IR 05000400/1993010
| ML18010B108 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1993 |
| From: | Christensen H, Darrell Roberts, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010B107 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-93-10, NUDOCS 9306160035 | |
| Download: ML18010B108 (16) | |
Text
%,I R REcu P0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report No.:
50-400/93-10 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No.:
50-400 Facility Name:
Harris
Inspection Conducted:
April 17 - Hay 14, 1993 Inspectors:
J.
Tedrow Senior Resi ent Ins ctor D.
Rob ts, Resident Inspector Approved by:
H.
hr stensen, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects Licensee No.:
NPF-63 D
e Signe
~ z.P 5'3 Date Signe D
e igne SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, security, surveillance observation, maintenance observation, preventive maintenance program review, design changes and modifications, firn protection/prevention program, plant nuclear safety committee activities, licensee event reports, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
One unresolved item was identified involving the seismic support for auxiliary feedwater piping, paragraph 2.b.(6).
Weaknesses were identified in the areas of technical/engineering support regarding the development of acceptance criteria and review of test data for a replacement safety injection pump, and in the plant nuclear safety committee review of the associated justification for continued operation, paragraph 8.
The licensee has made substantial improvements towards eliminating continuously lighted main control board annunciators, paragraph 2.b.(l).
9306260035 930528 PDR ADQCK'05000400 Q
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- D. Batton, Manager, Work Control
- J. Collins, Manager, Training
- C. Gibson, Manager, Programs and Procedures
- H. Hamby, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- D. HcCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- T. Morton, Manager, Maintenance
- J. Hoyer, Manager, Site Assessment
- J. Nevill, Hanager, Projects
- W. Robinson, General Manager, Harris Plant
- W. Seyler, Manager, Outages and Modifications H. Smith, Manager, Radwaste Operation
- D. Tibbitts, Hanager, Operations
- G. Vaughn, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Project B. White, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Monitoring
- W. Wilson, Manager, Spent Nuclear Fuel
- L. Woods, Manager, Technical Support Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Mode I) for the duration of this inspection period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS)
and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
shift supervisor's log; control operator's log; night order book; equipment inoperable record; active clearance log; grounding device log; temporary modification log; chemistry daily reports; shift turnover checklist; and selected radwaste logs.
In addition, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
The inspectors found the logs to be readable, well organized, and provided sufficient information on plant status and events.
Clearance tagouts were found to be properly implemented.
No violations or deviations were identifie Facility Tours and Observations Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities in progress.
Some of these observations were conducted during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator building; reactor auxiliary building; waste processing building; turbine building; fuel handling building; emergency service water building; battery rooms electrical switchgear rooms; and the technical support center.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(I)
Honitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status, area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors, electrical, system lineup, reactor operating parameters, and auxiliary equipment operating parameters were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode.
The licensee has made substantial improvements towards eliminating continuously lighted main control board annunciators.
During this inspection period the inspector observed that only one or two annunciators were r'outinely lighted on the main control board which was down considerably from previous operation with approximately ten.
Also, control room deficiencies have been reduced to approximately 20.
(2)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
(3)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
(4)
Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control activities were observed routinely to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed selected
radiation work permits to verify that controls were adequate.
Security Control - The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
.
activities which included:
protected and vital area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of closed circuit television monitors, the intrusion detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenance.
During a routine walkdown of the reactor auxiliary building, the inspector noticed that valves 1AF-5 and 1AF-24, which are two inch valves on the condensate storage tank recirculation lines from the "A" and "B" motor driven AFW pumps, were horizontally installed.
The valves had big Limitorque operators attached to the side with no support.
On May 5 the inspe'ctor brought this observation to the attention of engineering personnel who agreed to review the seismic qualificati'ons of the valves and the associated piping.
Preliminary discussions with licensee engineering personnel indicated that there was a potential design deficiency with this portion of the system.
The initial design of this system depicted the valves to be installed vertically.
However, during construction, due to obstructions caused by other piping systems in the area, the valves were installed horizontally.
Pipe stress calculations were redone at that time for the new construction orientation.
However, errors occurred in the modeling of the centers of gravity for the two valves and their motor operators.
During this inspection period, it was discovered that the centers of gravity for the valves themselves and not the composite valve and motor assemblies were figured into the stress calculations.
This recalculation, using correct figures for center of gravity, indicated that the actual stress for the piping exceeded the design basis earthquake allowable stress by 6 KSI.
