IR 05000382/1981024
| ML20031C954 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1981 |
| From: | Randy Hall, Tapia J, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031C941 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-81-24, NUDOCS 8110090156 | |
| Download: ML20031C954 (6) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV-Report: 50-382/81-24 Docket: 50-382 Category A2 Licensee:
Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174
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Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Inspection at: Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: August 25-27, 1981 l
Inspectors:
7-/7'7/
p.I.Tapia,ReactorInspector,EngineeringandMaterials Date Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4.a, & 5)
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D. P. befisson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Date Materials Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 4.b, & 5)
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Approved:
7-/hf/
R. E. Hall, Acting Chief, Engineering and Materials Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on August 25-27, 1981 (Report 50-382/81-24)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection and observation of construction activities, including previously identified inspection findings.
This inspection l
involved 48 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
l Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8110090156 810922 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G
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DETAES 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- T. Gerrets, QA Manager
- L. L. Bass, Project QA Engineer
- B. P. Brown, Quality Assurance Engineer
- R. G. Pittman, Quality Assurance Engineer
- R. G. Bennett, Quality Assurance Engineer
- R. E. Gautreau, Project Coordinator
- C. J. Decareaux, Project Coordinator B. Toups, Quality Assurance Technician Other Personnel
- C. L. Hawn, Quality Program Site Manager, Ebasco The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel including members of the engineering and QA/QC staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Site Tour The NRC inspectors walked through various construction and storage areas to observe construction activities in progress and to inspect the general state of cleanliness and adherence to housekeeping requirements.
The tour included the Reactor Building, Reactor Auxiliary Building, Fuel Handling Building, and the on-site testing lab.
During the tour of the on-site testing lab, the NRC inspectors witnessed the tensile testing of seven production Cadweld splices and revie ed the accompanying " Report of Tensile Test," generated to document the tensile te'st results.
During the observation of work activities in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, the NRC inspector witnessed the removal of Safety Injection System rigid pipe restraint No. 969 and verified that proper approval and documentation of work a.ctivities were being maintained.
Proper QA documentation was verified by reviewing " Hanger Cut-Down Report Sheet No. 1687." The review disclosed that the restraint had to be temporarily removed due to an interference with the installation of a block out sleeve in a floor penetration.
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No violations or deviations were identified during this portion of the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings During this inspection, implementation of corrective action taken in response to the following previously identified items was reviewed:
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'(Closed) Infraction (50-382/80-10. A):
Control of As-Built Infor-mation. During Inspection No. 50-382/80-10, the NRC inspector observed a portion of the in-process installation of the Condensate Piping System restraint No. CDRR-322. A review of the drawing being used by the installer revealed that the drawing had been " red-lined" to change from two W4x13 structural steel beams to one 4" square box beam manufactured from 1/2" steel plate. Through discussions with the Ebasco site engineering representatives, it was determined that a review of the change to address the structural adequacy of the steel shape had not been performed. This was found to be contrary to the requirements of Tompkins-Beckwith Procedure No. ASP-IV-37, Revision H, " Control of ' As-Built' Information for Piping and Pipe Support Systems," which limits the use of " red-lined" changes to minor field modifications which do not require a new stress analysis.
Although the design intent was not changed, the observed modification required design engineering input to determine its adequacy, and was therefore a major maoification within the context of the procedure for the control of as-built information.
In response to this infraction, a design review of the modification to support No. CDRR-322 was conducted and was shown acceptable.
In addition, Ebasco Procedure No. ASP-IV-37 was revised to restrict the scope of Ebasco's " red-lined" authority with respect to pipe support and pipe restraint modification. The revised procedure now requires Ebasco design engineering concurrence prior to imple-mentation of " red-lined" changes. Subsequent to the issuance of the revised procedure, training sessions were held with affected construction engineering and design engineering personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection of the actions taken to address the infraction, this item is considered closed.
