IR 05000387/1981015
| ML17139A414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1981 |
| From: | Mccabe E, Narrow L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17139A413 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-81-15, 50-388-81-08, 50-388-81-8, NUDOCS 8109240521 | |
| Download: ML17139A414 (14) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-387/81-15 lt k
N
. ~5-387 IL1B8 CPPR-101
. ~C>> -1 Priority Pennsylvania Power and Li ht Com any B
Category A
2 North Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and
'nspection at:
Inspection con Inspectors:
Berwick, Pennsylvania u 't 6 13p 1981
. arrow, eac or nspec or date signed Approved by:
E e C.
McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2B, DRPI date signed g 18 le]
date signed Ins ection.Summar:
Combined Inspection of'Units 1'and'2'on'Au ust 6-'13;'1981 '(Combined:Re ort Nos.
0-'387/8 -'15'and'50-388 8 -08 Areas Ins ecte
Routine unannounced inspection by one regional based inspector o
e status of Bulletins and Circulars(and signiTicant:Deficiency Reports and the corrective actions taken for resolution of these items.
The inspection involved 13 inspector hours at the licensee's corporate office and 25 inspector hours on site; 13 on Unit 1 and 12 on Unit 2, by one regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8i09240521 8l0909 I'
PDR ADOCK 05000387
PDR i
I I'
ff f'fq f W
"'
'b
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an
- R. A. Beckley, Resident NQA J. Buczynski, Lead Construction Surveillance Engineer P.
D. Capatosto, Lead QA Engineer R.
H. Featenby, Assistant Project Director R. Harris, Licensing Engineer
- J.
E. Hobbis, Sr. Project Engineer, Construction R.
E. Matthews, NQA Engineer A.
R. Sabol, Manager, NQA F.
L. Murst, Project NQA Engineer Bechtel Power Cor oration G.
G. Gloruigen, QA Engineer J.
Khandar, QA Engineer
~A.
M. Konjura, QA Engineer
- J.
E. O'ullivan, Assistant Project Field Engineer
- K. G. Stout, Project Field QC Engineer E.
Thomas, Lead Engineer, Field Engineering
- J.
VanOwen, Project Superintendent
~denotes personnel present at exit meeting The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the plant during a general inspection of Units 1 and,2.
The inspector examined work items for obvious defects or noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.
In addition, the inspector interviewed craft and supervisory personnel encountered in the work areas.
Specific activities and completed work observed included installation and rework of pipe hangers and supports.
3.
Construction Surveillance The licensee has recently instituted a construction surveillance program on site and has established an organization for performing surveillance of construction activitie The inspector discussed the purpose and scope of the program with licensee representatives and reviewed the work instructions which have been issued for control of the program and for guidance of personnel.
In addition, the inspector reviewed a random selection of personnel qualification records and interviewed four of the individuals assigned to this work.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a
~
(Closed) Significant Weakness (387/81-08-05; 388/81-04-04):
Lack of understanding by licensee personnel of the status of the
"Susquehanna Quality Assurance Program" (SQAP)
and its purpose within the overall QA program.
b.
In order to correct this weakness, the licensee provided additional training to NQA and construction personnel concerning the status of the SQAP, its application to the Susquehanna project and its interface with other manuals and procedures.
The inspector reviewed records of training on July 22, 23 and 29, 1981.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (387/78-00-15; 388/78-00-15):
As a result of a Conrail train going out of control and jumping the tracks at the site, a question was r'aised concerning the consequences of a similar accident on the spur leading into the reactor building.
The inspector observed that a stopper,
"Hayes Shock Free Bumper" had been installed at the end of this track.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (79-00-16):
Documentation of seismic and environmental qualifications of Limitorque valve operators.
Lack of such documentation had been identified on PP&L Deficiency Report OR No.
0130 and on Bechtel NCR 3003.
The inspector examined DR 0130 and NCR 3003 both of which had been closed.
These documents showed that the required qualifications documents had been submitted, reviewed and approved by Bechtel and accepted by PP8(L.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Noncompliance (79-41-02):
Failure to use prescribed drawings for inspection and turnover of pipe supports.
This nonconformance had also been reported as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(80-00-01).
The inspector discussed corrective actions with QA and engineering and reviewed documentation shown below.
Stress isometrics had been used for
fabrication, installation and inspection of pipe hangers.
As corrective action for this noncompliance and the significant deficiency, and in order to maintain control of as-built drawings, a program has been instituted whereby stress isometrics are used by the field to prepare installation drawings.
These drawings together with hanger details are used for fabrication, installa-tion and inspection.
Changes in locations, which.are permitted by specifications, are identified on as-built drawings which are referred to engineering for review and re-analysis as necessary.
