IR 05000397/1981012
| ML17275B158 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1981 |
| From: | Dodds R, Haist D, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17275B157 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-81-12, NUDOCS 8108040316 | |
| Download: ML17275B158 (14) | |
Text
Report No.
Docket No.
Licensee:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEt1ENT REGION V
License No.
Safeguards Group Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
/
D. P.
ist, Reactor Inspector 7N /
ate S gned W.
Wagner, eactor Inspector 7 PA
/
Dat S gne Approved by:
Summary:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
Reactor Construction Projects Branch 7 2 Dat S gne Ins ection durin the eriod of June 22-26 1981 Re pit No. 50-397 81-12)
A~Id:
R Rl, dl p
l All
CFR 50.55(e) construction deficiencies.
The inspection involved 61 inspection-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Si080403ih ai0723 i PDR
- DOCK 05000397I'PDR'V Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS, 1.
Persons Contacted a ~
b.
Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem WPPSS)
- R. T. Johnson, Project guality Assurance Manager
"B. A. Holmberg, Deputy Project Manager - Engineering
"G. I. Wells, Deputy Project Manager - Construction M. A. Clinton, Project Engineering Management Specialist
- K. D. Slagle, Project Construction Management
- R.
E. Grant, Project Construction Management
- D. L. Smedley, guality Assurance Engineer
- C. S. Carlisle, Deputy Program Director S. Noordhoff, guality Assurance Analyst Bechtel Power Cor oration co d.
e.
- M. Jacobson, Project guality
- W. H. Boarder, guality Assurance
- T. A. Mangelsdorf, Project Manager G.
B. Wagner, Lead Staff Engineer - Piping and Mechanical Burns and Roe Inc.
S. Salpute, Field Group'5upervisor - Electrical R.
D. Carmichael, Electrical Engineer M. L. Bursztein, Assistant Resident Project Engineer J.
G. Propson, Lead Electrical Engineer H. Ferris, Lead Hanger-Eqgineer)
~'.
F. Akers, Senior, Welding.'Engineer Supervisor I. 'Anexahdrow, tlechanical Engineer, H.:E., Lunt,, Manager, Materials"Engineering Fischbach'/L'ord
,
M:"'Hollenbeck equality Assurance', Engineer t
State of,.Washin ton
- G. Han'sen,.Operatioiis
'Division 'Chief, Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council
','
Bon'nevil 1 e 'Power Administrati on,
-r (
- W. Chin, Project Engineer
- Denotes attendance-at management interview on June 26, 1981.
In addition, Mr. A.
D. Toth, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector attended the management intervie rj cy j
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2.
Site Tour The inspectors conducted a site tour on June 22, 1981 to observe housekeeping, storage, maintenance of safety-related equipment, and in progress work and completed work.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55 e
Re ortable Construction Deficiencies The following construction deficiencies were examined by the inspectors for reportability, thoroughness of evaluation, corrective action, and generic applicability:
a.
BWR Relief Valve. Control S stem and Associated Containment Loads b.
The adequacy of the Mark II containment design during a relief valve and loss of coolant accident loading., was first reported by the licensee under the provisions of 10 CFR 50. 55(e) in February, 1976.
Since that time resolution of the containment suppression pool design has been coordinated with the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
During evaluation of the Mark II containment it was determined that subsequent safety relief valve activation may produce loads greater than the initial activation loads resulting in a possible design deficiency.
The licensee has determined that this issue is not reportable based upon actual in-plant safety relief valve test results at two other plants which show that subsequent safety relief valve loads are not significantly greater than initial activation loads.
This item is closed.
Fault Connections
- Westin house Containment Penetrations t
Defective terminations were identified on Westinghouse supplied electrical penetrations and reported under the provisions of
CFR 50.55(e)
on March 19, 1979.
The defective terminations resulted from installation of improper sized lugs.
Penetration modules were removed,.",under the 'direction of Westinghouse and returned to,the, manufacturiiig'site for,.'repair.
The inspector verified that.all el'ectrical penetrations'f this type were inspected following identification, of'his-,problem.
Corrective actions appeared appropriate~ to,coirrect'(his deficiency.
This item is It.'i '
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-3-Westin house Containment Penetrations With Poorl Soldered Connections Defective solder connections were identified on Westinghouse containment penetrations and reported under the provisions of
CFR 50.55(e)
on May 4, 1979.
The defects consisted of cold solder joints and lack of adequate solder.
The inspector verified that all penetrations with soldered connections of this type had been identified and inspected.
Deficiencies have been documented and will be repaired on.site by the electrical contractor.
Other defects identified on cable jackets will be repaired to maintain environmental qualification of the cable.
Corrective actions taken or schedu'led to. take place appear appropriate to correct these deficiencies.
This item is closed.
ualit Class II Structural Steel:,Su ortin ualit Class I
E ectrsca Cab e Tra s "
Instances of~qual,ity c)ass'
cable tray supported by quality
'lass =II ~structural,'steel',w'ere identified by the licensee at the'01"and 525 Toot 'elevation of,the:,Radwaste/Reactor Building corridor'. ~-.gh'is"deficiency wasieported".under the provisions of,'0 CFR 50,;55'e,'on'une'-21; 1979.",.The,iDspector examined Project Engi'neer ing, Directi ve nos. '215-'CS-0770- and 215-CS-0981 issued to upgrade'he structural;steel'.from quality class II to quality class I";-'.The'linspe'ctor a1soi verified the initiation of a review of all,-'class'1E 'cables r'outed,'in."sei'smic category II areas and a review.'of'lectrical and;conduit 'routing at all building interface areas: to ensure that the 'routing of,class 1E trays through the Class. II Reactor/Radwaste Building"corridor was an isolated case.
