IR 05000373/1979044
| ML19296D774 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1980 |
| From: | Spessard R, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296D771 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-79-44, NUDOCS 8003130163 | |
| Download: ML19296D774 (7) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-373/79-44 Docket No.
50-373 License No.
CPPR-99 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
La Salle County Station, Unit 1 Inspection At:
La Salle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: November 1 - December 31, 1979 Inspector:
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Inspection Summary Inspection on November 1 - December 31, 1979 (Report No. 50-373/79-44)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, resident inspector, preoperational inspection consisting of a review of licensee actions on IE Circulars received by the licensee since the last inspection, a review of licensee actions on IE Bulletins received by the licensee since the last inspection, witnes-sing of preoperational testing, Maintenance / Surveillance Procedure review, Emergency / Abnormal Procedure review, and plant walk throughs. The inspec-tion involved a total of 207 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. H. Holyoak, Station Superintendent
- G. W. Reardanz, Quality Assurance Engineer R. D. Bishop, Technical Staff Supervisor G. J. Diedrich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent
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C. W. Schroeder, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor J. M. Marshall, Operating Engineer J. Renwick, Operating Engineer R. Ragusse, Senior Operating Engineer J. Andrews, Technical Staff W. Huntington, Technical Staff J. M. Damron, Technical Staff W. C. Kirchoff, Technical Staff G. L. Swihart, Technical Staff D. M. Pristave, Technical Staff T. A. Hammerich, Technical Staff H. Hentschel, Technical Staff K. D. Presley, Technical Staff The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the technical, operating, and construction staff; as well as certain licensee contractor employees from General Electric Co.
and H. P. Foley Co.
- Denotes persons present at Management Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (37?/78-30-01):
Previous concerns identi-fied during an Inspection of Operational Staffing identified a need to qualify certain non-licensed "A" Technicians to ANSI N18.1 stan-dards. The licensee agreed to commit to this qualification, but, the inspector had informed the licensee that he must make the appro-priate changes to the FSAR and his procedures to reflect this com-mitment. The inspector reviewed procedure LAP 100-5, Rev. 6,
" Review of Personnel Qualifications to ANSI N18.1 Requirements"
dated November 9, 1979, and FSAR Amendment 42, Chapter 13, Table 13.1-1, "LSCS Organization Titles and ANSI N18.1 Equivalents" and e
determined that changes to these documents incorporated this commit-ments. The inspector reviewed the qualifications of selected per-sonnel effected by this commitment and determined that these per-sonnel met the minimum requirements established for the position described in ANSI N18.1 to complete his inspection of operational staffing.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
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3.
IE Circular Followup
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The inspector verified that the licensee received the following IE Circulars and that the licensee is in the process ri reviewing them for applicability. Therefore, the review is not complete and no action has been taken or planned by the licensee. These circulars are considered to be open items as follows:
IE Circular 79-23 (373/79-44-01); IE Circular 79-24 (373/79-44-02); IE Circular 79-25 (373/79-44-03). The inspector verified that IE Circular 79-22 was received by the licensee, was reviewed for applicability and was determined to be inapplicable; therefore, no action was taken or planned, and the inspector's review of this is closed.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
4.
IE Bulletin Followup The inspector verified that the licensee received the following IE Bulletins that require a written response by the licensee; however, the written response period has not terminated. Therefore, the inspector's review of these IE Bulletins is open as follows: IE Bulletin 79-25 (373/79-44-04); IE Bulletin 79-28 (373/79-44-05). The inspector verified that IE Bulletin 79-26 was received by the licen-see for information only with no formal response to the bulletin required. The inspector explained to the licensee that no formal response to the bulletin was required because the unit was under construction and that the requirements in the bulletin should be addressed prior to license issuance. The inspector's review of this bulletin is open (373/79-44-06).
The inspector verified that the licensee rec +ived IE Bulletin 79-27, but some uncertainty exists as to whether a formal written response is required of the licensee. The Bulletin required action to be taken by all power reactor facilities with an operating license and for those nearing ompletion of construction. The six plants listed as being near completion of construction do not include La Salle County Nuclear Station, but does include plants which are not as close to completion of construction as La Salle County Nuclear Station (for example, Zimmer).
All other plants under construction were sent this bulletin as information only with no formal response required. The inspector and the licensee are, therefore, uncertain as to the applicable status of La Salle County Nuclear Station with respect to this bulletin. The licensee expressed concern that the Office of Inspection and Enforcement was treating the La Salle County Nuclear Station pre-licensing review as a lower status prior-ity with respect to scheduling than the Zimmer station. The licen-see stated that it has been their understanding with the Office of NRR that their review priority status is the same as the Zimmer Station. The inspector stated that he was unaware of a priority-3-
status established within IE for near term license review work and
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was unable to explain the apparent difference in classification implied in the required response to IE Bulletin 79-27.
This item remains open pending clarification (373/79-44-07).
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
5.
Witnessing of Preoperational Testing The following tests were witnessed by the inspector:
a.
