IR 05000397/1981009
| ML17275B044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1981 |
| From: | Dangelo A, Dodds R, Elin J, Haist D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17275B043 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-81-09, 50-397-81-9, NUDOCS 8106010376 | |
| Download: ML17275B044 (17) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO".MISS ION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMVZ
REGION V
Report No.
50-397 L '
N CPPR-93 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Safeguards Group Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-.2)
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington April 13-16 and April 28 - Nay 1, 1981
. P.
aist Reactor Inspector,
/'
, 0. Eli, Reactor Inspector s zz/~g D
e Signed
"5~~SIs:::
Date Signed A. J.
D'Ange
, Reactor Inspector Approved By:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Prospects Sect>on
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Reactor Construction Projects Branch
'ugary:
Ins ection durin the eriod of A ril 13-16 and A ril o.
0-39-0 ate Signed S
Dat Signed 28 - Na
1981'e ort Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional-based inspectors.
of icensee actions on previous enforcement items, unresolved items. antd, follow up items; licensee action in response to. NRC '10 CFR 50.54(f) request; and licensee action on
CFR 50.55(e) construction deficiencies.
The inspection involved 103 inspection-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations mere identified.
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RV Forta 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted b.
C.
Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem WPPSS)
+*R. T. Johnson, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- B. A. Holmberg, Deputy Project Manager - Engineering
+*D. H. Smedley, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J. D. Martin, Plant Manager
+*M. A. Clinton, Project, Engineering Management Specialist
+*G. I. Wells, Deputy Project Manager - Construction
+W.
G. Keltner, Assistant Construction Manager
.
+C. S. Carlisle, Deputy Project Manager
+W.
C. Bibb, Project Manager
+A. M. Sastry, Deputy Project Manager
+R.
B. Glasscock, Director, Quality Assurance
+T.
P.
M. Maidment, Project Management Burns and Roe Inc.
BSR)
- R. C. Root, Site Manager
~J. Austin, Quality Assurance Engineer
+M, Parise, Special Projects Manager
+R. Grant, Construction Quality Manager
+B. J.
Yah Er em, HVAC Superintendent Bechtel Power Cor oration d.
e.
+M. Jacobson, Project Quality Assurance Engineer
+J. Tutini, Superintendent
+R. Johnson, Manager of Quality Wri ht, Schuchart Harbor Boecon GERI WBG)
D. Bowen, Quality Control Supervisor J. Anderson, Lead Structural Engineer - Containment MCC Powers
+J.
A. Har mon, Project Manager Waldin er Cor oration E. T. Barker, Project Manager
f a
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector attended the management interview held on May 1, 1981.
- Denotes attendance at management interview on April 16, 1981.
+
Denotes attendance at management interview on May 1, 1981.
2.
Site Tour An inspector conducted a site tour during the day shift to observe housekeeping, electrical work in progress, Fishbach Lord cable storage, and storage of standby service water pumps.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Items a.
(0 en Enforcement Item 50-397 79-16 09) Reactor Protection S stem, ur >ne Sto a ve Tur ne Governor a ve Tr The reactor protection system components providing protective reactor trips on loss of turbine. load were not originally purchased or installed in accordance with FSAR statements.
The inspector reviewed engineering changes for compliance with industry standards and recent FSAR changes concerning this system.
PED 220-I-0336 was written to identify the "turbine first stage pressure" pressure switches (PS N003A-D) as class 1E equipment and to route and install their sensing lines as class 1E equipment.
PED 218-E-2340 was written to purchase turbine stop valve position switches (PS N006A-D)
as class 1E equipment and provide class 1E cables to terminal boxes TB-RPS-A1,. A2, B1 and B2.
Turbine governor valve fast closure pressure switches (PS N005 A-D) are to be purchased as class 1E items by PED 220-I-0336.
The inspector noted, however, that the test solenoid valves associated with turbine governor valve fast closure pressure switches (RPS-SPV-5S-D) are to be relocated per PED 220-I-460.
Since these valves were observed to be uncapped by the inspector during this inspection and during various other NRC inspections since this issue was first raised, the cleanliness of these valves is in question.
The licensee stated that these valves would be replaced.
Additionally, the inspector could not identify in the FSAR any statements discussing the possible co@eon failure due to location of turbine stop valve position switch terminal boxes (TB-RPS-A1, A2, Bl and 'B2) within the turbine missile cone approximately
feet from the turbine shell.
