IR 05000397/1981022
| ML17276B000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1982 |
| From: | Dodds R, Elin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17276B001 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-80-515, FOIA-80-555 50-397-81-22, NUDOCS 8201290367 | |
| Download: ML17276B000 (34) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
~,
REGION V
Report No. 50-397/81-22 Docket No. 50-397, License No.
CPPR-93 Safeguards Group
'icensee:
Washin ton Public'Power Su 'lv"S stem P. 0.
Box 968 d
Richland, Washinoton'9352'.
Facility Name:
Washin ton Nuclear Project No. 2'(WNP-'2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton"Count',d Hashin ton r
Inspection conducted:
November 2-5'and November 16-R20, 1981" Inspectors:
J. 0. Elin, Reactor I spector Approved By:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor rogects ection Reactor Construction Projects Branch
/e Pz at Signed te igne Summary:
Insnection durinq the Oeriod'of November 2-'5 and 16-'20,""1981 (Re ort No.'50-397/81-22).
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of previously identified enforcement and followup items.
The inspection activities involved 58 inspector-hours onsite and 10 inspector-hours, in the regional office by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
8201290367 820l15 PDR ADOCK 05000397
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Washin ton Public"Power Su ol""S stem WPPSS
- R. C. Hatlock, Program Director
- W. C. Bibb, Project Hanager
- J. Honekamp, Technical Assistant
- R. Johnson, Project guality Assurance Hanager
- H. Crisp, Construction Hanager
- B. A. Holmberg, Engineering Hanaaer b.
Bechtel'Power Cor'ration
- H. J. Jacobson, Project guality assurance Engineer
- D. K. Cosgrove, gual.ity Assurance Engineer
- H. Boarder, equality Assurance Engineer
- Denotes attendance at management interviews on November 5, 1981 or November 20, 1981.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Items a.
The licensee's actions on the following enforcement-items were reviewed and, based on these actions, the following items are considered closed:
(1)
Closed)
Noncomoliance (50-397/79-04 11) Inade uate'Batter Rack Installation Plastic spacers in'stalled by Fischback. Lord, Contract 218, between cells of batteries Bl-l, B1-2, and B2-1 did not fi.t snuggly between the cells allowing the cells, to move both laterally and vertically.
Exide -installation i,nstructions required a snug fi't. Additionally,'eouired shims were not installed between the battery rack uprights'and rails, resulting in about-35 cells'with a gap of 1/8" to, 1/4" between cell 'and rail.
P WPPSS test and startup personnel re-installed the batteries per'xide requirements. 'uality control coverage was provide'd by test and startup quali,ty control personnel.
These activities were reviewed by'the NRC resi'dent inspector during September,'1981.
His comments are documented in inspection report (50-397/81-18)."
This item is closed.
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(2)
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'Closed Noncom liance. 50-397/80-04/14 Failure to follow ualitv control.nroce ures w en insnectin i e han ers 'ontract'215 High.Pressure Cord Spray Support HPCS-48 was identified to,have an undersi'zed fillet weld and an end connection between the rigid strut'nd the betide flange or iented 90. degrees to the drawing.
Final quality control acceptance inspection and "as-built" drawings had been completed for this restraint without noti'ng these condi'tions.
The licensee responded that the rigid sway strut, as designed, would bind as the pipe moves.
The "As-Built" drawing was marked to show. the correct "As-Built" conditiqn.
Calculations were performed to verify that"a fillet weld of 3/16" rather than 1/4" was adequate'or the required desion strength.
The licensee noted that the quality control procedure stated that all welds were to be visually examined but only a sample were to be measured for size.
The weld in question need not have been measured during quality control insoection.
(3)
The licensee's actions to resolve this issue seem adequate.
Bechtel Power corporation has assumed the quality control responsibilities previously assigned to Contract 215.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Noncomnliance.(50-397/80-04/15)
Failure to'ollow ualitv control rocedures,'old oint omitte on we records Contract 215 The weld record for pipe support LPCS-12 indicated that for pipe lug weld No: 6, final visual visual inspection and Verification of acceptable NDE by quality control had not been performed.
A Liquid Penetrant Report No. 9702 dated September 28, 1979.
was available indicating acceptance of weld No. 6.'t appeared that, when the weld record was prepared, the quality control hold points were'omitted for weld No. 6.
