IR 05000373/1981024
| ML20010A528 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1981 |
| From: | Lanksbury R, Reimann F, Schultz R, Shepley S, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010A519 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-81-24, NUDOCS 8108110511 | |
| Download: ML20010A528 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT'
REGION III
Report No.
50-373/81-24 Docket No.
50-373 License No. CPPR-99 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Co ducted: May 18 thru June 26, 1981 k"-
.- se,r Inspector :
R. D. Walker Y.MeU
' g /(S. E. Shepley
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. D.
ksbury fB 4-R D. Sch 7'A3 I
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Approved P,: i,.W.Reimann,ActingChief
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Reactor Projects Section IC Inspection Summary Inspection on May 18 thru June 26, 1981 (Report No. 50-373/81-24)
Areas Inspected: Routine, resident inspection, preoperational inspecticu and Management Meeting. The inspection consisted of a review of licensee action on previcue lindings, IE Circulars received by the licensee since last inspection, non-routine event review procedures, document control program, operating procedures, followup on Headquarters requests, inspection activities preparatory to license issuance, and a plant walkthrough/ opera-tional status review. The inspection involved a total of 360 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors includir.g 80 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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8108110511 810729 PDR ADOCK 05000373 G
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DETAILS 1.
Percons Contacted
- B.
B. Stephenson, LaSalle County Station Proj ect Manager
- R.
H. Eolyoak, Station Superintendent
- R. D. Kyrouc, Quality Assurance Engineer
- G.
J. Diederich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent
- R. D. Bishop, Administrative and Support Services Assistant Superintendent
- C. W. Schroeder, Technical Staff Supervisor R. Raguse, Senior Operating Engineer J. M. Marshall, Opeiating Engineer W. Huntington, Assistant Technical Staf f Supervisor H. J. Hentschel, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor F. Lawless, Rad-Chem Supervisor E. E. Spitzner, Startup Coordinator
- E.
Stevak, Quality Assurance
- L. W. Duche), Proj ect Management Staf f J. Bowers, Onsite Nuclear Safety Engineering Group (ONSEG)
T. Borzym, Security Administrator
- E. Boyd, Master Mechanic
- W.
J. Shewski, Manager of Quality Assurance
- J. J. Maiey, Manager of Projects
- T. E. Quaka, Site Quality Assurance Superintendent
- L. J. Burke, Site Construction Superintendent
- J.
S. Abel, Director of Nuclear Licensing
- B.
Lee, Jr., Executive Vice President
- J. J. O'Connor, President
- C.
Reed, Vice President
- T.
E. Watts, Project Engineer
- R. E. Jortberg, Director Nuclear Safety
- J. U. Gieseker, Assistant to Site Construction Superintendent
- b. L. Shamblin, Staf f Assistant Project Manager's Of fice The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the technical, operating, and construction staff, as well as certain licensee concractor employees.
- Denotes persons present only at management interview onsite.
- Denotes persons present only at management meeting held RIII office.
- Denotes persons present at both the management interview onsite and the management meeting held at the RIII off.O.e.
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License Action On Previous Inspection Findings
(0 pen) Item of Noncompliance (373/81-07-01):
Followup on a level IV item of noncompliance resulting from a plant tour on February
20, 1981, as part of an inspection which ended March 6,1981. This
was a "no response" item of noncompliance because the immediate implementation of strong corrective actions was anticipated to prevent recurrence.
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T;te inspector, in an attempt to verify the implementation of the program as described on page 5 of inspection report (50-373/81-07),
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made a tour of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building on June 2,1981, and
found conditions of general cleanliness to be unacceptable.
The following deficiencies were noted:
Division I Switchgear Room:
a.
On load centers:
Deep layers of dust and dirt Trash and paper towels Milk cartons Candy wrappers Cigarette packs Metal tins containing fish remains (tuna / sardine)
Lunch and sandwich bags Various pieces of metal b.