The licensee has performed an operability determination of this system using guidelines set for th in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability, and.
ASME'ection III, Appendix F, and concluded that the affected piping, and therefore the AFW system, was operabl C.
Unresolved Item (400/93-10-01):
Review calculations and licensee actions regarding the seismic qualification of AFW piping.
The inspectors found plant housekeeping and material condition of components to be satisfactory.
The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, and TS requirements in these areas was satisfactory.
Review of Nonconformance Reports Adverse Condition Reports were reviewed to verify the following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions and generic items were identified and items were reported as required by 10 CFR 50.73.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
~ HST-I0164
~ OST-1007
~ OST-1013
~ OST-1039
~ OST-1215
~ OST-2046 Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range N42 Operational Test CVCS/SI System Operability lA-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Calculation of quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, Weekly Interval Emergency Service Water System Operability Train B
Tank Area Drain Pump 1X Discharge To Storm Drains Check Valve 1FD-120 Automatic Isolation Surveillance Test The performance of these procedures was found to be satisfactory with proper use of calibrated test equipment, necessary communications established, notification/authorization of control room personnel, and knowledgeable personnel having performed the tasks.
No violations or deviations were observed.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits were issued and TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
~ Sample and change lube oil in the "A" containment spray pump motor in accordance with procedures PH-H0074, Lube Oil Sampling, and HPT-H0084, Motor Lube Oil Change.
~ Clean, inspect, bridge, and megger the motor for fan AH-29-1X in accordance with procedure PH-E0009, 480 Vac Motor Preventative Maintenanc ~ Repair leak in the nitrogen gas bottle for valve 1HS-62 in accordance with procedures CM-H0188, Hain Steam Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Operator Disassembly, Maintenance and Reassembly, and CM-M0186, Paul Monroe, Hain Steam Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Operator Fill and Bleed Procedure.
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation of removed components and independent verification of the reinstallation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Preventive Maintenance Program Review (62703)
A review of vendor technical manuals was performed to verify the content of the Preventive Maintenance (PH) program for various system components.
As mentioned in NRC Inspection Reports 50-400/92-20, 50-400/92-10, and 50-400/91-24, licensee implementation of technical manual recommendations into the program had been weak.
The licensee implemented a technical manual review process to identify additional items for inclusion or to provide written technical justification for omission from the PH program.
The inspectors reviewed technical manuals for the following components; containment spray pumps and motors, emergency service water pumps and motors, charging/safety injection pumps and motors, component cooling water pumps and motors, residual heat removal pumps. and motors, and the vital inverters.
Also, the Technical Support Guide (TSG-248)
used by the licensee to perform the technical manual review was referenced by the inspectors.
The inspectors found several examples where the licensee was deviating from the recommendations of the vendor.
For the containment spray pumps, a vendor manual recommendation that required the pump's mechanical seals be removed, inspected, and requalified when service life approached 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> or after each shutdown cooling operation, had not been identified by licensee personnel during their review.
After discussing this matter with the equipment vendor, licensee personnel informed the inspector that this statement in the technical manual was intended for operation of residual heat removal pumps only and was no longer applicable.
A change to the technical manual was initiated to delete this statement.
For the emergency service water pumps, a vendor manual recommendation to disassemble and inspect the pump for indications of wear every two years was not included into the PH program.
The documented engineering review of this requirement stated that the two year rebuilding was too frequent and that five years has been determined by plant management to be appropriate.
In addition, the trending of inservice testing vibration data would trigger any necessary pump work.
The inspector questioned whether there were PH requirements to trigger the five year inspection.
Instead of a PM requirement, the licensee relied on the ten year maintenance plan to implement a
corrective maintenance work ticket to perform the pump inspection.
Although deviations existed between the technical manual recommendations and licensee PM requirements, no recommendations which were necessary to be performed to protect equipment operability, had been omitted by the licensee from the PH program.
Since licensee personnel had to contact
the vendor representatives for the answers to issues raised during this inspection, the inspector considered that the licensee's documented justifications for deviating from the vendor manual recommendations could be improved.
During a review of the component cooling water pump technical manual, the inspector noted that the manual contained an operating specification for maximum suction pressure of 22 psig.
During tours of the auxiliary building, the inspector has frequently noticed this suction pressure to be as high as 30 psig.
The licensee system engineer was contacted and the operator logs were referenced for this parameter.
