IR 05000397/1981002
| ML17275A921 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1981 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Dodds R, Haist D, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17275A920 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-81-02, 50-397-81-2, NUDOCS 8103250004 | |
| Download: ML17275A921 (25) | |
Text
e U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No.
50-397/81-02 Docket No.
50-397 License No.
CPPR-93 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted:
January 27-30, 1981 ass
,
eac or nspec or Inspectors:
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Date Signed Q/f e
Approved By:
Wagn
,
eacto nspec or-
.
F. Burd in, Reactor nspec or Date Signed Date Signed R. T. Dodds, C se
,
nglneering uppor ec Ion Reactor Construction and Engineerinj Support Br~nch Da Signed Summary
'I Ins ection durin "the eriod'of'Januar'7-30,1981;'e ort'No.
50.-397 81-02 Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
~AI d:
R i
. """
di p
i tg" gi 1l di p t of construction activities including licensee action on open enforcement items; preparation for repair of deficiencies in the sacrificial shield. wall; continuation of investigation of allegations of irregularities in the construction manager'
administration of the quality assurance program; and licensee action on IE Bulletins and Circulars.
The inspection involved 75 inspector hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
alosssoQOW I
RV Form 219 (2)
I S~~
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem (WPPSS W.
J.
- J
- B
- R.
- J
- W L.
P.
R.
W.
A.
G.
G.
R.
K.
W.
M.
D.
G.
b.
Bur C. Bibb, Project Manager D. Martin, Plant Manager Thorpe, guality Assurance Engineer A. Holmberg, Deputy Project Manager, Engineering T. Johnson, Project quality Assurance Manager A. Harrington, Administration Manager
'.
Keltner, Assistant Construction Manager Noble, Engineer Peistrup, Engineer Powe, Lead guality Assurance Engineer-Audits G.
Conn, Manager, Design Engineer N. Kugler, Supervisor, Design Engineering C. Sorensen, Supervisor, Licens'ing Engi,neering Brastad, Engineer Supremo, Engineer D.
Cowan, Engineer J. Holle, Engineer Butterworth, Senior qAE-Welding Cooley, Senior gAE Baker, Lead Surveillance Engi,neer ns and Roe,'nc.'&R
- G. T. Harper, Si'te Engineering gon~ger
- R.
C. Root, Site Manager
- M. J. Parise, Special Projects Manager H.
R. Tuthill, Assistant guali.ty Assurance Manager B. Dundgan, guality Assurance Engineer R.
D. Carmichael, quqli.ty Assurance Engineer E. Zarate, guality Assurance Engineer c.
WSH/Boecon Geri WBG J. Nichols, Purchasing Agent R. Cowgill, Lead Receiving Inspector K. Bishop, Chief Welding Engineer W. Martin, Welding Coordinator D. Beddingfield, Procurement qA Manager D. Bowen, Procurement gA Supervisor
- Denotes those present at management meeting on January 30, 1981.
Additionally, the USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Mr. g.
D. Toth and Mr.
G.
Hansen, Division Chief, State of Washington Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, attended the meeti.n Upon arrival at the site the inspectors toured the HNP-2 plant to observe completed work and equipment maintenance.
Specific areas examined included the vital switchgear and onsite power systems; the control room, and preheat activities on the SSW girth weld joint.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins'and Circulars The following IE Bulletins and Circulars were reviewed by the.inspector to determine the promptness and throughness of licensee actions to correct or avoid those known or potential deficiencies:
a.
Bulletin 79-09, Failure of GE T e AK-2'Circuit'Breaker'.in'Safet Related S stems The licensee's review of his records of G.E. parts and materials has verified there are no G.E. Type AK-2 circuit breakers. used or plans for using this type breaker in safety related systems at the WNP-2 facility.
This item is closed.
b.
Bulletin 79-11 Fault 'Overcurrent Tri ',Device'in'Circui't'.Breakers for En ineered Safet Devices.