In open cable tray 189A 1YP:
t Many used paper tissues Soft drink cans Milk cartons Orange peels Two Granolla wrappers Two Snicker wrappers
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Three Twinkie wrappers
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Five gum wrappers
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Potato chip Lag
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Many potato chips-Cigarettes Nineteen plastic sandwich bags containing food remains Vanilla sugar water Hostess "Ho Ho" wrapper Tobacco pouch
Cupcake paper Four chicken bones
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Remains from one pear, one apple and 'one banana
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In open cable tray 186n 1YC:
Milk certon
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-Paper trash d.
In open cabic tray 206B lYC:
Empty cardboard boxes Paper wrappings I
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In open cable tray 212B 1YC:
Lunch bags
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Wrappers f.
In open cable tray 213A lYF:
I Lunch wrappers Twinkie wrapper g.
On wooden platform supported by cable trays:
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Odd pieces of wood
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Cardboard box Milk cartons Lunch bags Metal tin with fish (tuna / sardine) remains h.
On top of 125V battery room:
Soft drink cans Food wrappers
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Lunch bags
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Banana pec1s I
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In 125V battery room:
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Paper and trash
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In 250V battery room:
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Empty wooden tool box
Paper and debris
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On 125V and 250V' battery chargers protective screens:
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Division II Switchgear Room:
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a.
On load centers:
Foam cup Candy wrappers Used paper tissues Dirt and debris b.
In 125W battery room:
Large paper coverall lying next to~and touching batteries One-poly bag Two cable ties Two dozen metal bolts, nuts, washers Several cellophane wrappers Miscellaneous paper Heavy deposits of plaster and mud Two large tool assemblies Two four feet long pipes (1" & 3" diameter)
Divisien III Switchgear Room:
a.
In 125V batter i room:
Tool box Paper, plaster, debris b.
On.125V battery charger:
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Blueprints Cardboard box Lightbulb in paper carton Trash, debris
. Adjacent to energized 125V battery charger (within exclusion zone):
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Pasteboard barrel half full of paper and trash Empty cardboard box
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Cardboard box containing plastic hats
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The result of this tour is considered an additional example of noncompliance p-(373/81-07-01). The inspector has determined that implementation of housekeeping at ISCS is inadequate and that the present program needs to be upgraded. A formal reply to the above mentioned noncompliance is therefore required and should addresa all actions agreed to in the.neetings of February 23,1981, June 5,1981 and any subsequent meetings in whicb.
the housekeeping / cleanliness issue was discussed.
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Closed (373/80-05-07): Follow-up on suggestions identified in IE Information Notice 79-35 " Control of Maintenance and Essential
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Equipment." The essence of this Information Notice was incorporated into NUREG 0737 Task Action Item I.C.6 " Guidance on Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of Operating Activities." The liceasee
~has committed in Amendment 54 to FSAR, Appendix L, to provide a system consistent with the clarification of NUREG 0737 by issuance'of a full
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power license (fuel load) for performing thin function. The inspector has been tracking the NUREG 0737 commitment under open item (373/81-06-01)
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which remains open because the licensee's corporate office has not submitted
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to the station their generic plan for covering Task Action Item I.C.6.
i open item (373/80-05-07) is closed because it is redundant to open item
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(373/81-06-01) which remains open.
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I Closed (373/79-15-05): Minor problems with Operating Precedure LOP-RT-08,
Rev. O, " Reactor Water Cleanup System Strainer Backwash." The inspector
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reviewed Rev. 1, dated January 30, 1981, of LOP-RT-08, and found that the problems in this procedure have been corrected.
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Closed (373/79-23-01): The inspector reviewed procedure LAP-240-1, "Use of Locks on Valves" and found it inadequate in that the.ist was not in i
agreement with the licensee's Piping and Instrumentation Drawings. The inspector reviewed Rev. 3, dated May 14, 1981, of LAP-240-1 and found the
procedure adequate consistent with the implenentation of FCR L0027 which
is revising all Piping and Instrumentation Drawings to reflect the current locked valve list which is in LAP-240-1.
l Cloced (?73/19-44-11): The alarm annunciators on ' panel 1H13-P601 used to t
I monitor various Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) injection line integrity, were not consistently named from one systen to another. The inspector reviewed
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these alarm annunciators and found that they have been modified such that.they are consistent from one system to another.
