IR 05000400/1993007
| ML18010B076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1993 |
| From: | Christensen H, Darrell Roberts, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010B075 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-93-07, 50-400-93-7, NUDOCS 9304130149 | |
| Download: ML18010B076 (25) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/93-07 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
February 20 - March 19, 1993 Licensee No.:
NPF-63 Inspectors:
J.
Tedrow D.
Robe nior Resident spector Resident Insp tor Dat S'ed Q f~
Da e igned Accompanying Personnel:
R. Watkins, Intern Resident Inspector Approved by:
H.
hristensen, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects ate igned SUMHARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, fire protection, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, site organization changes, nuclear safety review committee activities, followup of onsite events, cold weather precautions, and design changes and modifications.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
Colateral roving fire patrol duties have been assigned to security personnel, paragraph 2.b.(6).
The licensee was well prepared to handle a potential land vehicle bomb threat, paragraph 2.b.(5).
9304130i49 9g03P9 PDR ADOCK 05000400
Hajor changes were made in the site organization structure and managers, paragraph 5.,
The first meeting of the Nuclear Safety Review Committee was held, paragraph 6.
An automatic turbine runback occurred on February 25, paragraph REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Collins, Hanager, Operations
- J. Cribb, Hanager, guality Control
- C. Gibson, Hanager, Programs and Procedures D. Knepper, Project Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Dept.
B. Heyer, Hanager, Environmental and Radiation Honitoring
- T. Norton, Hanager, Haintenance
- J. Hoyer, Hanager, Project Assessment
- J. Nevill, Hanager, Technical Support A, Powell, Hanager, Harris Training Unit
- W. Robinson, General Hanager, Harris Plant
- W. Seyler, Hanager, Outages and Hodifications H. Smith, Hanager, Radwaste Operation
- G. Vaughn, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project
- W. Wilson, Hanager, Spent Nuclear Fuel Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Hode 1) for the duration of this inspection period.
a 0 Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS)
and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
shift supervisor's log; control operator's log; night order book; equipment inoperable record; active clearance log; grounding device log; temporary modification log; chemistry daily reports; shift turnover checklist; and selected radwaste logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
The inspectors found the logs to be readable, well organized, and provided sufficient information on plant status and events.
Clearance tagouts were found to be properly implemented.
No violations or deviations were identifie i
b.
Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities in progress.
Some of these observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations
- encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing building; turbine building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms; electrical switchgear rooms; and the technical support center.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(I)
Nonitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were, in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
During a tour of the reactor auxiliary building, the inspector noted oil accumulation on the air exhaust screens for the charging pump motors.
These pumps are driven by electric motors through mechanical speed increaser gears.
During pump operation, the speed increaser was observed to be generating an oil mist which was vented to the pump room through an air breather/precipitator.
The inspector observed an oil mist and oil droplets coming out of the air breather.-
The inspector concluded that since the cooling air supply suction for the pump motor was located very close to the vented oil mist, that this was most probably the source of oil on the motor air exhaust screens.
's discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-400/92-04 and 50-400/92-13, recurrent oil leaks have been noted on the charging pumps.
The licensee implemented plant modification
= PCR-6140, CSIP Oil. Misting Problem, in an attempt to stop one source of oil leakage.
This modification added new air breathers to the speed increasers which were supposed to entrap any oil droplets and direct them back to the speed increaser sump.
From the observations, the inspector concluded that the modification failed to achieve the desired result of preventing intrusion of oil into the motor.
The inspector discussed the potential adverse effects for the presence of an oil film on the motor windings with license engineering personnel.
The licensee had previously contacted the equipment vendor and discussed this situation and determined that no operability or environmental qualification issues result from oil contamination of the motor electrical windings.
The motor windings are embedded in an epoxy resin for protection.
However, the vendor did recommend that the windings be cleaned at the earliest convenient time to remove the oil and prevent dust build-up.
The inspector checked the component technical manual that also stated that the interior of the motor be kept free from oil which might allow dust buildup and block ventilation resulting in overheating of the motor windings.
The licensee is presently evaluating the effectiveness of the air breather modification and a potential cleaning plan to remove contaminants from the motors.
