IR 05000387/1981005
| ML17139A149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1981 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Narrow L, Reynolds S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17139A148 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-81-05, 50-387-81-5, 50-388-81-02, 50-388-81-2, NUDOCS 8105060093 | |
| Download: ML17139A149 (12) | |
Text
'0 U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-387/81-05 Report No.
50-388/81-02 50-387 Docket No.
50-388 CPPR-101 Ad R
Priority B
Category A
Licensee:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns lvania 18101 Facility Name:
Sus uehanna Units
and
Inspection at:
Allentown, Pennsylvania and Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection condu ed:
February 5-6 and lu-20, 1981 Inspectors:
L.'arrow, Reactor Inspector ate signed
.
D. Reynolds, Reactor Inspector date signed Appr oved by:
E.
C.
McCabe, Jr'., Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B date signed s I ile)
date signed Ins ection Summar
Combined Inspection on Februar 5-6 and I8-20, 1981 Re ort No. 50-387/81-05, 50-388 8 -0 A~d:
R Rd dd d
Rd Ry dd y
R d
d R
of the licensee's work and gC activities related to welder qualifications, pipe welding performance and records, and the status of outstanding items.
The inspection involved 48 inspector hours on site; 23 on Unit 1 and 25 on Unit 2.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
SZ 65O6O Oa s
DETAILS 1..
Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an
"R. A. Beckley, Coordinator, NDE Training and Program E.
W. Carroll, Senior NQA Analyst
"S. L. Denson, Project Construction Manager R. Harris, Licensing Engineer
"P. Kyner, Resident NQA G.
E. Lockyer, NDE Consultant F. Martin, Senior Engineer
- R. E. Matthews, NQA Engineer C. McVicker, Supervising Engineer NQA Operations A. R. Sabol, Manager NQA R. A. Schwann, Supervising Engineer NQA Engineering
~R. A. Schwarz, Senior Project Engineer, Construction Bechtel Power Cor oration
"M. A.
Drucker, Lead QA Engineer K. Durland, Assistant Lead QC Engineer, Welding G ~ T.. Finnan, Lead QC Engineer, Welding J.
Khandhar, QA Engineer D. McWilliams, QC Engineering Aide
- J. O'ullivan, Assistant Project Field Engineer
"K. G. Stout, Project Field QC Engineer
'Denotes those present at the exit interview.
The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
2.
Plant Tour The'inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant during a general inspection of Units
and 2.
The inspector examined work items for obvious defects or noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.
Particular note was taken regarding the presence of quality control inspectors and indications of quality control activities.
In addition, the inspector interviewed craft and supervisory personnel encountered in the work area.
Specific work in progress and completed work observed by the inspector included recently completed reactor coolant pipe welds, installation of pipe restraint anchor pads, installed pipe hangers and supports and
protection of electrical wiring from sharp edges of cable trays and bi ol og ica 1 shi el d pen etr ati on s.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Welder uglification The NRC inspector reviewed the procedures followed for performance qualification testing of welders.
The welder training and qualifica-tion facility was inspected.
Two welders were observed being trained on 5G pipe weld assemblies.
The, wraparound bending fixture, electrode storage and handling systems and fixtures for test assemblies were noted and reviewed.
The NRC inspector accompanied one of the licensee's gA representatives on an audit of the Bechtel welder qualification records for 15 welders who performed welding on
Class A> >0 Class B
anct 2.C1ass C PjPe joints.
The licensee and Bechtel demonstrated their established procedures for the qualification of welders, maintenance of records for qualification status and conformance to ASME Code requirements for qualification.
The filler metal fssup slips provide the data for input to the monthly computer tabulation of welder activity.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Pi e Weldin
- Work in Pro ress and Record Review The inspector visually examined reactor coo1ant system completed welds DCA-207-1, FW4 and FW5 and reviewed welding records for these welds.
Final NDE had not been completed.