I Closed (373/80-16-08): The inspector determined that there was a fault in
the RPS/PCIS alarm procedure logic such that it caused the procedures and the annunciator alarm windows to be in error. The inspector reviewed this l
area and found that the licensee has taken steps to correct this fault.
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Closed (373/81-08-01): The inspector found that 6perating' Design Change Requests (ODCR's) had been used by the Systems Test Engineers (STE's) for initiating design changes resulting from preoperational test activities.
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The inspector felt that the use of the ODCR's constituted a degradation of the intent if not the. letter of Quality Procedure' QP3-2. The inspector reviewed this item and found that the licensee has-approved and implemented i
procedure LAP-1300-5, " Field Change Requests"'to replace the ODCR system and therefore, meets intent and letter of Quality Procedure QP3-2.
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Closed (373/81-08-02): The inspector wJi concerned with dieposition of
ODCR's that were carcelled or rejected without disposition. The inspector l
has determined that ' alte QA is reviewing all ODCR's.for disposition I
in manner prescribed by QP3-2 for FCR's'.
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Open (373/80-16-02): Closure of IE Bulletin 80-13, " Cracking in Core Sp ray S pe rgers'. " This bulletin was addressed to the licensee (LaSalle County Nuclear Station) for information only and therefore, the licensee is not required to submit a formal response to the NRC.
The inspector is required to determine if the licensee has conducted a review of the bulletin and taken steps that are applicable to the facility. This bulletin per Item 1.
of the " Actions To Be Taken By Licensees" requires the following:
For all boiling water power reactor facilities with an operating license at the next scheduled and each following refueling outage until further notice, perform a visual inspection of the Core Spray Spa'rgers and the segment of piping between the inlet nozzle and the vessel shroud.
Remote underwater TV examinations are acceptable if adequate resolution can be demons t rated.
The viewing in sitt of 0.001 in. diameter fine wires is considered as an acceptable means of demonstrating suitable resolution of the TV examinations.
Such techniques as the use of oblique lighting, and the ability to light from each side independently are considered useful in enhancing the image of cracks to facilitate detection.
The licensee's position with respect to the requirement of this bulletin is that the postulated cause of observed cracks in earlier vintage BWR core spray sparger assemblies is " cold work and sensitization during fabrication and installation stresses." The crack mechanism is believed to be initiated and propagated by intergranular stress corrosion.
In the absence of generic metallurgical analysis, which is yet to be completed by GE, the LSCS project group has reviewed the existir.g measures which could aid in either preventing or discovering early on a similar failure on the LaSalle County Station.
The preoperational integrity of the LSCS core spray spargers is ensured through visual inspection of the core spray spargers in the Preservice Inspection Report (Volume 4, Section 10.2).
Continued surveillance of these components is included in the LSCS Inservice Inspection Plan (Tab 24).
In addition, the initial design of the LSCS components recognized the importance of adequate stress margins for the core spray nozzles. The calculated and allowable stresses for the core spray nozzles are summarize.
in FSAR Table Q111.36-4 and illustrate the design margins for the Design, Emergency and Faulted conditions.
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The concerns expressed in IE Bulletin 80-13 have been adequately addressed by these provisions and no further remedial action is considered necessary including upgraded visual inspections beyond those required by ASME,Section XI, Summer 75 Addenda.
The inspector stated that it was his position that sufficient justification inad not been given for him to determine that after license issuance, the upgraded visual inspection requiremente of the core spray spargers of IE Bulletin 80-13 would not be applicable to LaSalle County Nuclear Station as it !s to other Boiling Water Reactors.
The inspector also stated that he would refer this item to headquarters for resolution.
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Closed (373/81-15-01):
Review of response to IE Bulletin 81-02.
The inspector verified that:
a.
The licensee managemant received the bulletin, j
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That the licensee reviewed the bulletin for applicability.
c.
That the licensee has taken or is scheduled to take applicable corrective action.
d.