Inspector Followup Item (400/93-07-01):
Follow the licensee's activities to prevent oil intrusion into charging pump motors or establish a periodic motor cleaning schedule.
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected radiation work permits to verify that controls were adequate.
During a routine tour, the inspector noted that most of the personnel monitoring friskers had been changed to a yearly calibration frequency vice the previous semi-annual calibration frequency.
The inspector discussed this observation with licensee health physics personnel.
The licensee's calibration procedure for this instrumentation, SIC-705, Calibration of Radiation/Contamination Survey Instruments, was recently changed to specify the annual calibration frequency.
The inspector checked that this change was in agreement with the Final Safety Analysis Report (Section 12.5.2. 11.3)
and ANSI N323-1978 which both specified a calibration frequency of at least annually.
Security Control - The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities which included:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of 'closed circuit television monitors, the intrusion detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface,"-with operations and maintenance.
S In response to a request for information from the NRC NRR and Regional Offices, a review of the licensee's contingency plans for responding to a potential land vehicle bomb threat was performed.
This inspection included interviews with licensee security management and personnel, review of the security plan and applicable security response procedure, and a survey of the surrounding plant area, to verify terrain features and availability of materials, vehicles and equipment necessary to implement the contingency plan.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was well prepared to handle this type of threat.
, Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities', staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
The licensee recently realigned personnel resources in the plant services unit which resulted in security personnel performing fire safety inspections and tours instead of plant services personnel.
The fire zones that contain Thermolag material or that have other outstanding deficiencies that require a firewatch/patrol were collocated with the corresponding security patrol boundary and firewatch responsibilities transferred.
An inspection of the affected fire zones is performed each hour and reported to the secondary alarm station, which maintains a log of the areas inspected.
The secondary alarm station will inform the radwaste control room in case of fire or identification of fire hazards.
Radwaste operations personnel compose the plant fire br'igade.
In case of security emergencies, the security guard force will respond to security priorities and fire protection inspections will fall upon the on-duty fire protection technician.
The security force will not be assigned to provide continuous, fixed post, fire watch coverage.
The inspector discussed this practice with licensee management, reviewed the fire safety inspection log being maintained in the secondary alarm station, and reviewed the training records for the nuclear security officers who
received fire protection training.
The inspector found the transition to be effective and that appropriate training had been given to the security officers, The inspectors found plant housekeeping and material condition of components to be satisfactory.
Improvement was noted in controlling boric acid leakage from the spent fuel cooling pumps.
The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, fire protection requirements, and TS requirements in these areas was satisfactory.
c.
Review of Nonconformance Reports Adverse Condition Reports were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions and generic items were identified and items were reported as required by
CFR 50.73.
Surveillance Observation (61726),
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
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OST-1013 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Honthly Interval OST-1026 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation Daily Interval
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OST-1111 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump IX-SAB Operability Test Honthly Interval OST-1214 Emergency Service Water System Operability Train A quarterly Interval HST-EOOll 1E Battery quarterly Test
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HST-I0209, Pressurizer Level Loop (L-0460) Operational Test The performance of these procedures was found to be satisfactory with proper use of calibrated test equipment, necessary communications established, notification/authorization of control room personnel, and knowledgeable personnel having performed the tasks.
Performance of procedure OST-1026 was observed to verify that RCS leakage was within specification limits.
The licensee had previously identified an increase in containment sump inleakage of approximately two gpm.
A containment entry was made on Harch 9 when it was determined that the most likely source of the leakage to be from the secondary side of the
"A" steam generator.
The leak rate test was performed without the aid
of the plant computer which necessitated manual logging of RCS parameters from main control board instrumentation.
Collection of test data and computation of test results was found to be satisfactory.
'a ~
b.
In response to industry events at other Mestinghouse plants, the inspectorreviewed the licensee's design for the CVCS system and verified that measures were in place to help prevent a postulated failure of VCT outlet check valve 1CS-167 which isolates the CVCS system from the high head safety injection system during the post-LOCA recirculation phase.
A failure of this valve, either by backflow or seat leakage, could initiate a sequence of events ultimately resulting in a release of radioactive liquid through the recycle holdup tank which in turn relieves to the atmosphere.
The licensee had already addressed the potential for this event in ACR 92-145, dated April 27, 1992.