The operator log sheets specified an acceptable range for suction pressure to be 20-40 psig.
The system engineer contacted the equipment vendor and determined that the 22 psig was simply a purchase specification and that a 50 psig suction pressure limit was applicable to conform to the stress analysis for the pump.
The system engineer initiated a change request to the technical manual to reflect the correct 50 psig limit for maximum suction pressure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to veri,fy that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and ap'proved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met
'cceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following modifications/design changes were reviewed:
~ PCR-3430 Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tank Discharge
~ PCR-3431 Waste Monitor Tank Discharge to the Waste Neutralization System These modifications affected the two major liquid radioactive waste release systems by installing blank flanges in the discharge piping to the waste neutralization system.
Each release pathway had been designed with an option of directing the discharge flow to the cooling tower blowdown system or the waste neutralization system.
Since the waste neutralization system was not a contaminated system, the licensee had administratively prevented radiological releases to this system by implementing clearances on the discharge valves.
Only the non-radioactive secondary waste tank was allowed to discharge to the waste neutralization system.
The inspectors found that these modifications improved the radiological controls associated with liquid releases by preventing an inadvertent discharge.
No violations or deviations were identifie,
Fire Protection/Prevention Program (64704)
Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were oper able.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed fire brigade training status, fire pre-plans for the reactor auxiliary building, third party audits of the fire protection program, fire protection equipment testing, and observed fire. brigade performance during two fire drills.
Portions of the-following procedures were reviewed during this inspection:
AP-200 FPP-001 FPP-002 FPP-012 FPP-013 FPP-014 HPP-630 OHM-002 PEP-323 TI-105 FPT-3101 OPT-3101 FPT-3001 FPT-3004 FPT-3002 FPT-3003 FPT-3005 FPT-3110 FPT-3201 FPT-3010 FPT-3302 FPT-3006 Emergency Equipment Inventory Fire Protection
- Conduct of Operations Fire Emergency Fire Pre-Plans Fire Protection
- Minimum Requirements and Mitigating Actions Fire Protection Surveillance Requirements Respiratory Protection Shift Turnover Package Setup of Emergency Facilities Fire Protection Training Hose Rack Inspection:
Auxiliary Building Monthly Interval Fire Extinguisher Inspection:
Auxiliary Building Monthly Interval Motor Driven Hain Fire Pump Operability Test Weekly Interval Hain Fire Pump Flow Test Annual Interval Fire Hain Valve Position Verification Monthly Interval Fire Suppression Valve Cycle Test Yearly Interval Fire Suppression Non-Accessible Valve Cycle Test 18 Month Interval Hose Rack Inspection:
Containment Fire Detection Functional Test Local Fire Detection Panel 1 - 6 Month Interval Engine Driven Hain Fire Pump Operability Test Weekly Interval Hain Drain Test Auxiliary Building quarterly Interval Fire Main Flow Test Three Year Interval The radwaste shift supervisor was responsible for identifying and documenting fire brigade personnel per procedure OMM-002.
To assist this effort, the fire protection specialist had developed a roster of trained personnel.
The inspector noted a disclaimer on the.roster which stated that the status of physical examination and respirator training was not verified.
The radwaste shift turnover checklists for the last quarter were reviewed to verify the composition of the fire brigades.
The inspector found that on two occasions, March 17 and Harch 24, 1993, one member was listed on the fire brigade who was not properly qualified (i.e., recent physical examination and respirator training).
This matter was discussed with the fire protection specialist and radwaste shift supervisors who informed the inspector that an unqualified person
had been specified on the fire brigade for those occasions.
However, a
qualified individual was available for fire brigade duties during those occasions and the appropriate verbal assignments had been made but not documented.
The inspector considered that clear communication of fire brigade member training status would help alleviate occurrences such as these.
Licensee personnel concurred and the fire brigade roster was changed to include dates for member physical, respirator fit test, and respirator training.
Appropriate manual fire fighting equipment, as specified by the fire pre-plans, was found in the fire zones of the reactor auxiliary building.
However, minor deficiencies were noted in three actual equipment locations which were different than that specified on the fire pre-plans.
The inspector was informed that the pre-plans were presently being revised and that his observations would be incorpo'rated.
The inspectors observed fire drills on April 22 and Hay 6, 1993, which involved simulated fires in the waste processing building and reactor auxiliary building.
Fire brigade response for the first drill was poor in that a member failed to arrive at the scene with appropriate turnout gear and it took a considerable amount of time to deploy the fire hoses to combat the postulated fire.
