IR 05000400/1993014
| ML18010B151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1993 |
| From: | Christensen H, Darrell Roberts, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010B150 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-93-14, NUDOCS 9308050011 | |
| Download: ML18010B151 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 gp,q REcQ
0 C
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+a*++
Report No.:
50-400/93-14 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
June 19 - July 16, 1993 Inspectors:
J.
T drow, Senior Resi ent Inspector
.
Rob rts, esident Inspector Approved by:
H.
C ri tensen, Section Chief Divisi n of Reactor Projects Licensee No.:
NPF-63 9 v5'D Date Signed ate igned 728 t~
D e
'gned
,
SUMMARY This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, design changes and modifications, plant nuclear safety committee activities, licensee event reports, review of special reports, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
One non-cited licensee identified violation was identified:
Failure to establish adequate measures to verify that designs for two safety-related systems were seismically accurate with respect to their design bases, paragraph 2.c. (1).
Improvements were noted in the material condition of components located in the 190 foot elevation of the reactor auxiliary building, paragraph 2.b.(3),
and in the reduction of the backlog of open work tickets, paragraph 4.a.
Management attention was directed to old deficient conditions which were identified by the establishment of caution tags, paragraph 2.a, and towards the adequacy of transmitting operator guidance via night orders and technical support memorandums, paragraph 2.c.(2).
9308050011 930723 PDR ADOCK 05000400
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Batton, Manager, Work Control J. Collins, Manager, Training
- C. Gibson, Manager, Programs and Procedures
- H. Hamby, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- D. HcCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- T. Morton, Manager, Maintenance J. Hoyer, Manager, Site Assessment J. Nevill, Hanager, Projects
- W. Robinson, General Manager, Harris Plant W. Seyler, Hanager, Outages and Modifications H. Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation
- D. Tibbitts, Manager, Operations B. White, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
- W. Wilson, Manager, Spent Nuclear Fuel
- L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Mode I) for the duration of this inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS)
and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
shift supervisor's log; control operator's log; night order book; equipment inoperable record; active clearance log; grounding device log; temporary modification log; chemistry daily reports; shift turnover
- checklist;-and -selected-radwaste logs-;In-addition; the inspector independently verified clearance 'order tagouts.
The inspectors found the logs to be readable, well organized, and provided sufficient information on plant status and events.
The inspectors reviewed the caution tag log and monthly audits performed on the log.
Several components were noted to have been tagged for over three years.
Host of these components had plant modifications scheduled to correct the deficient conditions
identified by the caution tags.
However, three caution tags (OP-90-341/342/343)
had been established on non-safety-related cooling tower makeup recirculation valves because of automatic controller problems and the associated plant modification to correct the deficiency had been canceled.
Also, when the inspector verified selected tags in the field, two of three non-safety-related general service bus breakers had been cautioned tagged (OP-92-115/116) for a defective ammeter selector switch without a corresponding deficiency tag to initiate appropriate repair efforts.
These items were discussed with licensee personnel.
The inspector was informed that appropriate procedure revisions would be incorporated to manually control the cooling tower recirculation valves and then the caution tags would be removed.
The caution tags on the two breakers had been established as a
preventive measure based on the third breaker problem which had an associated deficiency tag.
The two breaker caution tags were subsequently canceled.
The items found by the inspector did not represent a safety concern, however, the inspector encouraged the licensee to devote appropriate attention to correct the old deficient conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities in progress.
Some of these observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing building; turbine building; fuel handling building; emergency service watei building; battery rooms; electrical switchgear rooms; and the technical support center.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
Honitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were -in--accordance with-the TS for the current operational mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the
(3)
(4)
(5)
continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of 'material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various: areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
The inspectors observed that the material conditions in the "A" containment spray/RHR pump room have been improved significantly.
As mentioned in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/92-04, both the
"A" and
"B" containment spray and RHR pump rooms have been plagued by ground water intrusion problems.
An extensive effort was coordinated to strip and repaint the walls and floors in the "A" room, as well as upgrade various electrical conduit and junction boxes which had corroded as a result of the ground water problems.
The licensee plans to renovate the "B" room in the upcoming months.
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected radiation work permits to verify that controls were adequate.
Security Control
- The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities which included:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of closed circuit television monitors, the intrusion detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing
'quipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
The-inspector -accompanied.a-fire-technician -on his-routine rounds in the RAB and observed that the technician acknowledged the various fire panel alarms and was cognizant of the status of fire doors and components throughout the fire system.
The inspectors found plant housekeeping and material condition of components to be satisfactory.