C.
The licensee's review of the Westinghouse, parts and,materials list has determined that no Westinghouse Type DB-50,or DB-75 circuit breakers are used in safety related systems at. the WNP-2 facility.
The 480V class breakers used at llNP-2,are, Westinghouse Type DS breakers with Type LS trip units.
This.item is closed.
4 ~
Bulletin 79-23, Potential Failure'of'Emer'nc'iesel.'Generator Field Exciter Transformer.
The licensee's review of the design of the onsite emergency electrical system demonstrates that the prob'lem described, in Bulletin 79-23 will not affect the operation of the onsite power system. at WNp-2.
This is because the diesel generators are grounded through either a neutral grounding resistor (Units 1 and 2) or a neutral transformer (Unit 3); also, the excitation transformers are delta connected with.
no connection to ground.
This item is closed.
d.
Bulletin 79-25 Failure'of'Hestin house BFD'Rela s'in'Safet-Related
~Sstems.
The licensee's review of the Westinghouse parts and materials list has demonstrated there are no Westinghouse type BFD relays used or planned for use in safety-related systems at this facility.
This item is close Bulletin 79-28 Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Tem eratures The licensee has reviewed his records and has determined that no NAHCO Model EA180 stem mounted limit switches are in use or planned for use ig safety-related applications at sustained temperatures above 175 F.
The limit switches used at WNP-2 in safety related application in high temperature locations are NAMCO Model EA700.
This item is closed.
Bulletin 80-06, En ineered Safet Features ESF Reset. Controls No action for this bulletin is required at this time for plants in the construction permit stage.
The Deputy Project Manager for Start.-Up has entered this bulletin in his IE Bulletin (IEB) log.
Verification that re-setting of ESF signals does not,result in changing position of safety-re'lated equipment from emergency mode to normal mode will be accomplished during pre-operationa]
testing or during start-up through system line-up tests.
This item will remain open pending confirmation of this action.
Bulletin 80-'16; Potential Hisa lication of 'Rosemaunt" Inc.
Models 1151 and 1152 Pressur'e Transmitters With Either'"A "or "D"
~0<<
The licensee has reviewed his records and determined that two process monitoring loops utilize the Rosemount Model No.
1151. transmitters.
The two transmitters will be modified to "E".output code models by installing new circuit boards recommended by the manufacturer.
The characteristics of these new circuit boards will eliminate the misoperation during overrange condi'tions.
This modification is scheduled for completion prior to July 1981,.
This item will remain open pending confirmation of this action.
Bulletin 80-'19; Failures'of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Rela s'in Reactor Protective S stems of 0 eratin Nuc ear Power P ants'Desi ned b
Combustion En ineerin
.
The licensee's review of his records has determined that mercury-wetted matrix type relays are not used in the reactor protective system or any other safety-related system at WNP-2.
This item is closed.
Bulletin 80-20 Failures of Westin house T
e W-'2 S rin Return To Neutral Control Switches.
The licensee's review of his records has determined that Westinghouse Type W-2 control switches are not used in safety system design at WNP-2.
This item is close Bulletin 80-23 Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured b
VALCOR En ineerin Cor oration.
The licensee's review of his records has determined that VALCOR Solenoid Valves having part numbers V70900-21-1 or -3 are not used to perform any safety-related functions at WNP-2.
This item is closed.
Circular 79-02 Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Su lies The licensee has analyzed the design and operation of 120 volt inverter power supplies.
Inverter In-l, manufactured by Solidstate Controls Inc. (SCI), is not Part of the plant engineered safety features, but it does energize the plant communication system and the plant computer.
The licensee's analysis of the In-1 inverter has brought out that the WNP-2 SCI inverter has two features which will reduce the chance of faulty operation of the inverter.
A voltage regulator and filter between the alternate AC supply and the static switch will reduce the inverters susceptibility to AC transients.