The licensee stated that the system would be reviewed to insure that it was not susceptible to common mode failure."
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As installation of these modifications has not yet commenced, this item will remain open.
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s and Followu Items a ~
b.
Closed Followu Item 50-397 80-06 04
- Loose Lockina Nut on imstor ue a ve erators - IE C rcu ar 9-0 and
CFR 50.
e Re ort of u ust 1980 The inspector examined procedure no.
SLT-M6, Rev. 0, "Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators" which will be used to inspect'nd secure the locking nuts on Limitorque type SMB and SMC valve operators.
This procedure has been approved and will,be implemented during system lineup.
This item and the associated 50.55(e) report are considered closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 50-397 79-18 01
- Inter retation of S3E Co e Sect on XI or Mec anszed Preservtce Exam nations The licensee's Preser vice Inspection Program Plan had specified a "fit and function" test of mechanized ultrasonic examination equipment and use of the manual preservice examination data to satisfy the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code Section XI.
The inspector had questioned whether this would satisfy the code requirement that such examinations be conducted under conditions and with equipment and techniques equivalent to those that are expected to be employed for subsequent inservice examinations.
The inspector obtained the IE position on the equivalency of manual and mechanized preservice examinations and transmitted this position to the licensee in a letter dated January 20, 1981.
This position interprets the ASME response to Agenda Item lfo. ISI-76-31 to require a broad correlation effort, with explicit documentation of a spectrum of reflectors identified by manual examination, together with corresponding data from automated examination, with the correlation developed from representative reflectors in each type of examination area.
The licensee inservice inspection personnel stated that they understand the IE position and intend to comply with it.
Correlation plans will be developed as the fit and function tests proceed.
The issue of ASh1E Code interpretation is considered closed.
The licensee's correlation plans and results will be examined as a part of the routine inspection progra c ~
0 en Foll owu Item 50-397 80-08 32 -Pi e Installation Cleanliness The inspectors had identified instances of poor control of pipe cleanliness in the laydown areas and in the installed 'condition.
The contractor attributed the findings to failure to follow existing procedures.
The contractor has written procedure no. gAP-366,
"Site Surveillance" to ensure that storage conditions are monitored.
The contractor guality Control Supervisor has conducted a surveillance of two storage areas and found them to be unacceptable.
Corrective Action Request Ho.
198 was issued March 20, 1981.
The response and corrective action will address all storage areas.
1Jhen corrective action is completed, routine surveillances in accordance with gAP-366 will begin.
Since the contractor has not yet completed actions to correct the pipe cleanliness deficiencies, it is considered premature for HRC inspection.
This item will remain open pending completion of contractor actions.
0 en Followu Item 50-397 81-02 01 -Voidin of ualit Assurance De ic>enc Documents The inspector had identified the absence of a policy on the voiding of quality assurance deficiency documents such as nonconformance reports and corrective action requests.
The disposition of voided documents was inconsistent, with some being voided without explanation or signature.
The licensee has revised Project Management Instruction No. PMI-4-2 to include appropriate instructions for voiding or rescinding corrective action requests and has revised PHI-4-4 to include appropriate instructions to contractors on voiding of nonconformance reports.
The licensee has determined that guality Audit Finding Reports are not susceptible to voiding since they do not become numbered and validated until the audit report is issued and only a certified lead auditor may close a guality Audit Finding Report.
The licensee has performed surveillances of site contractors to determine if the contractor has procedures or instructions regarding the voiding of deficiency documents and has determined that three contractors (217, 219 and 234)
have no instructions.
Project guality Assurance has directed the reverification task force to include a sampling of voided quality assurance deficiency documents during the reverification effort.
The reverification plans have not yet been finalized so the inspector was unable to verify implementation of this commitment.
This item will remain open pending implementation of these commitment (Closed Unresolved Item 50-397 79-16/02
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Re air of Laminations a
ot Be In u
Com sance st A S Dl.l The inspector had questioned the practice of routinely repairing structural steel discontinuities by grinding to a depth of 3/8-inch and rewelding.
Burns and Roe engineering responded to this item by stating that the discontinuities described as "laminations" on addenda to work procedure no.
84 were surface discontinuities, not laminations, and were detected on the face, not edges, of structural members.
Burns and Roe stated additionally that in approximately 95 percent of the cases, the discontinuities were removed by grinding before reaching the 3/8-inch depth.
