IR 05000387/1981016

IE Insp Rept 50-387/81-16 on 810803-0814 & 0831-0915.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Program & Witnessing & Emergency Planning Training

ML17139A432
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	09/18/1981
From:	Mccabe E, Rhoads G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17139A431	List: IR 05000387/1981016 ML17139A430
References
50-387-81-16, NUDOCS 8110060480
Download: ML17139A432 (18)

Text

Report No.

I

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I License No.

Licensee:

Priority Category B

s 1 an'a 18101 Facility Name:

S s uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection at:

Salem Township, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:

August 3-August 14, 1981 and August 31-September 15',

1981 Inspectors:

~l is1 date signed date signed Approved by:

Ebe C.

McCabe, Chse

,

eac or rogects Section No. 28, DRPI date signed vl duelsl date signed Ins ection Summar:

'8 dg 3-dg 319,1981 dllg 31-lPtlgl ldilddt (Report No. 50-3387/81-16)

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9:p p t'II program implementating, preoperational test review, preoperational test witnessing, emergency planning training, and licensee event followup, The inspection involved 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> by -the resident inspector during both regular and backshift periods, Results:

No items of noncompliance were identified.

Region I Form 12 (Rev.

April 77)

8110060480 810918 PDR ADOCK 05000387

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an L. Adams, Plant Supervisor of Operations T. Clymer, Site gAE F. Eisenhuth, Senior Compliance Engineer E. Gorski, Plant guality Supervisor J.

Green, Operations guality Assurance Supervisor H. Keiser, Superintendent of Plant D. Thompson, Assistant Superintendent of Plant G. Yezefski, ISG Test Engineer Bechtel Cor oration E. Figard, ISG Supervisor N. Johnson, ISG gC Engineer K. Stout, Project Field guality Control Engineer r;:The inspector'aisle;j'nteryiewed other pflLL employees, as well as employees of Bechtel.;f

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2. 'Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant during normal and backshift hours.

- During these tours, the following items were evaluated:

Hot Work: Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures used.

Fire Equipment: Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.

Housekeeping:

Ninimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels of systems under or following testing.

Equipment Preservation:

Maintenance or special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable.

Component Tagging:

Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety, equipment protections and jurisdiction.

Instrumentation:

Adequate protection for installed instrumentation.

Logs: Completeness of logs maintaine II, I

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Security:

Adequate site construction security.

Cable Installation:

Adequate precautions taken to prevent damage to in-stalled cables.

Cotmunications:

Adequate public address system.

Equipment Maintenance and Controls: Corrective maintenance is performed in accordance with approved procedures, no unauthorized work activities, on systems or equipment, no uncontrolled openings in previously cleaned or flushed systems or components.

No unacceptable items were identified.

3.

Prep erational Test Review a.

Transversin In-Core Probe S stem (1)

Re ferences:

(a)

Preoperational Test P78.4 Revision 1, Test Review Board reviewed September 1,

1981.

(b)

FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.4.5.

(c)

FSAR Section 7.7.1.6.

(d)

FSAR Section 14.2.12.1.

(e)

Regulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 1.'2)

Findings:

The inspector reviewed reference'a)

to ascertain whether design and operational commitments made in references (b) through (e) were adequately tested; The inspector noted the following:

(a)

Appendix I to reference (a) signifies that there were no alarms

'o undergo prerequisite testing in accordance with Technical Procedure (TP) 1.9.

The inspector noted that the system did con-tain alarms and annunciators.

(b)

Reference (a)

does not test the containment isolation signal for the transversing in-core probe system while it is in the manual operating mode.

Reference (c) states that the isolation signal is operable in both the manual and automatic modes of operating.

The inspector gave these comments to the ISG Coordinator on September 4,

1981, and to the Assistant Superintendent of plant on September 5,

1981.

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,, 'tt The resolution to these comments will be reviewed during p subsequent NRC inspection.

(387/81-16-01}

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4.

Meetin s Attended a.