Also, the power supply will automatically transfer back to the inverter upon restoration of inverter output voltage and frequency.
The two critical instrument power supplies (Divisions I and II}
utilize solid state inverters manufactured by Elgar Corporation.
These two inverters also have the two features detailed above for the SCI inverter.
During pre-operation testing the undervoltage trip setpoints for the inverters are to be checked to determine that they are correctly set at the proper setting (]04/1Q5 YDC)..:[his item will remain open pending completion of this action.
Circular 79-05, Moisture'Leaka e in Stranded Mire Conductors The review of moisture leakage in stranded wire conductors is i,n progress and remains as an open item pending completion of the technical review.
Circular 79-13,'Re lacement'of'Diesel'Fire Pum Startin
.Contactors Defective starting components caused the failure to start (remote initiation) of the diesel fire pump at the Davis-Besse Plant.
The defective components (Cummins Type 118848 magnetic switch and Type 199573 D.C. relay contactors)
were used in the..diesel fire pumps at llNP-2.
The magnetic switches and relay contactors on the two fire pump diesel engines have been replaced with the new design components at lNP-2.
This item is close Circular 79-17 Contact roblem in SB-12 Switches on General Electric Metalclad Circuit Breakers The intermittent contact problem in SB-12 auxiliary switches was caused by a worn die used to form a hole in the contact arm of the switch.
The problem could be found in switches shipped from the factory in the time period of August 1, 1978 to July 1, 1979.
The licensee has determined that the G.E. metalclad circuit breakers at WNP-2 were manufactured in September 1974 and shipped to the site in October 1974.
Therefore, the problem does not apply to equipment at WNP-2.
This item is closed.
Circular 79-20 Failure of GTE S lvania Rela T
e PM Bulletin 7305, Catalo 5U12-11-AC With a 120V AC Coil.
The processing of this circular is incomplete at this time.
The processing procedure in effect at the time the circular was issued was inadequate and consequently, the action required (review of records)
was not completed.
The circular is presently being being processed and will be examined in a future inspection.
The processing procedure has been revised since the circular was issued in September 1979 to insure complete processing of all regulatory information and requirements.
This item.wl.ll.pemain open.
Circular 79-23 Motor starters and'Contactors Failed;to'0 crate.
The Gould, Inc., Electrical Products Group, reported to the NRC on September 11, 1979 potential defects in certain NEMA Size 3, starters and contactors.
The faulty units manufactured between June 1,
1978 and August 30, 1979 are code dated 7822 to 7935.
The licensee reviewed his records and determined seven (7.), NEMA size
starters could possibly fall into this category.
.However,. examination of the units revealed that six have date codes 7817 and one has date Code 7816.
None. of the possibly defective starters were received at WNP-2.
This item is closed.
Circular 80-09, Problems'with'Plant Internal.Communications S'stems Two plants (Kewaunee and Davis-Besse)
experienced degradation of some plant communication systems following loss of offsite power.
The degraded systems were energized from non-safety buses.
The licensee's review of the WNP-2 design has revealed that the PABX telephone and PA systems are energized from, Division.A uni.nterruptible power supply which is supplied from the 250V battery.
A second issue which grew out of the problem at Kewaunee was the inducement of false signals in electronics equipment when two-way portable radios were used as a substitute for the plant communication system.
The WNP-2 Operation Section and the Test and Startup Section are aware of the issue.
This item will remain ope r.
Circular 80-10, Failure to Maintain Environmental uglification
~Eui ment.
The wrong class of insulating material had been used, in reconnecting motor leads following maintenance at the H.B.
Robinson Nuclear Plant.
This resulted in degrading the environmental qualification of the motor.
The Operating Section at WNP-2 has established a training module to make maintenance personnel aware of this issue and established a maintenance procedure which will monitor this issue once the plant becomes operational.
