IR 05000387/1981027

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IE Insp Rept 50-387/81-27 on 811119-1221.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Testing,Fire Protection,Staff Training,Bulletins & Circulars & Fuel Receipt
ML17139A503
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna 
Issue date: 12/23/1981
From: Mccabe E, Mccann J, Rhoads G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17139A502 List:
References
50-387-81-27, IEB-79-26, IEB-80-09, IEB-80-9, IEC-77-05, IEC-77-5, IEC-80-04, IEC-80-4, IEC-81-09, IEC-81-9, NUDOCS 8201070204
Download: ML17139A503 (36)


Text

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Docket No.

50-387 U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY, COMMISSION-OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I

N

. 00'PR-101 Priority Licensee:

pe ns 1 ania Power and Li ht Com an Category B

2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns 1 vania 18101 Facility Name:

Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection at:

Salem Township, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:

November 19 - December 21, 1981 Inspectors:

oa s, esl ent nspec or c ann, esl en nspec or date signed JX ~ 5/

date igned Approved by:

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eac or ojects Section No. 2B, DRPI date signed s 2./zg Ip)

date signed Ins ection Summar

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19 -D 0 7 21, 1981

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. 50-'287RRl-277 Routine resident (154.hr.N) inspection of: I'reoperational testing; fire protection; operating staff training; fuel teceipt; bulletins and circulars; open items; and p'Iant status, Two open items, 3 Circulars, and 1 Bulletin were closed.

Five new items were opened including training fov NRC tl.icenses not being measured to cur-rent, highev numerical grade reqNrements and completion of the large amount of health physicssand respirator training required before fuel load.

Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an L. Adams, Plant Supervisor of Operations T. Clymer, Site gAE F. Eisenhuth, Senior Compliance Engineer E. Gorski, Plant guality Supervisor J.

Green, Operations guality Assurance Supervisor H. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant D. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant Bechtel Cor oration E. Figard, ISG Supervisor M. Johnson, ISG QC Engineer The inspectors also interviewed other PP8L employees, as well as employees

.

of Bechtel.

2.

Licensee Action on NRC Findin s:

a.

(Closed)

Unresolved Item (387/80-14-02)

U date of Required Reading List or ua it ontro ns ec ors.

On November 25, 1981 the revised guality Control Required Reading List was reviewed.

The list did include all FSAR Table 17.2-1 items as one of the required reading topics.

This item is closed, b.

(Closed)

Ins ector Followu Item (387/80-14-09)

250 LtDC Battery preopet'a-tiona est.

On November 23, 1981 the test results of the Preoperational Test, P88,1, Revision 1 was reviewed.

The test had been reviewed and approVed by the Superintendent of Plant on July 17, 1981, This item is closed, c.

(Closed)

Ins ector Followu Item (387/80-16-06 Ino erable Public Address

~ss tern.

On November 18, 1981 the public address system was verified to be operating properly in the Core Spray Room B, Reactor Building, elevation 646'.

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Closed) Unresolved'tem (387 80-20-'04) Alarm'Testin

.

On December 8, 1981 FSAR Section 14,2.4.2, Revision 26 was peyjewed, This section describes the method the licensee is using to test alarlas, This item is closed.

e.

Closed Unresolved Item" 387 80-'20-12 Re ortabilit of'Startu Field

~R" SFR The inspector had previously reviewed SFR's and noted three that might be potentia11y reportable under

CFR 5$(55(e).

On November 18, 1981 a review of the licensee's action on these three SFR's was performed.

All three items were reviewed for reportability and sub-sequently found to be not reportable.

The following references document this review and determination:

PP8L Internal Letter, PLI-11544, dated January 8, 1981, PP8L Internal Letter, PLI-12182, dated February 18, 1981.

Bechtel Letter to PP8L, BLP-12497, dated May 30, 1980,.

This item is closed.

f.

Closed Ins ector Fol 1 owu Item 387/81-24-01)

Timel Issuance of Pro-ce ures.

Revision 2 to Administrative Procedure AD-gA-101 titled, "Procedure Pro-gram" was reviewed on December 8, 1981.

Section 6.6.2 stated that issuance date of procedures should be within five working days of approval unless otherwise specified by the Superintendent of Plant.

This item is closed.

g.

(Closed)

Ins ector Followu Item (387/80-28-13)

Reactor Core Isolation 00 lng ys em reo era iona es

.

On November 23, 1981 the Preoperational Test, P50. 1, Revision 1 and FSAR Revision 26 were reviewed to verify all inspector comments had been resolved.