The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, fire
protection requirements, and TS requirements in these areas was satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Review of Nonconformance Reports Adverse Condition Reports (ACRs) were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions and generic items were identified, and items were reported as required by
CFR 50.73.
Nuclear Engineering Department ACRs 93-85 and 93-89 both discussed licensee-identified deficiencies that have existed in the plant since construction.
Adverse Condition Report 93-85 documented that the nonseismic portion of the seismic/nonseismic interface for each of the three steam generator blowdown lines did not have two seismically designed supports as called for in design documents.
Licensee personnel identified the discrepancy while walking down the area in preparation for another unrelated modification.
The two missing supports on each blowdown line were required in the nonseismic portion of the pipe so that the loads imposed by the non-seismic pipe on the seismic boundary anchors would be minimized.
The licensee determined that operability of the blowdown system following a seismic event would not be in jeopardy because the non-seismic piping is located in an area with low seismic input.
Additionally, seismic input would be limited by the wall penetrations through which these pipes pass and which are adjacent to the three anchors in question.
The licensee's engineering unit performed an analysis using guidelines associated with NRC Generic Letter 91-18 and their Design Guide DG-II.20, Design Guide For Civil/Structural Operability Reviews, to qualify for the short-term the seismic portion of the system.
Long-term'ualification will be achieved when the licensee implements a modification to install the required supports prior to restarting from the next refueling outage.
The inspector concluded that although the discrepancy placed the licensee in an unanalyzed condition it did not significantly compromise plant safety.
Adverse Condition Report-93-89 documented-a-deficiency associated with the boron recovery system.
During a walkdown of this system associated with a PCR to reclassify it as non-seismic, licensee personnel discovered that a vent line from the boron recycle evaporator feed demineralizer did not have two supports (BR-H-2632 and BR-H-2634),
installed as originally called for in design documents.
The two supports were originally intended to be installed but were deleted by a Field Change Request (FCR-M-1749) during
construction which was intended to delete both the supports and their associated piping.
The FCR was written to remove the section of vent piping between the second vent isolation valve and a ventilation duct downstream following concerns associated with potential flooding of the duct during certain evolutions.
Due to a design/construction error, the piping remained and the supports were deleted.
The licensee has performed a two-over-one walkdown in accordance with Design Guide DG II.19, Verification Walkdown in Accordance With Regulatory Guide 1.29, to verify that the non-seismically supported piping has no impact on the safety-related components in the Boron Recycle System near which it is located.
Completion of the PCR to reclassify this system to non-seismic will properly correct this deficient condition.
Both of the above cases involving poor design control practices are violations of the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control.
However, neither example is being cited because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violations met the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.
Preliminary licensee reviews indicated that there were no other discrepant cases similar to the ones identified above.
However, the licensee's search had not concluded prior to the end of the inspection period.
Licensee management was encouraged by the inspectors to continue to be alert to potential design deficiencies in the plant.
NCV (400/93-14-01):
Failure to establish adequate measures to verify that designs for two safety-related systems were seismically accurate with respect to their design bases.
ACR 93-263 reported that on June 26, 1993, the containment vacuum relief system actuation limit was temporarily exceeded while starting/stopping RAB fans.
A night order to limit the RAB differential pressure had been issued April 8, 1993, but was not complied with.
Since a plant modification to change the pressure sensing lines for the containment vacuum relief system was under development, the operating procedure for the RAB ventilation system had not been changed to provide direction for preventing excessive RAB differential pressure while starting--and-stopping the fans.
Licensee management relief on the night order process to provide sufficient clarification to the operators on system operation.
However, operators typically only review night orders issued since their last shift. If continuing long-term action is required by a night order, reliance on memory is necessitated.
The inspector did not have a safety concern over the brief-amount of time the containment vacuum relief system actuation limit was exceeded, but was
concerned about the method used to communicate instructions to the operators.
The inspectors reviewed the standing orders issued to operators and found a few examples where specific long-term
" guidance had been provided.
One involved a recommended rate of power change for power increases and decreases which had not been incorporated into the operating procedures.
Another involved the desired temperature band for maintaining the spent fuel pools.
In addition, from a review of plant procedures concurrent with the night orders, the inspector found that many standing orders had already been incorporated into-plant procedures and could be deleted.
In regards to the spent fuel pool temperature, the inspector found conflicting guidance in three separate documents.
The night orders recommended that a band between 85-105 degrees F be maintained while the operating procedure recommended a 85-115 degree F band be maintained.