This item is closed.
s ~
Circular 80-16 0 erational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model'510DO Anglo Tri Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters The NRC has recently been advised through a 10 CFR 21 report that operational deficiencies exist in Rosemount Inc.
Model 510DU trip units and Model 1152 pressur e transmitters.
The licensee's review of the records has determined the Rosemount Model 1.151 pressure transmitters are used at WNP-2 and the design does not include any Model 1152 units.
The licensee's review of the design is continuing to determine whether it includes the use of any Rosemount Model 510DU trip units.
This item will remain open.
t.
Circular 80-23 Potential Defects in Beloit'Power S stems'Emer enc Generators The licensee's review of the electrical equipment lists has determined that no generators manufactured by Be'toit Power Systems are used in either Class I or non-Class I application at NNP-2.
e=
This item is closed.
Steel Structures and Su'rts WBG I
On January 20, 1981, NRC:RV, granted the licensee permission to proceed with installation of the sacrificial shield wall.(SSW) girth weld joint.
The mechanical contractor, WBG, is responsible for the installation activities associated with this work.
This report addresses the mechanical contractors'uality program relative to the welding activities employed for the SSW girth weld joint.
a
~
Weldin Procedure S ecification
. The welding procedure to be utilized for repair of. the SSW is WPS No. 26, Revision 7.
The inspector examined this procedure and the procedure qualification records for compliance with AWS Dl.l and contract specifications.
Revision 7 to WPS No.
resulted in changes to the essential variables of the weld procedure; however, in accordance with AWS Dl.1., these changes were supported by requalification of the original weld procedure specification.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie b.
Wel din Material Control The control, issue, return and storage of weld filler material at TG (Turbine/Generator)
Radwaste Room 2 was examined for compliance with procedural requirements.
The inspector also examined HBG Warehouse 6 for proper storage conditions, especially moisture control, of electrode E70T-1 to be used on the SSW weld joint.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Welder ual ificati on As of this inspection the mechanical contractor does not have an established procedure for qualification of welders and welding operators for guality Class I work.
However, HP-236 which addresses welder qualification was in the review cycle and is expected to be approved shortly.
The licensee assured the inspector that welders for guality Class l work wil1 not be qualified until HP-236 is approved.
The inspector noted that HP-236 was not on the list of "Contract 215 Procedures for Restart Commodity No.
2 - Sacrificial Shield Hall Girth Weld Repair."
At the exit meeting a commitment was made by licensee representatives to put HP-236 on this list of procedures for repair of the SSH.
d.
~PP The inspector observed the preheating operation in process at the SSH girth weld joint for compliance to AHS Dl.] and the mechanical contractor's procedural requirements.
Specific items examined were thermocouple placement, calibration of equipment and preheat records for heat up rate and soak time.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
e.
SSW Joint Pre aration
'The SSW girth weld joint preparation will be performed by the air carbon arc cutting process (also referred to as air-arc gouging).
Although this work was not in-process, the inspector was able to examine the contractor's evaluation of their welder's ability to air-arc gouge to the degree required for weld preparation of the SSW girth weld joint.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Alle ations of Im ro er ualit Assurance Practices b
the Construction Mana ement Or anization.
An investigation was initiated on November 4, 1980 of allegations made by an individual regarding the quality assurance practices of the construction management organization, Burns and Roe, Inc. during the time period of 1975 through 1977.
The specific allegations as understood by the NRC and the results of the initial investigation of these allegations are detailed in IE Report No. 50-397/80-19.
Further investigation of these allegations was conducted during this inspection.
This investigation included a review of the applicable quality assurance requirements, interviews with individuals associated with the activities, and review of records of activities conducted during the time period of the alleged improper practices.
The findings with regard to the specific allegations as understood by the NRC are detailed below.
An allegation is considered, substantiated when its elements are factually established by proof or competent evidence.
The substantiation of an allegation does not necessarily imply that there has been a violation of NRC regulations.
