IR 05000400/1979021
| ML18017A826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1979 |
| From: | Bradley R, Bryant J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18017A820 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-79-21, 50-401-79-21, 50-402-79-20, 50-403-79-20, NUDOCS 8002200216 | |
| Download: ML18017A826 (11) | |
Text
~R Bray
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 t'OV I 6 1979 Report Nos. 50-400/79-21, 50-401/79-21, 50-402/79-20, and 50-403/79-20 Licensee:
Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Facility Name:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-400, 50-401, 50-402, and 50-403 License Nos.
CPPR-158, CPPR-159, CPPR-160, and CPPR-161 Inspection at Shearon Harris site near Raleigh, North Carolina Inspector:
R.
D. Bradley
'Approved by:
J.
C. Bryant, Section Chief, R
S Branch ate igned Dat Signed SUMMARY Inspection on October 15-18, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 30 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of construction status; licensee action on previous inspecton findings; inspector followup items; licensee identified items; and IE Circular 78-08.
Results Of'he five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were iden-tified in four areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency - Improper control of welding electrodes - paragraph 6.a.).
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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%G W. Howe, Vice President, Technical Services H. Wyllie, Senior Construction Manager J. Chiangi, Manager, Engineering and Construction QA M. Parsons, Site Manager L. Forehand, Principal Site QA Specialist M. Lucas, Senior Resident Engineer M. Simpson, Principal Site Construction Inspection Specialist Other licensee employees contacted during this. inspection included two con-struction craftsmen, one technician, the document control supervisor, and two senior QA specialists.
Other Organizations T. F..Glennon, Project Superintendent, Rigging International R. Lerch, Project Superintendent, Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBGI)
-F. P. Hazelip, Welding and QA Superintendent, CBSI
+Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview
/
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 18, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The utility was advised that an NRC resident inspector would be assigned to the Harris site in fiscal year 1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (400-401/79-18-02 and 402-403/79-17-02):
Organiza-tional and Functional Alignment of Site Inspection Personnel.
The inspector held discussions with site management, examined a revised site organizational chart, and reviewed the job description for the Principal Construction Inspec-tion Specialist.
Three full time permanent personnel have been assigned exclusively to the mechanical inspection unit due to the present work load.
One offer is currently outstanding for the comparatively smaller work load of the electrical inspection unit.,
An examination was made of the QA records file for electrical and mechanical Discrepancy Reports to determine which personnel had been involved in identifying discrepancies and who had been assigning the corrective action and resolution The inspector found no evidence which would indicate that quality had been compromised by the Construction Inspection Organization through insufficient independence from cost and schedule.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in Paragraph 5.b.
5.
Inspector Followup Items a.
(Open) Inspector Followup Item (400-401/79-18-01 and 402-403/79-17-01):
Concrete Repair Procedure.
The inspector reviewed revision 1 of QCI 13.4,
"Concrete Repair Inspection",
and held discussions with responsible QA inspection personnel.
QCI 13.4 has been revised to include concrete repair checklists for placement and post placement activities'he titles adjacent to the two approval signatures now reflect the organizations of the authorized signatures appearing on the checklists.
The Grout Test Report for the three 2-inch cubes which are representa" tive of repair placement 1WPSL236007 was reviewed and the strength values were found to be within specification limits.
The repair area in the waste processing building was examined and found satisfactory.
~This item will remain open pending the revision and subsequent evalu-ation of procedure WP-27, "Repairing of Concrete Surfaces".
b.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 401/79-18-05:
Damage to Reactor Auxiliary Building.
The inspector held discussion with the QA site staff and reviewed the corrective actions and resolutions documented in Discrepancy Report C-286.
The inspector noted the corrective actions for two of the damaged areas were different from that originally discussed during inspection 79-18, i.e., rebar was straightened instead of being cut and cadwelded.
The licensee was'unable to readily provide documents which reflect the proper authorization had been obtained from the architect-engineer prior to proceeding with repairs (straightening approximately 90 dowels).
~ This item has been upgraded to an Unresolved Item No. 401/79-21-02, Damage to reactor auxiliary building, pending further review by the inspector.
6.
Independent Inspection a 4 Construction Status The inspector conducted an inspection of the safety related structures for Units 1 and 2 and the waste processing building which is common to all four units.
Other areas inspected included storage yard 12 and
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the Unit 1 containment dome erection area.
Observations were made of nitrogen blankets for equipment in storage, proper drum counter perfor-mance prior to placement for concrete truck 6797, drawing revision control at field work stations, and weld.rod control in the dome erection area.
Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBGI) is continuing to work on the prefabri-cation and erection of the Unit 1 containment dome plate.
The pre-
fabrication work is presently 58/ complete and the erection of the dome is 26/ complete.