Also a technical support memorandum allowed a temperature band of 85-150 degrees F.
Even with the conflicting guidance, the inspector found that the operating procedure was complied with.
The inspectors encouraged the licensee to review long-term guidance provided to the operators for inclusion into appropriate procedures and to highlight these long-term actions in a way not dependent simply on memory.
The licensee was also encouraged to correct conflicting guidance from the various documents.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were
, observed and/or data reviewed:
~
ORT-1408 Security Diesel Operability Run Biweekly Interval
~
OST-1007 CVCS/SI System Operabil.ity Train A quarterly Interval
~
OST-1013 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval
~
MST-10149 Steam Generator C Narrow Range Level Loop (L-0494)
Operational Test The performance of these procedures was found to be satisfactory with proper use of calibrated test equipment, necessary communications established, notification/authorization of control room personnel, and
knowledgeable personnel having performed the tasks.
No violations or deviations were observed.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits were issued and TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
~
Change oil and filter in the diesel driver fire pump per procedure PM-M0012, Fire Protection Emergency Diesel Engine Semiannual Operational Inspection.
Replacement of Hydramotor actuator for control room normal supply fan outlet damper 1CZ-D7 in accordance with procedure PIC-I059, Calibration of ITT Hydramotor Damper Actuator Models NH-92, 94 and 96.
~
Tighten belts on fan AH-20-1A in accordance with checklist CL-ME0055, Air Handler Belt Adjustments.
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation of removed components and independent verification of the reinstallation.
'a ~
b.
As a followup to the comments contained in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/92-15, the inspectors reviewed the current backlog of uncompleted maintenance work tickets.
The backlog has been reduced from approximately 2,000 non-outage open work tickets to approximately 1,000.
In addition, the safety-related open work tickets had been reduced to approximately 200.
The licensee's goal was to achieve a seven week backlog of work for all the maintenance crews which equates to approximately 1000 open work tickets.
The inspectors consider'ed the licensee's use of an additional IEC maintenance crew to be effective in reducing and maintaining the backlog of work at an acceptable level.
Significant progress was noted in this area.
Due to the failure of the "8" ESCWS chilled water pump to start during the May 23, 1993, ESF actuation as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-12, the inspectors reviewed the maintenance history for failures of Brown-Boveri LK-16 circuit breaker closing coils. -Since 1991-the"inspectors-found six
.
instances where components failed to start from remote locations or automatically due to closing coil problems.
Four of these failures involved the electrical portion of the coil which was found damaged.
The other two involved mechanical binding of the closing coil pushbutton.
These breakers are currently scheduled to be replaced during the next two refueling outages.
Licensee personnel are presently investigating the failure mechanism of the closing coils and considering appropriate preventive maintenance
checks to be included with the current preventive maintenance efforts on these breakers.
Inspector Followup Item (400/93-14-02):
Follow licensee's action to develop'reventive maintenance checks on LK-16 circuit breaker closing coils.
Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following modifications/design changes were reviewed:
PCR-6920 RWST Transmitter LT-01CT-0991 IIW Changeout to Rosemount PCR-6961 Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration Alarm Setpoint PCR-6965 Installation of Temporary Pressure Gauge to Read Reactor Auxiliary Building Pressure Differential Temporary modification PCR-6961 was installed per vendor recommendation to increase the "B" RCP "alert" alarm setpoints for shaft and frame vibration to 18 mils and 3.5 mils, respectively.
During June 1993, spurious shaft and frame vibration alert alarms were received indicating that the "B" RCP was experiencing higher than normal vibration.
The vibration alert alarms had originally been set at 15 mils (shaft)
and three mils (frame).
As a result of the increased control room alarms, Westinghouse representatives were called in to perform diagnostic testing on the "B" RCP.
This testing was accomplished by collecting vibration data for all three RCPs while changing various operating parameters, such as CCW temperatures, seal injection flow rates, and containment fan cooler speed, which are known to cause changes in the shaft and frame vibration.
Conclusions from this testing were that the shaft is experiencing higher than normal vibration in the horizontal direction which may be -attributed to -an-increase in-lower -motor-bearing clearances.
As well, the higher than normal frame vibration is most likely caused by a near-resonant condition on the RCP frame due to a change in the structural stiffness of the pump's foundation.
The Westinghouse report negated the likelihood of an overbalance condition of the pump rotor causing the frame vibration.
The report also discussed the possibility of an out-of-calibration probe system which could inflect the vibration values.
