IR 05000382/1981027
| ML20033B660 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1981 |
| From: | Randy Hall, Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033B656 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-81-27, NUDOCS 8112010618 | |
| Download: ML20033B660 (9) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Report:
50-382/81-27 Docket:
50-382 Category A2 Licensee:
Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Inspection at: Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana Inspection conducted:
October 19-22, 1981 Inspector:
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A.R.(Johnson, actor Inspector, Engineering and Date Mate ~ s ion Approved:
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R. E. Hall, Acting Chief, Engineering and Materials Date'
Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted on October 19-22, 1981 (Report 50-382/81-27)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of safety-related con-struction activities pertaining to installation, inspection, and documen-tation of Reactor Turbine Generator Control panels; observation of work and review of records for safety related instrumentation cables; and inspection of the extent of safety-related electrical / instrumentation cable damage caused by the fire in the Containment Building on October 11, 1981. The inspection involved 24 inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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Principal Licensee Employees L. L. Bass, Project QA Manager
- R. G. Bennett, Project QA Engineer
- C. J. Decareaux, Project Construction Coordinator
- R. G. Pittman, Project QA Engineer Other Personnel J. Gutierrez, QA Site Supervisor, Ebasco M. Walsh, Engineering Site Support, Ebasco W. Peacock, QC Electrical Inspector, Fischbach and Moore (F&M)
B. Collyer, Middle South Services, Inc.
M. Combest, Middle South Services, Inc.
D. Eaves, American Nuclear Insurers Representative The NRC inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor per-sonnel including members of the engineering and QA/QC staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Safety-Related Electrical / Instrumentation Cable Damage Caused by the Fire in the Containment Building on October 11, 1981 (Potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reportable Deficiency)
The NRC inspector investigated the extent of the damage to two safety-related cable trays and three nonsafety-related trays below the burned out area at the steam generator main steam line (level +46, west side)
inside the Containment Building.
This damage was caused by a fire of the crib-up dunnage on October 11, 1981.
This incident was reported by LP&L to the NRC on October 12, 1981, as a potentially reportable defi-ciency under the terms and conditions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) iii. This incident involved a total of fourteen safety related and associated safety-related cables.
A total of five cable trays beneath the fire area were involved.
The top.two trays were safety-related (P105-SA and C106-SA) and contained a good deal of ashes and partially burned oak-wood timber (dunnage).
The bottom three trays were nonsafety-related and were partially pro-tected by temporary structures (fire retardent NCX plywood) above the trays.
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The NRC inspector inspected the safety-related electrical instrumentation-cables in the top two trays for damage. No damage was apparent to the cable tray structures.
Cable damage did not appear to be extensive as described below.
Safety-related Cable Tray P105-SA (480 VAC and 120/208 VAC voltage level) contained the following safety-related and associated safety-related cables:
h Cable No.
Cable Type Manufacturer Routing
30960C-SA 1/C 250 MCM Okonite-0kolon Penetration 101 to H2 Recombiner Analyzer Encl. A
.1 311008-PA 3/C #1/0T
Penetration 113 to Airborne Radia-tion Removal Unit E13-3A
34314-PA 1/C #1/10
Penetration 113 to Reactor Coolant Pump Instruments
33141-PA 1/C #1/0
Penetration 113 to Reactor Building Lighting Panel
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- information not obtained by NRC inspector Three out of the four 30960C-SA safety-related cables above showed blistering (approximately 10 inches long) along the outer jacket of the Okonite-0kolon composite insulation.
The remaining safety-related and associated safety-related cables above showed some glazing / discoloring, but no damage.
Safety-related cable tray C106-SA (120 VAC or 125 VDC voltage level)
contained the following safety related cable:
Qty Cable No.
Cable Type Manufacturer Routing
31133N-SA 2/C #14 Anaconda Penetration 141 to Reactor Containment Building Cooling Air Handler
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The above safety-related cable showed only glazing / discoloring along the outer jacket, but no damage.
The licensee's corrective action to the above safety-related electrical /
instrumentation cable damage, as dispositioned on NCR No. W3-3093, dated October 19, 1981, is as follows:
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Replacement of all safety-related and associated safety-related cables in Cable Trays No. P105-SA and C106-SA.
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Replacement of nonsafety-related cables in the remaining lower three cable trays on a case-by-case basis. This replacement will be based on the results of a detailed cable examination / report by consultants from Middle South Services, Inc. (Risk Control Group),
American Nuclear Insurers, and LP&L, yet forthcoming.
3.
Safety-Related Instrumentation Cable Terminations Internal to the Reactor Turbine Generator Control Panels The NRC inspector inspected the Main Turbine Control Panel (CP-1) and the Chemical and Volume Control System Panel (CP-4) in the main control room for instrumentation cable routing and termination at the field terminal blocks internal to each panel. This inspection was to assure that field installation was in accordance with Ebasco's Internal Panel and Cable Separation drawings, FSAR commitments, Ebasco specifications /
procedures, LP&L procedures, F&M procedures, and industry standards.
