IR 05000387/1981017
| ML17139A449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1981 |
| From: | Finkel A, Mcbrearty R, Mccabe E, Narrow L, Rhoads G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17139A446 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-81-17, 50-388-81-09, 50-388-81-9, NUDOCS 8110200698 | |
| Download: ML17139A449 (15) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-387/81-17 Report Nos. 50-388/81-09 50-387 Docket Nos.
50-388 CPPR-101 License Nos.
CPPR-102 Priority B
Category A
Licensee:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North Street Allentown Penns lvania 18101 Facility Name:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and
R.A. McBrearty, Reactor nspector Approved By:
A.E. F>nkel, R actor Inspector p e.4 G.G.
Rhoads, Resident; Inspector 0 C.~~
)v..",'.-"".
Ebe C.
McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No.
2B, DRPI Inspection At:
Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conduc d:
Se e
er 1-3, 1981 and September Inspectors:
L.
arrow, eactor Inspecto 15-18, 1981 date signed
/o /P, dat signed
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t signed
,.t iles date signed lo II ~$ (
date signed Ins ection Summar
Unit No.
Ins ection on Se tember 1-3 and 15-18 1981 Re ort No. 50-387/81-17 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannoonced inspection by a resident inspector (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />)
and three region-based inspectors (75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />) of:
installation, modification, and QC of electrical equipment; pre-service inspection; and outstanding items.
Unit No.
Ins ection on Se tember 1-3 and 15-18 1981 Re ort No. 50-388/81-09 based inspectors of:
installation and QC of electrical equipment; and outstanding items.
Results:
No violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an
"R.A. Beckley, Resident Nuclear QA Engineer
- B. Bosartt, Construction Project Engineer
- J.R. Buczynski, Lead Construction Surveillance Engineer
~P. Capatosto, QA Engineer
- S. Denson, Project Construction Manager
- A.T. Drennon, ISG Supervisor
- E.W. Figard, ISG Supervisor
"J.D. Green, Operations QA Supervisor
- J.E. Hobbis, Senior Project Engineer
- R.E. Matthews, QA Engineer R.
Spong, Equipment Supervisor
~D.J.
Thompson, Assistant Plant Superintendent Bechtel Power Cor oration
- G. Bell, Lead Project QAE
- H.F. Lillith, Project QA Engineer
"T. Minor, Project Field Engineer
- K.G. Stout, Project Field QC Engineer E.
Thomas, Lead Engineer, Field Engineering R. Vandiver, Field Engineer
- J.
VanOwen, Project Superintendent
"Present at exit meeting.
Other licensee and contractor personnel were 'also interviewed.
~Fii T
Work in progress, completed work, and plant status in several areas were observed during a general inspection of both units.
Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.
Craft and supervisory personnel encountered in work areas were interviewe 'I 3.
Status of Previousl Identified Items (Closed)
Unresolved Items (387/78-18-02 and 387/79-03-01):
Acceptance criteria for installation of pipe support clamp bolts/studs.
Assurance that bolts/studs were installed and inspected to assure that threads were not in the shear plane of the pipe clamps had been questioned.
The following documentation was examined.
Field Change Request FCR No. P-3220 clarified the requirement that the load bearing area was located between the two halves of the clamp and therefore no threads were to extend beyond the inner face of the clamp half.
This criterion was based on analysis by ITT Grinnell, the hanger manufacturer, and was in accordance with Addendum "A" of the ITT Grinnell Maintenace and Installation Manual.
NCR 3343 which required a random inspection of bolt/studs in the pipe fabrications shop and as installed in the field.
This NCR had been closed based on corrective action described in a memo dated March 16, 1981 and on gCIR-Al-271-(F) covering field inspection of the pipe hangers and supports in the suppression chamber.
The conduct of inspections in the pipe fabrication shop and in the field was discussed with the responsible gC personnel.
The shop inspection consisted of measurements of stud length, thread length and stud diameter and checking these dimensions against those furnished by ITT Grinnell.
Field inspection was by visual inspection of the bolt/stud between flange halves.