The subject discontinuities were detected by magnetic particle examination methods which are more stringent than the visual examinations required by AMS D1.1.
The inspector observed that the AMS D1.1 structural welding code requires further exploration and examination of discontinuities detected by visual examination.
The inspector also sampled twenty-five of the standard repair addenda and confirmed that the major ity of the discontinuities labelled as "laminations" were on the face of structural members and were detected by magnetic particle examination methods.
In cases where it appeared that the discontinuities could have been laminations observed at plate edges, the plates were removed or the discontinuities were explored to determine their size.
It appears that based on the above, the licensee has adequately met the intent of the AMS structural welding code.
This item is closed.
(0 en Followu Item 50-397 79-12 01
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WBG Im rovements Heeded n Concrete Anc or Bo t Insta at>on Practices The inspector had identified several concrete anchor bolt installation practices which differed from IE Bulletin 79-02 requirements and had obtained a commitment from the licensee to conform to the bulletin requirements.
WBG Wor k Procedure Ho. 281,
"Concrete Anchors" has recently been revised as a result of reverification task force reviews.
The procedure now incorporates the prohibition on reuse of Phillips Red Head anchors.
The licensee had committed to revise project engineering direction to address the acceptability of concrete anchors in grouted floor column supports and to initiate a sampling program on previously reinspected anchors and anchors installed subsequent to February 1978 for the presence of sleeve pull-up against base plate Project engineering directive no.
215-CS-2885 was issued on March 27, 1980 to provide instructions to the contractor regarding the. evaluation of concrete anchors in grouted floor column supports.
This project engineering directive requires the contractor to submit a procedure for approval using the directive as a guide.
The inspector could not locate the contractor's procedure and noted that the additional requirements for grouted floor column supports are not addressed in Mork Procedure No. 281.
Project Engineering Directive Ho. 215-CS-2405 was issued to the contractor to perform a sample inspection program to recheck anchor bolts already reinspected or reworked to verify that the sleeves have not pulled up against the base plate.
The inspector was unable to locate any contractor personnel with knowledge of the status and results of this sample reinspection program.
This item will remain open pending verification that requirements for grouted floor column supports are being implemented by the contractor and examination of the sample reinspection program results.
0 en Followu Item 50-397/78-09 05 -Installation of Cables n Power Generat on Contro Com ex PGCC General Electric Company identified by 10 CFR 21.21 Report (NRC No. 78-063-000)
various defects in PGCC cable installation.
During this inspection the Fischbach/Lord Electric Company instruction CP/gAP-428 was reviewed for compliance with specification requirements and FSAR commitments.
The separation and label identification to be used in PGCC cable does not appear to be included in the FSAR.
Chapter 7 of the FSAR references Chapter 8 for electrical separation, however Chapter
states that PGCC separation requirements are detailed in Chapter 7.
Reinspection of PGCC cables and terminations to F/L CP/0AP-428 was still in progress at the time of this inspection.
This item will remain open pending resolution of the FSAR description of the system.
Closed Followu Item 50-397 80-06 05 -Moisture Leaka e in Stranded ire Conductors Noisture leakage in stranded wire conductors was the subject of IE Circular Vo. 79-05.
During an inspection in April, 1980 (50-397/
80-06) the licensee stated that the review of this circular was not complet During this inspection the licensee stated that the conduit fittings, junction and terminal boxes, and limit switch enclosures in the primary containment had been inspected and found to be water-tight, NEHA-4 enclosures.
Furthermore, the use of NEYiA-4 enclosures within the primary containment is a requirement of the design drawings and equipment specifications.
Additionally, this area will be detailed in the licensee's Environmental gua1ification Report on safety related electrical equipment.
This item is closed.
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(0 en Followu Item 50-397 78-10 04 -Use of Flexible Conduit During a previous inspection it was found that the use of flexible conduit in place of rigid conduit was not consistent with FSAR statements.
Burns
& Roe engineers stated that the use of flexible coupling was required to provide for relative movement of rigid conduit systems and equipment.
Burns and Roe engineers also stated that this flexible conduit would be treated like rigid conduit with respect to separation requirements.
During an inspection in November, 1978 (Inspection Report 50-397/78-11)
the licensee stated that FSAR changes would be submitted to identify these uses of flexible conduit.
During this inspection the inspector noted that revisions to the FSAR did not include this item.
The item will remain open pending FSAR documentation.
