IR 05000389/1979009
| ML17207A344 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1979 |
| From: | Wright R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17207A340 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-389-79-09, 50-389-79-9, NUDOCS 7909040098 | |
| Download: ML17207A344 (15) | |
Text
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kg**4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-389/79-09 Licensee'lorida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No.
50-389 License No.
CPPR-144 Inspection at St. Lucie Site, Hut hinson Island, Florida Inspector:
R.
. Wright ate'igned Approved by:
F.
. Cantrell, Acting e
n Chief, RCES Branch SUNNARY Inspection on June 11-15, 1979 Areas Inspected at Signed This routine, unannounced inspection involved 35 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings; review of gA Manuals for errection and welding of penetrations, reactor coolant pressure boundary piping and other safety related piping; construction status and housekeeping; handling of core drilling for routing of conduit; observation of work activities to include protective coatings, concrete placements, magnetic particle inspection and rebar tensile testing; storage and preventive maintenance of NSSS components; handling of IEB's, IEC's and IN's.
Results Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in seven areas, one apparent recurring item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction - Failure to follow document control procedures, paragraph 3.a).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. J. Escue, Site Manager-W.
M. Hayward, Supervisor Engineer, gA-Construction
+J. L. Parker, Project (}C Supervisor
"E.
W. Sherman, gA Engineer B.
M. Parks, gA Engineer D. R. Cooper, gA Engineer J.
W. Adams, gA Engineer 0. J. Karch, gA Engineer C. Carlos, Civil gC Supervisor R. Behres, Mechanical gC Supervisor M. J. Curley, gC Inspector, Protective Coatings H. D. Bryant, gC Inspector, NDE Other licensee employees contacted included several construction craftsmen, technicians, and office personnel.
Other Organizations-W. J. Taylor, Project Superintendent (EBASCO)
-R. A. Garramore, Senior Resident Engineer (EBASCO)
J.
A. Baysinger, Process Control Specialist (EBASCO)
H. T. Powers, Jr.,
Process Control Engineer (EBASCO)
M. Schnieder, Protective Coating Craft Supervisor (EBASCO)
+Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 15, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The licensee was advised that no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
The inspector did discuss the licensee's incomplete corrective action concerning formerly identified deficiency item 389/79-01-01 and lack of timely corrective action involving FPL's audit /AC-PSL2-52 (see paragraph 3.a below).
Subse-quent to this inspection the licensee was notified by telephone on June 29, 1979, that this recurring deficiency was being upgraded to an infraction level repeat item of noncompliance 389/79-09-01.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Deficiency 389/79-01-01:
Failure to follow document control procedures.
RII inspector followup on FPL's letter of response dated March 12, 1979 (I,-79-59) revealed that item 2 of the subject letter had not been fully corrected.
Drawing 2998-G-517Rl was found correctly
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updated with the proper FCR 2-434 in the Document Control Center (DCC);
however, the corrected drawing apparently did not get distribution because the inspector found the same deficient drawing (with improper FCR$/2-557) existing in the QA and QC drawing files.
The subject response letter stated that all DCC reproducibles had been corrected, the drawings had been redistributed and all necessary corrections to FCR and DCN notations would be made by March 31, 1979.
Deficient items Nos.
and 3 on the response letter were found to be satisfac-torily corrected.
Ten other drawings were randomly chosen from the ACSE trailer and QC area files and found to be of current revision with proper FCR's and DCN's noted on the documents.
However, the inspector noted that FPL's Audit QAC-PSL2-78-52,
"Document Control" still remains open.
In fact, a recent FPL followup of this audit disclosed that approximately 40$ of the drawings checked in the field did not agree with control cards regarding FCR/DCN notes indicating continued uncor-rected problems in this area of management and failure to take prompt corrective actions.
This deficiency item is being closed in this report but being upgraded to an infraction level repeat item of noncompliance 389/79-09-01, Failure to follow document control procedures.
(Open) Infraction 389/79-08-01:
Failure to properly cure concrete test cylinders in the field and laboratory.