Each substantiated allegation is evaluated for possible noncompliance with NRC regulations.
Investigation findings:
a.
Alle ation:
Audit Findin s Were Removed b 'The ualit Assurance Mana er.
0 en Unresolved Item 50-397 80-19 03 Finding:
The allegation was partially substantiated.
As detailed in IE Report No. 50-397/80-19, the licensee's copy of Audit Report No. 215-76-13 contains an audit summary report dated February 3, 1977 stating a total of 15 audit findings.
Further investigation disclosed that the audit summary report was revised and that an earlier audit summary report, dated December 17, 1976 existed which stated a total of 16 audit findings including a finding No. 4, that "The Contractor has no established procedure for receiving, unloading and inspection of owner furnished material".
The licensee's copy of the audit does not include finding No.
which explains the total of 15 audit findings.
There ig evidence that each audit finding report for finding Nos.
4-15 has been changed to reflect a new finding number.
(The finding of
"No materials handling superintendent" discussed in IE Report No'.
50-397/80-19 was found in the licensee's copy of the audit report as audit finding report No. 15).
The involvement of the former quality assurance manager in the removal of audit finding No.
was not substantiate The licensee could not explain the deletion of this audit finding and is investigating'he finding to determine if it was valid.
The inspector investigated the substantive aspects of audit finding report No.
4 and the results are detailed below under paragraph 5e.
This item remains unresolved pending the results of licensee commitments described in paragraph 5e below (50-397/80-19/03).
Alle ation:
Nonconformance Re orts'and'Corrective Action Re uests Mere Voided b
The ual it Assurance Mana er.
Closed Unresolved Item 50-397 80-19
Finding:
The allegation was partially substantiated.
As detailed in IE Report No. 50-397/80-19,, nonconformance Report No. 2062, issued to document overnight storage of guality Class I valves at less than contract specification required Level 'B'torage conditions was voided at the direction of the quality assurance manager.
Attached.to the voided nonconformance report was an explanatory note which. stated that the valves were adequately covered to meet the level 'C..'torage requirements-of the General Electric specifications.
The note also directed that the inspection report that originally documented the problem ( Inspection Report No. R-1480)
be reopened as Revision l.
The inspector confirmed that the valve manufacturer did not require level B type storage conditions for the valves.
The licensee was unable to locate Inspection Report No. R-1480, Revision 1 and, as such, the inspection report was improperly dispositioned.
Corrective Action Request No.
1218 addressing the removal of the same guality Class I valves from the warehouse without obtaining owner "release for instal.lation" was also voided, without explanation, and contained the initials of the quality assurance manager.
An associated Inspection Report No.,R-'1479 was also voided "at the direction" of the quality assurance.
manager.
The former quality assurance manager explained that Burns and Roe had control over the release of equipment and. that the deficiency should therefore not have been addressed to the contractor.
He further stated that the deficiency was probably resolved within Burns and Roe.
The inspector located a completed equipment release form indicating proper release of the valves one month later.
The inspector sampled approximately twenty-fiye voided quality assurance deficiency documents (corrective action requests and nonconformace reports) written during the time period of 1973 to present.
The dispostion of these voided documents is inconsistent.
Recently (1978-present)
voided documents usually contain an explanation for the invalidation or a reference to
-10-another document.
Often, the explanation'appears in the log book but not on the document.
Approximately twenty percent of the documents sampled have no explanation for the invalidation and as such are not auditable or verifiable.
The inspector verified that no project procedure or other guidance exists regarding the voiding of quality assurance documents.
The licensee made the following commitments to investigate and'resolve the concern over voided quality assurance documents:
('1) revise the quality assurance instructions pertaining to nonconformance reports, corrective action requests and quality audit finding reports to provide requirements for acceptable voiding of these documents and to delineate those persons with authority -to void quality assurance documents; (2) perform surveillances of. on site contractors performing guality Class I work to ensure that they have similar requirements; and (3) direct the reverification task force to include a representative sampling of voided corrective action requests and nonconformance reports in the reverification of completed safety related work.
