IR 05000382/1981012
| ML20004D667 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1981 |
| From: | Randy Hall, Andrea Johnson, Tomlinson D, Whittlesey K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004D660 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-81-12, NUDOCS 8106090633 | |
| Download: ML20004D667 (8) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFOPCEMENT
REGION IV
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Report: 50-382/81-12 Docket: 50-382 Category A2
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f Licensee: Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delaronde Street
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New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 s
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Inspection at: Waterford Site, Taft, Louisiana Inspection Conducted: April 27 - May 1, 1981
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Inspectors:
A y. R. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Date
,5 M.:terials Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5)
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dh 5 -89-8 1 0. PT Tomlins % Reactor Inspector, Engineering and Date
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Materials Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 6, and 7)
Other Accompanying Personnel:
K. A. Whittlesey, Reactor Inspector - Trainee Engineering o,1d Materials Section (,' W C'
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Approved:
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R. F. Hall, Acting Chief, Engineerin'g and Materials Date Section Ins::ection Summary:
Inscection on Acril 27 - May 1,1981 (Recort 50-382/81-12)
Areas Inspected-Routine, unar.. ounced inspection of construction at :1vities incluaing:
(1) observation of work and review of procedures and documentation of Reactor
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Turbine Generator control board cable fabrication and installation
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(2) observation of work and review of procedures of safety-related electrical penetration assemblies and terminations M
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(3) work activities and review of documentation pertaining to installation of safety-related electrical and instrumentation cables (4). follow up of two previously identified unresolved items (5) visual examination of "0" stop repairs
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(6) visual examination of Reactor Coolant loop piping welds (7) review of construction and inspection recoros for Reactor Coolant loop piping welds
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The inspection ~ involved 61 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAI'S 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
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- L. L. Bass, Project QA Manager
- B. P. Brown, Project QA Engineer
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- R. G. Pittman, Project QA Engineer
- R. G. Bennett, Project QA Engineer
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- B. M. Toups, Project QA Engineering Technician
- C. J. Decareaux, Project Coordinator
- A. D. Jones, Project QA Engineer
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- W. M. Miller, Project QA Engineer A
Other Personnel
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E. J. Ritzmann, Project QC Manager, Fischbach and Moore (F&M)
E. T. Thompson, QC Inspector, F&M R. Lewis, QA Engineer, Ebasco R. Caudel, Project Engineer, Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B)
- J. Gutierrez, Site QA Engineer, Ebas o M. Walsh, Engineering, Ebasco A. H. Marrero, Control Room General Foreman, F&M
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L. Serpas, Control Room Foreman, F&M The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel including members of the engineering and QA/QC staffs.
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- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inscection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item (50-382/80-31):
Installation of Safety-Related
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Electrical Penetrations. During the course of the inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed and discussed with the licensee his response to the previously identified inspection findings cited by the NRC during the November 17-20, 1980, inspection regarding the use of AWS 01.1 field welds on the electrical penetration secondary side. The NRC inspector concurred with the licensee's position that the shield buildin9 is not
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designed as a part of the pressure retaining boundary for the reactor containment, and consequently secondary side field welds do not form part of the pressure boundary. The design criteria for the shield building is stated clearly in the FSAR, Section 6.2.3.1.
The NRC inspector reviewed Ebasco Engineering's response and proposed solution to revise Ebasco Specification LOU 1564.258 and Canax Drawing LOU 5817.1342 to reflect penetration secondary side welding performed in accordance with AWS 01.1 and FCR-E-1950 which was issued on
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February 13, 1981. The NRC insoector concluded, however, that it could
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not be determined whether AWS 01.1 welding was appropriate or in violation of the ASME Code, it could not be determined whether the secondary side penetration assembly was required to be Code stamped since it was not part of the pressure boundary. The FSAR commitments, including Regulatory Guide 1.63 and IEEE-317-1976, address the pressure boundary and ASME Section III, Subsection NE (Class MC) and Section IX
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only.