The RII inspector examined the concrete laboratory curing room and found the licensee had replaced the defective sprinklers on the right hand side of the room.
Visual observation of the room and sling psychrometer relative humidity readings examined revealed all cylinders now have free water maintained on their entire surface areas at all time and a relative humidity of 95/ plus is being maintained.
FPL is in the process of experimenting with several methods to field cure test cylinders within the required ASTMC-31 range of 60 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.
During a basemat placement for a tunnel between the component cooling building and the reactor auxiliary building the following methods were observed being evaluated.
Immediately upon molding, two groups of cylinders were placed beneath a tent or canopy.
One group was surrounded with cylinders filled with ice and covered with wet burlap.
The other group was left exposed to the atmosphere.
A third group of cylinders (control set) were molded and cured in the concrete laboratory.
FPL was documenting temperature variations during the above curing conditions and plans to compare the respective breaking strengths of the specimens, cured under different conditions.
This item will remain open pending the licensee's final written response and acceptance of that response by the RII inspector.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Review of QA Manual:
Penetration installation and welding; Reactor coolant I
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pressure boundary pipe errection and welding; and safety related pipe errection and weldin ~
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The purpose of this inspection is to ascertain whether QA plans, instructions, and procedures have been established in the facility QA manual (aggregate manuals)
and that they conform to the QA program as described in the Safety Analysis Report.
General Direct supervision and technical control of the above functions are exercised by the Piping Superintendent (Union Boiler Company)
and by FPL's Welding Superintendent who report to the Site Manager through the Project Superinten-dent.
The services of pipe fitters, welders, and welding operators for the site installation processes are contracted to individuals through another organization (i.e.,
labor contractor).
Since the labor contractor only supplies individuals to the site for qualification by FPL, this contractor need not have a
QA Program, certificate of authorization, nor be subject to audits.
The FPL Welding Superintendent and Piping Superintendent are supported by a sufficient number of welding and piping control personnel to ensure that all the conditions required by the Code have been met.
Both the Welding and Piping Superintendents authority to stop nonconforming work are exercised through the Site Manager via the Project Manager.
FPL's site Quality Control organization (Mechanical-NDE) will perform the QC and NDE functions.
QC inspections are to be performed in the field by qualified personnel during such construction quality activities as receiving, storage, fabrication, errection, installation and testing.
The Project QC Supervisor has the authority to stop nonconforming work.
FPL's site QA Unit is responsible to perform planned and periodic audits of all construction activities including activities performed by site contractors.
These audit results are documented and reviewed by management.
FPL's QA group can stop work or operations adverse to quality in accordance with the appropriate Quality Procedure.
The following specification(s),
QA/QC manual(s)
and procedure(s)
constitute the QA program documents:
1.
FPL Quality Assurance Manual 2.
FPL Topical Quality Assurance Report (FPL TQAR)
3.
FPL ASME Quality Assurance Manual 4.
FPL Construction Quality Control Quality Instruction Manual (CPL:QI)
5.
FPL Site Quality Procedures (SQP's)
6.
FPL Administrative Site Procedures (ASP's)
7.
FPL Quality Assurance Department Organization Manual 8.
FPL PSL-2 Welding Procedure Manual
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EBASCO Specification FI0-2998-099, "General Power Piping and Examination and NDE Requirements for Piping System Materials, Velds and Components" 10.
EBASCO Specification FI0-2998-099B,
"Nuclear and Nonnuclear Two Inch and Under Station Piping" Implementation Inspection The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee personnel, reviewed controlling specification(s),
QA manual(s)
procedure(s)
and observed that facilities are provided for the support of the requirements of the above documents.
The above identified documents confirm that the licensee has established QA/QC plans and procedures to assure that penetration instal-lation and welding, reactor coolant pressure boundary pipe errection and welding, and other safety related pipe errection and welding work will be accomplished in accordance with QA program requirements.
The following areas were examined:
l.
Organizational structure and QA personnel 2.
Audits 3.
Corrective Action 4.
Document Control 5.
Quality Records No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Independent Inspection Effort.