That the licensee's written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin.
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That the licensee's written response information required by the bulletin.
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That the licensee's written response includes adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response.
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That the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to appropriate onsite manageuent representatives.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
3.
Review of IE Circulars Received Since Last Inspection Report The licensee has received IE Circulars 81-04, 81-07, and 81-08 since the last inspection report written by the inspector. The licensee is still reviewing these circulars at this time, and the inspector will review the the licensee's response during a subsequent inspection under Open Item Numbers (373/81-24-01), (373/81-24-02), and (373/81-24-03) respectively.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
4.
Non-Routine Event Review The inspector reviewed various procedures to ascertain whether responsibilities have been assigned for the review of off normal operating events and planned and unplanned maintenance activities to assure that the licensee's system for identification reporting and review of safety related operating events described in the proposed Facility Technical Specifications or NRC Rules
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and Regulations is. functioning.
A. Procedure Reviewed 1.
LAP-100-2, " Investigation of Operating / Maintenance Errors,"
Revision 3, dated March 27,' 1981 2.
LAP-1500-5, " Deviation Reports," Revision 1, dated October 2,1979-7-
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3.
LZP-1310-1, " Notifications," Revision 0, dated October 30, 1980 LXP-100*
Security Revision 0 Dated 4/29/81
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LXP-200- 1 *
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-200-6*
Security Revision 0 Dated S/25/81 LXP-200-8*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-200- 5*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-209-10*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-200-4*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-200-9*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-200-2*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 LXP-200-3*
Security Revision 0 Dated 3/25/81 B.
Inspection Criteria 1.
Proposed Facility Technical Specifications as follows:
a. 6.1. G.1. a. (7)
b. 6.3 c. 6.4 d. 6.6.A e. 6.6.B f. 6.6.C 4.
10CFR 21.21 5.
10CFR 50.72 6.
10CFR 73.71 7.
NUREG-0161 C.
Inspection Findings 1.
The inspector determined that responsibilities have been assigned for the prompt review and evaluation of off normal operating events to assure identificatirn of safety related events.
2.
The inspector deternined that responsibilities have been delegated for the prompt review of planned and unplanned main;enance ana testing activities to assure identification or violations of limiting conditions for operation requirements of the technical specifications.
3.
The inspactor determined that responsibilities have been assigned for reporting safety related operating events internally and to the NRC, 4.
The inspector determined that responsibilities have been delegated for assuring completion of corrective actions relating to safety related operating events.
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The inspector ascertained by direct questioning, that licensee j
representatives assigned responsibilities in Item 1-4 above understand their responsibilities for safety related operating events in each of the following functional areas:
a. Operations b. Maintenance i
c. Instrumentation and Control
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d. Radiation Chemistry With respect to the above interviews, the inspector did ascertain that the Shift Engineer interviewed exhibited some degree of uncertainty in two areas of reporting required by 10CFR 50.72 and LZP-1310-1.
The two areas of uncertainty were as follows:
a. 10CFR 50.72(a)(7) requires that any event resulting in manual or
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automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features, including the Reactor Protection System be reported per the requirements of 10CFR 50.72(a). Procedure LZP-1310-1, step F.2.C. (3) requires that,
"Any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features, including the Reactor Protection System. Notification is required for unplanned unit or reactor trips rasulting from valid Reactor Protection System (RPS)~ actuation. Excluded from notification are:
a 1. Inadvertent trips that result from personnel error or
minor equipment malfunction and are unrelated to a plant
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transient or valid RPS actuation.
j 2.. Partial actuation of safeguards or RPS (i.e.-half scrams).
3. Spurious safeguards actuation (i.e.-system isolation due to water hammer of steamline differential pressure (DP)
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transmitters)" be reported as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour by telephone.