The immediate corrective actions were to add a quarterly backflow test for 1CS-167 to the IST program on the basis that the valve does indeed perform a
safety function (CVCS isolation) following a LOCA.
Additionally, an engineering evaluation (PCR-6351)
was initiated to determine whether the system's design was adequate from the standpoint of single failure criteria considering an assumed leakrate of 0.3 gpm past the valve's seat.
The evaluation demonstrated that the lifting of VCT relief valve 1CS-127, which relieves to the recycle holdup tank, is not credible for Shearon Harris given the assumed failure of 1CS-167 'he licensee concluded that onsite and offsite doses following a LOCA would not be impacted as a result of backleakage through the VCT outlet check valve.
The licensee initiated an action item to develop a test procedure which will include the 0.3 gpm seat leakage acceptance criteria for 1CS-167.
Inspector Follow-up Item (400/93-07-02):
Follow the licensee's actions to develop a leak test for check valve 1CS-167.
During the performance of procedure OST-1013, the inspector noted that the emergency diesel start time was approximately 9.5 seconds.
Although acceptable, considering that this data is collected with hand held stopwatches, this value was considered by the inspector to be very close to the maximum 10 second start time specified by the TS.
The "A" emergency diesel generator is on an increased.test frequency due to previous failures as mentioned in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/92-08.
Several previous diesel starts have had to be repeated due to unreliable start time
'
measurement.
The licensee initiated a plant modification, PCR-6105, EDG Start and Load Recorder, to install recorder devices which will measure the time required for the generator to achieve
'ated frequency and voltage.
Considering the little margin of error present for measuring the diesel start. time, the inspector urged licensee management to expedite the implementation of this modificatio Haintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits were issued and TS requirements were being followed.
Haintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
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Rewire the swing charging pump to replace the "B" charging pump in accordance with procedures CH-E0012, Electrical Power Feed Switchover For Charging/Safety Injection Pump 1C-SAB, CH-E0014, Initial Checkout of Electric Hotors and post maintenance testing in accordance with procedure OST-1007, CVCS/SI System Operability quarterly Interval.
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Troubleshoot loss of DC control power for the "A" emergency diesel generator control panel.
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Temporary leak repair of the seal water supply line for the "B" condensate booster pump.
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Replace fuel oil booster pump for the "B" emergency diesel generator in accordance with procedure CH-H0155, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine Driven Fuel Oil Booster Pump Haintenance.
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Troubleshoot 1HS-70 not stroking closed from the main control board.
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Troubleshoot/Repair the 1C air compressor for the "B" emergency diesel generator.
Charge cell ¹28 on 1B-SB emergency battery per procedure CH-E0003, Station Battery Single Cell Charging, and retest in accordance with procedure HST-E0011, lE Battery quarterly Test.
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation of removed components and independent verification of the reinstallation.
The inspectors noted the use of electrical grounding devices and good utilization of electrical safety equipment during the charging pump motor work.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Site Organization Changes (36800)
On Harch 4 the licensee announced a new organizational structure for the corporate and site nuclear generation'group.
As part of the corporate improvement initiatives implemented in response to-problems at another licensee nuclear project, organizational changes were implemented to increase line-management accountability for operations, improve effectiveness of support functions, and increase functional consistency among the three licensee nuclear projects.
For the Harris plant, this reorganization resulted in the training and licensing sections reporting directly to the site Vice President, and a nuclear safety r'eview
committee was established to advise the site Vice President.
Other changes were made which removed the security, regulatory compliance, and emergency preparedness areas from the cognizance of the plant General Manager and transferred them to other section managers.
Also, on Harch 15, a new plant General Hanager for the Harris plant arrived onsite.
The inspectors discussed this reorganization with senior plant.
management.
Nuclear Safety Review Committee Activities (40500)
The inspector attended the first Harris Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee meeting.
This committee was recently formed in conjunction with the new site organization structure to advise the site Vice President on safety policies and problems.
Committee members include the site Vice President, Plant General Hanager, Operations Hanager, Technical Support Manager, Plant Assessment Hanager, Vice President Nuclear Services Department, and two outside nuclear experts.
