IR 05000389/1979014
| ML17207A634 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1979 |
| From: | Economos N, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17207A630 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-389-79-14, NUDOCS 7912110214 | |
| Download: ML17207A634 (11) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Ot;T 1a 579 Report No. 50-389/79-14 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami; Florida 33101 Facility Name:
St. Iucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389 License No.
CPPR-144 Inspection at St. Luci Unit 2 near Hutchinson Island, Florida Inspected by:
N.
o os Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed
/o -~o-7g Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on September 11-14, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 25 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of other safety-related piping - welding, and radiograph review, steel structures and supports visual examination of welds, storage facilities - piping and equipment; licensee actions
'on previous inspection findings, vendor shop inspection, Precision Metals Services.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in four areas; one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction - Control of weld electrodes),
paragraph 5 DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. J.
Escue~
Site Manager
- J. D. Kirk,,Assistant Site Manager
- W. M. Hayward, QA Supervisor W. F. Jackson, WeldingSuperintendent-J.
W. Adams, QA Engineer (Mechanical)
-B. M. Parks, QA Engineer
+E.
W. Sherman, QA Engineer J.
R. Behris, QC Supervisor H. Powers, Process Control Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians.
Other Organizations Ebasco Services, Inc.
(Ebasco)
+R. A. Garramore, Sr. Resident Engineer W. J. Taylor, Project Superintendent Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CBRI)
C. L. Fields, Project Welding and QA Specialist Precision Metal Services Joe Bamber, QA Manager
+Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 14, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector identified the areas inspected which included safety-related piping-welding and radio-graph review; steel structures and supports, visual examination of welding, vendor shop inspection, storage facilities, actions on previous inspection findings.
One item of noncompliance was discussed in detail.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Deficiency 389/79-07-02, Documentation of Specific Variables used to qualify WPS.
FPL letter of response dated August 10, 1979, has been reviewed. and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
The
C
-2" inspector held discussion with the welding superintendent and examined corrective actions as stated in the letter of response.,,
The inspector concluded that FPI had determined the full extent of the subject non-compliance, performed the necessary survey and follow-up. actions to correct the present, conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar cj.rcumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item, 389/79-04 Control of Preheat and Interpass Temperature Temporary change issued 415/79 for procedure SQP-39 R/o "Field Welding Control" defines methods to be used for preheat application control, monitoring and documentation.
Interpass temperature checking is also addressed.
(Closed)
Unresolved item 389/79-11-01 Reactor Coolant Pump Restraints (Pump Stops)
The two pump stops 2A2 and 2B2 containing welds with questionable surface indications e.g.,
voids, grinding marks were nonconformed, repaired and reinspected by the licensee in accordance with structural Welding Code AWS Dl.l.
The welds on both pump stops were found accept-able.
The inspector reviewed related QA/QC documents including noncon-formance reports 779M and 803M and visually inspected the welds in both pump stops.
A visit to the fabricator's shop, Precision Metal Services, is discussed in paragraph 5a of this report.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 389/79-07-03, Welder Performance Qualification Procedures The licensee has agreed to document his welder training/indoctrination program in the form of a procedure.
This item will be ready for IE review by October 15, 1979.
(Open) Infraction 389/79-07-01 Welder Performance Qualification Records The inspector discussed with cognizant licensee personnel corrective actions taken and, reviewed supportive documentation.
Procedure QI-9.3 is being revised to address the recording of certain weld indications as they appear on the radiographic film.
This item will be closed when this revision is implemented.
(Open)
Unresolved Item 389/79-06-01 RT technique of B. F.
Shaw Fabricated Welds The inspector discussed B. F. Shaw's response to Ebasco concerning the indiscriminate use of film side penetrameters on their shop fabricated pipe welds.
The inspector and the licensee's representative did not accept B. F. Shaw's position and will submit the following weld numbers as examples of instances where a source side penetrameter should have been use Weld d Diameter Distance
'From End Confi uration MK. No.
10
1 6tl 4 II 8 II 10" 1 1 II 9 II 12ll 15 II Pipe to Ell Pipe to Ell Pipe to Pipe Pipe to Ell 1-6-SI-464-2 I-6-SI-464-2 I-8-CC-37-4 I"10-SI-422-7 RIR-78-282
-1
1 12"
] 2tt 6tl 12ll 12" 18" 6 II 121l Pipe to Ell Pipe to Ell Pipe to Ell Pipe to Ell I"12-SI-150-1 I-12-SI-151"3 I-6-SI"515-1 I-12-SI-406-5 R1R"77-230 6 II 4 ~
I-6-SI-464-2 R1R-77-178 6!t 6"
9" from c/c of Ell I-6-SI"111"6 The inspector stated this item shall remain open until the matter can be resolved satisfactorily.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Independent Inspection Efforts a
~
Steel Structures and Supports Vendor, Shop Inspection On September 13, 1979, the inspector accompanied the licensee's representative to Precision Metal Services, in Fort Pierce, Florida, the fabricator of the pump stops, discussed earlier in this report.
The inspector observed the licensee's surveillance activities relative to certain reactor pump restraint embeds identified as Mark 4-1 and Mark 3'-1.
These components were being fabricated under purchase order No.