The Shift Engineers uncertainty-was with respect to the three
exceptions in procedure LZP-1310-1 and their applicability to Reactor:
Scrams (Reactor Protection System Actuation). The inspector stated
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that literally any Reactor Scram which was induced by or results in the inducement of any form of reactor' transient is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(a)(7).
i b.10CFR 50.72(a)(9) requires that any fatality or serious injury occurring on the site and requiring transport to an offsite medical facility for treatment, be reported per the requirements of
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Procedure LZP-1310-1, step F.2.C. (5) requires that "Any fatality.
or serious injury occurring on the site and requiring transport to an offsite medical facility for treatment. Serious injury is considered to be any injury that in the judgement of the licensee representative will require admission of the injured individual to a hospital for treatment or observation for an extended period of time (greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />).
Injuries taat only require treatment and/or medical observation at a hospital or offsite medical facility, but do not meet the conditions satisfied above, are not required to be reported.
a) Notification should also be made for less severe injuries if contamination complications also exist or if an ambulance service is used to transport the victim to an offsite medical facility" be reported as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour by telephone.
The Shift Engineer's uncertainty was in two areas. The first area of uncertainty was with respect to injuries. occurring on Unit #2, which is unlicensed and under construction, while Unit #1 is operating with a license.
The inspector stated that the reporting requirement was by site not by unit; hence, such injuries are reportable.
The second area of uncertainty was with respect to the definition of a serious injury in LZP-1310-1.
The Shif t Engineer was not sure whether the one hour clock started after the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in the hospital had elapsed.
The inspecter stated that it was his position that the Shif t Engineer must make a judgement with respect to seriousness within the first hour af ter report of the injury and could not wait. to see if the individual stayed in the hospital for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
The inspector discussed his findings with the Unit #1 Operating Engineer who agreed with the inspector's interpretations and agreed to clarify these uncertainties within the operating staff.
- These procedures were reviewed to ascertain if the reporting requirements in 10CFR 73.71 and Regulatory Guide 5.62 had been incorporated into the procedures. The NRC RIII Safeguards Section will review these procedures in an indepth fashion and determine whether the reporting requirements have been adequately addressed.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
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5.
Document Control Program The Document Control Program was reviewed for conformance to regulatory requirements, Quality Assurance Program requirements, and applicable indust"v guides and standards. Drawings were reviewed for current revisions and that responsibilities were assigned for the control of obsolete drawings. Master indices were checked for procedure control and that procedures in use were consistent (same revision) as listed on the master indices. Administrative procedures were examined for drawing control. Controlled drawings were checked for consistency.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
Documentation Reviewed:
LAP-810-8, Receipt and Distribution of Drawings LAP-810-9, Control of Drawing Modification LAP-810-10, Reproduction of Controlled Documents - (Excluding Drawings)
LAP-810-II, Control of Documents (Including Drawings) to be Reproduced and Logged to Work Requests and Field Change Requests LAP-820-1, Station Procedures LAP-820-2, Station Procedure Preparation and Revision LAP-820-3, Procedure Distribution LAP-820-4, Temporary Procedure Changes LAP-820-5, Use of Station. Mechanical and Electrical Checklists
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LAP-820-6, Use of Procedure Deficiency Sheets LAP-850-2, All NRC Correspondence LAP-850-4, Review of Technical Document Updates Q.R. No.6, Document Control Q.P. No.C-1, Distribution of Design Documents Q.P. No.C-51, Document Control for Operations-Transfer of Records
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Sargent and Lundy document lists are received at the site 3 to 6 weeks after approved issusnce dates. An example of this is the Mechanical Drawing List, Ray issue, which has not yet.been received at the Station as of 6/18/81.
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Edison's Q.A. Audit, QA A-01-81-12, -in April of 1981, identified similar
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l problems in regards to receipt delays of Sargent and Lundy document lists.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
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6.