Advisor Committee on ~Reactor Safe uards'CRS)*Meetin The inspector attended a meeting of the full committee of the ACRS on August 7, 1981.

The meeting was convened to discuss the licensee's application for an operating license for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.

A letter documenting the outcome of this meeting was issued by the ACRS on August 11, 1981, to Commission Chairman Palladino.

b.

Prehearin Conference The inspector attended a meeting on August 12, 1981 among members of the Licensee Staff, the NRC's Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Office of the Executive Legal Director, various intervenor participants, and members from the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency,(PEMA) and Department of Environmental Resources (DER).

Also a member of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in attendance.

The meeting had been ordered by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLBI)

in charge of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station s ASLB hearings, The participants in this 'meeting discussed which contentions the interyenor's decided to drop due to new material presented, and in which. order the re-maining contentions shou1d be discussed in the hear~tin s

ached'u1ed to star October 6, 1981.

5.

Emer enc Plannin Trainin On September 4,

1981 the inspector attended an Emergency Plan implementing procedures walkthough with supervisors of the plant staff organization.

The purpose of this training was to ensure the on-site emergency organization has an understanding of their responsibilÃtfe's(as ilisted in the Susquehanna Emergency Plan.

A hand out listing all on-site supervisors responsibilities was given to the personnel attending the lecture.

The presentation consisted of a scenario initiated by a standby gas treatment system ventilation exhaust monitor high radiation alarm, and proceeded to point that airborne radioactivity was being released off-site.

The instructor walked through the implementing procedures in an attempt to show how to classify the incident, how to change classifica-tion as accident condition worsened, and how to proceed through implementing procedures as accident scenario developed.

The inspector had the following concerns:

(a) The objective as described in the handout was not completed since the participants did not discuss their responsibilities as listed in the Susquehanna Emergency Plan.

(b) The scenario as presented did not represent an actual condition that could exist at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, since the standby gas treat-ment system does not exhaust into another exhaust system as portrayed in the scenari I 'I V

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(c) The instructor stated that the Emergency Classification Logic Table in Implementing Procedure (EP-IP-001, Appendix C) is going to be amended.

Since this procedure was used extensively in this lesson, the value of con-ducting the training prior to a planned major change to the table is question-able.

These remarks were discussed with the Assistant Superintendent on September 8,

1981.

This item remains unres'olved pending a review of licensee resolution to the inspector's comments.

(387/81'-,"16-02)

6.

Construction Site.Incident On August 21, 1981, the licensee s security discovered a device consisting of a piece of copper tubing approximately 6" in length and 1" in diameter.

The device was capped at both ends.

The location of the pipe was on the 818 foot elevation, Unit 2 Reactor Building Refueling Floor.

The security guard felt the device could be a pipe bomb and notified security supervision.

State law en-forcement personnel were notified, the device was moved to a rear laydown area of the site and after confering with the state police, an Explosive Ordance Demolition (EOS)

Team was requested from Fort Indiantown Gap.

The team arrived and after examining the device, detonated a shell casing placed below the lip of the cap on one end of the device, causing the cap to be stripped off the de-vice.

No explosives were found inside the device.

The pipe was checked for fingerprints., but none could be found.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were notified of the event.

On September 3,

1981 the inspector reviewed Construction Site Incident Report Number 8-0018-81 dated August 21, 1981, which described the incident and actions taken by personnel.

No unacceptable conditions were noted.

Control Rod Drive Pi in a.

References:

(1)

PPEL letter to Bechtel Power Corporation, PCLBC-4408, dated June 1,

1981.

(2)

Bechtel Power Corporation internal letter, CME-5531, dated June 2, 1981.

(3)

Bechtel Power Corporation internal letter, ENC-6467, dated June 4, 1981.

(4)

Bechtel Power Corporation letter to PP&L, BCLPC-9183, dated June 11, 1981.

(5)

PPSL internal letter, PLIS-51'9, dated June 16, 1981.