The inspector conducted a walk-through inspection of the intake structure, auxiliary and containment buildings noting construction activities underway, status of construction and general housekeeping conditions of these facilities.
The RII inspector noted two core drilled cylinders (6" and 10" diameter cores)
lying on the auxiliary building floor at elevations - 0.5. It was apparent that both cores had cut through reinforcing steel.
RII inspector research into the matter revealed that the licensee had correctly implemented procedure, SQP-57,
"Core Drilling For Routing of Conduit" in handling this situation, Likewise, FCR 2-984 was found properly documenting and dispositioning these cores per FPL procedures SQP-17,
"Design Control".
Prior engineering review and approval were obtained prior to commencing the coring.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie *
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-5" 7.
Observation of Work Activities a
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Nuclear QA Protective Coatings
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The RII inspector inspected the facilities for storage of coating materials to ensure they met the manufactures (Ameron and Sherwin-
- Williams) recommendations of 55 to 100 degrees Farenheit.
All paint containers were found to be adequately labeled with batch number and date of manufacture information on them.
Several paint containers were examined and none were found stored beyond allowable shelf life.
Discussions with the protective coatings QC inspector, an EBASCO craft supervisor and observations of surface preparation work and coating applications in-progress in the auxiliary building for the walls and floor at elevation -0.5 (in the vicinity of the Hold Up Reciprocating Pump Room 2A and 2B and the Hold Up Drain Pump Room) revealed the work and inspection of that work were being accomplished with the following control documents:
EBASCO FLO Spec 2998.769D "Coating Service, Levels, I, II and Balance of Plant" ASP-ll, "Protective Coatings" QI-9.7, "General Inspection of Painting Material and Protective Coatings, Application and Surface Preparation" Records examined indicated the QC inspector was qualified to perform protective coatings inspection.
Review of training records revealed select FPL QA/QC personnel had attended training given by the Institute of Applied Technology (Phoenix, Arizona) in nuclear QA coating work.
In addition, records examined indicate FPL and Ameron conducted a two day (June 4-5, 1979) "Protective Coatings Seminar" at which approximately 25 QA/QC, painting superinten-dents and engineering personnel attended.
b.
Concrete Placements The RII inspector examined various stages of preparation, in-process testing and documentation, delivery of pumped concrete, placement and consolidation of placed concrete for concrete work packages 610A and llOC.
The following documents governing concrete placement activities were used as inspection criteria:
PSAR Sections 3.8.1 and 3.8.3 FPL Quality Instructions (QI) 10.3, 10.6, 10.71 EBASCO Concrete Specification FLO - 2998.473 Drawing Numbers 2998-G-671, 501, 503-S.02
-6-The in-process testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedures and properly calibrated equipment.
Compressive test cylinders were taken and cured in accordance with the methods described in paragraph 3b of the report.
QC monitored the entire placements.
c.
Magnetic Particle Inspection (MP)
The inspector observed the in-process, information basis, MP inspection of Weld No.
163 connecting a
main steam truss girder and support column.
Surface preparation, probing methods, equipment, magnetizing current, examination techniques were observed to be in accordance with QI 9.4,
"Magnetic Particle Inspection".
The calibration records for the Magnaflux Model P-90, Magnetic Particle Unit (Serial No.
FPL PSL-401)
used during the above examination were examined and found current in accordance with QI 12.1, "Control and Calibration of Tool Gauges and Test Devices".
The personnel performing the above MP inspection were found certified in accordance with QI 2.7,
"NDE Personnel Qualification and Certification".
d.
Rebar Tensile Testing The inspector observed the tensile testing of Florida Steel reinforcing steel bar samples (all grade 60) for bar size No.
8 for heat Nos
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194608, 193823, 194614, 194615, and bar size No.
6 for heat Nos.
193083 and 193084.
The tensile properties of all bars (yield and ultimate strength)
met ASTM requirements.
Elongation percent measure-ments taken in accordance with ASTM A-370 requirements were satisfactory.
The Forney testing equipment was last calibrated 1/16/79 and the calibration is good for a
one year period.
All testing was found accomplished in accordance with FPL QI 10.77, "Testing of Reinforcing Steel Bars".