The licensee stated that weld record form NF-6A for LPCS-12 had been developed by the 215 contractor and the visual and NDE inspection requirements. for lug weld 6 had been erroneously omitted.
A revised weld record form was initiated which included the required visual and*NDE inspections.
'These inspections were satisfactorily performed.
The licensee actions to resolve this issue seem adequate.
Bechtel Power Corporation has assumed the quality control responsibilities previously assigned'to contract 215, This item is close I,(
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(4)
Closed Noncom liance'0-397/81-03 03) Failure to erform e ui ment maintenance in'accordance with rocedures.
The motor for standby service water pump 1A (safety
.related equipment)
did "not have energized space heaters or meet the storage reauirements of ANSI N45.2.2.
A review of maintenance documentation disclosed that the motor had not had insulation resistance tests performed for almost two years.
Satisfactory insulation resistance tests were, performed on July 7, 1981.
Motor space heaters were energized on March 6, 1981.
CAR 1522 was issued 'to perform the requi,red maintenance.
(5)
The corrective actions taken by the licensee appear satis-factory.
Periodic maintenance of this equipment is being performed by Fischbach/Lord (Contract 218}.
This item is closed.
n (Closed Noncom liance'(50-397 -80.-04/16) Inf rmation incomplete on sacnficial s iel wall ualitv records, Records of shield wall inspections did not reflect the activities performed.
Some records of testing were not dated, results of tests were not indicated, and some weld maps were inconsistant with. other weld recqrds.
(See 50-397/79-12/02 allegations 6 and 7}.
Records associated with the sacrificial shi.eld wall were reviewed by the licensee and a master list of defi.ciencies compiled.
The identified deficiencies were addressed by the licensee in the dtscussion of various concerns in Appendix A of "Engineering Evaluation of the WNP-2 Sacrificial Shield Wallubmitted to NRR on August 1, 1980.
NRR by letter dated February 25, 1981 accepted the overall adequacy of the SSW structure based on their review. of the licensee's fracture mechanics analysis contained in.the August 1, 1980 report cited above.
At this time the work remaining on the sacrificia1 shield wall is (1) fillingof'oids in concrete and (2} repair of accessible welds per NRR's letter of February 25.,
1981.
These items will be reviewed by the resident inspector.
during his routine insnection program.
This item is close I I )
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The licensee's actions on the following enforcement items are not yet complete or have not been verified by NRC inspection.
As of this inspection the following enforcement items remain outstanding for the 1INP-2 facility:
(1)
0 en Noncom liance'"(50-397/79-10/01) Failur'e'to'alif ost weld heat treatment'proce ure'PHHT-1 Contract 2 5
.
Post weld heat treatment of large pipe by Contract 215 was subcontracted to Seattle Industrial Controlled Heat, Inc.
Post weld heat treatment was specified and performed to
"Post Meld Heat Treatment Procedure No.
1 (PWHT-1)."
No qualification tests were conducted to assure that this procedure properly heat treated the pipe welds.
The lack of qualification testing did not establish. that the area under the heater blankets, displaced from the weld, was, not subjected to excessive temneratures.
The licensee's
"response to this item of noncompliance G02-80-120 states that a one-dimensional transient analysis was to be performed to determine the maximum temperature reached by the feed<eater piping heat treated per PWHT-,1.
This analysis showed that Pie maximum temperature anywhere on the pipe 'was below 1333 F, the lower critical temperature.
Subsequent review by NRC inspectors determi,ned that the adiabatic conditions inside the pipe assumed for the transient analysis-was. not conservative and would result in higher temperatures under the heater blanket for recorded weld crown temperatures if field oractice was utilized.
The licensee performed a fi.nite, element two dimensional thermal analysis assuming 6.7 'Kw and
Kw heater blankets with natural conjection and forced air flow of 44 ft/sec.
These analyses showed that the ASIDE code allowable maximum temperature of 1250 F was exceeded under the heater blankets.
This item remains open pending the licensee's verification of adequate heat treatment of the affected v'~elds.,
The licensee will update his response. letter ($02-80-120} to show (1) the corrective 'steps which were taken to subsequent heat treatment of welds which prev'ented continuation of this problem, (2) the number of welds on site affected by the use of PHHT-1, (3} and steps to be taken to show that
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adverse metalurgtcal properties have not been induced near these welds by the use of Pl<HT- ~
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en 'oncomoliance.
