streams.
This instrumentati'on is provided to monitor and control the releases of radioactive materials during normal and abnormal plant conditions as well as in effluents during effluent releases.
The alarm/trip setpoints for the effluent monitors are calculated in accordance with the procedures in the ODCH to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20.
The alarm/trip setpoints for the process monitors are specified by the TSs.
The licensee had developed a tracking system which summarized monthly TS Radiation Monitors which were inoperable for more than one day (refer to Inspection Report 50-400/92-25, Paragraph 5.b).
The system enabled the licensee to quickly identify'
problem monitor and rectify an adverse condition.
The inspector reviewed the monthly summaries of the tracking system for October, November, and December.
The plant was in the midst of a refueling outage for the entire month of October and most of November.
During that period, outage activities produced changes in ventilation patterns, etc.
which caused several equipment failure warnings (such as loss of process flow or loss of flow control).
Upon investigation, the licensee concluded that the warnings were spuri'ous.
However, o'e (RH-3500A) was out of service (OOS) for thirty consecutive days awaiting replacement
parts.
RM-3502A was OOS for more than 31 consecutive days, but its operability was not required during this period due to the refueling outage.
RH-3564B was OOS for several days in October and November with electrical problems which were resolved by the replacement of several components.
Also, RH-3566A was OOS for
.twenty-two days upon failing a source check, due to electrical problems.
Other monitors were OOS for shorter periods due to various reasons.
The inspector noted that all TS-required radiation monitors had been returned by mid-December and none had been reported to be OOS since then.
The inspector noted that the required monitors were available over ninety-four per'cent of the time during the last quarter of 1992.
The plant was on line for most of the month of December and monitor availability was almost ninety-eight percent for the month.
The inspector concluded that the program for maintaining the, plant's process and effluent monitors was being successfully implemented.
Release Permit Review TSs 3. 11. 1. 1, 3. 11. 1.2, 3, 11.2. 1, 3. 11.2.2, and 3. 11.2.3 define the requirements for liquid and gaseous effluent concentrations, doses and dose rates, and waste treatments released to Unrestricted'reas.
These requirements are intended to ensure that the limits of 10 CFR 20 and
CFR 50 are satisfied.
TSs 4.11.1.1.1, 4.11.1.1.2, 4.11.2.1.1, 4.11.2.1.2, 4.11.2.2, and 4. 11.2.3 define the surveillance requirements for the sampling and analysis program.
The inspector reviewed two randomly-selected Gaseous Release Permits (930008 and 930011)
and a randomly-selected Liquid Release Permit (930006)
from the month of January to verify compliance.
The permits included both release information and projected dose calculations and were found to be complete, including the identification of the source of the release, the activity released (identified by isotope),
and the volume of the effluent discharged.
The inspector concluded that the release permits were complete and well-maintained.
Monitor Calibrations The inspector reviewed primary calibrations of one gaseous radiation monitor, REH-1LT-3502A-SA (for Containment leak detection),
and one liquid radiation monitor, REH-21WS-3542 (for Secondary Waste Tank sampling).
The calibrations were made necessary due to the failure of the monitors to pass their respective Maintenance Surveillance Tests (HSTs).
The calibration of the gaseous radiation monitor was performed on October 30, 1992
, using Survey Instrument Calibration Procedure No. SIC-002,
"Primary Cal i br ati on of RD-53 Gas Radi ati on Honitor," Revi si on (Rev.)
1, Change 3, effective September 25, 1987.
The calibration of the liquid monitor was performed on September 1,
1992 using Radiation Surveillance Test Procedure No. RST-011,
"Primary Calibration of RD-53 Liquid Radiation Honitor," Rev.
4, Change 3,
effective Harch 23, 1988.
Ba-133, Cs-137, and Co-60 sources were used to develop plots of relative response vs energy and for energy calibrations for the multi-channel analyzer (HCA).
They had been properly decay corrected to reflect their activity at the time of, the calibration.
For the gaseous radiation monitor, the inspector reviewed the plot of counts vs voltage, generated to determine the monitor's operating voltage and found that it had been properly done.
Three ranges of sensitivity for Kr-85 and Xe-133 were determined arid independently verified.
Plots of sensitivity vs source strength of Kr-85 and Xe-133 were also generated as was one of sensitivity vs gamma ray energy.
The calibration documentation package also included the Certificates of Calibration of the Xe-133 and Kr-85 standard sources used in the monitor calibration which showed the sources to be traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
For the liquid radiation monitor, three Cs-137 sources (of different activity ranges)
were used to generate the. plot of sensitivity vs source strength.