(Closed) Infraction (50-382/80-10.8): Failure to Control Use of a Calibrated Tool Within Necessary Limits.
During observation of the installation of restraint No. CDRR-322, the NRC inspector observed that the 1/2" diameter anchor bolts were torqued using controlled tool No. 256, which was not calibrated for the range of torque values specified in Tompkins-Beckwith Procedure No.
TBP-33, Revision B, " Procedure for Inspectino Drilled-In Expansion Type Anchors in Seismic Class 1 Concrete."
i In response to this infraction, the anchor bolts on pipe restraint l
No. CDDR-322 were retorqued in accordance with the specified i
tolerances set forth in Procedure TBP-33. A review wac conductec l
of previously accepted anchor bolts installed with controlled tool i
No. 256 and it was found that three additional plates were required
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to be retorqued. The retorquing of the anchor bolts for all four l
plates installed with controlled Tool No. 256 was verified by l
Quality Control and found acceptable.
In order to preclude repeti-tion, the procedure for the issuance of torque wrenches has been l
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modified to assure that a copy of the calibration results are issued with the torque wrench.
These calibration results are reviewed by the QC. inspector prior to the torquing of the anchor bolts,.to. ensure that the bolt torquing requirements specified in. Procedure TBP-33 are, complied with.
Based on the results of this inspection of the actions taken to address Infractica No.-50-382/80-10.B, this item is considered closed.
(Closed) Infraction (50-382/80-20.A):
Failure to Follow Procedural Requirements for.the Tension Testing of Installed Expansion Anchors.
(Closed) Deviation (50-382/81-05):
Failure to Verify or Evaluate the Acceptability of Inspection and Test Results.
During Inspection No. 50-382/80-20, the NRC inspector observed that contrary to the
requirements of Tompkins-Beckwith Procedure TBP-33, " Procedure for Inspecting Drilled-In Expansion Type Anchors in Seismic Class 1
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Concrete," tension tests were not being performed on instailed expansion anchors at the frequency of one out of each one-hundred consecutively installed anchors.
A fallow-up inspection of the corrective action taken in response to this infraction was performed by the NRC inspector during Inspection No. 50-38?/81-05.
The review included tension test reports for anchors installed during the period February 27, 1978, through January 28, 1981.
The. review disclosed
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I one-hundred eleven test reports which contained unacceptable discrep-ancies.
Further review disclosed that contrary to LP&L's commitment to the NRC Green Book, WASH 1309, Tompkins-Beckwith did not have a procedural requirement that required inspection / test report results to be verified or evaluated for acceptability at the conclusion of the inspection / test and prior to retention in the Quality Assurance vault.
This finding was identified as a deviation from the Green Book,
" Guidance on Quality Assurance Requirements During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Pe e Plants." The licensee subsequently tension
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tested all ancM tohs in question and issued a nonconformance
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report for tMw, mnously tensioned anchor bolts which were found to have N e. ens i oned.
In addition, Tompkins-Beckwith Procedure T8P-33 wu w:
r, to provide proper tensioning values necessary to
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comply wiv the specification requirements.
Forms GP-723-42 and GP-723-43, utilized tc (ocument test results, were revised to incluce a quality control review and sign off prior to the documentation l
being filed in the Qud ity Assurance vault.
All anchors that failed j
during tension testing were corrected in accordance with the disposition
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of the issued nonconformance repo d.
Based on the review conducted of this inspection of corrective action taken in response to the infraction and the deviation, both items are cor idered closed.
(Closed) Infraction (50-382/80-20.8):
Failure to Follow Procedural Requirements for the Installation of Safety-Related Piping.
During Inspection 50-382/80-20, the NRC inspector observed seven fabricated sections of Safety Injection piping which were not properly hung in-4-
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the supports in correct position before welding.
