IR 05000335/1979026
| ML17207A615 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Julian C, Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17207A614 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-79-26, NUDOCS 7912060254 | |
| Download: ML17207A615 (7) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-335/79-26 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 Vest Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit
Docket No. 50-335 License No. DPR-67 Inspected at St. Lucie Site, Hutchinson Island, Florida Inspected by:
C. Jul an Approved by: E C
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T cornett, A ting Section Chief, RONS Branch
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Date Signed
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Date Signe SUMMARY Inspected on October 9-12, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of post-refueling zero-power testing and power-escalation testing preceding cycle 3 operation.
Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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MD Wethy, Plant Manager H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent E. Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent W. Bailey, QA Operations Supervisor R. Jennings, Technical Supervisor K. Ryall, Reactor Engineering Supervisor J.
Sweeney, Plant Engineer A. Wells, Operations Supervisor S. Dryden, Reactor Engineer A. Pell, Reactor Engineer G. Roos, Quality Control F. Leppla, ISC Supervisor A. I,onghouser, Jr., Assistant Plant Security Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included numerous technicians, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
"-Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 12, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector stated his concerns regarding the calibration of the reactivity computer, as detailed below in paragraph 5.
Licensee representatives committed to evaluate and resolve the matter prior to the next use of the reactivity computer.
The inspector stated that procedure OP 0110055 needed revision as discussed in paragraph 5 below.
The licensee representatives demonstrated that this revision had been initiated.
The inspector stated that previous open item 78-24-02 had been closed during this inspection.
By telephone conversation on 10/17/79, the Operations Superintendent verified the licensee's commitment detailed in paragraph 7 below to confirm the suspected in-core-detector cable switching, and correct the problem at the next refueling outage.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
Initial Cycle 3 Startup and Zero Power Testing The inspector reviewed the following test procedures and test results for cycle 3.
v OP 0030221 "Initial Criticality Following Refueling" Rev 2 OP 0110052
"Zero Power Physics Tests After Reload" Rev
The inspector reviewed the Nuclear Control Center Operator's log book entries for the period 5/29/79 through 6/15/79.
During the measurement of control rod worths and the isothermal temperature coefficient of reactivity the licensee employs an analog reactivity computer (reactimeter).
This device uses input from the plant nuclear instrumentation detectors, and performs an on-line analog solution of the six group reactor kinetics equations to output reactivity present in the reactor.
During procedure 0110052 a test is performed on the reactivity computer.
The reactor is placed on stable positive periods of varying magnitudes, and the resulting periods are measured with a stop watch.
The core reactivity corresponding to the observed reactor periods is inferred from calculated period-reactivity curves supplied by Combustion Engineering (CE).
These reactivity values are compared to the corresponding reactimeter output values to confirm proper reactimeter operation.
The inspector questioned if any test of the reactimeter is performed with negative reactivity values.
During the physics tests the reactimeter is often.used to measure negative core reactivity, and therefore, reactimeter accuracy in the negative sense should be confirmed.
Licensee representatives agreed that the reactimeter needs to perform accurately for negative reac-tivity inputs, and agreed to investigate methods to test the machine for negative reactivities.
Prior to use, an electrical performance check is performed on the reac-timeter using instrument and control (ISC) procedure 1400165.
The in-spector discussed this test with IRC representatives, and determined that a positive doubling step-signal input is used.
This test also does not confirm proper operation for negative reactivity values.
During the IRC checkout of the reactimeter in preparation for cycle 3 tests it was determined that certain of the six group beta effective values supplied by CE could not be simulated by the reactimeter.
These values, calculated for the all rods out condition, exceeded the range of input potentiometers installed in the reactimeter.
CE provided a revised set of kinetics parameters suitable for the St. Lucie 1 reactimeter, and stated that the use of these values yields a
34/, overprediction of the measured rod worths.
The licensee did indeed reduce the control rod worths measured during these tests by 3g during the evaluation of test result The inspector verified that reactivity-related technical-specification limits were met by the results of this test whether or not the 3% cor-rection was applied.
The inspector stated that this correction method is inconsistent with the detail and implied sophistication of the CE-supplied fuel-cycle analysis.
Licensee representatives agreed to determine if the reactimeter can be modified to correctly accept the calculated kinetics parameters.
The inspector stated that the results of the licensee's investigations in the area of reactimeter calibration would be reviewed at a future inspec-tion.
(50-335/79-26-01).
The licensee agreed to resolve these issues prior to the next use of the reactimeter following the next refueling.
During the review of the shutdown margin calculations, the inspector noted that the data sheet for procedure OP 0110055
"Shutdown Margin" Rev 4 needed to be updated.
It should reflect cycle 3 calculated value for the shutdown banks A and B rod worths and the calculated value for the most reactive stuck rod.
This revision was initiated before the inspector left the site.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were found in this area.
6.
Power Escalation Tests The inspector reviewed the following procedures and the results of these tests conducted after refueling for cycle 3.
OP 0010133 "Reactor Engineering Power Ascension Program" Rev
OP 3200020 "Primary System Manual Calorimetric" Rev
OP 1200051
"Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration" OP 3200050 "Calculation and Adjustment of Incore Detector Alarm Setpoints" Rev 4 OP 320054 "Surveillance Requirements for Total Integrated Radial Peaking Factor (F
)" Rev 5 r
OP 3/0058 "Surveillance Requirements for Total Planar Radial Peaking Factor (F
)" Rev
OP 3200051 "At Power Determination of Moderator Temperature and Power Coefficient" OP 320053 "Surveillance Requirements for Azimuthal Power Tilt (T )" Rev 6 q
OP 3200057 "Calculation of PDg RMS Deviation" Rev
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified in this are During this review, the inspector noted that procedure OP 3200050
"Calculation and Adjustment of Incore Detector Alarm Setpoints" has been revised to include a hand calculation check of the computer generated alarm values.
With this revision open item 78-24-02 from previous inspection 78-24 is closed.
7.
Incorrectly Connected Cables for In-core Detectors During power ascension the licensee discovered that four strings of in-core detectors had been apparently incorrectly connected due to "cable switching".
The inspector discussed the matter with licensee representatives.
They feel that two pairs of detector cables were interchanged during detector reconnection because the labels are aged and hard to read.
Reading is further hampered by the required respiratory protection equipment.
For this operating cycle the signals have been rerouted in the process computer to correct the problem.
Licensee representatives stated that the suspected cable interchanges will be confirmed at the next refueling and the cables will be relabeled to prevent recurrence of this problem.
(50-335/79-26-02)