Review of Operating Procedures The inspector reviewed the following LaSalle Operating Procedures (LOP's)
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for content and format per Regulatory Gu.*de 1.33 and ANSI'N18.7-1976:
LOP-CD-ole. Rev. 2 of 2/81, CD/CB Startup Electrical Checklist Unit 1 LOP-CD-OlM, Rev. 1 of 3/81, Unit 1 Condensate System Mechanical Checklist LOP-CY-01 Rev. 3 of 10/2/80, Filling and Venting the Cycled condensate Storage and Transfer System LOP-CY-OlM, Rev. 2 of 12/79, Unit 1 Cycled Condensate Storage and Transfer
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LOP-EH-01, Rev. O of 2/1/79, Filling the Electro Hydraulic Control System
LOP-EH-OlM, Rev. O of 2/1/79, Unit 1 Electro Hydriulic Control Mechanical
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Checklist LOP-FC-01, Rev. 2 of 2/6/81, Filling and Venting the Fuel Fool Cooling System LOP-FC-O1M, Rev. 1 of 2/20/81, Unit 1 Fuel Pool Cooling Filter and Demineralizer System Mechanical Checklist LOP-FW-03, Rev. 1 of 3/23/79, Startup of Motor Driven Reactor Feed Pump (MDRFP)
LOP-FN-04, Rev. 1 of 5/16/79, Startup of Turbine Driven Reactor Feed Pump (TDRFP)
LOP-CC-01, Rev. 2 of 3/3/81, Filling the Generator Stator Cooling System LOP-GC-OlM, Rev. 3 of 2/81, Unit 1 GC Generator Stator Cooling Mechanical Checklist LOP-HD-OlM, Rev. 1 of 2/81, Unit 1 Heater Drain Pump Discharge Mechanical Checklist LOP-HG-OlM, Rev. O of 12/76, Unit 1 Combustible. Gas Control Mechanical Checklist LOP-HS-01, Rev. 2 of 2/6/81, Hydrogen Seal Oil System Startup and Operation LOP-HS-OlM, Rev. 1 of 2/81, Unit 1 Hydrogen Seal 011 System Meche.nical Checklist LOP-HY-01, Rev. O of 1/29/79, Operation of Theruel Conductivity Gas Anslyzer LOP-HY-OlM, Rev. O of 12/78, Unit 1 Hydrogen System Mechanical Checklist LOP-MC-01, Rev. 3 of 11/9/79, Filling and Venting the Clean Condensate System LOP-MC-OlM, Rev. 3 of 11/79, Unit 0 MC Lineup Mechanical Checklist LOP-MC-02M, Rev. 2 of 11/79, Unit 1 MC Lineup Mechanical Checklist LOP-NR-01E, Rev. 1 of 9/22/80, Unit 1 Neutron Monitoring Startup Electrical Check-list LOP-PC-OlM, Rev. O of 5/18/77, Unit 1 Primary Containment Mechanical Checklist LOP-PS-ole, Rev. O of 10/79, Unit 1 Process Sample System Lineup Electrical Check-list LOP-RE-01, Rev. O of 11/14/78, Startup of Reactor Building Equipment Drains LOP-RE-OlM, Rev. O of 12/78, Unit 1 Reactor Building Equipment Drains Mechanical Checklist LOP-SF-02, Rev. 3 of 4/29/81, Suppression Pool Cleanup LOP-SF-OlM, Rev. 2 of 11/80, Unit 1 Suppression Pool to Condenser Mechanical Checklist LOP-WW-ole, Rev. 2 of 1/19/79, Unit 0 Well Water Electrical Checklist All comments on the above procedures were resolved with the licensee, during the exit interview.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
7.
Preoperational Test Witnessing
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The inspector witnessed portions of preoperational tests PT-VR-101, " Reactor.
Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning" and PT-VG-101, " Standby -
Gas Treatment System" conducted May 25, 1981. The purpose of the test witnessed was to prove that the Standby Gas Treatment and Reactor Building Ventilation Systems have the capability of pulling the required negative pressure in the Reactor Building. The systems failed to obtain the required negative pressurc.
(-0.25 inches water) because of in-leakage into the Reactor Building. The in '
leakage into the Reactor Building occurred despite purely temporary measures used to check it such as sealing doors with duct tape, bracing doors against their seals, using duct seal around leaks on penetrations, taping floor plates,
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calking around blow plugs, etc.