This was found to be contrary to the requirements of Ebasco Instruction PC-1, Section 2.32, " Instructions for Erection of Process Piping and Supports." This instruction requires fabricated piping to be hung in supports in correct position before welding the line to allow rotational give and take in joint positioning which may be necessary to make ends meet. The observed condition had progressed to the extent that it would be difficult for additional piping to be installed in the proper position as required.
Betwse the pipe was temporarily supported during the welding operaticas, a dimensional change occurred in the mating alignment to the pump.
Only one of the seven observed pipe spools was affected by a dimensional error.
In response to this infraction, Tompkins-Beckwith replaced the misaligned pipe spool to provide proper dimensional alignment to the pump. Craft supervisory and engineer'ng personnel were reminded and directed to verify com-pliance with the requirments of Instruction PC-1 and with Tompkins-Beckwith Procedure TBP-37, " Piping Installation Procedure, to ensure that correct positioning of pipe is accomplished prior to welding being performed. During this inspection, the NRC inspector performed a tour of the site to observe piping installation in progress. The tour did not disclose failure to comply with the requirements of Instructions PC-1 for the erection of process piping.
Based on the implemented corrective actions taken in response to the infraction anc on the results of the observations performed during this inspection, this infraction is considered closed.
(Closed) Unresolvea Item (50-382/80-06):
Interference Between Containment Spray Line and Containment Penetration. During Inspection No. 50-382/80-06, the NRC inspector observed an apparent interference between the vertically run 10" diameter Containment Spray line and the 1-1/2" diameter socket-weld fitting of contain-ment penetration No. 41.
It was determined that the theoretical clearance between the Containment Spray line ar.d the to-be-installed elbow in the as-built condition could not be obtained.
During this inspection, the NRC inspector observed the completed rework to provide the design clearance.
TheCongainmentSpraylinewas modified by the installation of two 45 elbows.
Based on this modification and the review conducted during this inspection, this unresolved item is considered closed.
4.
Review of Items Reported Under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e)
During this inspection, a review was conducted of quality assurance documentation relative to the following items reported under 10 CFR Part50.55(e).
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Inadequate Clearance Between Piping and Box-Type Supports The status of actions taken to resolve the inadequate clearance between piping and box-type supports was reviewed. This construc-tion deficiency resulted from the use of installation criteria between box-type pipe restraints and pipe of 0"-1/16".
The use of
"0" gap between pipe and box-type restraints did not take into account the radial expension of the pipe due to thermal effects.
Actions in progress during this inspection include measurement of all as-built gaps by the Ebasco site support engineering hanger group and analysis of the as-built gaps versus the calculated thermal movements and maximum expected radial expansion of pipe to determine acceptability of the as-built condition. Gap criteria have been developed and have been incorporated into the respective Tompkins-Beckwith procedures. These criteria were reviewed during this inspection.
Implementation of modifications and documention of as-built gaps of restraints which are modified will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
b.
High Strength Bolts As stated in IE Report No. 50-382/81-22, LP&L has identified an item that is potentially reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e). The concern of this item was the failure of several A-490 high strength bolts while being torqued. Approximately 1400 of these bolts are presently installed in the support structures for the four reactor coolant pumps. The bolts were installed by Nuclear Installation Services Company (NISC) in accordance with their Procedure E.S.154, Revision D, which specifies only the turn-of-the-nut method for the torquing of bolts and studs. This method, approved by the American Institute of Steel Construction (NISCO), requires that 10% of the fasteners or two fasteners per connection (whichever is greater) be inspected using a calibrated inspection wrench. Records indicate that this was performed following the bolt installation. A second inspection was performed in July 1981, during which all bolts in the four supports were tested by retightening to the design value.
It was reported to LP&L that "several" bolts were found to be at less than the required minimum torque. This method ensures that the minimum torque value for all bolts has been met but gives no indication if the bolts have been over-torqued and have possibly exceeded the material yield point.
These items will remain open pending results of the LP&L/Ebasco analyses and evaluations presently being conducted.
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Exit Interview The HRC inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 27, 1981.
The NRC inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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