This item is closed.

h, (0 en)

Ins ector'Folloivu Item 387 80-'28-07)

Halon'S stem -'ower Genera-tion ontro Com ex.

FSAR Section 9.5. 1.2.5 refers to the Halon 1301 fire suppression system described in General Electric Topical Report NEDO-10466 dated February 3,972, however, only Reyision 2 to that document dated garch, 1978 describes the Halon system, FSAR Section 9.5.9 (references}

has still not been up-dated to specify the correct reyision of NED0-10466,

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Closed Ins ector Foll owu Item 387/81-09-02, Com 1 etc Review and A

rova of Nuc ear De artment Instructions Re ar s n ra> ns n

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See detailL5;:c of~tliis repor.t;

~,(p 0 en) Ins ector Followu Item (387/81-09-01')

Com lete Review and A

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enenc rainin Pro rams.

See detail 6 o~.atilt'hhiisseaport',

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Unresolved Item 387 78-'05-'01 Containment Isolation Valves.

On December 14, 1981 the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Section 6,2.4,2 which stated that the use of'mergency core cooling heat exchanger valves acceptable f'r use as containment isolation valves.

This item is closed.

1.

(Closed)'Constru'ction Deficienc 'Re'or t (387/80-'00-'04;'388/80-00-04)

ITT Genera ontro s'amotor ctuator Deficienc

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This item is covered under Bulletin 80-09 in Section 4.

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Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant during normal and backshift hours.

During these tours,, the following items were evaluated:

Hot Work: Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures used.

Fire Equipment: Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.

Housekeeping:

Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels of systems under or following testing.

Equipment Preservation:

Maintenance or special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable.

Component Tagging:

Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety, equipment protections and jurisdiction.

Instrumentation:

Adequate protection for installed instrumentation.

Logs: Completeness of logs maintained.

Security:

Adequate site construction security.

Cable Installation:

Adequate precautions taken to prevent damage to in-stalled cables.

Communications:

Adequate public address system.

Equipment Maintenance and Controls: Corrective maintenance is performed in accordance with approved procedures, no unauthorized work activities on systems or equipment, no uncontrolled openings in previously cleaned or flushed systems or components.

No unacceptable items were identifie g e

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5, 4,

IE Bulletin and'Circular Followu IE Bulletins and Ci rculars listed below were reviewed to verify the following:

(a) Bulletins and circulars received by PP8L corporate management were for-warded to appropriate individuals within the organization, including station management, for information, review and/or corrective actions as required.

(b)

PP&L bulletin responses were submitted to the NRC within the specified time period.

(c) Licensee reviews and evaluations of bulletins and circulars are complete and accurate, as supported by other facility records and by inspector observations of installed plant equipment.

(d) Corrective actions specified in licensee bulletin responses or internal ciraular evaluation memoranda have been completed and/or responsib'i'ljities have been assigned for completion.

h-- 'ircular'77-'05,'

"Possible Li uid'Entra'ment'in'Valve'Bonnets."

(1)

References:

(a)

PPEL letter to Bechtel Power Corporation, PLB-7217, dated May 6, 1977.

(b)

Bechtel letter to PP8L, BLP-8466, dated October 26, 1977.

(c)

PP8L letter to Bechtel, PLB-8146, dated April 25, 1978.

(d)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-2687, dated April 25, 1978.

(e)

Bechtel letter to PP8L, BLP-9593, dated August 7, 1978.

(f)

Bechtel letter to PP8L, BLP-9740, dated September 13, 1978.

(g)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-2687, dated November 5, 1980.

(2)

~Fihdin s:

5efegeg~ce (a) through'~(g)Tdocutseits the licensee's "peyiew oy this

<cl)euler; QTe~jcensee stated the" p(obl~e

<Lj<Lgot exjst pt susgue-Fhannq gteaIg'~Electrjc S~ttigg, and'that. bg exepcjsjnq, gl] geste yves Ca te tqdrostptic testing the posgjbility ot"water entr.apttient'in the

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6.

PP8L draft "Technical Specification for Hydrostatic Test Re-quirements for Piping After Repair or Replacement" was reviewed.

Section 3.5.2.4 states that upon completion of hydrostatic testing the gate valves within the test boundaries shall be exercised during draining to preclude the possibility of water entrapment in the bonnet.

This circular is closed.

Circulai 80-'04

"Securin

'of'Threaded'Lockin

'Devices'on'Safet'-'Related ul ment.