Revised stress isometrics are returned to the field and the entire procedure is repeated.
Applicable sections of the following documents were examined by the inspector:
Specification M-213, "Installation, Inspection and Documenta-tion of Pipe Supports, Hangers and Restraints" Rev.
8 and Addendum No. l.
Specification M-204, "Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Service Piping," Rev.
7 and Addendum 2.
MCAR 1-44 and Final Report,
"Q Design Drawings for Fabrication, Installation and Verification of Pipe Support Details."
Engineering Procedures Manual (EPM) Appendix B,Section III.
Procedure FP-P-ll, Rev.
5, "Control of Piping Drawings."
Procedure FP-G-19, Rev.
6, "Performance of Construction Completion and Turnover."
Selected Stress Isometrics, pipe hanger installation drawings and hanger details illustrative of the program for fabrication, installation and inspection of pipe supports and for preparation of and review of as-built drawings.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (387/78-17-03; 388/78-16-01):
Classification of reactor building crane rails and refueling plat-form (RFP) crane rails as
"Non-Q" listed.
This item was also reviewed during Inspections 387/79-21, 388/79-12 and 387/80-10, 388/80-06.
Review of this question by NRR resulted in acceptance of the
"Non-Q" classification for the reactor building crane rails and reclassification of the refueling platform crane rails to "Q-listed."
The inspector reviewed the documentation listed below which showed that the RFP crane rails were "Q-listed" and
which provided evidence of material certification and inspection of installation.
Engineering Memo to Construction (EMC) 4966 which required that an NCR be written to document the "Non-Q" status of the RFP crane rails and corrective actions.
NCR 6026 which required certification of material conformance and inspection of installation and grouting.
Certification of conformance and mill test report for the anchor bolts.
Certification of conformance for the nuts and washers.
Certification of conformance for replacement hold down clips.(
Review and acceptance of chemical and physical tests of samples taken from crane rails.
QC inspection reports of crane rail installation and grouting.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
5.
Review of Nonroutine Events Identified b the Licensee (Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/77-00-01; 388/77-00-01):
Unsatisfactory field welding and inspection of shear studs.
This item was reported by the licensee by letter dated June 22, 1977, as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The inspector reviewed the following documents:
MCAR 1-18 and Final Report,
"Shear Studs for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.
NCR 3241 for modification of existing beams.
QC Inspection Reports QCIR No. C-63-I-1173-1 through 6 and QCIR No. C-63-I-C-1174-1 through 10.
Letter dated May 28, 1978 from Roger G. Slutter, Professor of Civil Engineering at Lehigh University concerning the Final Report on MCAR 1-18 including the design of composite beams, the methods of repair, conformance to AISC specifications and the adequacy of the statistical analysi e
Records of retraining of gC, gA, engineering and construction personnel in stud welding and inspection during the period May 28, 1977 to June 29, 1977
'he inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
b.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/78-00-05; 388/78-00-05):
Seismic qualification of Westinghouse, medium voltage, metal clad switchgear was reported by the licensee by letter dated April 17, 1978 as a significant deficiency in accordance with
CFR 50.55(e).
This item will be reviewed by the Seismic gualification Review Team of NRR-EgB.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/79-00-06; 388/79-00-06):
Discrepancies between final stress analysis calculations and loads used for design of pipe support, detail drawings was reported by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
in a letter dated September 5,
1979.
Since these calculations and drawings were performed in Bechtel's San Francisco office, the Vendor Inspection Branch of Region IV performed an inspection at that office (Report No. 9900522/80-03).
This discrepancy was found to be limited to certain isometric drawings for Susquehanna only and resulted from an inadequate design change control procedure.
The procedure and the affected pip'e support detail drawings have been revised.
The inspector reviewed a random selection of stress isometric drawings and pipe support drawings and determined that loads shown were in agreement.
Also, all such drawings are again reviewed in accordance with the program outlined in Paragraph 4.d above and any discrepancies should be identified during that review.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
d.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (387/79-00-17; 388/79-00-17):
Lack of adequate separation and damage to surface fibers of non-metallic cable sleeving material was reported by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on November 30, 1979 as a
potential significant deficiency.
On January 4,
1980, the licensee reported that it had been determined that this item was not a reportable deficiency.
The inspector discussed this matter with licensee representatives and reviewed MCAR 1-41 and the Final Report on Isolation Barrier Materials.
Further investigation had shown that separation of the cables was in accordance with specified requirements and a requirement for covering of the barrier material with scotch tape had been established.