Within the above areas of observation of work activities inspection no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Preventive Maintenance and Storage:
Reactor Pressure Vessel, Steam Generators, Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel Internals The above NSSS components were inspected for proper storage condition and continued adequate preventive maintenance in accordance with the following controlling documents:
CEND-353, "Field Handling, Maintenance and Storage Requirements for Combustion Engineering Furnished Equipment";
SQP-23,
"Preventive Maintenance";
and SQP-3,
"Material Control".
All pr'otective covers, seals, plugs, coatings, dessicant materials, supporting dunnage, and nitrogen gas protection (Primary and secondary side of steam generators and pressurizer)
were found operating, intact, undamaged and maintaining the required internal dewpoint prescribed by procedure.
The storage level of all components was found equal to or better than that required by SQP-3.
The subject NSSS components are enclosed in chain link fencing with a padlock gate away from construction vehicle traffi T S
t
The inspector reviewed preventive maintenance records available for the above mentioned NSSS components for the period of January to June 1979.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
IE Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices Discussions conducted with responsible management personnel revealed that when IEB's, IEC's and IN's are received onsite they are reviewed by gA personnel for site applicability, need for IE response, and distributed to affected site engineering organizations for input or information.
(Closed)
IEB 78-05:
Malfunctioning of circuit breaker auxiliary contact mechanism - General Electric Model CR 105X.
FPL supplemented its initial response (L-78-219) by letter (L-79-166) dated June 15, 1979, stating the licensee has determined that the subject GE CR 105X auxiliary contact mechanisms are not in use or planned for use in safety related systems for St. Lucie Unit 2 ~
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
(Closed)
IEB 78-06:
Defective Cutler-Hammer, Type M relays with DC coils'y supplemental letter (L-79-165) dated June 15, 1979, FPL has determined that Cutler-Hammer, Type M relays with DC coils are not in use or planned for use in safety related systems at St. Lucie Unit 2.
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
(Open)
IEB 78-12B:
A Typical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds.
FPL stated in its letter of response (L-79-159) dated June 11, 1979 that by letter (LD-79-024 dated April 25, 1979)
from Mr. A. E. Scherer, Licensing Manager, CE to the Director, NRC Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, CE intends to submit the generic report requested by Item 1 of IEB 78-12B by June 8,
1979 and will provide FPL with information so they can respond to the Bulletin by June 29, 1979.
Accordingly, FPL feels it can respond to IEB 78-12B by June 29, 1979.
(Closed)
IEB 79-03:
Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company (YWEC).
FPL stated in its letter of response (L-79-160)
dated June 11, 1979 that they have determined that ASME SA-312 Type 304 or other welded pipe (without filler metal) manufactured by YWEC is not used or planned for use in safety related systems at St. Lucie Unit 2.
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
(Closed)
IEB 79-04:
Incorrect w'eights for swing check valves manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation.
The licensee responded by letter (L-79-129)
dated May 22, 1979, stating that no Velan check valves are supplied for St.
tucie Unit 2.
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this tim (Closed)
IEB 79-07:
Seismic stress analysis safety-related piping.
FPL stated in its letter of response (L-79-164) dated June 14, 1979, that none of the methods specified in the subject Bulletin were used by the AE or the NSSS vendor for St. Lucie Unit 2.
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
(Open)
IEB 79-09:
Failures of GE Type AK-2 circuit breakers in safety related systems.
The licensee responded by letter (L-79-156) dated June 7, 1979, stating if the subject circuit breakers are used in St. Lucie Unit 2, procedures similar to those described in St. Lucie 1, IEB 79-09 response (L-79-130 dated May 22, 1979) will be developed prior to initial fuel loading.
(Closed)
Nonconforming pipe support struts.
RII inspector inquiry into this matter revealed that FPL had its AE (EBASCO) research this IN and by letter SL-2-79-291 dated May 21, 1979 EBASCO stated that Bergen-Paterson had reviewed the struts used on St. Lucie Unit 2 and con-cluded that all struts were adequate for their design application.
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.