The critique of this drill was effective in identifying these deficiencies and the brigade was judged to have failed the drill.
The second drill was conducted as remedial training for the same fire brigade.
The performance of the fire brigade was improved during the second drill.
The inspector reviewed records for previous drill performance for the current year and found no similar performance problems.
The inspectors found that appropriate independent audits were being performed on the fire protection/prevention program.
Also, periodic testing was being accomplished on fire fighting equipment/systems.
Although the TS did not address requirements for fire protection, the licensee had made several commitments to this program in the FSAR.
The inspector found that the licensee had implemented the FSAR requirements into applicable plant procedures.
The inspector noted that fire hose station AX-9-37, located at the access to the containment equipment hatch, was included in procedure FPT-3110 to be checked every refueling outage for those stations that are inaccessible during plant operation.
Accessible hose stations receive a
monthly check.
The containment equipment hatch area was classified as a
neutron radiation area and was previously inaccessible during reactor operation.
Health physics personnel have changed the posting of this area to a radiation area; making this area accessible during normal reactor operation.
The inspector suggested that plant management consider increasing the checking frequency for this hose station.
The licensee's fire protection/prevention program was considered to be satisfactor,
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Activities (49500)
The inspectors attended selected PNSC meetings to observe committee activities and verify TS requirements for committee composition, duties and responsibilities.
Heeting minutes were also reviewed to verify that activities were accurately documented.
During the April 26 meeting, the committee discussed the installation of a spare rotating element into the "B" Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) casing.
An internal Justification for Continued Operation (JCO)
was developed to support the return to service of the "B" CSIP without performance of the system flow balance required by TS 4.5.2.h.l if the system flow characteristics were altered.
The safety injection system flow characteristics had been established during pre-operational testing by throttling the safety injection flow control valves.
This test established a maximum flow for the strong
"A" CSIP of 685 gpm and a minimum flow from the weakest
"C" CSIP of 348 gpm.
The replacement rotating element included an internal pump casing and was supplied with a pump performance curve from the manufacturer.
The new "B" CSIP pump curve was compared to the "A" and
"C" CSIP performance curves and was determined by the licensee to be bounded by the "A" and
"C" pump curves.
The new "B" CSIP performance curve was comparable to the "A" CSIP although slightly less for higher flows.
However, the new
"B" CSIP produced more flow than the old "B" CSIP.
Licensee personnel evaluated the extra flow obtained when the "A" CSIP would be operated with the new "B" CSIP and determined that the FSAR accident analysis would remain valid.
Although TS 4.5.2.h. 1 allows a total pump flowrate from one CSIP of 685 gpm or less, the pump manufacturer allowed a
'ominal runout flow limit of 675 gpm.
The 685 gpm TS limit had been approved by the vendor but only for the "A" CSIP.
Based upon the magnitude that the new "B" CSIP could exceed the 675 gpm limit and satisfactory performance of similar pumps at higher flow rates, the PNSC approved the JCO.
During the PNSC meeting, the inspector noted that committee members 'did not fully discuss TS requirements for system testing if flow characteristics were altered.
The inspector identified this aspect near the conclusion of the meeting.
However, little discussion ensued..
On April 27, 1993, the "B" CSIP was tested by performing procedure OST-1007 which established total charging flow at about 92 gpm at which point differential pressure and vibration data were recorded.
The data from this test reproduced only one point on the "B" vendor curve which would also serve as new baseline data to support future quarterly testing under the inservice testing program.
The "B" CSIP was subsequently put in service replacing the "C" CSIP.
On April 28, 1993, an internal memorandum was generated by the system engineer stating that the OST test results supported the evaluation in the JCO and the "B" CSIP could be declared operable.
Based on the memorandum, the pump was declared operable and placed in service on April 2 On April 29, the NRC inspectors questioned the validity of the JCO and the internal memorandum.
The inspectors observed that the OST data taken for the "B" CSIP, when compared to pre-operational test data for the "A" CSIP, illustrated that the "B" CSIP was a stronger pump.
The inspectors noted that pre-operational test data for the "A" and
"C" CSIPs indicated a two to five percent decrease in 'developed head when compared to their respective vendor curves.
This same degradation phenomena had not been observed for the "B" CSIP when the OST data was compared to the vendor-supplied pump curve.