Although a charter of the committee's purpose, qualifications and responsibili-ties has been created, the implementing procedures are still under development.
No TS presently govern the committee's activities.
'The first meeting consisted of site familiarization for the new members.
The inspector considered the two outside experts to be extremely qualified.
The additional safety review of plant events and activities provided by this committee should be beneficial to safe plant operation.
Followup of Onsite Events (93702)
On February 25, 1993, the plant experienced an automatic turbine runback from 100 percent to 85 percent power following trips of the "A" and then the "B" Heater Drain Pumps (HDP).
The "A" HDP tripped following a lev'el transient in the 4A Feedwater Heater (FWH).
The "B" HDP tripped minutes later on low Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH).
The licensee immediately began.troubleshooting the cause of the level transients in the 4A and 4B feedwater heaters that supply the NPSH for the two heater drain pumps.
Troubleshooting included the installation of chart recorders, under PCR 6798, to allow continuous monitoring of 4A FWH water level, level transmitter output signals, and the positions of two level control valves.
The licensee also calibrated the NPSH loops which provide control room alarming and indication as well as protective trips for the HDPs.
Engineers also performed independent NPSH calculations based on as built system data to compare with indicated NPSH.values in the control room.
During this comparison, the licensee discovered that a
scaling error had-been introduced into the loops that caused indicated NPSH to be as much as 25 feet lower than actual NPSH.
The licensee concluded that were it not for the scaling errors the pumps probably would not have tripped following the FWH level transient.
As a corrective action, the licensee developed temporary modification PCR 6806 to disable the NPSH trips until the scaling factor could be corrected.
This would allow a plant load increase without a turbine
runback caused by unnecessary pump trips.
Pump protection was still provided by low level and low flow trips.
During the load increase, operators were required to continuously monitor the indicated NPSH and take precautions (i.e.,
reduce load and trip the pumps) if pump NPSH dropped to a specified value.
In addition, operators increased the water levels in the. fourth stage FWHs by one inch of water.
This action eliminated NPSH swings that were observed during initial attempts to increase load.
Full power operations were resumed on February 27, 1993.
On March 11, following rescaling of the NPSH loops, the pump NPSH trips were reinstated.
The licensee was still investigating several possible causes of the level transients at the end of the inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for protecting safety-related systems against extreme cold weather conditions.
The licensee's actions for cold weather protection were primarily controlled under Administrative Procedure, AP-301, Adverse Weather Operations, section 5. 1.
The inspector reviewed AP-301, operating procedures, rounds guidance, and alarm response procedures, to verify that they contained the proper immediate and supplementary actions that were necessary to prevent safety-related equipment from freezing.
The inspector also conducted walkdowns and verified that heaters were installed, freeze protection panels were energized, and exposed equipment was adequately protected from harsh weather.
Procedure AP-301 is entered at the discretion of the shift supervisor when the ambient temperature drops below 35 degrees F.
It contains general guidance for operators to verify operability of freeze protection panels and that other systems are functioning properly.
Operating procedure, OP-161.01, Operations Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance Systems, contained more specific instructions for main control room personnel on energizing heat trace panels.
Procedure OP-161.01 served as the heat tracing system lineup procedure.
From a review of system lineup files, the inspector noted that,a complete system lineup, per OP-161.01, had not been performed and documented since March 1992, when the procedure was initially developed.
This was discussed with licensee personnel who assigned a performance frequency to the operating procedure.
Following comments in NRC Report 50-400/92-02, the licensee revised auxiliary operator rounds guidance to incorporate specific heat trace panels for operators to observe during walkdowns.
Panels affecting safety-related systems, as listed in OP-161.01, were referenced in the rounds guidance, along with systems affected,,so that,.operators could give priority attention to those panels.
The inspector accompanied an operator during one set of rounds to verify that rounds guidance was being followed.
While the operator was attentive to the freeze protection system and to those systems requiring operational checks, the inspector discovered additional deficiencies with four heat trace
circuits that had not been previously identified.
When informed the operator initiated work requests and hung deficiency tags for the affected circuits as required.
Heat trace and temperature maintenance system problems are annunciated in the radwaste control room.
Annunciator Panel Procedure, APP-111, Freeze Protection and Temperature Maintenance, directed radwaste operators, depending on the panel that was in alarm, to either troubleshoot the affected panel or-'to log the alarm and notify the main control room.