The NRC inspector traced out the total route of 22 safety-related tenni-nating instrumentation cables, from each panel conduit bottom entry, through internal wireways and bundles, to the appropriate fanning strips and terminal blocks. The cables were checked for proper conduit entry, color coding, wireway installation, wireway routing, identification, correct size, grounding, shielding, and physical separation. The NRC inspector reviewed the quality related records (F&M cable pull and termination slips, QC checklists for cable pulling and cable termina-tions/ splices, and QC system inspection reports) relative to the above 22 installed instrument cables, to ascertain whether these records reflect work accomplishment consistent with the established construc-tion procedures.
During the inspection of the Main Turbine Control Panel (CP-ll), the NRC inspector observed that field cables entering the panel through the bottom entry conduits had their respective outer jacket (including ex-truded belt or cable tape and fillers) removed, and the cable conductors bundled at intervals using ty-raps. No bundling was observed within wireways. The NRC inspector verified that this type of construction was appropriate as delineated on Cable and Conduit List Installation Notes (Ebasco Drawing LOV-1564-8288, Sheet 6B, Revision 7 (Note 9.19a)
and Fischbach and Moore Construction Procedures (F&M Procedure CP-307, Revision 5, paragraph 6.1.6).
Field cables are permitted to be stripped
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of their outer jackets within cabinets up to 4 inches at the point of entry.
Cable conductors are then to be bundled at a minimum of every 6 inches.
The NRC inspector observed no cover plate on one end at the front lower wireway (4x4) in which these bundled conductors entered.
It was confirmed that design drawings called for a cover plate on one end only.
The licensee is currently investigating retrofitting the wireway to accommodate cover plates on both ends to preclude fraying of bundled cable conductors at the wireway entrance as well as the exit.
-The follcwing safety-related cables for the Main Turbine Control Panel (CP-1), pulled and terminated by F&M, were inspected:
Cable No.
32328J-SA 32563P-SAB 32318J-SA 32315L-SA 323410-SA 32341E-SA 32563R-SAB 32527C-SAB 32388B-SB The following F&M QC checklists for cable pulling (including associated cable pull slips) for the Turbine Control Panel (CP-1) were reviewed by =the NRC inspector:
QCP-306,32328J-SA QCP-306,32563P-SAB QCP-306, 32318J-SA QCP-306,32315L-SA QCP-306,32341D-SA QCP-306, 32341E-SA
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QCP-306,32563R-SAB QCP-306,325278-SB QCP-306, 323888-SB QCP-306,32397E-SB The following F&M QC checklists for terminations and splices (including associated cable termination worksheets) for the Turbine Control Panel (CP-1) were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
QCP-307,32328J-SA QCP-307,32563P-SAB QCP-307,32318J-SA QCP-307, 32315L-SA QCP-307,323410-SA QCP-307,32341E-SA QCP-307,32563R-3AB
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QCP-307,32527C-SAB QCP-307, 52388B-SB QCP-307,32397E-SB The following F&M rework forms for rerouting of safety-related cables in conduits for the Turbine Cor. trol Panel (CP-1) were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
Rework Form No.
Date 187 December 12, 1979 573 December 12, 1979 Rernuting of safety-related cables called for on the above forms was due to conduit space limitations.
Rerouting was approved as directed by Ebasco Site 3upport Engineering.
The following safety-related cables for the Chemical and Volume s Control System (CVCS) Panel (CP-4), pulled and terminated by F&M, were inspected:
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Cable No.
30680G-SB 30301C-SB 30337D-5B 303420-SB 303700-SAB 32408F-SAB 30300C-SA 30350C-SA 303650-SA 30325L-SA 30350H-SA 30351C-SA The following F&M QC checklists for cable pulling (including associated cable pull slips) for the CVCS Panel (CP-4) were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
QCP-306,30680G-SB QCP-306,30301C-SB QCP-306,30337D-58 QCP-306,303420-58 QCP-306,303700-SAB QCP-306,32408F-SAB QCP-306,30300C-SA QCP-306,30350C-SA QCP-306,30365D-SA QCP-306,30325L-SA QCP-306,30350H-SA QCP-306,30351C-SA
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The following F&M QC checklists for termination and splices (including associated cable termination worksheets) for the CVCS panel (CP-4) were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
QCP-307,30680G-SB QCP-307,30301C-SB QCP-307,30337D-58 QCP-307,303420-5B QCP-307,303700-SAB QCP-307,32408F-SAB QCP-307,30300C-SA QCP-307,30350C-SA QCP-307,30365D-SA QCP-307, 30325L-SA QCP-307,30350H-SA QCP-307,30351C-SA The following Ebasco Drawings were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
Dwg. No.
Revision Title
LOU-1564, B288 CP-1 Internal Panel and Cable Sheet *
Separation
CP-1 Cable Termination LOU-1564, B288 Sheet *
Sheets LOU-1564, B288 Rev. O CP-4 Internal Panel and Cable Sheet 10F Separation LOU-1564, B288 Rev. 1 CP-4 Cable Termination Sheet 10F-1 Sheets
- Sheet numbers and revision numbers not recorded by NRC inspector
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The following Construction Procedures were reviewed by the NRC inspector:
No.
Rev.
Title CP-301
Installation of Electrical Conduit CP-306
Safety-Related and Non Safety-Related Cable Pulling CP-307
Cable Terminations and Splices The following Ebasco Site Procedure was reviewed by the NRC inspector:
No.
Rev.
Title ASP-II-2
Site Document Control No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 22, 1981.
The NRC inspector summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection.
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