50-397 79-10 03 Insufficent aualit recor s of'post wel 'at'treatment'ontract 215
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II Contract 215; Aright, Schuchart, Harbor, Boecon Corporation,
'eneral Energy Resources, Inc, a joint venture (hlBC>),
subcontracted pi'pe weld heat treatment to Seattle Industrial Controlled Heat, Inc.
Sufficient re'cords were,not maintained to furnish evidence'f'roper post weld heat treatment.
Several heat treatment charts were illegible to the degree that thermocouple numbers could not be identified, thermocouple indicatio'ns were'not recorded on some portions'of recorder charts, and there were inconsistencies on charts and certification-sheets for, thermocouples.
Additionally, operators names were not recorded, and there were incohsistenci,es between the date of heat treatment on certification sheets and on recorder charts.
These problems are for heat treatments performed prior to September 12, 1979.
After that date, WHY performed post weld heat treatment until the Bechtel assumption of those responsibilities in August, 1981.
(3)
WBG reviewed all completed post weld heat treatment records of Seattle Industrial.
Approximately 30 nonconformance-reports, have been generated.
This item will remain open pending review of the disposition of these nonconformance reports.
The licensee will update his res'ponse letter to state (1}, the nature of the specific nonconformance conditions found during the review detailed in his response (G02-80-120.and G02-80-55),
and (2} the corrective actions taken to correct these, conditions.
0 en
.Noncom liance (50-397 79-16/Q9) Reactor rotective svstem components not s ecifie or urchase on c ass seismic cate or
Desi n
Four turbine stop valve position switches and eight pressure switches providing reactor protective system indication of turbine govenor valve fast closure were not specified or purchased to the reouired quality requirements.
Engineering changes (PED} have been i'ssued to replace existing instrumentation with qualified instrumentation, as stated in the licensee's response letter (f02-80-3Q},
This action was reviewed by NRC inspectors in Report 81-09 end found satisfactory.
The item remains open pending review of component installation, scheduled for completion during 198 (
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(4)
0 en'oncom liance 50-397/80-.08/09)
Failure to Maintain records for temnorarv weld attac ments Contract 215 (5)
- Inspection disclosed that the records for pipe spools LPCS-756-5.7, LPCS-756-19.21 and LPCS-2271-1 indicated that temporary weld attachments had been made to these parts, but the records failed to reveal the required weld record for welding the temporary attachments.
WBG (Contract 215) i,ssued CAR-178 which required issuance of Special Requiremen'ts Checklists (SRC)
g6 Revision 1 onto each work package prior'to release of piping restart.
This SRC specified a review of any'dye penetrant or magnetic particle test reports in the work package for indication of a temporary attachment that had been made and removed.
It also called for a physical examination of the component to ascertain if any evidence of. blended or rough areas indicative of removed temporary attachments exi'sted.
The responsibility of Contract 215 in this area has been assumed by Bechtel Power Corporation.
Bechtel is currently generating a revised corr'ective'ction plan to incorporate the requirements of the WBG special requirements checklists into the Bechtel work program.
The licensee will provide a letter to NRC, Region V detailing the method of incorporating the WBG special requirements checklists, which have been reviewed by the NRC and found satisfactory, into the Bechtel Program.
(0 en)
Noncom liance.(50-397/80.-.08/22).Incorrect acce tance standards used to evaluat'ei enetrant examination results.
ASME Section YII criteria were 'Used instead of ASt/E Section III criteria as acceptance standards. for liquid penetrant examination on several 'safety related pi,pe schools.
Contract 215 performed a review of liquid penetrant examirlation reports.
Licensee will update his response to the item o'f noncompliance (G02-80-209 and G02-81-54) to show (1) the results of the review of completed liquid penetrant reports, (2) additional di'screpancies disclosed during this review if any, and (3) the disposition pf these discrepancies.
The inspector notes that the NDE work previously assigned to Contract 215 is now b'eing: performed by Bechtel.
This item.remqins open pending review of the licensee's updated respons I t'
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-7-(6)
0 en Noncompliance 50-397 81-03/01 Burns and Roe fai lure to u date desi n'draAinas in'accordance with roject instructions Drawings were not revised by Burns and Roe when the drawing control log identified five or more project engineering directives (PED) with assigned'usi'ness documents.
or at least one project engineering directive outstanding for longer than.three months as required by project instruction No. WNP-2-018.