5.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55 e
Re ortable Construction Deficienc IF Va ve 0 erator tla V
rate Off S aft The inspector examined the licensee's actions in response to notification from the vendor, Basic In Flow, of a possible operating defect on Limitorque motor and manual operators used in conjunction with BIF butterfly valves.
The described defect involves loosening of the shaft key that locks the operator spline adapters to the valve stem resulting in loss of dr iving torque to the valve.. The licensee has initiated nonconformance repor ts which prescribe corrective actions recomnended by the vendor for each of the nineteen affected valves, seventeen of which are safety related.
This item is closed.
6.
Mork Restart:
Contract 215 The regional inspector provided assistance to the Senior Resident Inspector in a review of licensee actions to resolve the following listed concerns in preparation for restart of the mechanical contractor in the areas of piping and hanger (
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ualit Assurance Pe uirements Ao lied to Seismic Cate or I, qua st C ass I
Items The inspector examined correspondence between the licensee and Burns and Roe regarding the quality assurance requirements of
CFR 50, Appendix B that are to be applied to components, systems, and structures that have been classified Seismic Category I, guality Class II (i.e. having the potential to adversely impact guality Class I equipment).
The licensee had not yet determined the pertinent
CFR 50, Appendix B requirements to be applied to Seismic Category I, guality Cl.ass II items.
The inspector expressed concern that work may be proceeding on Seismic Category I, guality Class II items in the absence of defined quality assurance requirements, particularly since the 215 contractor is taking action to eliminate quality control involvement in equality Class II work.
The specification quality assurance requirements to be applied to Seismic Category I, guality Class II items is considered unresolved.
(50-397/81-09/01)
CFR 50.55 e
Construction Deficiencies - Evaluation of Pro rarrmatic Deficiencies and Procedure Im acts The 215-contractor had reviewed applicable
CFR 50.55(e) reportable conditions and prepared a matrix reflecting the procedures in effect at inception of the deficiency and the procedures now in effect to cover wor k and preclude recurrence of the 50.55(e) condition.
The inspector verified that this matrix was independently reviewed by the RCSW Task Force, which concluded that the contractor's programmatic deficiencies have been recognized, evaluated, and corrective action implemented to preclude recurrence of the same type of deficiencies.
Individual 50.55(e)
items will be reviewed for corrective action during the cour se of normal inspections.
Ins ection Re uirements for As-Built Drawin s RCSW Task Force memorandum no.
RCSW-80-331 identifies that Work Procedure No. 332, Rev. 0, "Large Bore Pipe and Hanger As-Builting" allows final as-built walkdown by field engineering without subsequent quality control involvement for hangers and pipe installed and vaulted prior to September 1980.
This results in no quality control involvement for previous as-builts which may be found to be inaccurate during engineering walkdown.
Work Procedure Ho. 331, Rev. 0,
"Small Bore Pipe and Hanger As-Builting" does not require quality control involvement in the as-builting of small bore piping.
The licensee and task force personnel stated that the issue of quality control involvement in these areas has not yet been resolved.
This will be examined further following licensee action on this issu ~
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Subcontractor Desi n Control 8.
The inspector examined MCC Powers design methods and design drawings for quality class I supports for compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B
and applicable contract requirements.
MCC Powers is a subcontractor to The Maldinger Corporation (TMC) contract 216 HVAC performing guality Class I and II work.
guality Class I work consists of the fabrication and installation of instrument panels and the design and installation of supports for instrument panels and tubing.
The licensee presently has a hold on all MCC Powers guality Class I
or Seismic Category I work.
During an examination of MCC Powers design methods, the inspector observed that MCC Powers could not produce design calculation or design drawings for supports of the following instruments, tag numbers:
COHV-1, COHY-4 and MN-TT-53A.
The inspector was not able to determine if MCC Powers or TllC had established measures to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design basis were correctly translated into drawings, procedures and instructions.
The licensee. indicated that MCC Powers was not reviewed by the Reverification of Completed Safety Related kirk Task Force (RCSM) and will not be allowed to restart guality Class I work until a review of MCC Powers is conducted by RCSH.
The issue of Contract 216 subcontractor design control is considered unresolved.
(50-397/81-09/02)
Unresolved Items 9.
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the
'nspection are discussed in Paragraphs 6.a.
and 7.
Mana ement Interviews The inspectors met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspections.
The scope of the inspections and the observations and findings of the inspectors were discusse P
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