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The inspector stated that the test must be performed satisfactorily after all temporary seals, bracing, etc. are removed and af ter Unit #1 separation from Unit #2, (i.e. floor drain separation etc.) has occurred.
The inspector will witness this test again when it is. lone under conditions that represent those that will be required for Unit #1 fuel load. Open item (373/81-24-04).
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
8.
Followup on ifeadquarters Requests a. The inspector was called by the reviewer from the Office of NRR Auxiliary Systems Branch with request for information on the tornado protection provided for ventilation intakes and exhausts at LaSalle County Nuclear Station. The inspector took photographs of the tornado protection structures at LaSalle County and wrote memorandum to the reviewer describing each ventilation system that was required to be protected at LaSalle County Nuclear Station, j
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b. The Office and I and E Headquarters called and needed information on the extent of testing performed by the licensee with respect to I and E Bulletin 79-15.
The inspector researched the area and provided the information necessary.
c. The Region III Office required the Senior Resident Inspectors support at the RIII Office to organize _ the presentation of LaSalle County Nuclear Station I and E issues required to be resolved prior to license issuance by the Director.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
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'1 9.
Inspection Activities Preparatory to License Issuance (Status of Licensee Procedures-and Preoperational Testing Program a. Operating, Maintenance, Surveillance, Abnormal and Emergency Procedure Status i
The licensee has effectively completed writing these procedures and has cc cleted approximately 90% of the changes that were necessary due to system walkdown, NRC, onsite, -and other review input, b. Preoperational Testing Program Status The licensee projects a total of 125 Preoperational Tests / System Demonstrations required for Unit 1 operations of which 115 of these are specific to Unit I and the remaining 10 are specific to Unit 2.
The. licensee reported that 122 systems have been turned over for preoperational testing, that 115 Preoperational Tests and Systems Demonstrations have been started, that 80 Preoperational Tests and System Demonstrations have been completed, and the preoperational testing program is approximately 85.2% complete at this time.
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The lic'ensee stated that-final Prcoperational Test or System Dtmonstra--
tion r'esults for 41 tests of the. 91 required by the NRC are. ready.for NRC review, i.e.,
the entire test is complete and the results have been reviewed and accepted by the licensee. These forty tests are PT-DO-101
" Diesel Oil," PT-VY-102 "LSCS ' Equipment Ventilation," PT-PV-101 " Reactor Vessel Internals Vibration," PT-D0-201 " Unit 2 Diesel Oil,".PT-FC-101
" Fuel Pool Cooling and. Cleanup," PT-NR-10,1A " Source Range Monitors,"
PT-SC-101 " Standby Liquid ' Control," PT-VJ-101 " Machine Shop Vantila-tion," PT-V0-101 "Off-Gas Ventilation," SD-WR-101 " Reactor Building
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Closed Cooling Water System," SD-CW-101 " Circulating Water System,'l _."
SD-CX-102 " Rod. Worth Minimizer," PT-AP 202 " Unit No. 2 DC Distribution,"
"SD-CD-101 " Condensate and Condensate Booster System," SD-HD-101A-
"Feedwater Heaters and Drains," SD-CY-101 " Cycled Condensate System,
SD-WE-101A " Equipment Drain and Waste Collector Process. System,"
PT-AR-101 " Area Radiation' Monitors," PT-NR-101C " Power Range Neutron Monitors," PT NR-101B " Intermediate Range Neutron Monitors," PT-RD-101A.
" Rod Drive Control," PT-VD-101 " Diesel Ventilation," SD-WS-101 " Service Water," SD-EH-101B." Turbine Supervisory," SD-CD-102. " Condenser and Auxiliaries," SD-W-102 "Feedwater Control," SD-FD-101B " Moisture Separator Reheaters," PT-VP-101." Primary Containment Vent and> Purge,"
PT-HP-101 "High Pressure Core Spray System," PT-LP-101 " Low Pressure Core Spray System," PT-RI-101 " Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System,"
PT-AP-101 " Unit. #1 AC. Distribution," PT-AP-201 " Unit #2 AC Distribution,"
SD-WE-101C " Laundry Equipment Drains and Reprocessing," PT-VP-104 " Primary Containment Chill Water," SD-SA-101 " Service and Int,trument Air,"
PT-NB-101 " Nuclear Boiler," SD-PS-101 " Process Sampling," PT-VR-202
" Unit #2 Post LOCA' Hydrogen Control," PT-VY-20) " Unit. #2 Ccre Standby Cooling System Equipment Cooling," and SD-WY-101 " Solid Radioactive Waste."
c.