The licensee committed in the WPPSS letter of response (602-81-0122) to be in full compliance with. procedure WNP-2-018 with respect to upd'ating"of drawings by July 3G, 1981.
However, approximately 3500 WPPSS PED's and approximately 900 historical Burns and Roe ECO's (engineering change notices predating PED's}, previously held in,abeyance by the project, were incorporated into the system.
The licensee submitted a modification to his'esponse letter (902-81-0270}
which specified that the drawing control.log will be in full compliance by April 30, 1982 and the specification control log will be in full compliance by December 4, 1981.
This item will remain open pending a review of these activities.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Followu and Unresolved Items a
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The licensee's actions on various NRC identified followun and unresolved items were reviewed.
Sufficient information was available to support resolution of the following items:
A (1)
Closed followu.item"(50-397/77-03/04)
Weldin of dia onal braces to steel rids in cable spreadin room:
I In 1977 an inspector questioned the quality of welding of diagonal braces to steel grids in the ceiling of the cable spreading room.
This area was reviewed during 19?8, 1979, and 1980 through the NRC inspecti.on program relating to cable tray and cable-installation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified 'relating to the quality of th'ese welds.
A This item is close k
(2)
(Closed Followu 50-397 77-07/14 'Meld crackinq of structural atform steel
~nside containment The licensee submitted a form 50.55(e} report on Ap} i,l 10, 'j978 (G02-78-121)
on the matter'of cracking of field welds.
made to
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heavy structural beams which makeup the 541-'levation platform inside the containment drywell.
The licensee s actions were inspected in March and April, 1978 (Inspection Report 50-397/78-02).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
This item is closed.
(3)
Closed Followu Item (50-397/78-10/04 Use of flexible conduit not detailed sn S
R
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FSAR Section 8.3 has been modified by SCN 80-84 to incorporate a description of the use of flexible metalic conduit.
This item is closed.
(4)
Closed)'Followu
.Item (50.-'397/79-'04 13) Batter room ventilation ductin Three supports.f'r ventilation ductwork transversing the room housing safety related battery Bl-1 appeared
'to be improperly anchored to the overhead.
Due to a large number of deficiencies noted in the work of Waldinger Corporation (Contract 216),
a 100/ re-inspection of heating and ventilation work in the battery rooms was performed.
This inspection was documented on l/GPSS surveillance report 80-319 dated October 14, 1980.
All
"as built" drawings for hangers in the battery room have.
been reviewed by Burns and Roe engineering and have been assigned either an "approved" or "approved qs, noted" status.
The completed installat'ion was examined by the inspector to insure proper attachment of HVAC hanqers, to overhead embedments.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were note This item is close ~
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(5)
(Closed Followu Item 50-397 79-04
Maintenance of batteries
'I During construction",
the station batteries were'ound to have specific gravities of some cells less than the,reauired 1.200.
This was'valuated by the manufacturer as being caused by stratification of the electr'olyte.
The manufacturer (Exide)
recommended that a'igh rate of discharge and/or a prolonged-or "equilizer" charge would provide adeauate electrolyte mixing action.
(6)
A discharge capacity test was performed on all batteries and all batteries were found to be acceptable.
Sqme problems with low specific gravities noted after the discharge capacity tests and equilizer charges 'were. resolved by averaging the gravities taken at various electrolyte levels, in accordance with the recommendations of IEEE 450-1980 (draft) which. addresses the problem of gravity gradients and has recommended solutions.
The licensee appears to have adequately addressed the problems associated with lowIspecifi'c aravities.
The licensee's activities associated with current mai'ntenance of station batteries were reviewed and found, acceptable.
This'tem is. closed.
Closed Fol 1 ou(uo'Item'50-'397 79-04
Sei smi c
'ade uac 'of RCC i e su orts On January 17, 1979 the licensee submitted a
CFR 50..55(e)
report identifying two pipe hanaers supporting reactor, closed cooling (RCC) system pipes above class IE cables in the Radwaste Building,.which. were not designated f'r seismic
.
Category I loads.
The licensee's report stated that the Radwaste Building was evaluated and found capable of withstanding events designated by seismic I criteria.
FED 215-H-3610 and 215-H-3832 were issued to upgrade six RCC pipe supports from seismic class II to seismic class I status.