The implementation of these commitments will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
(50-397/81-02/01)
Alle ation:
A Corrective'Action'Re uest blas Im ro erl.
Closed Finding:
The allegation was not substantiated.
IE Report No. 50-397/80-19 details the resu1ts of.an investigation of this allegation.
Alle ation:
Work'MaNot'Have Been'Sto ed'as'Re uired'b ualit ssurance Procedures.
Closed Unresolved Item 50-397, 80-19
Finding:
The allegation was not substantiated.
IE Report No. 50-397/80-19 details the background of this allegation.
The licensee stated that the contract specification No. 2808-215, Section 52A, paragraph 3. 16 statement that, "Fail,ure to take appropriate action to a Corrective Acti.on Request in the time allotted shall require the work to be stopped in the area the Corrective Action Request applies" is not, and has not been the criteria for determining when stop work orders are issued..
Use of such a rigid criteria would not allow the licensee to distinguish between minor and serious deficiencies when taking action against a contractor.
Currently, the procedure that governs action against contractors for quality deficiencies is Project Management Instruction (PMI) 5-3, "guality Enforcement Actions and Stop l(orks".
The inspector reviewed this procedure and found that it contains criteria for categorizing the severity of a deficiency,'riteria for determining whether a stop work should be issued, and instructions for resolving the deficiency in the event a stop work is not issued.
The inspector had no further questions on this issu The licensee was unable to produce minutes of a meeting requested by the 215 contractor to resolve the subject of the original corrective action request (traceability of documentation)
nor was the licensee able to explain the excessive amount of time taken by Burns
Roe to accept the contractor's actions to resolve the problem (approximately 21 months).
However, since the corrective actions taken by the contractor at the outset of the dispute on traceability were later accepted by Burns and Roe without modification, and appear to meet NRC requirements, there was no quality issue unresolved during the protracted disagreement.
The actions taken to ensure timely resolution of corrective action requests and the use escalated quality enforcement actions, or stop work orders where corrective action is -not forthcomming has been examined (Ref.
IE Report No. 50-397/80-20)
implementation of these actions will be examined further during the restart. efforts.
Alle ation:
The Burns and'Roe Oualit Assurance'ater'ial'Control Grou Has Performin Recei t Ins ection or Site ontractors it out Hritten Procedures.
Finding:
The allegation was substantiated.
As described in Paragraph 5a, an audit finding that a.contractor had no receiving inspection procedure has "apparently been removed from audit report No. 215-76-13 (audit conducted in December, 1976$.
In light of this, the inspector examined the receiving i'nspection procedures in effect and receiving records for. that time period.
Burns and Roe Procedure No. 2808-(-2.5,
"Site Receiving inspection Planning" was issued as Revision No.
0 on Hay 25, 1972 and withdrawn from use as Revision'o.
2 on August 13,,1975.
This procedure specifies the requirements by which Burns and Roe performed receiving inspection of all owner purchased guality Class I items.
This procedure was superceded by Procedure No. 1.29,
"Prepurchased Material Receiving and Release for Use." issued as Revision 0 on July 30, 1975 and apparently effective through at least February 3, 1977 as Revision No.
1.
This procedure, in paragraph 5.1, delineates Burns and Roe quality. assurance responsibilities as
"Review of specification required quality documenation and reporting the status thereof" and "Review of Material Receiving Report (MRR) packages for approya] of all receiving activities."
The licensee provided a contract 215 procedure No. gCLP-14, "Receiving Inspection"'.issued as Revision No.
0 on September 16, 1974, which specifies that the contractor shall perform receiving inspection for owner-purchased equipment.
Thus, it appears that Burns and Roe had a. receiving inspection procedure effective until August, 1975 with. the 215-contractor developing his own procedure in September 1974.