The inspector by direct observation inspected the root pass socket fillet weld HCC-131-23 FW9 which was being made as a spool piece weld.
The work was conducted in accordance with the Bechtel Traveler WRSa for multiple welds, the weld identification was noted, the WPS was in accordance with code requirements, the welding technique and sequence were adequate, no burn-through on the ID was noted, the filler metals correct, gas coverage acceptable, welding equipment in good condition, welder properly qualified, interpass cleaning acceptable and weld history records adequate.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Licensee Action on NRC Bulletins Bulletin 80-25:
Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWR's.
Target Rock safety relief valves are not used at this site and this bulletin has been distributed to interested personne This item is resolved.
6..
Licensee Action on NRC Circulars The following circulars have been closed since records on file in the licensee's office show that the equipment in question is not used at this site.
79-17 Contact Problem in SB-12 switches on General Electric Metal Clad Circuit Breakers 79-19 - Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pump Impellors 80-11 - Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures Circular 80-12:
Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May Fall out of Place Mhen Mounted Below Horizontal Axis is closed.
The licensee has inspected all Henry Pratt Butterfly Valves for orientation and to determine if keys are intact.
Two valves were found to have'-keyway below the horizontal.
The keyed connections were found to be tight and the end's of the shaft were "upset" to prevent keys from working loose.
Air operated valves supplied by other manufacturers were also inspected.
No valves were installed with shafts below horizontal and all keyed conn'ections were tight.
The inspector examined NCR No.
5949 and (}C inspection reports dated Deptember 10, '1980 and October 10, 1980 which showed that these valves had been inspected and the shaft ends upset except for one valve returned to vendor and two valves which had set screws lnsta1Ted to prevent loosening at keys.
This item is resolved.
Circular 78-15:
Tilting Disk Check Valves Fail to Close with Gravity in Vertical Position.
This circular is closed as discussed in Paragraph 7(b) below for item 387/80-00-03..
7.
Review of Nonroutine Events Identified b the Licensee (a)
Licensee letter PLA-446 dated February 1,
1980 reported as a
significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR. 50.55(e)
the unauthorized welding of an attachment to the Unit Pl reactor pressure vessel (RPV) (387/80-00-02 This item was also identified as an unresolved item during inspection 387/80-01.)
(b)
The NRC inspector reviewed the "Final Data Package for ASME
- Section XZ Repair of the Reactor Pressure Vessel per FODR KRl-193 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit I for PP&L Co." which described in detail the methods used to remove the unauthorized attachment and inspect the affected area.
The data contained in the subject report indicates that the weld metal and weld HAZ associated with the weld have been removed with no adverse ef'feet to the strength and reliability of the pressure vessel.
The NRC inspector visually inspected the location where. the unauthorized attachment was removed.
The NOE tests were witnessed by Peabody, Bechtel and licensee qualified personnel.
'The licensee's actions to preclude a recurrence were reviewed by the NRC inspector.'his item is considered closed.
By letter dated August 15, 1978, the licensee reported a
significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e);
failure of certain Anchor-Darling tilting disc check valves to close by gravity when installed in a vertical run of piping (78-00-03).
Licensees were also notified of this potential deficiency by IE Circular No. 78-15.
Documentation of the licensee's corrective actions were reviewed by the inspector during Inspection 387/80-15.
At that time the inspector observed that valves IF012A and B were tagged as not tested.
Retest of valve 1F012B identified failure to close properly.
The failure was identified on NCR No. 6092.
This NCR was dispositioned to disassemble all valves mounted in the vertical position, clean and cycle from open to close to assure that valve will close by gravity.
These corrective actions had been completed and NCR No.
6092 was closed and accepted by gC November 6, 1980.
This item is resolved.
(c)
By letter dated September 18, 1978 the licensee reported a
significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e);
fai lure of carriage bolt fasteners on 480 volt Motor Control Center (MCC) bus splices.
(78-00-04)
During installation of the MCC's, the contractor noted random failure of bolts used to fasten the bus'plice plates.