Where these areas were inaccessible, the lengths outside of the flange were measured and checked against the vendor's dimensions.
The inspector also made spot inspections of installed flanges to determine the feasability of the inspection methods used and to confirm the inspection results.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (387/79-08-04):
Physical security plan implementation.
This item will be reviewed by the Region I Physical Protection Section.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (79-08-07):
Procedures to assure that noncon-forming items are precluded from use in safety-related systems.
Examination of the "Defective Device List" dated June 10, 1981 verified that the contact mechanisms identified in Bulletin 78-05 were listed there, with a requirement for inspection of the contact arm prior to their users The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item (387/79-18-01):
Commitment to solution heat treat jet pump external riser pipes.
The following documents relate to the jet pump external riser pipes:
Drawing No. 761E722; Heat Treatment Certification Record dated 8/16/78; PP&L Letter No. PLA-291.
After review of the above, the inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/79-21-01):
Incorrect seismic classification of certain pipe supports in the Emergency Service Water System.
The inspector observed that the inconsistency between the. FSAR and Regulatory Guide 1.29 had been clarified in response to FSAR guestion 211. 185.
Turnover Exception Form Number 011A.O. 1/111A.O. 1, Sheet 35 listed the hangers in violation of Regulatory Guide 1.29 which had been resolved.
The inspector spot checked a sample of hanger drawings for the Service Water System.
These drawings had been revised to show that the hangers in question had been analyzed for Seismic Category I requirements.
The inspector also discussed this question with respect to similar hangers or other systems with the licensee's engineering representative, and was informed that computer list of hangers and P&ID drawing had been reviewed for conformance to the revised SAR requirements.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (387/79-26-02):
Dropping of Core Spray pump motor.
The inspector examined (1) Field Procedure FP-M-2, Revision 2, for rigging and handling of equipment and materials; (2)
NCR 4269 which dispositioned this item by scrapping of the dropped motor; and (3) Accident Report of this incident dated August 20, 1979.
Discussion with the licensee's equipment supervisor indicated that no further incidents of this nature had occurred.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (387/79-31-01):
Failure to properly review GE I&SE Procedure 1-12, Revision 2.
It had previously been established that the inadequacies of this procedure had been corrected by Revision 3,
and that the work had been performed in accordance with Revision 3.
The inspector reviewed actions to prevent recurrence of such failures.
Nuclear Department Instruction NDI-gA-12.2. 1,
"Management-of Plant Modifications of Repairs under ASME B&PV Code" (formerly issued as NDI-gA-1.2) provides direction and establishes reponsibility for review and approval of documents concerned with plant modifications.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/79-40-01 and 387/79-40-02):
Calibration records on test report-nozzle N2A and calibration records-voltage reading.
A letter dated 12/13/79 from The Great Atlantic and Pacific Pipe Welding and Construction Company (GAPCO) to G.
Morrell, General Electric Company, indicates that the calibration was done to the manufacturer's specifications by properly trained personnel.
The
letter further states that the questioned voltage reading is considered as base line data for comparison with subsequent readings and is not adjustable.
The inspector had no further questions on these items.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (388/79-19-02):
Redundant flow transmitters did not meet separation requirements of Specification G-21, Revision 1.
NCR No. 4788 identified this problem and dispositioned it by requiring installation of a barrier.
The work was comp1eted on February 22, 1980 and accepted by QA on August 5, 1980.
The inspector observed that the barrier had been installed as required by the NCR disposition, and had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (388/80-04-01):
Failure to protect electrical equipment (control rod drive electrical connectors)
against corrosion.
The inspector examined the following documents.
Bechtel Letter M-1-1675, dated June 5,
1980 and attached cleaning procedure.
GE Letter EAG 2143, dated June 19, 1980, which concurs with cleaning procedure and requests continuity and hi-pot tests.
NCR No. 5656, which identifies corrosion of connectors and requires rework in accordance with M-1-1675 and EAG 2143.
Work on this NCR was completed, and was accepted by QC on November 12, 1980, except for two cables which are carried on NCR No.