The results of these reviews'wi,ll be examined in conjunction with a related 50.55(e) deficiency reported on December 18, 1978 regarding class lE cable trays routed in a Seismic Category II area.
This specific item is considered closed.
Steam Tunnel Su ort Box Beams This deficiency, reported under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on November 14, 1980 was examined in IE Report No. 50-397/81-'10 as item no. 50-397/80-08-13 and is-considered closed.
Failure of Batter Char er Ca acitors
This potential deficiency was reported under the provision of
CFR 50.55(e)
on July 24,'1980.
Subsequent evaluation by the licensee has disclosed that the capacitor failures resulted from excessive shelf life.'he manufacturer will provide a procedure II
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for "re-forming" the capacitors.
The deficiency was also determined by the licensee to not be reportable because of sufficient battery storage capacity to safely shutdown the plant.
This item is closed.
Power Pi in Com an
- Poor Weldments Sway brace brackets, HS-14a, supplied by Power Piping Company
,
were reported to have undersized fillet welds and incomplete fusion (see NRC Report 50-397/80-17).
The licensee's final report on this deficiency was submitted under the provisions of 10 CFR
, 50.55(e)
on June 1,
1981 (WPPSS Letter No. G02-81-124).
The inspector discussed the corrective action test plan with licensee personnel in order to determine if additional information related to the deficiency may be required.
Metallurgical and design analy'ses were performed:
The inspector reviewed the method of sampling, testing parameters, and results of applied loads to various types of brackets.
As a result of this program the licensee has applied a derating factor to all applicable brackets of a welded construction.
All installed brackets not meeting the adjusted:design allowable load have been identified by nonconformance reports.
The number'of; te'st samples selected appear to be sufficient for the test program.
The applied derating factor to bracket sizes 15, 20, 25 and 40 appears to be conservative.
All size 50, 60 and 80 installed and uninstalled brackets will be replaced.
This item is considered closed.I, J
Additioiial,NRC concerns were-addressed regarding Power Piping Company sway struty~b'rackets-in -NRC Report 50-397/80-17.
The concern was.,to" what extent'these"deficiencies affect other sway strut,~members
'such'as'IIthe",strut';barrel to socket weld, sway strut
,to cl'amp 'weldm'ent,;and turn buckle, welds.'he inspector reviewed Pac'ific jesting Laboratorie's.test results on 24 specimens submitted by the licensee;
= The'esul'ts-'indicated that no welds failed under.the proof,. load.-~~'<The licensee will issue a final report addressing'he test results an'd conclusion regarding the sway strut.'members.;,
'eneraal Motors -Diesel En ine-Turbochar er Thrust Bearin Problem
'ID The licensee has identified the, problem associated with the thrust bearings on the turbochargers for the two diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generator on Nonconformance Report Nos.
53-05666 and 2-05667, respectively.
The inspector examined the corrective actions as documented on the nonconformance reports which prohibit fast hot starts after shutdown (15 minutes - 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) until a modification package becomes available from the equipment manufacturer.
These corrective actions are as recommended by the Electro-Motive
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-5-Division, General Notors and appear sufficient to prevent possible damage to the diesel generators.
This item will remain open pending installation of the modification package.
Westin house DEH Cabinet Located Ad acent to General Electric Control Room Bench pard The non-seismic category I Digital Electrohydraulic Control (DEH)
cabinet located adjacent to a seismic category I control room benchboard was identified as a significant deficiency and reported under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on November 14, 1980.
The inspector examined Project Engineering Directive No.
W218-CS-3771 which provides for a structural barrier around the DEH cabinets to prevent their impacting essential equipment during a seismic event.
These actions appear adequate to correct this deficiency.
This item is closed.
Di'esel Generator Switch ear Installed Too Close to Associated Control Cabinets The installation of diesel generator switchgear units with insufficient clearance with respect to adjacent control cabinets was identified as a significant deficiency and reported under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on November 14, 1980.
This deficiency was identified following in-situ tests of Westinghouse electrical equipment with rigid conduit connections by applying the results of the in-site tests to electrical equipment of other manufacturers which also had rigid conduit connections.
The inspector examined Project Engineering Directive No.'18-CS-5218 which provides for structural coupling of the affected equipment.
This action appears 'adequate to correct this deficiency.
This item is closed.
k.
IEEE ualificatio'n of Rosemount Transmitters I
,'A lack of documentation on 'envir'onmental qualification of Model No.""1151 DSG pressure transmitter's was identified as potentially reportable under the provisions of, 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on November 14, 1980.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee and General Electric has confirmed'that the transmitters supplied contain the same components as the ones ir'radiated a'nd environmentally qualified.
This item then is not reportable and is considered closed.
l.
An 0 crated Valve With Im ro er Limit Switches This deficiency was originally identified as potentially reportable on November 14, 1980.
Subsequent evaluation by the licensee disclosed that the improper limit switches provide indication
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of valve position only and do not activate any control functions.
Failure of the limit switches or incorrect valve position indication following a Design Basis Event will pose no safety hazard.
The inspector examined the licensee's rationale for determining that this deficiency is not reportable and verified that the licensee has examined applicable vendor drawings to determine that improper limit switches have not been supplied on similar valves in the plant.
The improper limit switch will be replaced.
These actions appear adequate to correct this deficiency.
This item is closed.
4.
'Mana ement Interview The inspectors met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.
The scope of the inspection and the observations and findings of the inspectors were discusse h
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