Failure was found to be due to use of 1/4 inch units with 3/8 inch bolts.
The problem was reported on NCR-No.
2825 and'CAR-1-27.
Corrective action consisted of replacement of all already installed splices with 3/8 inch bolts and nuts, updating of the vendors (Cutler-Hammer) instruction book to include torque value to be used and use of 3/8 inch nuts on
MCC's not yet installed.
The inspector reviewed the final report of the deficiency, NCR No.
2825 which showed the rework complete and which had been accepted by QC, and letters QAL 689 and 734, dated May 7, 1979 and August 3, 1979 which verified replacement and torqueing of bolts.
The inspector also examined selected inspection reports of bolt torqueing.
This item is resolved.
(d)
By letter dated March 23, 1979, the licensee reported a poten-tial significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e);
defective diodes in Circle Seal Model J-69B solenoid valves.
(79-00-03)
This item was later determined to be not reportable under
CFR 50.55(e)
but nevertheless corrective action was taken by the licensee and was reviewed by the inspector during inspection 387/80-33.
The item remained unresolved because of a discrepancy concerning the number of such valves furnished to the site.
The inspector examined:
Quality Action Request (QAR) No.
FO 43652; Circle Seal Controls letter to Bechtel dated January 22, 1981 with attached Packing List and Returned Material Report; and Circle Seals Certificate of Conformance dated January 16, 1979.
These documents confirmed that all of the defective diodes furnished to the site or to vendors for use on valves furnished to the site had been replaced.
This item is resolved.
8.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/76-09-02):
Control of Weld Procedures for weaving to reduce stresses in stainless steel welds.
This item has been reviewed during inspection 387/78-02 but remained unresolved.
The NRC inspector. reviewed the documentation and held a meeting with the licensee, Bechtel, and GE representatives in attendance.
The intent of the unresolved item was to indicate ambiguities in the welding documents that could lead to increases in sensitization of stainless steel.
The actions taken to rectify the ambiguity was to revise Bechtel Spec GWS-SN Revision 4 dated December 27, 1977.
Pipe welding under the cognizance of GE follows the GE limitations on weaving as a function of electrode diameter.
The NRC inspector also reviewed Bechtel FP-W-1 Rev 10 (instructions to welders).
In paragraph 3.12, Bechtel permits weaving of the cover pass in a single weave which may exceed a 3/4" weave previously committed to by
the licensee.
Cover pass weaving has no effect on pipe ID IGSCC susceptibility and is considered to be an acceptable practice.
As the licensee has revised the welding procedures, has conducted welder training sessions and will continue to instruct the welders in techniques to minimize heat input, this item is considered to be resolved.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (388/78-15-01):
Storage of RHR Heat Exchangers.
This item had been reviewed during Inspection 387/80-31; 388/80-19 and has been resolved except for the Unit 2 heat exchangers
'pending completion of the nitrogen layup for these units.
The inspector examined Bechtel Procedure FC1-N-193, Rev.
B, for
"Removal of Chromate Solutions and Dry Nitrogen Lay-up of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers 2E-205A and B" and the records of per-formance of this work.
The inspector also observed the installed nitrogen system including provisions for maintaining the required pressure.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (387/79-26-03):
Bechtel audit showed absence of QC monitoring/surveillance during post*weld heat treatment (PWHT).
The inspector discussed this questions with Bechtel QA and was informed that QC now monitors PWHT..
Correspondence between Bechtel QA and QC (QA/10>1362, KGS-706 and KGS-745)
was reviewed together with QA finding PFA 13-4-2, QAF-1 which was closed on April 23, 1980.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (79-40-06):
FSAR descriptions of Feedwater System Containment Isolation Valves.
Revision 15 of Paragraph 5.4.9.3 of the FSAR provides a description of the as-built construction of this system.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (387/78-99-01):
Closeout of NCR No.
2721.
