IR 05000373/1981030
| ML20054H672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1982 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054H669 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-81-30, NUDOCS 8206240316 | |
| Download: ML20054H672 (1) | |
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13.
Followup on Significant Event That occurs While Inspector Is On Site The inspector determined by review of the Shif t Engineer's and Operator's Log on July 20, 1981 that the Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test had been terminated at 12:15 a.m. on July 19, 1981 because of damage to the Reactor Building roof. The inspector conducted interviews with Shift Engineers, Shift Foremen, Reactor Operators, the Test Engineer and startup personnel from the construction department to ascertain the failure mechanism for the Reactor Building review. These interviews determined the following:
a.
Sometime during the weekend of July 18-19, 1981 in the process of conducting the Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test, the Reactor Building was overpressurized. The overpressurization was apparent-ly caused by an abnormal HVAC configuration with a supply fan running, the exhaust fan off or tripped, and the Reactor Building isolation dampers closed.
The overpressurization caused damage to the Reactor Building composition roofing and insulation.
b.
The Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test was being conducted under the direction of the Startup Engineer without an approved procedure as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI and Quality Requirement 11 of the Commonwealth Edison Company Quality Assurance Ranual.
c.
The construction Startup Engineer ordered the Reactor Operator to run the Reactor Building ventilation fans in the " start" position which defeats interlocks, which would have prevented l
the overpressurization had the fans been run in the " auto" posi-
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tion as required by the operating procedures and applicable preoperational test procedures. The Startup Engineer's reason for this action was to draw a vacuum greater than that allowed by the interlocks so that he might find leaks in the Reactor Building by a listening technique.
d.
The test was run with steam tunnel blow out pancis caulked to prevent air in leakage. The inspector believes that had the blow out panels not been caulked and allowed to perform as designed, the overpressurization would not have occurred as the blow out panels are designed to open and relieve pressure at a lower pressure than that necessary to blow the Reactor Building roof.
This failure to have procedures is considered to be an item of non-compliance of 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion XI and will be followed under Open Item (373/81-30-10).
One item of noncompliance at the Severity Category of a Level IV was identified in this area.
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