At each shift turnover, and at other times during the shift, the main control room operators were presented with the current annunciator panel status for heat tracing systems.
The inspector observed that almost half of the 36 annunciators were currently lit.
Moreover, approximately half of nearly one hundred open work requests for deficient heat trace circuits were at least one year old.
This indicated that the freeze protection system was not a high priority maintenance item.
However, further review by the inspector determined that only a few of the lit annunciators and open work tickets could affect safety-related systems.
Although, the licensee had planned several modifications to improve the overall dependability of the heat tracing and temperature maintenance system, many of those efforts had not been scheduled or completed prior to the start of the current cold weather season.
One effort involved the verification of actual field lengths of all heat trace circuits so that plant drawings and power distribution and motor data sheets could be updated accordingly, and that preventative maintenance procedure acceptance criteria could be modified to reflect actual expected current conditions for individual circuits;'iAnother effort involved relocating temperature sensing thermostats,for'-'four heat trace panels outside of the turbine building so that ambient temperatures could be sensed to automatically energize these panels.'perators currently have to manually energize the affected pan'els because the thermostats are located inside the turbine building near hot system piping where ambient temperature usually exceeds the actuating setpoint (i.e.,
40 degrees F).
The inspector discussed with plant management the possibility of assigning higher priorities to these and other related deficiencies
.
during the upcoming warmer season. "'The inspector concluded that safety-
'elated equipment was adequately protected from extreme cold weather conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
i Installation of new or modified systems were.reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approvedjin accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications
and/or testing in progress.
The following modifications/design changes were reviewed:
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PCR-6535 ERFIS CPU Upgrade PCR-6140 CSIP Oil Misting Problem PCR-6798 Troubleshooting HDP Trips PCR-6806 Delete NPSH Trip on IA and IB Heater Drain Pumps During the review of temporary modifications PCR-6798 and PCR-6806, the inspector noted that the safety reviews for these two modification packages were very similar.
In order to troubleshoot the HDP trips, several test leads,and a chart recorder were installed in accordance with PCR-6798 to monitor several feedwater heater level control valve signals.
The implementation of PCR-6806 resulted in wire leads being lifted in the heater drain pump trip circuitry which disabled the NPSH trip for these pumps.
The inspector not'ed very similar wording between these two modification packages for part IV of the'safety -review, Unreviewed Safety guestion Determination.
In the answer to question
. number five of these determinations, the safety reviewer responded that the installation of temporary test equipment of the subject system does not create any new accident scenarios.
Since this answer did not really address the NPSH trip modification for which electrical leads were lifted, the inspector questioned the appropriateness of this response.
Even with this deficiency, the inspector agreed with the safety reviewers conclusion that an unreviewed safety question did not exist for the temporary modifications performed on these non-safety-related systems.
Discussions with the safety reviewer revealed that an appropriate safety review had been performed.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 19, 1993.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Inspector Follow-up Items addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
No dissenting comments from the licensee were received.
Item Number 400/93-07-01 Descri tion and Reference IFI 400/93-07-01:
Follow the licensee's activities to prevent oil intrusion into charging pump motors or establish a periodic motor cleaning schedule, paragraph 2.b.(3).
400/93-07-02 ll.
Acronyms and Initialisms
IFI 400-93-07-02:
Follow the licensee's actions to develop a leak test for check valve 1CS-167, paragraph 3.a.
ACR AFW ANSI CPU CSIP CVCS EDG ERFIS-FSAR FWH gPIll HDP IFI IST LOCA HST NPSH NRC NRR OP OST PCR RCS/RC-SI TS VCT Adverse Condition Report Auxiliary Feedwater American National Standards Institute Central Processing Unit Charging Safety Injection'ump Chemical Volume Control System Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Response Facility Information System Final Safety Analysis Report Feedwater Heater gallons per minute Heater Drain Pump Inspector Follow-up Item Inservice Testing Loss of Coolant Accident Haintenance Surveillance Test Net Positive Suction Head Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operating Procedure Operations Surveillance Test Plant Change Request Reactor Coolant System Safety Injection Technical Specification Volume Control Tank
8