(1)

Re fei ences:

(a)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-7557, dated March 25, 1980.

(b)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-8054, dated May 5, 1980.

(c)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-8432, dated May 28, 1980, (d)

General Electric Company letter to PP8L, GP-80-168, dated October 16, 1980.

(e)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-10979, dated December 3,

1980.

(f)

PP8L letter to General Electric Company, PLG-1608, dated December 8, 1980.

(g)

PPEL internal letter, PLIS-54, dated April 8, 1981.

(h)

PP8L internal letter, PLI-13456, dated May 8, 1981.

(i)

PP8L internal letter, PLIS-791, dated July 21, 1981.

(j)

PPSL internal letter, PLIS-1118, dated September 4, 1981.

(2)

~Findin s:

A review of references (a) through (j) noted the following:

(a)

General Electric had reported to the licensee that the Main Steam Isolation Valves, Turbine Stop Valves, and Combined Inter-mediate Valves supplied to the licensee had been reviewed, and that all internal threaded connections, were prevente from loosening by peening, lockplates or pinnin n 1 l

7, (b)

Training with respect to the circular, stressing the importance of locking devices was conducted for the electrical and mechanical maintenance personnel.

(c)

The licensee feels that the Administrative Procedure AD-00-025, Conduct of Haintenance is adequate to provide the requirements for securing of locking devices on threaded fasteners.

The pro-cedure requires that controlled procedures and drawings be utilized to perform maintenance on safety-related equipment.

These con-trolled documents would provide the requirements for locking devices.

This circular is closed.

Circular"81-'09; "Containment'Effluent

'. Water That B

asses Radioactivit onstor.

(1) 'eferences:

(a)

PPSL internal letter, PLI-14192, dated August 3, 1981.

(2) ~Findin s:

Reference (a) stated that a review of appropriate P8 ID's had been studied to identify water systems penetrating primary containment which were not radiation monitored.

Two drain lines were discovered which did not have radiation monitors in-stalled, but since both lines led to the Liquid Radwaste Treatment'ystepj.'hich is treated and monitored prior to release to the environment,'no modifications are planned.

A review of water system PEID's and tours of the containment resulted in no additional unmonitored lines.

This circular is close h tl U

8.

Bulletin 79-26, Revision 1, "Boron Loss From" BWR'Control Rod Blades."

(1) References:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

PP&L Letter to NRC, PLA-623, dated February ll, 1981.

Susquehanna Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Section 3.2.3.14.

PP&L Reactor Engineering Procedure, RE-TP-015, Revision 0, "Control Blade Lifetime Determination and Replacement Criteria," approved November 25, 1981.

NRC Letter to PP&L dated December 1,

1981.

PP&L Surveillance Procedure, SR-00-003, Revision 0 (Draft), "Shut-down Margin Demonstration."

(2) ~Findin s:

(a)

The licensee committed in reference (a') to record and update on a continual basis the exposure history of each control blade, and that the depletion of B-10 in each blade would be detqrmined from this exposure history.

Reference (c) established a method for using exposure history as computed by the plant process computor to deter-mine B-10 depletion in control rods.

(b)

(c)

The licensee committed in refulgence (a) to replace individual control rods prior to exceeding 34Ã B~" depletion.

Reference (c) established'

method for determining which rods would exceed 34% B~O depletion during next fuel cycle, and established this as a criterion for re-placement of the control rod.

The licensee committed in reference (a) to perform Shutdown Margin Tests in accordance with technical specifications, and include a

reactivity term in calculation to reflect reactivity due to (boron loss.

(d)

Reference (e)

was reviewed, and it was noted that this draft pro-cedure did incorporate requirements of-.the bulletin for,'hutdown Margin Test.

The licensee did not commit to performing destructive testing of control rod blades as requested by the bulletin.

On December 16, 1981 reference (d) was reviewed.

This letter from the Assistant Director of Licensing of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) stated that the NRC staff was presently reviewing a General Electric Report NED0-24226, "Evaluation of Control Rod Blade Lifetime With Potential Loss of B4C."

The letter stated the following concerning the bulletin:

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9, In the event the final evaluation of GE Report NEDO-24226 is not completed prior to licensing a'ction on Susquehanna, Unit 1, we will condition the operating 'license to be responsive to IE Bulletin No.

79-26, Revision 1.

In the ev'ent that satisfactory resolution for this issue is achieved following the 1icen'sing, action on Susquehanna, Unit 1, a recommendation to remove this license condition will be taken into consideration.