(6)

PPSL letter to Bechtel Power Corporation, PCLBC-4499, dated July 1, 198 I ~

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(7)

PP&L Internal Letter, PLI-14119, dated July 8, 1981.

(8)

PP&L Internal Letter, PLIS-778, dated July 20, 1981.

(9)

PP&L Internal Letter, PLIS-788, dated July 21, 1981.

(10)

PP&L Internal Letter, PLIS-957, dated August 11, 1981.

(11) Bechtel Design Specification 8856-M-164 Revision 2, Design Specifica-tion for the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.

(12) General Electric System Design Specification Data Chart for Control Rod Drive System, 22A1342A4, Revision 0.

(13) General Electric System Design Specification for Control Rod Drive System, 27A1342, Revision 0.

(14) General Electric System Installation Specification for Reactor Assembly, Welding, Cleaning, Examination, and Storage, 22A4202, Revision 1.

(15)

ASME Section III Part NB4427, 1974 Code Through Winter 1976 Addendum.

(16)

ANSI B16.11, dated June 1973, titled Forged Steel Fittings, Socket-Welding and Threaded."

(17)

PP8L Internal Letter, PLIS-1079, dated August 28, 1981.

b.

~Findin s

The inspector reviewed references (1) through (14) and noted that the licensee was concerned over the acceptability of socket welds in the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System.

There are a series of five socket welds on each insert and withdraw line.

Reference (11) did not establish a scribing technique to assure a proper gap existed in the socket weld fitup prior to welding.

This gap is noted in reference (16) and shown on figure NB4427-1 of reference (15).

As stated in reference (16) the gap is to prevent problems in the cracking of fillet welds when the pipe is seated against the bottom of the socket 'prior to welding.

Reference (5) stated that NISCO, the subcontractor in charge of these welds utilized an informal scriging practice where socket weld fitup was verified and documented 1005 by their Welding Engineer, and monitored by their guality Control Engineering.

In discussions with the licensee representative, the inspector was informed that the Welding Engineer signed all Welding Process Control Cards signifying that the fitup was prope ~ ~

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The inspector then reviewed NISCO guali;ty Assurance Manual - ASME Section III, Revision C, Section 7.5.1, dated June 6, 1978', which states that the Field Engineer-Welding is responsible for the Engineering Hold Points and sign off the Welding Process Control Sheet (PCS) of the mechanical characteristics of the weld.

These characteristics were to include align-ment and 1/16" retraction of socket welds.

The inspector asked to review a number of Process Control Sheets and was informed that NISCO had the Process Control Sheets in their home office for review prior to N-stamping the CRD system and that the PCS would be on-site sometime in October.

This item will remain unresolved pending NRC review of the Process Control Sheets.

(387/81-16-03)

Since the licensee felt that NISCO was remiss in not using a scribing techni-que, it requested Bechtel to radiograph 105 of all welds not indicating a

scribe mark at each of the four insert/withdraw penetration bundles inside containment.

As described through references (8) through (10) forty welds Q were radiographed with one weld (Number 07-34-W) radiographed twice.

This weld indicated no gap during the first radiograph, and indicated a zero to 1/30" gap with the film rotated

for the second radiograph.

On August 13, 1981 the inspector walked down portions of the CRD insert and withdraw lines and inspected various socket welds.

The inspector noted many areas other than those radiographed which had socket welds without any visible scribe marks.

The inspector informed the Assistant Superintendent on September 8,

1981 that if a 10/ sample of all unscribed welds was the objective of the radio-graphs then the sample size was not large enough.

Also the inspector in-formed the Assistant Plant Superintendent that since scribe marks were not required in the NISCO Welding Procedures, the indication of a scribe-like mark on the socket weld lines did not necessarily mean proper fitup existed at time of welding.

This item will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

(387/81-16-04)

The inspector then reviewed reference (17) which described an inspection performed by PPSL guality Control of the CRD Hydraulic Piping System.

The report noted numerous welding discrepancies with the CRD system, including unsatisfactory weld surface defects on 17 welds, undersize welds on 21 welds, and insufficient slope which was found generic to all CRD penetrations.