6347.
NCR No
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6347 identifies cables 2C1831 and 2C1447 as not complete.
This work was completed on April 8, 1981 and was accepted by QC on Apri 1 9, 1981.
f Records of training for area and termination engineers on June 20, 1980 and QC inspector on June 25, 1980.
The inspector checked the connectors in the field, observed that they were encased in plastic bags and properly protected, and had no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (388/80-04-02):
Failure to control temperature/humidity in areas containing electrical equipment.
The inspector discussed this with licensee representatives and observed conditions in the upper and lower relay rooms.
The inspector was informed that temporary air conditioning units were installed after inspection 388/80-04 and have since been replaced by permanent air conditioning equipment.
Filters on these units are checked daily.
The inspector observed that temperature and humidity conditions as shown on charts in the upper and lower relay rooms were within the specified limits, and had no further questions on this ite 'a)
(Open) Infraction (387/79-14-03):
Failure to specify supplementary essential variables in welding procedures.
The inspector reviewed licensee letter PLA-368 dated 6/14/79, welding procedure specification DWP-SQI-1.4, Revision 4, and DWP-SQI-1.4. 1, Revision 1,
and had no further questions on those welding procedure specifications'his item remains open pending NRC review of the General Electric Company audit referenced in letter PLA-368.
(Open) Unresolved item (387/80-03-01):
Radiographic examination of various welds.
The inspector reviewed Nuclear Energy Services, Inc.
(NES) incomplete examination analysis reports 118 to 138 inclusive, letter 5553-145 dated 4/23/81 and letter 5553-146 dated 4/24/81, and could not conclude that ASME Code,Section XI requirements will be met. This item remains open.
4.
Review of Nonroutine Events Identified b the Licensee (Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/78-00-06):
On November 14, 1978 the licensee reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e),
that during PGCC/ACR cable rework, numerous cases of insulation damage were found.
Also, conductors had been pulled from their pin connectors.
The licensee instituted a
100% inspection program for the cable/connector repair and rework for the items listed on NCR-3231.
Procedures have been written and training given to field personnel to correct the items listed on NRC-3231.
The inspector verified that the items listed on NRC-3231 were inspected and repaired as required.
This item is resolved.
(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency (387/79-00-11):
On November 30, 1979 the licensee reported the information shown below as potentially reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
After additional testing the licensee informed NRC Region I that this item was not reportable.
During field inspection and testing, 32 of 1481 cables failed the hi-pot acceptance test of the PGCC/ACR cables.
The failed cable was replaced.
The licensee changed procedure FP-E-7, Revision 10, dated January 28, 1981, entitled,
"Cable Card Control Part 1" and PGCC/ACR Handling and Installation, Part II to require that the pull test and hi-pot data be documented on the NCR form.
The inspector reviewed Audit Report CL-35 dated April 10-May 18, 1981 which verified that the requirements of FP-E-7 were complied with and that cable retesting was performed.
This item is resolved.
(Closed) Potential Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-12; 388/80-00-12).
Rejectable indications were found during preservice inspection.
On May 5, 1980 the licensee reported this as a potentially reportable deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
It was later found to be not reportable.
The inspector interviewed licensee representatives and reviewed associated reports and documents, found that it was properly dispositioned, and had no further questions on the ite (Closed)
CFR 21 Report 78-062-000 (78-SC-04).
By letter dated July 19, 1978, GE reported a defect in CR2940 control switch assemblies.
This item was reported by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
(387/78-00-05).
Corrective action taken was inspected and found acceptable by an NRC inspector during inspection 50-387/81-12.
This item is resolved.
(Open) Potential Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-09 and 388/80-00-09).
On April 20, 1980 the licensee reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e),
a leak through a bolt hole on a 3-inch butterfly valve furnished by Jamesbury Corporation.
After additional testing and review, the licensee reported that the item was not reportable.
Twenty of these valves were supplied to SSES.
Review of the documents listed below showed that all valves had been retested by the vendor and, except for the originally identified deficiency, were acceptable.