El (e)

Reference (c) did not state any periodicity requirement f'r the control rod blade boron depletion determination.

On December 14, 1981 the inspector discussed this with the Senior Nuclear Engineer, who stated the intent was to perform this procedure prior to, or during each refueling outage.

The inspector stated that this should be placed in writing so that requirement would not be overlooked.

I This bulletin remains open pending incorporation of periodicity of control rod blade boron depletion determination into procedure ~

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"H dramotor Actuator'Deficiencies."

(1) References:

(a)

Bechtel Materials Requisition M-336A, Revision 14.

(b)

Bechtel Materials Requisition M-362, Revision 10.

(c)

ITT-General Controls Letter to NRC dated December 7,

1979.

(d)

PPSL Letter to NRC, PLA-464, dated March 28, 1980.

(e)

PPSL Internal Letter, PLI-7854, dated April 22, 1980.

(f)

American Warming 5 Ventilating to NRC dated May 6, 1980.

(g)

Bechtel Letter to PP8L, BLP-12432, dated May 16, 1980.

(h)

PP8L Internal Letter, PLI-8360, dated May 28,~1980.

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(i)

PP8L L~etter to Bechtel, PLB-11391, dated May 29, il980.

(j)

PPSL Internal Letter, PLI-8429, dated May 29, 1980.

(k)

PPSL Letter to NRC, PLA-500, dated July 2, 1980.

(l)

PPSL L~etter to Bechtel, PLB-11570, dated July 9, 1980.

(m)

Buffalo Forge L~etters to Bechtel dated July 11, 17, C3 (n)

Bechtel Letter to PPSL, BLP-12860, dated August 5, 1980.

(o)

PP&L Internal L~etter, PLI-9363, dated August 21, 1980.

(p)

PLA Letter to NRC, PLA-534, dated August 25, 1980.

(q)

American Warming and Ventilating, Inc. Letter to NRC dated October 7,

1981.

(r)

Work Authorizations (WA)

WA-U10956 WA-U12355 WA-U12425 WA-U10956 (s)

Preoperational Test P34.1, Revision I

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(2) ~indin<is:

11, References (a) through (s) were reviewed on December 9, 1981.

From this review it was determined that ITT General Controls Model NH-96 Series Hydramotor Actuators had been provided to the licensee by American Warming and Ventilating, Inc.

(AWV) and by Buffalo Forge Company.

Both companies have responded to the licensee confirming that the Hydramotor Actuators provided to the site would perform acceptably.

The licensee also performed testing of all modulating dampers in accordance with reference (r).

All dampers listed in reference (f) for Unit 1 were verified to be tested in reference (s).

This item is close I r

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0 eratin Staff Trainin 12..

(a) The procedures listed below were reviewed to determine if the initial training commitments specified in the Final Safety Analysys Report weI'e being implemented:

Nuclear Department Instruction (NDI) gA-4. 1.2, ReVision 0 of Septembey 11,. 1981, "Training Responsibilities."

Nuclear Department Instruction (NDI) 4, 1.3, Revision 0 of Decelqbep 18, 1980, "Training Courses and Scheduling,"

Nuclear Department Instruction (NDI) gA-4. 1,4, Revision 0 oi'eptember 15, 1981, "Instructor Certification."

Nuclear Depar'tment Instruction (NDI) 4.2.1, Revision 0 of June 17, 1981,

<Licensed Operator Training and qualification Program,"

Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) gA-8600, Revision 0 of September 16, 1981, "Training Documentation."

Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) gA-3400, Revision 0 of October 12, 1981, "Selection Examinations Program.".

Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) gA-7300, Revision 0 of September 25, 1981,

"On-The-Job Training."

Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) gA-3100, Rev~ision 0 of September 17, 1981, "Plant Access Training."

Nuclear Training Instruction (NTI) gA-8200, Revision 0 of September 8,

1981,

"Personal Training Records."

Administrative Directive AD-00-049, Revision 0 of March 21, 1979,

"gualification and Training of Maintenance Personnel."

Administrative Directive AD-00-730, Revision 0 of November 12, 1981,

"Health Physics Training Programs."

(b) Personal training records of at least two individuals from each category listed below were reviewed to determine if training requirements were being met.

Selected persons were also interviewed to verify the accuracy of their personal training records:

Principle staff members Reactor operator candidates Senior reactor operator candidates Maintenance craftsmen Radiation protection technicians Technical staff members

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((c) ~Findin s:

13.

One of the documents required by NTI-gA-8200 to be included in personal training records is an individual or position training curriculum.