A series of PPSL NCR's were written to document the problems noted.

On September.1, 1981 the inspector discussed their discrepancies with the Manager, Nuclear guality Assurance, who stated that PPSL Engineering was reviewing the results of the gC inspection, and attempting to determine the extent of the problem, and why these problems were not identified during the turnover process.

This item will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

(387/81-16-05)

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Circulation Hater Buildin Floodin On September 3 and 4, 1981 the jnspectop peyteqed jnfopttIgtjon concepnlng a flooding incident which happened duping the"epplg mopnjng 'of (unjust 18>

1981 in the circulating water building, The'fqllo~jng pefepences crepe reviewed:

(1)

Shift Supervisor's log enterings fop August 18, 1981, (2)

Control Room Operator's log entpjes fop August 18, 1981, (3)

Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP)-gP-42-004,

"Cooltng Toyep Injec-tion System,"

I(4)

TOP-OP-42-005,

"Cooling Tower,",sBlowdoWn Tratement System."

(5)

Plant Operating Procedure OP-42-001, "Circulating Hater System and Cooling Tower~Operations,"

approved September 2,

1981.

(

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Startup Administrative Procedure A06e10 Revision 4, approved April 7, 1981, (7)

Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 1, issued January 1977.

(8)

FSAR Section 13.5.

The incident occured as p1ant operators') started a second makeup water pump, and switched return path of maf(eup water from the 18" deicing intake structure line to the 30" blowdown line to accomodate extra wattle coming from having two makeup water pumps running.

.Val;ye-015-:003,. a'manual operated, normally open valve in the blowdown line had previously'een shut to pep-form maintenance downstream of the valve, and had not been repositioned when the tag permit was cleared following completion of the work.

This valve was also not checked when switching operation to the blowdown line, The inspector could not find any reference to check the position of this valve during his review of references (3) and (4).

Since this valve shut off the blowdown path, the water be'gan backing up into a 24" line coming from the Unit 2 blowdown line.

Hater backed up into the Unit 2 cooling tower basin, and into the Unit 2 circulating water suction lines.

These four 78" lines had manhole covers removed from them which permitted the, water to gravity drain into the circulating water bui1ding.

Operators piaced the manhoie covers back in piace and began repiacing nuts on the manho1e covers to slow down the water escaping from the lines.

This caused water to back up in the circulating water suction

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lines which began filling up a fire pump suction line which taps off the circulating water lines common connection.

A valve had been removed from this line for maintenance, and the opening'covered with tape to prevent debris from entering the system.

When water reached the level of this valve opening the tape did not hold, and water began coming out of this line.

By the time operator's had gotten the makeup water pumps stopped and the leak stopped, approximately 4'f'water covered the circulating water building floor.

Twenty-two motors were covered with water, mainly small drain pumps, and caustic pumps.

The inspector had the following concerns:

(1)

No procedure was in effect which controlled the evolution being con-ducted.

(2)

The tag permit system as approved does not require repositioning of valves/switches following maintenance to the normal operating position, nor is there a procedure which allows the operator to know status of valves not in the normal operating position.

On September 8,

1981 the inspector discussed this item with the Assistant Superintendent of Plant, who stated that the licensee also was concerned about the event, and had initiated two studies of the problem, one by the Operations Department Personnel, and another by the Nuclear Safety Assess-ment Group (NSAG).

The Assistant Superintendent also stated that the Protective Permit and Tag System (AD-gA-103, Revision 0, approved September 7,

1981)>'had just gone into effect and that the permit now required a "Return To" block to be completed which stipulated the position the valves are supposed to be in after the permit tags are removed following the required maintenance.

The Assistant Superintendent felt that if this was in effect during the event, the valve may not have been left in the wrong position.

The inspector will review the reports on this event during a subsequent NRC inspection.

(387/81-16-06)

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.

Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Sections 5."pnd 7,b, 10,.

Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with facility management to discuss the inspection and findings identifie ~

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