IR 05000395/1980006
| ML19309G921 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1980 |
| From: | Kellog P, Skolds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309G916 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-80-06, 50-395-80-6, NUDOCS 8005070780 | |
| Download: ML19309G921 (7) | |
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'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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a REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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,o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 8 05070 /
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l Report No, 50-395/80-06 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, South Carolina 29218 Facility Name:
V. C. Sw,mer Docket No. 50-395 License No. CPPR-94 Inspection at Summer Nuc a Power Sta ion near Parr, South Carolina Inspected by:
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J. L.
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Date Sikned Approved by:
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P. J.
ello M Actin-M an chief Date Sitned RPS#3 %
f Inspected on February 1-29, 1980.
SUMMARY Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection by the Resident Inspector involved 171 inspec-tor-hours on site in the areas of preoperational test procedure review, preopera-tional test results review, administrative procedure review, proposed technical specification review, independent inspec+. ion effort, followup of previous enforce-ment matters, plant tour, storage of new fuel, and followup of open items.
Results i
Of the 9 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were
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. identified in 8 areas; I apparent item of noncompliance was found in 1 area
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(Infraction - improperly positioned safety tags and lifted leads paragraph 8).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Plant Manager
- J. G. Connelly, Assistant Plant Manager S. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor
- K. Woodward, Operations Supervisor
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D. Hembree, Assistant Startup Supervisor i
- A. A. Smith, Site QA Coordinator
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C. L. Ligon, Administrative Supervisor
- A. Koon, Technical Staff Engineer F. Leach, Chemistry Supervisor B. Croley, Technical Support Supervisor
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Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
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technicans, operators, and office personnel.
Other Organizations i
C. Bowman - Westinghouse
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- Attended exit interview i
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Exit Interview t
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on Februay 15, and February 28, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The
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item of noncompliance was discussed with licensee management. The inspector also attended the exit interview of T. Burdette on February 28, 1980.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken for deviation 79-28-05, Startup Supervisor signing Phase II Procedures. The corrective action
appears to be adequate. This item is considered closed.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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N 5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review
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The inspector reviewed the following preoperational test procedures:
AH-P6 Control Room Ventilation SS-1 Nuclear Sampling ET-01-E-02 Heat Tracing Outside Piping ET-01-E-03 Heat Tracing BIT ES-01-E-21 Unit Aux Emergency Aux Transformers
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AH-P45 ESF Switchgear Cooling Coil Test
CO-1 Hotwell Level Control Pressurizer Miniflow Setting j
RC-4 RC-8 Pressurizer Relief Tank
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CR-2 Reactor Trip Breakers
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CS-5 Solid System Operations
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WC-1 Chemical Treatment The procedures were reviewed to ensure they were technically adequate and to ensure they were consistent with the commitments made in Chapter 14 of the FSAR and with Regulatory Guide 1.68.
The inspector had the following comments concerr2ing the tests.
a.
AH-P6 There exists an interlock between XFN34 (Toil t Fan), dampers XDP134A, XDP134B, XFN30A and XFN30B (Control Room Emergency Filter Fans) such that when XFN 30A or B starts, XFN34 stops and XLP134A or B closes.
Starting XFN30A stops XFN34 and closes XDP134A. Starting XFN30B stops XFN34 and closes XDP134B.
Dampers XDP134A and XDP134B are in parallel.
If either XFN30A or XFN30B fails to start XDP 134A or XDP134B will fail to close.
This will create the situation of having the control room ventilation system open to the ventilation equipment room when control room isolation is being called for.
The path would be through XDP 134A or B and through XFN34.
Dampers XDP 134A and B are labeled XDP234A & B on the HVAC control board in the control room. These iems will remain open (80-06-01)
pending licensee review.
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b.
SS-1
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Table 14.1-32 of the FSAR states that thia test will verify that a sample can be obtained from each nuclear sampling point. The procedure does not call for a flow verification from all 3 SI accumulators nor does it call for a flow verification from both 'he blowdown line and t
the drum on the steam generator sample lines.
In both cases, steam generators and accumulators, the. sample lines penetrate containment through one line. The lines are flushed prior to the performance of the preoperational test, however, flow from each sample l point must be verified to meet the intent of the FSAR.