Burns
Roe has assigned a task (No,.
1590), to review and analyze class IE circuits in seismic category II areas, and to prepare PED's to correct deficiencies.
An additional assignment is to prepare a (SAR amendment detail,ing the installation of class IE circuits and devices in seismic class II areas.
An update of the 10 CFR 50.55(e)
report is to be comoleted with this task.
As this item is being tracked under 10. CFR 50.55(e)
report number 78-12-A, this followup item number is. closed.
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Closed
- Followu Item 50-397 79-12
-,'2 Investi ations into alle ations of'or ualit
.work on sacrificial shield wall F
The Leckenby Corporation, acting as a subcontractoi to Contract 215 (HBG)
I pre'formed shop prefabrication and site fabrication of the sacrificial shield in the 1975 to 1977 'time frame.
During June 1979, the NR'C Region Y office received nine allegations regarding work performed on the sacrificial shield wall and related str'uctures,.
Two additional allegations were received in October 1979.
NRC Inspection geports 50-397/79-12 and 50-397/79-13 detailed eight allegation (No.
1 through 8).
Three addi'tional allegations (9.,
10. and-11}
were detailed in NRC Inspection Report (50;392/79-16).
The resolution of these 11 allegations is described below; Alle ation No.
"The welds in the steel plate (2 to 2-1/2 inches thick) were made in many instances as partial penetration welds, only 3/8-inch.
deep, contrary to specifications and drawings (report 79-12);
The allegation was not 'substantiated.
However, it was found that laminations found in structural steel were only "chased" 3/8-inch.
This aspect of'he allegation was left open as a followup item (50-397/79-16/02)..
This item was subsequently closed in Repor tt50-397rr81-Q9.
Alle ation'No.t
"Cracked welds were repaired by wash passes".
The allegation was not sub.-
stantiated and was closed in inspection report 50-397/79-12.
No followup action required.
Alle ation No.
Alle ation'No.',
"Few welds rget visual acceptance criteria".
This allegation eras substantiated and appeared'.in 'inspection report 50.-397/79-16 as unresolved i'tern (SO-397rr79-16/04}.
This item was discussed subsequently in inspec-,
tion reports 50-397/81-05 and 50.-397/81-10.
The item was'inally resolved in inspecti'on report 50-397/81-16 by the resident NRC inspector..
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"Some welds were not inspected".
This allegation was substantiated and tracked under unresolved item 50-397/79,-16/04..
Thi.s, item was closed i,n Report 50-397/81-16 by.the resident NRC
,, inspector.
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Alle ation No.
Alle ation Ho.'
,"Voids in shield=wall concrete."
The allegation was substantiated as a known problem and',discussed in Report 50-397/78-10.
This item was-initially closed in Report 50-397/79-08.
Subsequently the licensee performed a detailed survey of voids in the sacrificial shield wall and filed a 50.55(e) report on the voids in June 1980.
'hese voids were filled during 1981 with an epoxy based radiation attenuating media.
The licensee's work in this area was, reviewed by the NRC resident inspector
,during the time period of this report and closed in report 50-397/81-24.
I This allegation and the licensee
CFR 50.55(e) report dealing with, the same subject are considered to be closed.
"Fabricator (Leckenby) could not obtain certifications for-shi.eld material".
This allegation was substantiated.
The licensee submitted to. the NRC on August 1, 1980 an
"engineering evaluation of the HNP-2 sacrificial shield wall".. Appendix A of this report addresses specific concerns noted that affect the structura1 adequacy of the shield wall.
Concern No. 24,addressed discrepancies with SSW certified material test reports..
Based on this report the NRC was. accepted the overall adequacy of. the SSM structure.
(NRR letter-to the licensee dated February 25, 1981).
This item is closed.
Alle ation'No.
Alle ation. No.
"Sections were fabricated without prior receiving inspection",
This allegation was not substantiated.
However, the subject of'ncomplete records Upas identified as an item of noncom'ppliance (50;.397/86-04/16)
which is addressed in paragraph 2.a.(5) of this report.
"Contractor was not provided wi,th satisfactory engineering guidance".
The.,allegation was not substantiated, however, the topic of engineering direction was followed under unresolved item '(50-397/79;16/04)
which was closed in inspection report 50-397/81-1 ~
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-12-All etion No.