This NCR was closed and accepted by QC August 5, 1980.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (387/80-01-01):
Hydrostatic tes s of portions of corespray pump and RHR pump discharge lines at less than required pressure.
The inspector examined NCR No.
5953 which identifies the lines which had been improperly tested, the required test pressures and showed all re-tests to be complete and accepted by QC on January 12, 1981.
Specification M-214, Rev.
7 had revised the schedule of hydrostatic test pressures.
The inspector also reviewed the hydrostatic tests results for these lines which showed the tests to have been performed under the required test condition The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Infraction (387/80-04-01; 388/80-02-01):
Failure to document chemical analysis of weld filler metal.
The subject infraction involved the utilization of E309L-'16 and ER 309 austenitic
'HAM and GTAW filler metals which met ASME Section II SFA-5.4 and SFA 5.9 filler metal requirements, but failed to be tested for residual elements required by ASME Section III (1974) Table 2432.1.
The fi11er, received before January 1972'y. the Limerick
- site and transferred.to Su'squehanna, did not, require'ana1'ysis for these elements.
The 1974 Edition of Section III requires that these elements be analyzed for information only rather than indicating a specific range or maximum for each element.
The filler metals meet all other requirements for Section III and are considered by the inspector to be metallurgically acceptable.
The actions taken by the licensee including residual analyses for three heats
'and weld joint deposit analyses for two welds was reviewed by the inspector and found acceptable.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Open)
Noncompliance (387/79-30-01):
Failure to apply design control to meet Section XI examination requirements for recirculation system field modifications.
The NRC inspector discussed the subject field modification with a-l,icensee's representative and the licensee's NOE consultant.
The'ifficulties involved in the ISI base line ultrasonic inspection of the joint, illustrated in Nuclear Energy Services, Inc.
Document 80A2787, page 10, were discussed in some detail.
NRC has continued to express concern that the subject joint which contains portions of the original weld, portions of the original riser/sweepolet joint, portions of the original sweepolet ID cladding, plus the new riser buildup and three new clad areas, in addition to the final butt weld, will present weld cast structures with coarse multi-directional columnar patterns that will greatly inhibit interpretation of the ultrasonic test.
The currently recommended wrought stainless steel calibration blocks cannot duplicate the complexity caused by the multidirectional columnar structures.
The NRC position with respect to this item remains as discussed during the meeting with the licensee and his consultants on October 29, 1979.and described in Inspection Report 387/79-37.
(Open) Unresolved Item (387/80-28-12):
Control rod drive stub tube weld evaluation.
The NRC inspector discusse'd, with Mr. Lockyer, NDT consultant to the licensee, the results of the Dr. Warren Savage-George E. Lockyer report on the metallurgical and NDE evaluation of the subject stub tube welds.
This item was previously discussed in Combined Report 50-387/80-23 and 50-388/80-15, and Report 50-387/80-2 The Savage-Lockyer report is entitled "Allegation of Crack-Like Ultrasonic Indications in the Control Rod Drive Housing to Stub Tube Melds for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Number One-Summary of Investigation" and was forwarded to the licensee by Mr.
Lockyer in a letter dated November 2, 1980.
The NRC inspector concurs with the explanation of the indication as caused by acoustic anisotropy resulting from the orientation of the coarse grains typical of facecentered cubic cast structures.
The NRC inspector also concurs with a statement attributed to Dr. Savage by Mr. Lockyer that the apparent orientation and distribution of ultrasonic indications was not consistent with the location of weld defects (from processes used) dictated by solidification mechanics.
Mr. Lockyer indicated that the "wave guide acoustic beam distortion was further verified by finger damping on the fillet surface."
This item remains open pending final review of the ultrasonic data and the Savage-Lockyer report by Region I.
9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on February 20, 1981.
In addition, the NRC Resident Inspector, Mr. G.
G.
Rhoads, attended the meeting.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and identified the inspection findings'.
pr,
":iF