Tests had shown that the damage to the surface fibers would not have caused failure of the wirin The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
(Closed) Construction Oeficiency (387/80-00-01; 388/80-00-01):
Failure to use prescribed drawings for installation and inspection of pipe hangers was reported by the licensee on January 25, 1980 as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
This had previously been identified by an NRC inspector as an item of noncompliance (387/79-41-02).
Corrective actions are discussed in Paragraph 4.d of this report.
This item is resolved.
(Closed) Construction Oeficiency (387/80-00-11; 388/80-00-11):
Ovality of field bent small bore pipe exceeds established tolerance values.
This item was reported by the licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
on April 18, 1980
'he inspector discussed this item with representatives of the licensee and reviewed the documentation listed below.
All small bore pipe bends were check for ovality, flat spots and peaks in accordance with a procedure provided for that purpose and replaced as necessary.
The following documents were examined:
Acceptance criteria for Installed Pipe Bends in 2-inch and Smaller Piping.
Specification M204, "Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Service Piping," Rev.
7 and Addendum 2 which established a
requirement that all bends 'be inspected for ovality and wall thickness.
Procedure FP-P-18,
"Procedure for Pipe Bending," which requires that "one shot" ram type, benders are not to be used.
It had been determined that the nonconforming bends had been primarily made on this type of bender.
This procedure also required that all bends be verified by a "small pipe" engineer for ovality and as necessary for wall thickness; and that gC verify and document ovality of all small pipe bends.
NCR Nos.
5523 and 5674 which identified the initial nonconforming conditions and which were dispositioned by inspection of all small bore pipe bends'CR No.
6460 which provided a record of inspections of all pipe bends, identified nonconforming bends and provided a record of reworked bend s
~
The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.
g.
(Open) Construction Deficiency (387/80-00-20; 388/80-00-20):
Qualification of ICO-Rally sleeving.
As a result of questions raised concerning non-metallic electrical cable sleeving (Paragraph 4.d above)
the licensee had additional qualifications tests performed by Mylie Laboratories.
These tests showed that hot spot tempera-tures to which the sleeves would be exposed (1500 ) were above the temperature rating of the ICO-Rally material (1200 F) and also that this material did support combustion.
As a result this material has been removed from the approved list and any of the material installed will be removed and replaced with an approved material.
r This item is unresolved pending review by an IE inspector of these changes.
6.
Licensee Action on NRC Bulletins and Circulars The inspector reviewed the documents listed below which had been issued in order to assure that nonconforming items, once identified, would not be purchased at a later date.
A, "Production and Maintenance of the Defective Device List."
Memo PLI-13042, dated April 3, 1981.
Defective Device List, 1st Issue.
The status of selected Bulletins was reviewed and is show'n 'bel'ow.
Bulletin 79-04:
Incor rect weights for swing check valves manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation.
Bechtel Letter BLP 13894 dated January 29, 1981 confirms that no Velan swing check valves were installed on Seismic Category
systems and there were no purchase orders open with Velan.
Therefore, no such valves could be purchased without PP&L approval.
This item is resolved.
Bulletin 80-07:
BMR Jet Pump Assembly Failure.
This question had been rai sed with the licensee by NRR ( FSAR Question 112.10).
The licensee's response is addressed in Section 3.9.5 of the Safety Evaluation Repor This item is resolved.
Bulletin 80-08:
Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds.
The licensee has responded to NRC questions concerning this item by letter PLI-13434 dated Nay 7, 1981.
This question was also discussed by an NRC inspector with the licensee's representative and is considered acceptable.
This item is resolved.
Bulletin 79-25:
Failure of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety Related Systems.
Licensee action with respect to this Bulletin was reviewed during inspection 387/80-18.
Although the licensee had reported that no BFD relays of the type identified in the Bulletin were in use on site, one BFD relay was found in storage'urther investigation revealed that:
( 1)
The relay found in storage was not of the style identified as deficient in the Bulletin.
(2)
Additional BFD relays were used on the 13.8 Kv and 4.16 Kv breakers.
Further information from Westinghouse stated that these relays are not the ones referred to in the Bulletin.
However, the licensee has requested that this information be confirmed by inspections of the equipment.
Inspection of Unit 1 breakers confirmed this information.
Unit 2 breakers are not accessible for inspection at this time.
This item is resolved for Unit 1 but remains unresolved for Unit 2 pending inspection of the breakers.
Licensee's actions concerning the following circular was reviewed:
Circular 79-04:
Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators.
This item was reported by the licensee as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)
and was identified as 387/79-00-02, 388/79-00-02.
Licensee's actions concerning this deficiency were reviewed during inspection 80-33 and the item was closed.
This item is resolved based on that revie The inspector met with licensee and construction representatives (denoted in Oetails, Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 13, 1981.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and identified the inspection findings.