These documents are still being developed as part of procedure NTI-(A-3002A.

The training curriculum is basicallyi a check-list of specific 'tra'ining cata-logue courses which are required/recommended for each individual or job classification.

Several draft curricula were reviewed including those for Reactor Operators, Senior Reactor Operators, and Health Physics Technicians.

These curricula adequately incorporated the training requirements of higher level instructions.

A training department representative stated that the training curricula would be developed and included in all personal training records.

It was also noted that no specific training programs were in place for chemistry technicians. or technical professional staff members such as Re-actor Engineers, Health Physics Specialists and some principle staff members.

The training department representative stated that position or individual training curricula would also be developed for these personnel.

Licensee progress in this area will be followed up in a future inspection.

(50-387/

81-27,-01)

Implementing instructions and procedures are sufficiently developed, with exceptions<no'ted above, to alleviate the concerns identified in Inspector Followup Item 50-387/81-09-02.

Continued adequacy of and conformance with approved training procedures will be monitored as part of the routine in-spection program.

Another document required by NTI-q4-8200 to be included jn pepsonq1 tppjnjng records is an Employee Background Tpajnjng Record.

Many tragnjnp pecopls reviewed did not contain this document, It ~s noted that thiq dqcgqent was only recently required to be included (in the persona+1 training records and that auditable records of this information are y1se required in personnel files, which are kept at the corporate offices, The'tpyjnjng department representative was aware of the'ew requipement to j,nclude thgs information in the training records and was already collecting jt, Procedure NDI-gA 4.2. 1, Revision 0 of April 1, 1981 requires that Training for Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operators be documented on Attach-ment 1 to the procedure.

This form is also used to document recommendation of the individual for NRC licensing.

These forms had not yet been prepared and included in 'Iicensed operator training records.

The training depart-ment representative was aware of this problem and stated that the new forms would be prepared and completed prior to recommending individuals for an

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NRC license.

Licensee compliance with these new procedural documentation requirements will be verified in a future inspection.

(50-387/81-27-02)

Many individuals who will need Health Physics Level II and Respirator Training have not completed it.

A training department representative ack-nowledged that approximately 20Ã of those who will require this training have not received it, and that these individuals are primarily more senior station personnel with very restrictive schedules; The training staff is planning a large scale effort to complete the training prior to fuel load, and may augment the training staff with outside instructors, for that purpose.

Licensee completion of this training will be verified in a future inspection.

(50-387/81-27-03)

Procedure NDI-(A-4.2.1, Revision 0 of April 1, 1981, Licensed Opepptop Training Program requires that candidates for NPC pepctop gpepqtop op Senlop Reactor Operator licenses complete a written certification examination with an overall score -of at least 80/ and a score of at least 70$ in each area prior to recommendation for licensing.

This reflects current acceptance criteria for NRC written operator license examinations.

Training records for several licensed operator candidates contained certificates dated August 17, 1979 from the General Electric BWR Training Center in Morris, Illinois indicating that the candidates had demonstrated adequate knowledge at the Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator level overall and specific area written examination grades were attached to the certificates.

Grades fop three out of four candidates did not meet the current requirements of procedure NDI-(A-4.2.1 and no subsequent certification examinations were recorded.

Discussions with a training department representative confirmed the licensee's intent to use the General Electric Certificate to satisfy the written examination requirements of NDI-(A-4.2. 1 for these operators and that the effect of upgraded passing score requirements had not been recognized.

The inspector stated that recommendation of candidates for NRC licensing based on the General Electric Certificates alone would not be acceptable if the grades fell below current standards, and that to meet the intent of'DI-(A-4.2.1 additional justification that the candidates have an adequate level of knowledge would be required.

This item is un-resolved pending review of the licensee's actions to verify that the licensed operator candidates have demonstrated adequate knowledge in all required areas prior to recommendation for NRC licensing.

(50-387/81-27-04)

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15, 6.

Com arison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Descri tion (a) The as-built condition of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

System was checked against the drawings and descriptions in the FSAR.

This check consisted of:

Verification that latest copies of system field drawings are in agreement with FSAR Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID's).

Verification by field observation that the components are installed as described in the FSAR.

References used were:

Inspection and Enforcement Report No. 50-387/81-02-02.

Bechtel Drawing No. M-155, Revision 13, with attachments.

Bechtel Drawing No. M-l56, Revision 11, with attachments.

FSAR Section 6.3.

FSAR Figures 6.3-1a and 6.3-16, Revision 25 of July, 1981.