The inspector sampled records for owner-furnished.guality Class
equipment received at the site after August, 1975 and found the following evidence that receiving inspection was being performed by Burns and Roe for, the 215 and 206A contracts;
,
k\\
-12-Contract 215 206A Document B&R Project Quality Assurance Report No.
R1182 for 68 Fuel Racks and miscellaneous clamps, shims, sleeves and pipe (B&R Form No. 84031)
B&R Inspection Report No.
19507 for miscellaneous anchor plates and structural steel Date 2-26-76 7-19-77 There was no evidence in the document packages for this eauipment to show that the contractor had performed any receiving inspection.
A letter was issued on November 16, 1976 from Burns. and Roe to the 215 contractor "...to re-emphasize the contractor's responsibilities relative to receiving and receiving inspection of owner furnished equipment..."
The licensee committed to assemble a chronology of receiving inspection activities for the 215 and 206A contracts in an effort to clarify:
(1) the organization responsible for performing receiving inspection; (2) the organization actually performing receiving inspection; (3) the procedures used by that organization to perform receiving inspections; and (4) the qualifications of the personnel performing receiving inspections.'dditionally, the licensee quali.ty assurance organization will clarify to the reverification task force..thatparagraph 2.4 of letter No. G02-80-153 dated July 17, 1980 (1Q CFR 5Q.54f letter)
which discusses evaluation of site contractor receipt inspection programs, will apply also to receipt inspection. of owner-furnished equipment, and to any Burns and Roe involvement in-receipt inspection.
This item remains unresolved pending review of the licensee's chronology of receivinq inspection activities (50-397/80-19/03).
f.
Alleqation:'he Hain'Steam'Sto
'Valves Weie'Installed in'The
>Iron 'Location.
0 en
'Unresolved. Item 50-397/80-19
Finding:
As detailed in IE Report No. 50-397/80-19. this allegation was substantiated.
The licensee is continuing to investigate whether or not there was an engineering evaluation of this condition with concurrence by the vendor, General Electric.
This item remains unresolve g.
Alle ation:
A Contractor's Nondestructive Examination Procedure Has Inade uate'Because It'Did'Not Re uire The Ins ector to Record The De th of Excavation for Weld'Re airs.
Finding:
The allegation was not substantiated.
Documentation of the depth of excavation when performing visual weld inspection is not a requirement of the ASME or American Melding Society code applicable to the installation of Quality Class I pipe or structural stee1..
The code requirement concerning reduction beyond the minimum wall thickness due to excavation is addressed in the procedure No. )CP-6,
"Non-Destructive Examination Procedure for Visual Meld Examination".
The inspector. had no further questions on this issue.
8P
h.
Alleaation: 'udits'b
'MPPSS Did'Not.Em hasize. Corrective Action b Contractors.
This allegation was not i nvestigated and will be examined during a
'ubsequent inspection (50-.397/80-19/02).
- Alle ation: 'e aration'of Electrical Cables. From-Instrument Tubina on Redundant S stems Is Not Besna.Cons> ered.
Finding:
The allegation was not substantialed.
The inspector verified that the loss of redundant components js being considered in the pipe break and missi,le study, and the fire damage study.
In both of these studies, the credible loss of equipment is determined and an analysis is then performed to ensure the ability to shut down the plant..It may be determined, at this point, that additional separation and/or. protection is required for redundant systems or portions of systems and action will be taken to provide that protection or separation.
The inspector had no further questions on this issue.
6.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information i,s required in order to ascertain whether they are 'acceptable i tems, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items identified during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 5.
7.
Management Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted ln paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.
,The items inspected and the observations and findings of the inspectors were discussed.
The licensee acknowledged the investigation findings and the commitments in relation to them.
The inspector emphasized the importance of having all quality assurance procedures affecting a restart work activity in place and approved prior to the start of work.
The licensee acknowledged this requiremen i