Erection of wall liner stands at 88/.
Concrete placed to date totals 283,000*cubic yards and reinforcing steel quantities total 37,000 tons.
The current fuel loading dates are as follows:
Unit No.
Unit No.
Unit No.
Unit No.
June 1,
1983 June 1,
1985 June 1,
1988 June 1,
1990 Rigging International personnel have arrived at the site and preparations are underway to assemble and erect the derrick that will be used to set the major NSSS components and containment dome.
b.
Equipment Storage The inspector examined the remaining six component cooling water heat exchangers in storage yard number 12 to verify nitrogen had been reapplied following a repair/rework evaluation by the licensee.
This evaluation is addressed in inspection report 50-400,401/79-14 and 50-402,403/79-13.
The dry gas blankets had been re-established as required.
c ~
Field Drawing Control Eight safety-related drawings were selected at random from the stick files being used at four locations within the Unit 1 reactor auxiliary building, containment building, and waste processing building.
A review of the -document record card file maintained in the Document Control Center disclosed that the revision levels of the selected drawings were the latest revisions of record.
The ability of the licensee's system to control outstanding change notices will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
'
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-4-d.
Weld Rod Control On Monday, October 15, at 3:00 p.m., the inspector conducted an inspection of the Unit 1 containment dome erection area and noted that the portable work station doors were standing open and no workers were observed in the surrounding area.
Further examination revealed that the return oven within the work station was unlocked even though the oven was on and contained weld rods.
This is in noncompliance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B in that activities affecting quality were not being accomplished in accordance with documented procedures, namely:
Section 8 of Division 4 of the CBRI Contract Quality Assurance Handbook which states:
Paragraph 8.2.2.1
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"All welding material at the job site shall be stored in clean, dry, locked storage areas or locked electrode ovens".
Subsequent discussions with CBRI personnel disclosed that repairs had recently been accomplished on the return oven and that proper operating temperatures were in the process of being verified.
The inspector pointed out that procedures require calibration under lock and key if rods are contained and the oven is left unattended.
This item has been identified to the licensee as Noncompliance No. 400/79-21-01,
"Improper Control of Welding Electrodes".
This incident has been classified as a Deficiency in that there was no evidence to indicate that weld rods had been removed from the oven and used without proper authorization.
Within the above areas of inspection, one item of noncompliance and no deviations were noted.
7.
Licensee Identified Items Prior to this inspection, the licensee identified the following items under 10 CFR 50.55(e):
a
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(Closed)
Item (400/79-20-01):
Emergency Airlock Weld Deficiencies.
On September-12 1979, CPSL notified Region II of a potentially report-able event involving deficient fillet welds on 44 out of 304 airlock anchor studs.
On October 9, 1979, CPSrL reported that their evaluation had determined the deficiency to be nonreportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The inspector reviewed the licensee's engineering evaluation report and found the conclusions to be acceptable.
The architect-engineer and CPSL concluded that the subject anchor studs meet ASME code allowable stresses.
Permanent Waiver (PW-AS-124) authorized the use of the airlock without additional rework/repai b.
(Closed)
Item (400,401/79-18-04),
Lack of Post Weld Heat Treatment on Nozzles for Containment Valve Chambers.
Region II was notified by the licensee on September 19, 1979, that this potentially reportable con-dition had been evaluated and determined to be nonreportable.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation report and the referenced ASME code requirements and finds the architect-engineer's conclusions acceptable.
8.
Inspection and Enforcement Circular Status (Open)
78-CI-08:
Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants.
The licensee met with members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on September 18, 1979, to discuss environmental qualification of safety-related Class 1E electrical equipment.
A proposed plan for documentation of environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in the Final Safety Analysis Report was presented as described in CPM,'s letter dated September 17, 1979.
In that letter the licensee stated that the description in their FSAR will list individual pieces of equipment, their location, the seismic and environmental envelope that it is or will be qualified to, the qualification method and the qualifi-cation results.
CPM pointed out, that at the time of the filing of the FSAR, not all of the test data for all of the equipment will be available.
The testing program is ongoing and is anticipated to be completed in late 1981 and early 1982.
All required test data will be available and on file prior to receiving the Operating License for the facility. It is not CPGL's intention to provide all of the test data in the FSAR, but rather to specify the qualification envelope, method of qualification and qualification results and to provide only representative test data for NRC staff review.
All other test data for individual pieces of equipment will be located in CPM 's files and available for NRC audit.
COL was encouraged to consider use of IEEE Standard 323-1974 where possible in qualifying equipment.
CPM was provided a draft copy of NUREG-0588,
"Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment".
CPGL was requested to meet with the NRC staff again as soon as representa-tive test data is available for discussion.
Region II will review these matters in future inspection l fil'
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