"Magneti c parti cl e inspecti on of structural steel by Contract 215's subcontractor was changed from DC to AC contrary to AWSD.1.1".
This allegation was not substantiated; no followup -required.
Alle ation No."10
"1/32 tolerance on the sacrificial shield wall bear'ing plate was not fully met".
The allegation was not.substantiated.
No followup required.
Allegation Nd.
"The shop fabricated segmerits appeared to
'be improperly heat stressed as evidenced by
" 'etal"'di'scoloration".
This allegation was not"s'ubstantiated.
The licensee discussed,
"in, a letter,to the NRC (602-80-28, concern
'--'6 with supplemental letter dated January 14,
'1980)', the use of heat to form, the curved
','~'plates used. in the sacrificial shield wall.
- -'h'e lack'f'ritten procedures.
to control heat straightening of shield, wall 'segments was deemed a'n item of noncompliance (50-397/
80-04/04) which was closed in report
'. 50-397/80-19; These allegations were either not substantiated or addressed under other tracking numbers.
Tracking of this item is resolved.
(8)
Closed Followu Item (50-397/80-'06 Ol Plant housekee in re uires*imnrovement Site tours conducted on Honda',
November 16, 1981 and Thursday, November 5,
1981 disclosed an improvement in site housekeeping.
No items were observed laying in cable trays and no pipes or instrument sensing lines'were discovered uncapped.
This item is closed.
(9)
(Closed followup it'em (50-397/79-16/03)
MBG Review of sacri.ficial shield wall subcontractors ualit ro ram Records associated with construction or fabrication of the sacrificial shield wall were to be reviewed by the contractor.
The lack of complete quality records was subsequently made an enforcement item (50-397/80-04/16),,whi'ch is addressed in paragraph, 2.a(5) of this report.
This item is close ~
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-13-(10)
Closed Followu Item 50-397 80-08
Su ort base late anchorin roblems.
On July 23, 1981 the licensee by letter (G02-81-0195)
evaluated the problems of anchor failures associated with support base plates as a reportable deficiency under 10. CFR 50.55(e),
(Licensee Item 155).
This item is now tracked under 50.55(e)
reports.
(ll)
Closed Unresolved Item '0-397 80-'04 20 'Surface discontinuities on radial braces for 'downcomers.
Radial downcomer bracing in tlie wetwell was found to have surface discontinuities throughout the length of the brace.
The concern was that these discontinuities, might extend into the weld, violating AWS Dl.l requirements..
The licensee initiated NRC 213B-07992 to document this problem.
Linear indications within the wel'd zone, defined as withi,n 1 inch.
of the weld, were repaired by grinding under repair procedure RP-l.
In three instances the grinding was excessive so as,to cause local violation of minimum wall requirements on downcomer braces.
These were repaired by welding.
The completed work.
was examined during this inspection and found to be within the requirements of AWS Dl.l. 'his item is closed.
(12)
Closed)
Followu Item (50-397/89-.10/04 Re ortin 'of otential 50.55 e
construction.
eficiencies The inspector reviewed WNP-2 project instruction PHI 4-10, revision 3 effective June 1, 1981.
This instruction adequately reflects the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) for reporting potentially significant deficiencies identified by the licensee.
This item is closed.
(13)
Closed Followu Item (50-397/81-.11/01)
Review of Bechtel C*union em o'ee'or anizational in e en ence.
guality control personnel who review the'completed work of site contractors were assigned to Bechtel by HBG, the site contractor performing the wo'rk: who has an'employment contract with the gC employees unio I*
(14)
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lt Since the date of this concern, the contractor has been replaced by Bechtel Power Corporation.
Bechtel now has full responsibility for employment of quality control personnel who review 'the completed work of site contractors.
This program system was reviewed during a special team inspection in September 1981 (Inspection Report,50-397/81-17).
No significant weaknesses were identified.
This item is closed.,
Closed
'Foll'owu "Item (50-597 81-16/02 Site controls to remove all tern orar insta ations (15)
The specific concern involved a 21/2 inch telephone circuit routed in a 2-1/2 inch conduit from manhole E-1 to the Communications Room at elevation 525'f the Radwaste Building.
Investigation showed that this conduit is a permanent
'nstallation.
As noted in Ingpection Report 5G-397/81-16 the conduit did not appear to be routed over or near any seismic designed or other safety-related equipment.
