IR 05000335/1979028
| ML17207A705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1979 |
| From: | Compton R, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17207A704 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-79-28, NUDOCS 8001020111 | |
| Download: ML17207A705 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 goy 20 1919 Report No. 50-335/79-28 I,icensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Docket No. 50-335 License No. DPR-67 Inspection at S
Inspector gH R.
M.
L i site near Ft. Pierce, Florida l/ Z>
Da Signed Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Da e Signed SUMMARY Inspection on October 31 - November 2, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 19 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems, IE Bulletin 79-14.
Results Of the one area inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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M. Barrow, Operations Superintendent-J. Krumins, Site Engineering Representative
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W. Bailey, Operations QA
-"D. I. McAfee, Operations QA Other Organizations EBASCO Services Incorporated T. A. Tarte, Backfit Project Engineer G. H. Krauss, Civil Engineer T. E. Holwell, Iead Mechanical - Nuclear Engineer R. A. Christianson, Senior Pipe Support Designer R. L. Beauregard, QC Supervisor, Construction R. Martin, Engineer, Construction
"-Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 2, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
(Open)
IE Bulletin No. 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems EBASCO procedure 128-2.800,
"NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, Restraint and Piping Inspection, Final Review of Packages, BFI 128-2", was examined.
This proce-dure contained the detailed field inspection procedure and provided for the administrative controls over the field inspection and documentation effort.
Procedure 128-2.800, approved by EBASCO on October 25, 1979, was reviewed and approved by the FPM Facility Review Group (FRG) on October 31, 1979, after the field inspection, documentation and review work was essentially complete.'he field inspection procedure had previously been reviewed and approved by the FRG on August 3, 1979.
However, this original procedure contained no EBASCO preparer, reviewer, or approval signatures.
The poor design control exhibited by this lack of signatures on the procedure used for field work and the late formal approval of procedure 128-2.800 was
discussed at length with the licensee and the A-E.
The inspector did not identify any significant deficiencies in the field inspection procedure as originally approved by the FRG prior to the field work effort.
The field inspection effort consisted of measuring and recording previously selected key dimensions on isometric drawings and verification of valve identification and support/restraint design details.
The inspection teams were made up of a mechanical-nuclear piping designer or engineer, a support/
restraint designer and one or two technicians.
Completed inspection docu-ments were then reviewed and compared to the stress isometrics by an on-site restraint/stress analysis engineer.
Discrepancies that could not be satis-factorily evaluated in this preliminary review were forwarded to the EBASCO New York office for analysis.
Location of supports and critical dimensions for the inaccessible containment spray piping in the containment dome was done with surveying instruments by a local licensed surveyor.
The following inspection packages, consisting of the marked up isometric; piping configuration, support/restraint and valve checklists; penetration clearance forms and valve/operator orientation forms were reviewed:
Isometric CS-K-6, Dome Containment Spray Piping Isometric CH-G-10, Chemical and Volume Control Piping in area RAB-29 Isometric SI-N-9, Safety Injection Piping in area RAB-2 These packages were reviewed for completeness, type and extent of discrepancies, site evaluation of discrepancies and a spot comparison of marked up isometrics to the stress isometrics and the stress reports.
Portions of five piping systems as shown on nine different isometrics located in four plant areas were walked down for comparison of the inspection results to the as-built con'ditions.
The following lines were checked for properly recorded configuration dimensions, valve details where accessible and general support/restraint configuration and function.
Evaluations of discrepancies by the site restraint/stress analysis engineer were also reviewed.
BF Shaw Isometric SI-N-8 Line I-10-SI-417 I-12-SI-475 Area RAB-4 Supports/
Restraints/Valves SI-868"47, SI-678-9, 168 SIH-83, 175)
181 V-3206, V-3106 SI"N-1 I-10-SI-420 I-14-SI-424 SIH-68, 184 SI"676"226, 2073, 2074, 2076, 2275, 2316, 9206, 9230 I-V"07-1555, V-3444 WM-P-1 I-3-W-450 RAB-6 WMH-94, 95,
WH-635-3
BF Shaw Isometric 7Continued)
Line Area Supports/
Restraints/Valves SI-N"1 I-10-SI-420 RAB-6 SIH-7 SI-676-2355, 2375, 2376, 2395 SI-N-9 CS-K"1 CC-H-8 I"12-SI-814 I-12-SI-414 I"12-SI"407 I-14-CC-21 RAB-1 SIM-179 SI-678-36, 380, 385 V-3453 CSH-15 CS-678-146, 130, 133 CCH-87 CC-13-1, 1A I-SB-14-3 MS-L-7 MS-L-6 I-4-MS-113 I-4-MS-11 I-35.5-MS-1 I-8-MS-79 MST-A MST-A MSH-161, 1170, 1105, 1109, 1166, 2106, 2113, 2118, 3113, 3164, 3164A I-V-08-310, 350 I-MV-08-13, 3 MSH-7,
MS-L-9 MST-A MSH-7A I-HCV-08-2A Drawing SI-676-2376 shows a O-l/16 inch clearance between pipe clamps of restraint SI-676-2376 and a wide flange beam of restraint SI-676-2375.
The actual clearance in the field was approximately one inch on each side.
The licensee stated that the clamps had subsequently been adjusted to provide the specified clearance and that the discrepancy had been documented for evaluation in accordance with the field inspection procedures.
This minor isolated dis-crepancy between the inspection records and the as-built condition 'is not considered a significant safety concern.
Plant Change/Modification 596-79 for modifying restraints SI-868-6099 and SI-676-429 was examined.
Completed EBASCO (}C records, Welding Data/Process Sheets and Support/Mounting Inspection Reports, were also examined.
Audit/Surveillance activities related to the Bulletin 79-14 work were discussed with the site operations QA staff.
As of November 2, 1979, of a total of 2276 supports/restraints, analysis was still in progress on 317 containment spray (dome) pipe supports and 75 other supports by EBASCO's New York office and on 30 supports being analyzed by Combustion Engineering.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.