The following Ebasco Engineering and QA documents were reviewed by 'the
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NRC inspector:
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Ebasco Quality Assurance Report No. W30A-12299, dated December 1, 1980 Ebasco Engineering memorandum to R. A. Hartnett from J. Hart,
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dated December 4,1980
Ebasco Engineering memorandum to R. A. Hartnett fram J. DeBruin.
E dated February 13, 1981
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Ebasco Specification LOU 1564.258, Revision 6 Ebasco Penetration Drawings LOU 1564, 6 316, Sheets 1, lA, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, December 29, 1978
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Further information from Ebasco related to the safety imolications and the requirement for a Code stamped secondary side penetration assembly is necessary before this item can be closed; therefore, this matter is still considered unresolved.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-362/81-07): Field Changes to Engineering Orawings. A potential problem involving field changes to piping system isometric drawings was previously noted by the NRC inspector. During an earlier inspection, it was found that field changes were being made to assembly drawings by means of the approved " red-line" method; but
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- hese changes were not being forwarded to the engineering copies of the drawings until all work on a particular isometric was completed. This system allowed the only record of as-built condition to remain in the field for extended periods of time.
The field changes observed in
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report 50-382/81-07 had been made seven months prior to discovery.
Tompkins-Beckwith (T-8) and Ebasco had agreed that this was undesirable and that procedure changes would be initiated. Tomokins-Beckwith Proce-dure TBp-17, Revision E, was issued on April 20, 1981, requiring that all such changes be transferred to the engineering " stick-drawing" copies within forty-eight hours of the " red-line" drawing changes. During this inscection, it was confirmed that an ongoing effort was in progress to
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purge the construction areas of all single cooy red-line isometrics and to transfer all pertinent data to the engineering copies as soon as possible.
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This item is closed.
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3.
Safety-Related Instrumentation / Electrical Cables and Terminations Observation of Completed and In-Process Work The NRC inspector traced out the total route of five safety-related instrumentation and electrical cables, and their respective terminations
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outside the containment at electrical penetration No.141, to ensure that the cables / terminations had been installed in accordance with FSAR commitments, Ebasco specifications, LP&L. procedures, F&M procedures, and industry standards. The cables were checked for routing, color coding,
raceway installation, identification, separation, correct size, grounding, shielding, and proper termination.
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The following cables were inspected:
305960-SA
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31128E-SA
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305618-SA 305738-SA 30599C-SA No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Safety-Related Electrical Penetrations The NRC inspector also reviewed the partial and completed work of four
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safety-related electrical penetration assemblies and their respective terminations outside the containment. The NRC inspector also selectively reviewed the accompanying documentation and quality related records, the F&M installation, testing, and maintenance construction procedures, and the Ebasco drawings applicable.
It was noted by the NRC inspector that several ASME Code stamps (NPT-MC) were missing off the secondary header plates called for by the manufacturing (Conax) drawings. Due to the difficulties encountered during installation and testing of electrical penetration assemblies currently in process (e.g., seal welding at Lee plugs through the secondary header plate and retrofit modification by Ebasco/Conax), the removed Code stamps have been collected and secured in' the LP&L QA vault until such time as these problems have been resolved.
In the interim, electrical penetration identification has been maintained by vibroetching the primary header side and by appropriate identification i
at the electrical penetration junction box on the secondary side (Ref.
FSM NCR No. W3-147).
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The following electrical penetrations were inspected:
Penetration No.-
Penetration Junction Box 133 B3242-SPC
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143 83517-SMC
B3339-SMC
149
,83374-SMC
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The following construction procedures were reviewed:
CP-406, Revision 3, September 9,1980 i
CP-314, Revision 5, February 14, 1979
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The following Ebasco Low Voltage Power Control and Instrumentation Electrical Penetration Drawings were reviewed:
LOU 1564, 8-316, Sheet 1, Revision 4, December 29, 1978 LOU 1564, B-316, Sheet l A, Revision 2, December 29, 1978 LOU 1564, B-316. Sheet 2, Revision 3, December 29, 1978
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LOU 1564, B-316, Sheet 4, Revision 3, December 29, 1978 LOU 1564, B-316, Sheet 5, Revision 5, December 29, 1978
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LOU 1564, B-316, Sheet 6, Revision 4, December 29, 1978 LOU 1564, B-316, Sheet 7, Revision 4, December 29, 1978 No violations or deviations were identified.