The general concern was that temporary construction equipment might be inadevertantly incorporated in the permanent plant'.
The licensee's system turnover. process includes a walkdown of systems to assure that they are, complete and free from temporary attachments.
This aspect will be reviewed during the routine inspection of reverification and preoperational testing efforts.
This item is closed.
Closed)
Followu Item (50-397/81-02/Ol)
Inconsistent proce ures or'voidin ua it assurance e icienc ocuments
~
The disposition of voided quality assurance documents was inconsistent, due to the absence of a site policy on voiding deficiency reports.
Some documents were identifi.ed as being voided without explanation or signature.
As noted in Inspection Report 50-397/81-09. the licensee has revised Project Management Instruction No. PHI-4-2 to include, appropriate instructions for voiding or rescinding corrective action requests, and has revi.sed PHI 4-4 to'include instructions on voiding nonconformance reports.
The licensee has performed surveillances of site contractors to determine that these project management, instructions, are reflected in contractor procedures.
This item is close h 4>
, -15-(16)
Closed Followu Item 50-397 80-14 03 Alle ations of oor trainin oor record'control and inade uate rocedures The specific areas of. concern were reviewed by the inspector in September 1981 (Inspection Report 50-397/81-17).
No'tems of noncompliance or. deviations were noted and the problems addressed by:this concern appe'ared to have been resolved.
This item is closed.
(17)
Closed Unresolved'tem (50-397/78-10 03 'eismic ade uac of electrical conduit clam s
The subject of the adequacy of friction clamping devices for conduit and tubing has subseqUenty been identi,fied az a 10 CFR 50.55(e)
reportable condition by the licen'see and as such, will be tracked as a 50.55(e).item rather than an unresolved item.
(18)
Closed Followu.Item'(50-397 79.-'15/02 Overtor uin of atter termina s
an sntercel connectors Ouring the assembly of +24 volt,.125 volt and,25Q volt batteries, the FischbacF/L'ord Electric Company (Contract 218)
exceeded torque limits on the battery terminal connec'tions.
This was documented by the licensee i'n nonconformance report no. 218-04285.
The 125 volt battery terminals and the i. 24 volt battery terminals were examined by manufacturer representatives and found acceptable except for one terminal of a 24 volt battery cell which. was badly crashed.
The
'licensee has ordered a replacement'for thi.s cell.
These battery terminals were examined during.thi.s inspection, and only the identified, terminal deformati'on wa's noted.
The 250 volt battery, however, has some cells which have severe damage to terminal posts.
Some posts are deformed to the point of cracking.
The licensee requested by letter on September 24, 1981 recommendations from Exide on'the proper disposition'f these probl.ems..
This condition has been the subject of a 10. CFR 50.55(e)
report by the licensee and will be tracked as a 5Q.55(e} ite r L
J
f n
~
-16-(19)
Closed Followu Item 50-397 80-06
Use of Namco D2400X stem mounted limit switches IEB 78-04 The licensee's actions in response to IE Bulletin 78-04 were reviewed.
The licensee'tated by letter on October 30, 1980 (G02-80-236) that a
Namco type D2400X limit switch to be mounted on a valve within primary containment does not perform a safety-related or vital control function to mitigate an accident.
This switch had been previously reported as requiring environmental qualification.
As the switch does not perform safety-related or vital control functions, the question of environmental qualification is mute and this is closed as'>"a followup item.
It is noted that, since the issuance of IEB-78-04, special review requirements have been imposed by NRR, Equipment gualification Branch, on the environmental qual ification of safety-related electrical equipment.
The licensee is preparing a,report detailing the environmental qualification of electrical 'equipment to meet these requirements.
(1 (20)'losed Followu Item 50-397/80-06
Deco draft um deficiencies IEB 9-'
p,,l Jl
'In response to IEB '79-15, the licensee stated by letter (G02-,80-"200) that responses received from suppliers of safety-related pumps indicate no opera6onal problems have been experienced with the 'specific pump designs provided for the WNP-2 project.
No changes
.in design or installation and operating procedures were considered necessary as a result of the IEB 79-15 ireview.
The installation, operation and performance of all these pumps will be checked during system lineup and acceptance tests as part of the routine inspection program.
I 4.
tiana ement Interview The inspector met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.
The scope of the inspection and the observation and findi.ngs of the inspector were discusse A A