The Certificates of Calibration of the sources-showed.them to be traceable to the NIST.
The inspector concluded that the calibrations were properly done and that the radiation monitors produced accurate readings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
(84750)
NUREG-0737 requires that the licensee be able to obtain a sample of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere, Furthermore, the sample must be promptly obtained and analyzed (within three hours total) under accident conditions without incurring a radiation exposure to any individual in excess of 3 and 18 3/4 rem to the whole body or extremities, respectively.
TS 6.8.4.e requires that a program be established, implemented, and maintained to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze, under accident conditions, reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples.
The PASS should provide these capabilities and should enable the licensee to obtain information critical to the efforts to assess and control the course and effects of an accident.
The inspector spoke to the cognizant licensee Technical Specialist responsible for the system for a status update.
Some difficulties with the gas stripper had been experienced in maintaining a constant pressure or flow.
Equipment-related changes made to the PASS since the last inspection included two field revisions which had been added to Plant
Change Request (PCR)
6161; (1) to increase the tubing size to the portable cask and dilution valve 1SP-1004 and (2) to replace the flow control valve 1SP-978, which would allow stable.gas operation and sampling.
These items were completed on December 18, 1992.
In addition, PCR-6307 replaced the nitrogen flow controller, FIC-7472, with a later model and was completed in mid-December.
Also, PCR-4553 replaced a strip chart recorder, UIC-7466, for monitoring sample liquid flow, i.e.
RCS, and degassifier level.
Furthermore, two work tickets, 92-AMPW1 and 92-AMPX1, which had been, added to the outage work scope so that the PASS 'could be operated while the plant is on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System had been completed and the PASS was operated in the RHR mode.
92-AMPW1 was written to resolve an intermittent problem with the. totalizer readout and 92-AMPXl was written to resolve a problem of excess voltage of the controller.
Testing done during the fourth quarter showed improved results over those of the third quarter.
The in-line hydrogen stripped gas concentrations, the diluted RCS sample analyzed for chloride and boron, and the containment air sample analysis for iodine failed to meet the
.
acceptance criteria, while the diluted RCS sample analyzed for isotopic activity, on-line pH value and oxy'gen concentration, containment air sample isotopic analysis, the hydrogen grab sample, and the undiluted stripped fission gas isotopic activity satisfied the acceptance criteria.
To remedy the shortcomings and improve system performance,
. the licensee planned additional modifications to the PASS, such as the installation of a backpressure regulator on the grab sample line downstream of the flow controllers.
The inspector walked down the PASS to observe its physical condition and to see the modifications made to the system over the past several months.
Discussions with the cognizant Chemistry Specialist outlined various features and operational capabilities of the system.
The PASS was found to be well-maintained.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was continuing to make progress in its efforts to upgrade the PASS.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)'acility (84750)
The inspector met with cognizant licensee representatives to discuss the status of the clean-up effort of the SFPs.
Pool A was used for storage of new fuel as well as some spent fuel and Pool B exclusively for the storage of spent fuel from all three Carolina Power and Light (CPL)
nuclear facilities.
Pools C and D had been used for temporary storage of contaminated filters, scaffolding, etc.
The status of Pool C had not changed since the last inspection, i.e., it was empty of contaminated equipment and debris and filled with borated water to the same level of the Transfer Canal (to reduce stress on the isolation gates between the pool and the canal).
Pool D was filled with
borated water and contained some miscellaneous items remained.
The licensee planned to put movable lights on stainless steel wires, to avoid oxidation of the steel and its contribution to the undissolved solids.
The licensee had developed a tagging system for items suspended in the pools, which were inventoried twice per year.
Also, the licensee
.
had developed a design for a locking device for items suspended in the pools and planned to build and test a prototype in the near future.
Water clarity; due to undissolved solids, in Pools C and D continued to be a problem.
The licensee planned to =utilize a submersible filter system to remove the undissolved solids.
Furthermore, the licensee had initiated a
PCR to provide a permanent vacuum pump system to pump out the spent fuel shipping casks to better control any crud which may be shed from the spent fuel assemblies during their transportation. to SHNPP.
Also, the licensee had a goal to initiate work on PCRs to install permanent electrical and mechanical services on the "island" between Pools C and D.
It was hoped that this work would begin during the current calendar year.
. The inspector observed removal of spent bundles from a submerged cask in the spent fuel pit and their placement in the spent fuel racks of Pool B.
The operation preceded smoothly and the involved personnel followed conservative Health Physics (HP)
and safety practices.,
The inspector concluded that the licensee was making progress in the cleanup of Pools C and D and that Pools A and B and the Transfer Canal were well-maintained.