MCAR 1-53 and Final Report, Revision 1 on "Jamesbury Valve that Leaked During System Hydrotesting" which showed that one valve had been returned to the vendor, for body replacement, and had been retested and reinstalled.
The remaining 19 valves had been retested and were acceptable.
NCR 5243 for return of valve S/N NC-4000-Ol-C to vendor fo'
replacement.
NCR 5836 for retest of fifteen valves onsite, with four valves returned to the vendor and retested.
During retest, valve 111126-B was found to have a dent in the flapper disc and a crack in the polyethelene seal.
That valve was returned to the vendor for repair.
In addition, four valves were found to have been reinstalled, after return from the vendor, without gC inspection for cleanliness.
Three of these valves were removed, inspected and reinstalled.
Valve No. 21126-D had not yet been removed for inspection.
Equipment Substitution Record ESR No. P-1007, which documents substitution of valve 211126-B for Valve 111126-B.
Inspection Reports HRC-223-1, HRC-226-1 and HRC-230-1, which document installation and reinstallation of Valves 211126 A, B, and C.
1R HRC 223-1 is still open pending removal, cleaning inspection, and reinstallation of valve 211126-D.
This item remains unresolved pending closing of NCR 5836 and IR HRC 223-1.
5.
Licensee Action on NRC Circulars The licensee's action concerning the following circulars was reviewe Circular 80-01:
Unit 1:
The inspector reviewed documentation showing that all Unit 1 and common relays were cleaned in accordance with GE Procedure 721-PSM-162.2.
This item is resolved..
Circular 78-08:
Unit 2:
These relays will be cleaned when calibrated, in accordance with PL1-7913.
The inspector was informed that Procedure TP-1.21a will be revised to require cleaning of the relays.
This item remains unresolved pending procedure revision and performance of the work.
"Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment."
This circular was closed since the required information will be submitted to NRC by the licensee in the report on environmental qualification of electrical equipment and will be reviewed in the SER.
6.
Licensee Action on NRC Bulletins The following Bulletins were closed since the required information will be submitted to NRC in the report on environmental qualification of electrical equipment and will be reviewed in the SER.
Bulletin 77-05:
Electrical Connector Assemblies.
Bulletin 77-05A:
Electrical Connector Assemblies.
Bulletin 78-02:
Terminal Block Qualification Bulletin 78-04:
Environmental Qualification of Stem Mounted Limit Switches.
Bulletin 79-01:
Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment.
Bulletin 79-01B:
Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment.
7.
Nonconformin Conditions Identified at Other Sites The licensee was informed of nonconforming studs and nuts which had been reported at several sites in Region II.
The nuts and studs are used to hold the reactor pressure vessel to the support pedestal and were furnished by Acimet Manufacturing Company of Cleveland, Ohio.
Checks by the licensee showed no purchases from Acimet for the SSES site.
The inspector had no further questions on this ite.
Construction Surveillance Grou The inspector reviewed qualifications of inspectors assigned to this group and a random selection of their surveillance reports.
In some cases, the inspector noted that personnel had been certified as qualified and shown as suitable for assignment to a secondary discipline which was not supported by their experience.
However, in all cases, they were qualified for their primary discipline and had been assigned only to that work.
Prior to completion of the inspection, the licensee stated that personnel records had been corrected.
During discussions with the inspectors and review of their surveillance reports, the NRC inspector noted that the reports did not differentiate between observing work and reviewing records.
This item is unresolved.
(387/81-17-01, 388/81-09-01)
9.
Trainin of PP&L E&S Construction Personnel E&S construction personnel are assigned to work as needed under supervision of Plant Maintenance, The inspector observed such personnel performing check-out testing on Cabinets 1C622 and 1C692.
These cabinets are safety-related, although the men were working on non-safety related lines.
The inspector questioned these men concerning electrical requirements applicable to work performed on or in safety related equipment.
The men were not familiar with these requirements.
The licensee was asked to evaluate the training records and courses given to E&S construction personnel to assure that electrical/instrumentation work performed by this group complies with SAR requirements, and to assure that performance of nonsafety related work on or in safety related equipment will not degrade that equipment.