5C9129-ll and Ebasco specification FIO-2998-761 R/2.
The contract was issued originally to Lakeside Steel because of scheduling problems.
Lakeside subcontracted Precision Metals to perform the work.
Welding requirements
'were controlled by Structural Welding Code AWS-Dl.l.
The inspector examined completed welds for code compliance and reviewed related quality records for completeness and accurac The vendor's weld control program/facilities were inspected and the quality records of randomly selected weld electrodes-type 7018SR produced from heat number 92003A002 were reviewed.
In the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Open Storage - Piping and NSSS Components Storage conditions relative to safety related piping are controlled through site procedure SgP-3 R/0, while other components including those within the nuclear island are controlled through procedure SgP-23, Inspections performed under the latter are recorded on form SgP-23-1
"Equipment Storage Maintenance Record".
The storage areas controlled by both procedures were inspected for compliance with procedural requirements which included identification, protection, segregation of nonconforming items and record keeping.
In the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Control of Weld Electrodes Work areas inside the reactor and auxiliary buildings (RB and RAB),
were inspected in order to observe work progress, storage, housekeeping conditions and control of unconsumed weld electrodes.
In the lower level of the RAB the inspector noted several unconsumed coated weld electrodes scattered on the floor near the base of a safety 'injection pump support.
Inside the RB the inspector observed several low hydrogen 7018 coated welding electrodes stored in an open bucket that was near a work area but -left exposed to a heavy rain shower in progress at the time.
The inspector brought this finding to the attention of the licensee's representative and the wet electrodes were eventually destroyed.
In discussing this matter with the licensee the inspector expressed concern over the welder's apparent negligence and/or failure to take appropriate precautionary measures in view of the fact that rainy weather conditions existed during that day.
Moreover, the inspector stated that this practic'e was contrary to paragraph NB-2440 Section III of the ASME code which requires that precautions be taken to minimize moisture absorption, while site procedure SgP-8 paragraph 8.2.9 states that "in the field portable rod ovens shall be used for covered electrodes".
These findings represent two (2) examples of failure to follow code and/or procedural requirements, which is in noncompliance with Criterion V of Appendix B, to 10 CFR 50.
This apparent noncompliance is assigned item number 389/79-14-0 Steel Structures and Supoorts - Visual Examination of Welds
~ ~
At the time of this inspection installation and/or fabrication of certain steel structures e.g., fuel pool liner, spent fuel pool liner cask, transfer canal and supports e.g.,
RPV Support "B" was in progress.
The aforementioned liners are being fabricated on-site by CBI in accordance with Section III, (74W76) of the ASIDE Code.
Work completion on the aforementioned components ranges between 65 - 85 percent.
The RPV Support was fabricated in accordance with Ebasco specification FLO-29998-761 and the AWS Structural Steel Code Dl.l, design and joint details appeared on drawing number 2999-G 794 R/l.
From these items the inspector selected completed weld joints and examined them to ascertain whether they were consistent with code and specification/
drawing requirements.
Areas examined included location, size, shape, weld surface finish reinforcement height and blending with base metal, arc strikes, spatter and weld surface defects.
In addition the inspector reviewed CBI's stud weld procedure, WPS-81631 R/2 qualified in accordance with AWS C5.4-74
"Recommended Practices for Stud Welding".
Audit report 1979-2 documenting an audit of site QA program implementation performed by CBI corporate QA during June 6-7, 1979, was reviewed at this time.
Within these areas the inspector noted certain faint linear type impressions/
indications near the fitup between a rib and the horizontal base section of the RPV support.
Paint on this area precluded further investigation at that time.
However, the licensee agreed to examine the suspect areas and report their finding during a future IE inspection.
This matter was identi-fied as inspector followup item number 389/79-14-02.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Other Safety-Related Piping; Observation of Welding Activities Certain field welds, in progress of fabrication,. were selected at random for observation and evaluation of work performance in order to ascertain whether welding activities were being controlled and performed in accordance with applicable requirements of the ASME Code Section III (77S77).
Welds selected were as follows:
Weld FW-6 FW-7 nFW-4
~FW 5 Line/S stem I-12-SI It SI0495 SI-412 Diameter 12"
] Oll 12" 10" Sta e of Com letion Grinding weld prep II II Repair Repair-Reviewed radiographs Areas observed/inspected during this work effort included a review of weld travelers, weld and welder identification, availability of procedures instructions and/or drawing at the work station, welding technique, use of specified weld consumables, weld prep, use of specified cleaning tools,
purges and shield gas as applicable, weld repair instruction, weld appearance, arc strikes and spatter, conditions in and around work station; Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Other Safety Related Piping-Visual Examination of Welds
'
Completed field welds in piping outside the reactor coolant pressure boundary were examined in order to ascertain whether work performed (welding) was in accordance with applicable code and procedural requirements, see paragraph 7 above.
Welds selected for this effort were as follows:
Weld line/S stem Diameter FW-3 FW-4 FW-1 FW-2 FW-2 SI-412 ll SI-407 ll SI-474
]2ll 12ll 10tt 12 II 10" Areas observed/inspected for this work effort included location, configuration weld finish/appearance, uniformity, blending stops, arc-strikes and spatter grind marks'leanliness, process control record review for completeness and accuracy.
Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.