The inspectors concern was in the upper flow region where the new "B" CSIP could possibly exceed the TS upper limit of 685 gpm.
The licensee failed to demonstrate that
.
the "B" CSIP performance was bounded by the pre-operational test data for the "A" and
"C" CSIPs.
The inspectors therefore concluded that the system flow characteristics had been altered by the installation of the new pump rotating element and that the system testing requirements of TS 4.5.2.h.l were applicable.
On April 29 the licensee removed the new "B" CSIP from service, declared it inoperable and replaced it with the "C" CSIP.
Although no TS limiting conditions for operation were exceeded during this event, the inspectors concluded that engineering support for this evolution was weak in that the testing requirements and acceptance criteria had not been suffici'ently developed and documented prior to the performance of the OST on April 27 to support (or reject) declaring the new pump operable.
Furthermore, the OST test data was not adequately reviewed prior to returning the pump to service.
The inspector also considered the PNSC review of this matter to be weak because TS surveillance requirepents to determine system operability were not fully explored-.
Licensee management commissioned an internal management review board to investigate the root cause of these weaknesses.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
'a ~
(Open)
LER 93-02:
This LER reported the failure of air handler unit AH-92A which, in conjunction with an inoperable
".B" train ESCWS for other reasons, resulted in an entry into TS 3.0.3.
The maintenance associated with fan AH-92A was previously mentioned in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-08 and was considered to be poor.
The licensee has subsequently effected repairs to the air handler unit.
Remaining action to be accomplished includes the development of a procedure checklist for setting the fan drive belts, training for maintenance personnel, and additional analysis
b.
Co of the fan bearing failure.
This LER will remain open pending completion of this corrective action.
(Open)
LER 93-03:
This LER reported a containment vacuum relief system design deficiency which resulted in a TS violation.
This matter was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-400/93-08 and was the subject of a non-cited violation (NCV 400/93-08-02).
The LER also included another instance where containment internal pressure was not properly monitored as required by TS 3.6. 1.4.
The licensee has revised the actuation setpoint for the vacuum relief system and has changed the method for monitoring containment internal pressure.
A modification which will reroute the sensing lines for the system transmitters is presently being pursued.
This LER will remain open pending completion of this action.
(Open)
LER 93-04:
This LER reported that the required surveillance testing interval for Control Room HVAC system valves 1CZ-19.and 1CZ-20 had been exceeded on four occasions since initial plant startup.
The licensee attributed the missed surveillances to inadequate attention to detail by the operators and an inadequate review of in service testing data (which differed considerably for the valves and the dampers).
An underlying cause was human factors deficiencies in the labeling of the valves and dampers on the main control board.,
The licensee has revised the surveillance test procedure to include a
clarification and caution note to alert operations personnel of the labeling similarities between the valves and the dampers.
The licensee is presently developing enhancements to the inservice testing review process.
The licensee will also conduct real-time training on this event for operators and is evaluating possible enhancements to correct human factors deficiencies on the main control board.
This LER will remain open pending completion of the above actions.
10.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702
&
92701)
(Open) IFI 400/93-08-04:
Follow the licensee's activities to restore the "B" CSIP to operable status and review the generic implications of the pump shaft failure.
As mentioned in paragraph 8 of this report, the licensee has replaced the rotating element for the "B" CSIP and is evaluating further pump testing to comply with TS 4.5.2.h.l.
This inspector followup item will remain open pending the inspectors review of the licensee's actions to determine the root cause of the old pump's shaft break, and further review of the generic implications of the pump's failur Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on Hay 14, 1994.
During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the unresolved addressed below.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
No dissenting comments from the licensee were received.
Item Number 400/93-10-01 Descri tion and Reference Review calculations and licensee actions regarding the seismic qualification of AFW piping, paragraph 2.b.(6).
AFW ASHE CSIP CVCS/SI-ESCWS-FSAR gpm HVAC JCO KSI LER NRC OST PCR PH PNSC PORV pslg TS URI Vac Acronyms and Initialisms Auxiliary Feedwater American Society of Mechanical Engineers Charging/Safety Injection Pump Chemical Volume Control System/Safety Injection Essential Services Chilled Water System Final Safety Analysis Report gallon per minute Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Justification for Continued Operation Kilopounds per squay e inch Licensee Event Report Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Surveillance Test Plant Change Request Preventive Maintenance Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Power Operated Relief Valve Pounds per Square Inch Gage Technical Specification Unresolved Item Volt Alternating Current