Along with increasing the vibration alert alarm setpoints, Westinghouse recommended-that the licensee
r monitor the pump vibration weekly and perform further diagnostics during shutdown and startup activities associated with the next refueling outage to verify the preliminary conclusions drawn.
The temporary modification to raise the alert setpoints was installed on June 30 and did not affect the "danger" setpoints of 20 mils (shaft)
and five mils (frame) at which the operators are required to secure the pump.
The temporary modification will be removed during the next refueling outage in 1994 after the pump is inspected.
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
6.
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Activities (40500)
The inspectors attended selected PNSC meetings to observe committee activities and verify TS requirements for committee composition,.duties and responsibilities.
Heeting minutes were also reviewed to verify 'that activities were accurately documented.
During the June 30 meeting, the committee discussed activities associated with the Hay 23 ESF actuation (see NRC report 50-400/93-12).
This event had been discussed in previous committee meetings and the chairman commendably pointed out the need to avoid redundant agendas in PNSC meetings.
The two LERs discussed in paragraph 6 of this report were approved in the June
PNSC meeting.
The inspectors
'considered the conduct and documentation of these meetings to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current'NRC Enforcement Policy.
a ~
b.
(Closed)
LER 93-07:
This LER reported an unplanned ESF actuation which occurred on Hay 23, 1993, due to a circuit breaker malfunction.
This event was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-12 and was the subject of a violation (400/93-12-02).
Corrective actions for this event, which include training to operators on proper methods to,verify HOC switch alignment, will be tracked by the violation.
(Closed)
LER 93-08:
This LER reported an electrical wiring discrepancy that rendered the second of two redundant
amp
- overcurrent-protection =breakers-for the-IRVH bridge hoist electrical containment penetration inoperable since initial plant construction.
This event was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-12 and was the subject of a violation (400/93-12-01).
The cause of this event was an oversight during installation and wiring of these breakers.
The licensee's corrective actions will be tracked by the violatio ~
~
8.
Review of Special Reports (90713)
The inspectors reviewed a special report dated July 12, 1993, regarding the inoperability of the RCS subcooling margin monitor and the pressurizer safety valve position indication system. 'hese instruments were inoperable due to plant computer upgrades for a period in excess of seven days.
Therefore a special report was submitted in accordance with TS 3.3.3.6.c.
The inspector verified proper implementation of compensatory measures instituted for the inoperable instrumentation.
As corrective action, the license has completed the installation of the new reduced instruction set operating system for the central processing units as was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-04.
This action is expected to substantially improve the reliability of the ERFIS computer.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702
&
92701)
a.
(Closed) Deviation 400/93-08-03:
Performance of non-emergency safety-related maintenance without preplanning.
b.
The inspectors reviewed and verified completion of the corrective actions listed in the licensee's response letter dated June 3, 1993.
A night order was written to alert the operators that work would not be allowed to be started prior to preplanning except in emergency situations.
In addition the work control procedure was revised to clarify that only emergency work may be implemented without preplanning.
Training was provided to maintenance personnel on the procedure revision and the revision was covered in the operators required reading program.
(Closed) Violation 400/93-08-01:
Failure to properly implement inservice testing for components with data in the alert range.
The inspectors reviewed and verified completion of the corrective actions listed in the licensee's response letter dated June 3, 1993.
The licensee has developed procedure enhancements and guidance to clarify the test data review process.
Computer software enhancements were developed to aid in data trending and applicable personnel counseled on the use of the new instructions.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 16, 1993.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Violation, Unresolved Item, and Inspector Follow-up item addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the
inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
No dissenting comments from the licensee were received.
Item Number Descri tion and Reference 50-400/93-14-01 50-400/93-14-02 Acronyms and Initialisms NCV:
Failure to establish adequate measures to verify that designs for two'safety-related systems were seismically accurate with respect to their design bases, paragraph 2.c.(l).
IFI:
Follow licensee's action to develop checks on LK-16 circuit breaker closing coils, paragraph 4.b.
ACR AFW CCW CFR CVCS'RFIS ESCWS ESF F
FCR ILC IFI IRVH LER HOC NCV NRC PCR PIC PNSC RAB RCP RCS/RC RHR RWST TS Adverse Condition Report Auxiliary Feedwater Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Chemical Volume Control System Emergency Response Facility Information System Essential Services Chilled Water System Engineered Safety Feature Fahrenheit Field Change Request Instrumentation and Control Inspector Followup Item Integrated Reactor Vessel Head Licensee Event Report Hechanism Operated Cell Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plant Change Request Primary Instrument Control Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Residuel Heat Removal Refueling Water Storage Tank Technical Specification