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The procedure does not call for power to be reapplied to the solenoid operated valves after power is removed to verify the valves. fail closed.
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The procedure calls for flow in the VCT gas sample line (FI 6985) to be measured in gallons per minute.
The terminology " power air" is used in the procedure. The inspector felt this was confusing since both air operated valves as well as solenoid valves were used.
Step 6.16.9 should read 9312A instead of 9311B.
Installed instrumentation FI 6945 and FI 6985 are not called for to be recalibrated as required by the Startup Manual.
The procedure was not explicit in how an Emergency Feedwater (EF)
signal was going to be simulated but rather just stated to simulate an EF signal.
These items will remain open (80-06-02) pending licensee review.
c.
ET-01-E-02 Section 8, Acceptance Criteria, has no provision for sign off as required by Appendix C to Regulatory Guide 1.68.
This item will l
remain open (80-06-03) pending licensee review.
d.
AN-P45
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Step 6.1.6 contains a formula for calculating air velocity. One of the variables in the formula is air temperature. However, in order to make the formula work, the temperature must be recorded in Degrees i
Farenheit absolute. This was not specified in the procedure.
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RC-4 The inspector noted that the Westinghouse PLS and the procedure calls for maximum delta T between the pressurizer and loop temperature of
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260*F.
The proposed Technical Specifications indicate a maximum delta
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T of 320*F.
The inspector was informed that Westinghouse recommends keeping the delta T less than 260oF but the limit, as indicated by Technical Specifications is 320*F.
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Step 6.3 of the procedure set spray flow temperature at 535'FiS*.
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acceptance criteria indicated a temperature of 540*It5 was acceptable.
i The procedure was revised to set the temperature at 540*FiS*.
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RC-8
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The initial valve lineup left out several valves that could have affected the conduct of the test.
The procedure calls for makeup water flow to nonessentials set at a minimum of 150 gpm.
However, valves 1920A and B are designed to close automatically when flow reaches 150 gpm. This was identified by the licensee and SFR 1340 was generated. This item will remain open (80-06-04) pending review of the disposition of SFR 1340 by the inspec-tor.
The valve lineup was changed in the procedure.
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CR-2
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The inspector noted that the Reactor Trip switches in the Control Room are labeled Normal-actuate and a Safety Injection switch in the Control Room is labeled Normal-Trip. The labels on the switches should be reversed.
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WC-1 The inspector noted that Table 14.1-91 in the FSAR states that an objective of this test is to verify chemical feed flow into the conden-sate system. The procedure does perform this. However, it is not documented in the " Purpose" section or the Acceptance Criteria section
of the procedure.
The inspector noted that the sample lines for the ammonia and hydrazine tanks end about 1 inch from the floor. The ability to obtain a sample without extreme difficulty was brought to the attention of the licensee.
These items will remain open (80-06-05) pending licensee review.
6.
Preoperational Test Procedure hesults Review The inspector reviewed the results of AH-P7 Computer Room HVAC Preoperational Test.
The results were reviewed to ensure the data meets the acceptance criteria, any deviations are properly identified and resolved, the review procedures are being followed and that the results are adequately evaluated.
Finding were acceptable.
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'7.
Review of Administrative Procedures The inspector reviewed AP-101, " Development of Safety Related and Non Safety-Related Procedures" and AP-102 " Procedure' Review, Approval and Revision". The procedures were reviewed to verify conformance to the proposed Technical Specifications, Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 1 and ANSI 18.7-1976. The inspector had _the following comments:
AP 102 does not adequately address the review'of ehanges to procedures
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as described in the FSAR for unreviewed safety questions as required by 10 CFR 50.59.
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'r The definition of " safety-related" procedures as described in AP 101
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makes several non safety related procedures, in existence at present, safety-related.
Paragraph 4.3.1.B should read "Certain procedure changes which normally...."
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Section 5.2.1 of AP-102 omits Health Physics procedures concerning
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ALARA for PSRC review.
AP 102 does not adequately address the necessary action to be taken if
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an unreviewed safety question is determined to exist.
All procedures required by Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 do not
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yet exist.