FSAR Section 7.3.1.

The major portion of instrumentation and logic verification was accomp-lished during Inspection 50-387/81-02-02 as part of the research for re-view of Preoperational Test P52.1, therefore, this inspection was limited to verification of proper sensor and output locations.

All piping and mechanical portions of the system were

'walked down.'-"

(b) Findings:

The P8ID's in the FSAR are in substantial agreement with the latest field drawings and the 'as-built'ondition of the system.

There were two differences between the PAID's in the FSAR and the as-built system.

The first difference was the addition of a third isolation valve in the vent line for the HPCI pump discharge.

This valve was properly identified and approved on an interim drawing change to the Field PAID drawings, and was added to allow operation of two isolation valves from outside the steam tunnel instead of having to go into the tunnel.

The inboard isolation valve in the vent line is inside the steam tunnel, but will be locked open.

The second difference was a spectacle flange on the spool piece connecting the auxiliary steam system to the HPCI turbine.

This item was discussed with the system start-up engineer who stated that the spectacle flange was a temporary installation and would be removed when testing with auxiliary steam was completed.

This will be verified during a future inspection.

(50-387/81-27-05)

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16, Several relatively minor material deficiencies such as missi'ng valve identification tags, a cracked gage glass, and a missing test connection cap were also identified, and provided as a list to station management on December 11, 1981.

The Station Superintendent stated that it had been his intention to have operations personnel perform similar detailed system

'walk downs'n the future, and that he would expect material deficiencies of this nature to be identified for correction at that time.

I 7., Fire Protection

~I a.

Fire protection equipment in the control room, relay rooms and cable I-*'

spreading rooms were examined on a sampling basis for operability and proper installation to the extent that the installation is completed.

This inspection included fire alarm installations, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls and indications.

Fire protection equipment was also'xamined at various locations on the refueling floor, railroad air lock, diesel engine fire pump room, diesel generator building, and the turbine central area.

The following references were used to determined current requirements:

FSAR Section 9.5.1.

Part 9.5 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) with supplements 1 and 2.

Bechtel Drawings M-122 and M-178.

SSES Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection Review Report, Revision

March, 1981.

PPSL Letter, PLA-683, dated March 26, 1981.

NRC Letter, R. L. Tedesco to Norman kl. Curtis, dated January 13, 1981.

PPSL Letter, PLA-855, dated June 19, 1981.

PPSL Letter, PLB-11113, dated April 9, 1980.

b.

No violations were observed.

An inspection was performed by the Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool from December 17 to December 20, 1981.

The inspection findings will be reviewed under the routine NRC inspection pro-gra ~

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17, Followu 'on Licensee'dentified Items On November 24, 1981, the licensee telephoned the NRC regional office to dis-cuss problems found in 82 of 156 Agastat type GP relays during propel'attonal testing of the diesel generators.

The Agastat GPDC-740 control relays did not switch as required because of im-proper contact alignment.

Subsequent discussions with the Vendor product specialist revealed that all Agastat GP type relays manufactured before August, 1977, are subject to this problem, which was caused by shrinkage of the molded plastic contact base after removal from the mold which in tut n causes binding of the contact arm.

The diesels and control circuits were manufactured by Cooper-Bessemer.

Approximately BO Agastat GP relays are used for each one.

Virtually all functions of the diesel controller,t:includin'g emergency, start, were affected

.The relays are a standard commercial product and were not manufactured specifically for nuclear plant use, however, it is known that this type relay is installed in several other systems.

The licensee tested all of the relays for each diesel.

They will keep

operable relays from the diesel controllers on site and send the remainder back to Agastat for rework/replacement.

This will allow them to keep one operational diesel until sufficient replacement relays are received.

All of the relays will eventually be replaced.

The licensee is determining where the GP type relays were used in other plant systems, and what action may be required.

The licensee determined that this information is reportable under the requirements of 10CFR Part 50.55(e).

Resolution of this problem will be the subject of.a future inspection report.

(50-387/81-27-0~6)

Mana ement Meetin On November 20, 1981 the licensee corporate management representatives in-cluding the Senior Vice President-Nuclear, Vice President-Nuclear Operations, Vice President-Engineering and Construction, and the Superintendent of Plant met with representatives from Region 1 to discuss completion of construction and preparations for operations.

No enforcement action,- or significant safety issues were involved.

I Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of'oncompliance, or deviations.

Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section 5.c.

Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings u(ere held with facility management to discuss the inspection and findings identi.fied.,

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