During the exit meeting on September 18, 1981, the licensee stated that performance of safety-related work by E&S construction personnel has been stopped until their training records have been reviewed.
The inspector stated that, in addition to that review, the training courses should be evaluted to assure that they provide the necessary electrical requirements.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of the licensee's evaluation and resolution.
(387/81-17-02).
10.
Instrumentation Com onents/S stem Work Observations The inspectol observed work performance, partially completed work, and completed work, as appropriate, on the installation of instrumentation cabinets associated with the PGCC/ACR system.
The inspector reviewed modification work performed in c'abinets ITC611 and 1C617 located in the upper cable spreading and relay room of Unit 1.
In reviewing the documentation associated with the modification work and the condition of the cabinets, the inspector was unable to determine what accept/reject criteria is applicable when electrical modifications are being made to equipment during the test and operation phase of the program.
The condition of connector and cable re-work in cabinets in the Unit 1
I
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lower relay room was noted by the inspector as being similar to the conditions of cabinets in the upper relay room.
In both areas the inspector noted that connectors were not plugged, covers were not on connectors, and connector insert plugs were not in. place.
It appears that the test organization does not have requirements which define the accept/reject criteria for this type of work.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of licensee evaluation and resolution.
(387/81-17-03).
ll.
Maintenance Procedures and Ins ection Criteria The inspector reviewed the below listed maintenance apd nuclear department procedures which are intended to control Electrical/Instrumentation modifications by the Integrated Startup Group ( ISG),
and discussed inspection criteria with licensee representatives.
Documents reviewed include:
MT-GE-010, Revision 0, dated February 14, 1980 entitled "Electrical Cable Installation and Termination."
MT-GE-015, Revision 0, dated June 5,
1981, entitled "Advance Control Room (ACR) Electrical Maintenance; and Nuclear Department Instruction ND1 2. 1. 1, Revision 0, dated October 6,
1980 entitled "Charter-Nuclear Plant Engineer."
Section 4.c of NDI 2. 1. 1 states in part:
"Provide engineering information for preparation or modification of plant operating and maintenance procedures.
Review and approve such procedures as requi red."
The licensee stated that it was not their intent to follow NDI 2. 1. 1 as written and that this paragraph would be corrected.
The above listed documents do not identify and define the safety related criteria for performance and inspection of these modifications.
The inspector questioned the PP&L guality Control (gC) Supervisor concerning the acceptance criteria used to inspect for electrical separation in electrical panels.
The gC Supervisor stated that no acceptance criteria had been used during gC inspections of electrical maintenance.
He also stated that a guality Control Inspection Checkoff List for electrical separation inspection was being prepared, and that he had been directed to use Bechtel and General Electric construction specifications for separation criteria in the interim.
The inspector asked the gC Supervisor if reinspections of electrical maintenance were being required to assure electrical separation had been maintained for work performed on electrical equipment prior to incorporation of the Bechtel and General Electric specifications.
The
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gC Supervisor was unaware of a reinspection requirement.
The inspector discussed electrical separation with the Operations-guality Assurance Supervisor, who stated that PP&L internal letter (PLI-14541 dated August 13, 1981)
had been sent to the Superintendent of Plant by the Licensee's Nuclear Plant Engineering Group, and that this letter stated that the gC groups should use Bechtel and General Electric specifications until the licensee developed specifications dealing with electrical separation.
The inspector also discussed this item with the assistant Superintendent of Plant, and informed him that NRC will review PLI-14541 and the licensee's determination concerning the need for rein>pection of work which had been performed by maintenance.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review of the procedures listed above, PLI-14541, and the licensee determination concerning reinspection of completed maintenance work.
(387/81-17-04).
12.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain if they are acceptable.
Unresolved items are discussed in Detail Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11.
~Ei<<i The inspector met with licensee and A-E/Construction Company representatives (See Detail Paragraph 1) at the end of the inspection on September 18, 1981.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and identified the inspection finding ~
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