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Reactor Turbine Generator Control Board Cable Fabrication and Installation The NRC inspector inspected the safety-related cable field fabrication, installation, and testing methods used by F&M in accordance with Ebasco/F&M construction and administrative procedures at the Reactor Turbine Generator control boards and back panels in the main control room.,ork activity in
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. process, regarding crimping of connector pins and assembly of Amo type l
plug-in connectors, for 32 conductor stranded shielded cable used in control panels CP-45 (SB) and CP-42 (SA) was reviewed. The fabrication / installation of AMP type plug-in connector cable assemblies were inspected for proper l
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could not be readily identified by the NRC insoector
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stripping and crimping techniques, proper use of tools, proper cali-bration of tools, conductor end position acceptance, connector hood and clamp position acceptance, and proper identification of pin insertion.
The completed and installed connector assembly tests for continuity and
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DC meggering were then observed by the NRC inspector. A multiswitch test fixture box used for the continuity and meggering tests-was observed by the NRC inspector as not controlled / checked prior to use.
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LP&L QA immediately issued IR 309-81-152 requiring the test unit to be checked on a daily basis, and so documented by record, when employed.
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The following F&M construction procedure was reviewed:
CP-307, Revision 5, December 7, 1980
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The following Ebasco administrative procedures governing control room
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equipment were reviewed:
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ASP-IV-48, Revision G, March 10, 1981 ASP-I-4, Revision F, April 20, 1979 ASP-III-2, Revision M, July 2, 1979
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ASP-IV-49, Revision B, February 28, 1980 ASP-IV-23, Revision 0, December 17, 1980 ASP-IV-50, Revision C, December 1,1980
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WQC-6, Revision 0, November 7, 1979 The following cable assemblies with associated connectors within the control panel were inspected:
Cable Connector 312735-58 J7 316588-SB J11 31547J-SB J12 31147C-SB J16 311470-SB J17 31236R-SB J18
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Follow Up on an Inspector Icentified Problem Eight "0" stops for the Reactor Coolant loop piping were identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/80-09 as not conforming to the documented construction drawings. These stops were fabricated by Industrial
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Engineering Works, but were reoaired on site by Gulf Engineering. All repairs were performed and ir.spected by properly certified craftsmen and the record packages were. reviewed by the NRC inspector. No visual
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examination of the parts was performed by the NRC inspector at that
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time as they had already been installed in a controlled access locked area. This infraction was closed in report 50-382/81-07 based on the
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NRC review of actions taken and repair documentation.
During this inspection, entry was gained to the controlled area and a visual inspection was made of the accessible repairs made on the "0" stoos.
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All repair welds examined exhibited acceptable surfaces free of visible i
cracks, laps, undercut, porosity, and spatter.
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During this portion of the inspection, no violations or deviations were
identified.
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Visual Inspection of Reactor Coolant Loop Pioino The NRC inspector perforned a visual inspection of Reactor Coolant loop piping joints P10Wl, P10W2, P16W2, P14W2, P5W1, and P2W1. The joint locations were checked against orientation drawings to verify that the
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identification of each joint was correct. Each joint was examined for general weld appearance, wall thickness transitions, weld reinforcement, arc strikes, weld spatter, and surface finish.
The NRC inspector also visually examined each weld for surface defects such as cracks, laps,
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lack o" fusion, porosity, slag, and excessive undercut.
The NRC inspector reviewed the construction and quality records for the above weld joints.
A' check was made of welder identifications and certification dates. These were comoared to welding records to assure
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that each welder was properly qualified at the time these welds had been made. Records were reviewed of all inspections perfarned, except radiography, to assure that the proper inspections were performed and that all welds complied with the minimum acceptance requirements.
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 1,1981. The NRC inspectors summarized the purpose, scope, ard findings of the inspection.
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