IR 05000397/1981007
| ML17275B062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1981 |
| From: | Dodds R, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17275B061 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-81-07, 50-397-81-7, NUDOCS 8106080573 | |
| Download: ML17275B062 (7) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-397/81-07 Docket No.
50-397 License No, CPPR-93 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Faci1ity Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No: 2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted:
March 23-25, 1981 Inspectors:
W J.
lagner, Re tor Inspector D
e Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
ate Signed
~Ad:
R i, di p
i b
gi 1b di p
of construction activities including preparation for repair of deficiencies in the sacrificial shield wall, and licensee action on open enforcement items.
The inspection involved 19 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
Reactor Construction Projects Branch Summary:
I Ins ection durin the eriod of March 23-25, 1981, Re ort No. 50-397/81-07)
Sxososo +75 RV Form 219 (2)
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a
~
Mashin ton Public Power Su
S stem MPPSS b.
- J. Thorpe, Ouality Assurance Engineer
- R. T. Johnson, Project guality Assurance Hanager
- T. M. Hal ecki, Task Force 2 Representative
- H. A. Clinton, Engi,neer-Systems Turnover
- M. G. Keltner, Assistant Construction Hanager
- B. A. Holmberg, Deputy Project Hanager-Engineering Burns and Roe, Inc.
BSR C.
d.
L. F. Akers, Senior Weldi'ng Engineer Supervisor R. Popielarczyk, Hechanical Engineer WSH/Boecon Geri'BG K. Bishop, Engineering Hanager D. Williams, Technical Support Hanager G. Chancy, Melding Supervisor M. Norris, Chief field Engineer B. Tucker, Document Control Supervi,sor G. White, Training Specialist H. Cox, Corporate NDE Level I.'II'.
Young, Corporate gA Audit Hanqger General Electric
- J. Hiller, Resident Site Manager.
- Denotes those present at management meeting on Harch. 25, 1981.
2.
Sacrificial Shield'Wall Gir'th Meld Re air Pro ram a
~
Observation'of'Work and'Work Activities The inspector visually inspected all 24 segments of the sacrificial shield wall girth weld joint.
Using a low magnifier, the inspector examined the weld preparation joint for seams, scale or other harmful surface conditions which, may cause defects during welding.
Although visually identifiable indications were observed by the inspector, these had been previously identified and were being dispositioned by the licensee.
The inspector also noticed that the shielding material (BISCO, NS-1) required to fill the gaps was installed and that backing bays are being p]aced at the root of the weld joints.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie Review of ualit Im 1 ementin Procedures In reviewing the Field Project Engineering Directives (PED's)
issued on the sacrificial shield wall repair program, the inspector noticed that Field PED No.
215-W-4931 listed activities to be performed after the shielding material is applied.
Buttering of the bottom face of the joint had not been included in the listing.
The licensee report to the NRC,
"Engineering Evaluation of the HNP-2 Sacrificial Shield Hall" Attachment 4 states:
"One additional change to the above welding (H)
PEDS will be issued in a PED addendum.
The change provides for buttering the bottom face of the joint after the HT inspection."
Burns and Roe engineering personnel informed the inspector that this PED wi,ll be prepared after the backing bars are in place, and all locations (azimuths) requiring buttering are identified.
It was not apparent from these discussions that buttering would be performed.
Therefore, the inspector requested a commitment from the licensee to resolve this issue of buttering prior to the start of flux core arc welding on the SSH.
The licensee agreed to do this during the management interview.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Shield Material'lacement in Sacrificial*Shield Wall'Ga s
The inspector was informed by Burns and Roe engineering that, during the application of BISCO Product NS-1 shielding material, 20 additional voids were discovered behind some of the splice plates.
This is 20 voids more than the original 40 voids previously reported to the NRC.
These voi'ds are now detectable due to increased access behind the splice plates resulting from arc gouging.
This was documented in PED-H-A046.
The licensee is preparing a report on 'this matter.
Information from this report will be used to write an addenda to the original engineering evaluation of the sacrifici'al shield wall.
The inspector also questioned how application of the NS-20 foam was controlled to prevent the foam from filling the gap space provided for the NS-1 shielding material.
The NS-20, foam is.
used as a darning material to 'stop the NS-1 from leaking out the back wall.
NS-20 was applied in two instances.*
In the first, the splice plate gap configuration caused the NS-20, to be applied parallel to the wall which prevented the foam from flowing into the area pequiring NS-l.
In the second instance, the NS-20 foam was applied from the backside.
A special fixture was used to limit the flow of NS-20 to a depth of 1 inch, thus assuring the required 23 inches for the NS-1 shielding material.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie d.
Welder uglification It was reported in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-397/81-02 that the mechanical contractor (WBG) did not have an established procedure for the qualification of welders and welding operators for guality Class I work.
WP-236, Revision 3, which addresses welder qualification, was approved on 2/25/81.
As of this inspection WP-236 has not been included in the list of contract 215 procedures for repair of the sacrificial shield wall.
At the management interview, the licensee stated that WP-236 would be placed on this list and that performance qualification will be as described in MP-236 prior to flux core arc welding of the sacrificial shield wall.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection'Findin s
a.
Closed Followu 'tem 50-397/80-'06
Sacrificial Shield Mall-Potentia Lame lar Tearin at Attachment Welds The potential for failure in service caused by lamellar tears is identified in the sacrificial shield wall engineering evaluation report as concern No. 27.
The report describes the precautions taken, during design, fabrication and erection to minimize the potential for failure of the sacrificial shield wall from lamellar tearing.
The inspector requested additional inf'ormation on the possibility of delayed Tamellar tearing failures resulting from added loads.
The licensee responded in Burns and Roe Nemo No. F-81-2199 by stating that precautions were taken during the welding process, such as buttering and.through controlled welding sequences, to mitigate the possibility of delayed lamellar tearing.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Mana ement Interview The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and the commitments in relation to them as described in the body of the report, including resolution of the issue of butteri,ng the lower SSW ring prior to the start of welding operation A I
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