'o violations or deviations were identified.
Ventilation Ductwork Contamination (84750)
Inspection Report (IR) 50-400/92-08 identified. a condition in which contaminated water had collected in ventilation ductwork.
,The inspector reviewed the condition, with a special interest in determining if an unmonitored pathway existed.
(Refer to Paragraph 7 of IR 50-400/92-12.)
A valve leakoff header, which was designed to collect and separate the liquid and gaseous components of valve leakoff was improperly installed and, therefore, did not function as designed.,
As originally installed, the header permitted liquid to enter the ventilation ductwork rather than directing it into the equipment drain, as designed.
The liquid which entered the header was traced to its source, the packing gland valve leakoff line from Valve 1SI-327.
The upper valve packing had been replaced and the packing gland leakoff line isolated.
Isolation of the line precluded any leakage from draining into the valve leakoff header.
Therefore, there was no water in the ventilation ductwork at the time of the inspection.
The ductwork had been tagged by HP as being internally
'contaminated.
Work Ticket 91-ADDWl had been written to repair the valve stem and/or packing, and was field-completed on October 21, 1992 during the refueling outag Work Ticket 92-AKHB2 was worked per approved PCR-6368 to, rework leakoff line 6VLI-4-1 and restore it to its original design configuration.
The-inspector reviewed Plant.Drawing No. 2165-G-125S01, Rev.
10.
The inspector then walked down the problem in the field to verify the documentation.
'he only remaining item to resolve in this issue was the contaminated ductwork.
Work Ticket 92-ASZXI had been issued to decontaminate and/or replace the ductwork and was scheduled to begin on February 22, 1993.
Cognizant licensee personnel thought that most of the ductwork would be replaced rather than decontaminated.
It was noted that all air from the building's ventilation system was
- monitored before being released from the plant vent stack and that all liqu'ids entering the equipment or floor drainage systems were processed through the radwaste system prior to being released.
Therefore, no unmonitored pathway existed.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was making satisfactory progress in resolving the condition.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radwaste Processing and Transportation (86750)
CFR 71.5 (a) requires that each licensee who transfers licensed material outside of the confines of its plant or other place of use, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for 'transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR, Parts 170 through 189.
Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed the licensee's activities affiliated with these requirements, to determine whether the licensee effectively processes, packages, stores, and ships radioactive solid materials.
The licensee's program for the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, including solid radwaste, was conducted by the Radioactive Waste Shipping Group within the Radiation Control Operations Department.
Radwaste was processed and packaged by the Radioactive Waste Shipping Group, including compacting contaminated material, loading shipments, and preparing shipping documentation.
a.
Radwaste Shipping Documentation The inspector reviewed shipping logs for -disposal and special shipments since the previous inspection.
The special shipments were non-burial shipments of radioactive material and included a
wide variety of items, from empty spent fuel shipping casks to samples to be counted at the Energy and Environmental (E&E)
Center.
Disposal shipments were shipments of radioactive material
which ultimately were destined for disposal at the disposal facility at Barnwell, South Carolina.
These shipments.were commonly sent to a processor to'reduce their volume prior to final-disposal.
The inspector reviewed three disposal shipment packages, including D-15-92, D-16-92, and D-01-93 as well as two non-burial shipments, including S-108-92 and S-111-92 for.
completeness and compliance with the regulations.
The packages documented the shipments and included items such as unique shipment and shipping container numbers, waste content and volume, total activity, analytical summary and breakdown of isotopes with a half-life greater than five years, and emergency response information (including the emergency telephone number).
The radiation and contamination survey results were within the limits specified and the shipping documents were being maintained as required.
Spent Fuel Shipment Status The licensee had received one additional shipment of spent fuel from the H.
BE Robinson Plant between the last inspection and the end of 1992, for a total of six for the year.
A shipment of spent fuel from the H.
B. Robinson Plant arrived at the licensee's site during the course of the current inspection.
One additional shipment was expected to be made in the first quarter of 1993.
The, shipping casks would then be reconfigured to accept the spent fuel from the Brunswick Plant.
Shipments of spent fuel from the Brunswick site were expected to begin in the Spring, 1993.
Status of Changes Resulting from Shipment S-47-92 The inspector reviewed the status of corrective action -items resulting from an incident involving the failure of a "strong, tight package" of a shipment of Low Specific Activity (LSA)
material in June 1992.
(Refer to Paragraph 12.c of IR 50-400/92-12 and Paragraph 10.c of IR 50-400/92-25.)
Adverse Condition Report (ACR)92-234 had been written to address the subject so as to preclude its happening in the future.