Deficiency Status The licensee is currently listing 1014 Station Operations deficiencies and 1992 Station Construction deficiencies as outstanding'it' ems. The licensee has segregated these deficiencies into those that will' impact fuel load and those that will not.- The licensee has reviewed approximately
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2749 of these deficiencies for. segregation and preliminary assessment is' that 937 of those reviewed would.need to be cleared prior to fuel. load.
The inspector will continue to review this matter.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
10.
Plant Walkthrough/ Operational Status Review The inspector conducted walkthroughs and reviewed the plant operations status including examinations of contro' room log books, routine patrol sheets,- shift engineera log books, equipment outage logs, special
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operating orders, and jumper tagout logs for the period of May 18, 1981 through June 26, 1981. The inspector observed the operations status during three off-shifts during the same period as above. The inspector-also made visual observations of the routine surveillance, functional, and preoperational. tests in progress during this period. This reviev was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the -
requirements established under'10 CFR and administrative' procedures.
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.The inspector conducted. tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor, auxiliary,
and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted the status of
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construction and plant housekeeping / cleanliness. With respect to housekeeping / cleanliness, the inspector discovered conditions described
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in paragraph 2 under follow-up on Open. Item (!73/81-07-01). The inspector
. observed shift turnovers to verify that plant camponent status and-problem areas were being turned over to a relieving shift.
i No items of noncompliance vere identified in this area.
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11.
Management Interview
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
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at the conclusion of the inspection period. The inspector summarized!
the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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Management Meeting Held in NRC RIII Office June 26, 1981
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a. Attendance CECO Those denoted-in paragraph 1.
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J. G. Keppler, Director i
A. B. Davis, Deputy Director i
R. C. Knop, Chief Projects Branch #1 (
R. L. Spessard, Chief Engineering Inspection Branch C. C. Williams, Chief Plant Systems Section K..R. Baker, Chief Management ProgramsSection I. N. Jackiw, Acting Chief Test Programs Section D. H. Danielson, Materials and Processes Section J. Creed, Acting Chief Safeguards F. Reimann, Acting Chief Projects Section 1C
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W. L. Axelson, Acting Chief Emergency Preparedness'Section
D. Mill
, Inspector i
H. M. Wescott, Inspector J. H. Niesler, Inspector
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F. Maura, Inspector R. D. Walker, Inspector-
?I b.. Meeting Summary
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l This meeting was held between Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
l and NRC RIII representatives' to review the ' substantive issues that
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are germane to the NRC RIII review with ' respect to. license issuance.
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LaSalle County Unit #1.
The issues identified were as fcllows:
1.) Fuel load date variance from the September 15, 19G1 fuel-load date reported to NRR.
NRC RIII took the position that a November 1,1981 to December 1,1981 fuel load date was more realistic. CECO took the position that the September 15, 1981 fuel load date was a soft date and that they did not wish to change uit even though the November 1 to December 1,1981 fuel load date projected by NRC RIII, is possible.
2.) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) finding against Grundy County.
3.) Preoperational Test completion and subsequent NRC RIII review.
4.) Diesel Generator Preoperational Test concerns.
5.) System deficiencies.
6.) Housekeeping / cleanliness concerns (see paragraph 2. Open Item (373/81-07-01) discussion).
7. ) State of Rad-Chem Technician' Training.
8.) NRC RIII Open Items.
9.) TMI Action Plan Implementation.
10.) Construction problems.
11.) Implementation of Security requirements two months before fuel load.
During the meeting, it was agreed thct another meeting would be held to discuss progress on these issues in approximately one month.
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