Administrative Procedure 516 (AP 516) " Responsibilities and Authority
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of the Plant Operators" and AP 518, " Responsibilities and Authority of
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the Shift Supervisor", are reoundant in that both procedures describe
the responsibilties and authority of the shift supervisor. AP516 is classified as non safety-related but AP 518 is classified as safety-related.
Attachment I to AP-102 QA Review Requirements states that QA concurrence
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is required prior to implementation of " Repair" procedures.
It is not clear to the inspector what constitutes a " Repair" procedure.
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AP-101 was previously reviewed in report 79-28, open item 79-28-02.
This item will remain open pending procedure revision and inspector review.
8.
Plant Tour The inspector toured the plant at various times to observe construction activities, housekeeping, maintenance, equipment preservation and logbooks.
"indings were acceptable with the exception of the following:
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On February 7, 1980, while touring the Auxiliary Building, the inspector a.
i noted that the following red tags were incorrectly placed:
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Tag Number 1613 for 16EH IDB2Y (Spare) was located on the breaker for valve 8808B.
Tag Number 1768, 1561, 1068, 112^, 10-281-79-1, 12-046-79-5, and 08-276-79-1 for the breaker of valve 8811A were located on a spare
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breaker.
Tagnumber1536forasparebreakeronIDB2Ywahlocatedonthebreaker for valve 8811A.
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b.
On February 27, 1980, while touring the auxilia~ry buildin, the inspector a
noted that the following red tags were incorrectly placed:
Tag number 2421 for valve 8524A was located on valve 8542A l
Tag number 2422 for valve 8524B was located on valve 8542B.
Administrative Procedure 204.1, paragraph 3,5 states in part that the safety tags shall be attached to the equipment, valve, switch or device named on the tag. This is considered to be an apparent item of noncompliance (80-06-06). A similar item of noncompliance was identified in inspection report 79-41, dated January 18, 1980.
On February 2,1980 while touring the control room the inspector noted c.
that leads 9 and 10 on Terminal Board 730 on the Radiation Monit'oring Panel had lifted lead tags attached to them. However, the leads were not lifted. Lifting of the leads is normally accomplished by using
" standoffs" made of an insulating material. These standoffs were not present and the leads were attached to the terminal board. Start up Manual Procedure SUM-B-12 " Lifted Lead and Jumper Control", paragraph 6.2, states in part that temporary alterations are made as identified by the " Nature of Alteration" on the Lifted Lead / Jumper Tag. The temporary alteration (lifted leads) called for on tag number 679 did not exist in that the leads were not lifted. This is considered an apparent item of noncompliance (80-06-06)
d.
-The inspector toured the Fuel Handling Building on February 27, 19 to verify proper security cleanliness and proper storage of the new fuel.
Findings were acceptable.
9.
Meetings The inspector participated in a meeting on February 21, 1980 on site a.
between NRR and the licensee to orient the NRC consultant, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, with geology and seismology of the V. C. Summer site.
b.
The inspector participated in a meeting on February 22, 1980 on site with NRR to discuss the proposed standard Technical Specifications.
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10.
Open Items The follwoing open items were reviewed:
a.
79-41-02 FSAR Description of Inverter No. 6 b.
79-37-05 OQAM Requirement c.
79-31-07 Tagout Problems
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Theinspectorreviewedcorrectiveactiontakenin.aliIheaboveitemsand consider the above items closed.
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'r 11.
Technical Specifications The inspector reviewed portions of the proposed Technical Specif'ic'tions a
for clarity and enforceability.
Inspector comments were discussed with the licensee. All comme ~nts will be incorporated in a letter to NRR or a future inspection report.
12.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector noted that Section 11.3 of the FSAR states that if the recombiner feed concentration exceeds 6 percent by volume, a hi-hydrogen alarm sounds to warn the operator that all hydrogen entering the recombiner is not reacted. Section 3.11.2,5A of the Proposed Technical Specification states that the concentration of hydrogen and/or oxygen in the wast.e gas holdup system shall be limited to 2 percent by volume. This indicttes that the alarm would not occur until the concentration exceeded the limit specified in the proposed Technical Specifications by 4%. This item is open (80-06-07)
pending inspector review i
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