Its focus was on three corrective action items:
Corporate Health Physics to develop a company policy for the construction and use of wooden boxes for radioactive material shipments.
Corporate Health Physics to develop guidance on properly verifying interior and exterior bracing on radioactive material packages.
Harris Plant fhRC Department to revise shipping procedures/instructions to ensure proper interior= and exterior shorin The first two items were addressed by a
CPL corporate policy statement on the use of wooden shipping containers in Memo NPSS-93-010, dated January 28, 1993.
The.last item was addressed in HP Procedure (HPP) 810, Rev.
0, "Radioactive Material Shipping Manual," effective January 1,
1993.
These documents were reviewed by the'nspector and determined to be appropriate and complete and that their implementation would minimize the recurrence of a package failure.
Information Notice (IN) 92-72 The inspector discussed IN 92-72,
"Employee Training and Shipper Registration Requirements for Transporting Radioactive Materials,"
with cognizant licensee personnel to be sure that the licensee had rece'ived it and that the staff was aware of its implications in ensuring regul,atory compliance when shipping packages containing radioactive materials.
The corporate training department was reviewing the IN to assure that the issues raised were addressed in future training.
Furthermore, the licensee had already
.included part of the referenced information in its newly-revised shipping procedures.
Procedure Reorganization The licensee had undertaken a major procedure re-write project related to its implementation of the new 10 CFR, Part 20 on January 1,
1993.
The project had resulted in a reduction of Radiation Control procedures from 236 to 88, with a further consolidation to approximately 63 over the next few months.
The project was expected.to pay long-term benefits by improving the usefulness of the RC procedures and by reducing the administrative burden for their maintenance.
In the case of the Radioactive Waste Shipping. Unit, the project had reduced the applicable procedures to four:
HPP-800,
"Handling Radioactive Material;" HPP-810,
"Radioactive Material Shipping Manual;" HPP-820,
"Cask Utilization Manual;"
and HPP-880,
"Spent Nuclear Fuel."
'Each of the new procedures incorporated and consolidated several of the previously-used procedures.
For example, HPP-810 had incorporated twenty previously-separate procedures, including Vehicle Surveys, Curie Determination, Classification of Radioactive Material, the shipment of different classifications of Radioactive Material, etc..
Receipt of Spent Fuel Casks The inspector observed the receipt of two casks containing spent fuel from another CPL nuclear power facility.
The shipment arrived by rail.
Procedure HPP-880,
"Spent Nuclear:Fuel,"
was closely followed and the receipt took place without incident.
One cask was placed in the Radwaste Building in preparation"for placement in the decontamination pit and eventual submersion in
XX.
the spent fuel pit for removal 'and placement of the spent fuel in the spent fuel racks of Pool B.
The other cask was maintained outside of the Radwaste Building in a posted, roped-off area until the activities associated with the first cask were completed.
The casks were then switched to permit the second cask to be unloaded.
The technicians worked carefully, using good HP practices to survey, decontaminate, and prepare the cask for removal from or placement onto the rail car, depending upon the evolution in progress.
The actual cask movement was done strictly according to Corrective Maintenance Procedure CM-M0300, "Spent Fuel Cask Handling ( IF-300 Cask)," Rev..7, Change 2, effective January 9,
1992.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's shipping program was a
strength.
Shipping documentation was accurate, well-maintained and easily retrievable.
The staff was knowledgeable'nd competent and worked in a professional, conscientious manner.
Exit Interview XX.
The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 29, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector. described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results, including likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents and/or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
'cronyms and Initialisms ACR - Adverse Condition Report ALARA - As.Low As Reasonably Achievable CFR - Code of Federal Regulations Ci - curie CPL - Carolina Power and Light DEI - Dose Equivalent Iodine DOT - Department of Transportation ELC - Environmental and Chemistry E&E - Energy and Environmental EKRC - Environmental and Radiation Control g - gram HP - Health Physics HPP - Health Physics Procedures IN - Information Notice IR - Inspection Report
'
LSA -
Low Specific Activity MCA - Multi-Channel Analyzer pCi
- micro-Curie (I.OE-6 Ci)
MST - Maintenance Surveillance Test NAD - Nuclear Assessment Department
f
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODCM - Off-site Dose Calculation Manual OOS - Out Of Service PASS - Post Accident Sampling System PCR - Plant Change Request ppb - parts per billion ppm - parts per million RC - Radiation Control RCS - Reactor Coolant System Rev - Revision RHR - Residual Heat Removal SFP - Spent fuel Pool SHNPP
- Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant TS
- Technical Specification
'