Standby Liquid Control System
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The inspector witnessed portions of preoperational test PT-SC-101, " Standby Liquid Control System" and observed:
(1) Valve and system checkouts; (2) Heat tracing and testing of the appropriate piping and tanks; and, (3) Testing of squib valve monitoring circuitry.
b.
Emergency Power Systems The inspector witnessed portions of preoperational test PT-DG-101A "Preoperational Test Diesel Generator lA".
This test consisted of a startup and synchronization of the unit and running it at rated load (2600KW) for 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> after which the load was increased to 10% over rated (2860KW) at which time the unit was shut down. The unit shutdown was followed by a hot auto start initiated from the bus undervoltage re-lays and synchronization of the unit and a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> run at 1300 to 1500KW load conditions. The unit was shut down from the above auto start and another hot auto start was initiated from a relay trip of an ECCS actuation signal. The unit was reloaded from the last auto start signal to 1300 to 1500KW and run for one hour before being shut down. The inspector observed that the voltage / frequency regulation was proper under steady state and transient conditions.
c.
Emergency Core Cooling Systems The inspector witnessed portions of the following emergency core cooling system preoperational tests:
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(1) High Pressure Core Spray System Preoperational Test
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PT-ilP-101 The inspector witnessed pump vibration, pump flow, and system injection pattern tests.
(2) Low Pressure Core Spray System Preoperational Test PT-LP-101 The inspector witnes id pump vibration, pump flow, and system injection pa
.rn tests.
(3) Residual lleat Removal System Preoprational Test PT-Ril-101 The inspector witnessed pump vibration, pump flow, shut-down cooling flow, suppression pool spray flow /pattera, and low pressure coolant injection flow tests for the three Residual lleat Removal Loops (shutdown cooling flow and suppression pool spray flow / pattern not applicable to
"C" loop).
The inspector observed the following for the preoperational tests witnessed (Paragraphs a, b and c above):
(1) The appropriate preoperational test procedure or appro-priate revision was a.wilable in use by all test crew members; (2) The minimum crew manning requirements were met for the test; (3) The test prerequisites were met; (4) The proper plant systems were in service for the test; (5) The special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in service; (6) The test was performed as required by the procedure; (7) The test crew actions appeared to be correct and timely during the performance of the test; (8) The data appeared to be collected for final analysis by the proper personnel; and, (9) The test esults observed by the inspector indicate that acceptance criteria was met or documented as a deficiency.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
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6.
Main' ;ance/ Surveillance Procedure Review
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During a review of the index of licensee instrument surveillance procedures (LIS) for scope, the inspector discovered that the licen-see did not plan to have a surveillance procedure which will periodi-cally verify the physical position of the limit switches for Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) greater than or equal to 94% open indication. The inspector explained that the physical position sur-veillance procedure would be required to assure that the switches are positioned at the correct place in valve travel.
This problem was addressed to the Senior Operating Engineer because the Master Instrument Mechanic was unavailable to the inspector at the time.
The licensee assured the inspector that the required surveillance procedure would be provided. The inspector will review the contents of this procedure on a subsequent inspection, and the item remains open pending this review (373/79-44-08).
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
7.
Emergency / Abnormal Procedure Review The inspector reviewed selected alarm procedures against annunciator alarm panel window wording to assure that the wordirg conveyed the proper meaning to the operator and that alarms of the same parameters exhibit similitude in phraseology from system to system. The inspector identified the following weaknesses which promote confusion and lack of understanding in the operating staff.
All five of the ECCS Systems (LPCS, HPCS, RHR, A, RER B, and a.
RHR C) have a dual parameter alarm from their respective in-jection lines. The alarm will trip when a high pressure con-dition is sensed in the injection line, which indicates pos-sible leakage from the reactor vessel back trhough the normally shut injection valve. The clarm will also trip when a low pressure condition is sensed in the injection line, which indicates possible failure of the Keep Fill / Jockey Pump. The alarms are identified as follows:
(1)
1H-13-P601 C209 "LPCS Injection Valve Leakage High" (2)
1H-13-P601 C403 "RHR Pump 1A Discharge Pressure Abnormal" (3)
1H-13-P601 B406 "RHR Pump 1B Discharge Pressure Abnormal" (4)
1H-13-P601 B402 "RHR Pump IC Discharge Pressure Abnormal" (5)
1H-13-P601 A406 "HPCS Header Pressure Hi/Lo" This series of alarms neither exhibits similitude in phrase-ology from system to system; not in all cases do they convey the proper meaning to the operator. This fact was brought to the attention of the licensee and is considered to be an open item (373/79-44-09).
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b.
All five of the ECCS pumps (LPCS, IIPCS, RHR A, RilR B, and RilR C) have a pump motor breaker status alarm which is tripped f rom an auxiliary contact from the pump breaker.
The purpose of the alarm is to signify that the breaker has changed its status, presumably from the open to the closed position since the pumps are normally in a condition of standby readiness with the pump motor breakers open. The alarm would then be an indication of successful automatic initiation of the pump start logic.
Four of the pump breaker status alarms (LPCS, RiiR A, RIIR B and RHR C) do indeed initiate from the pump motor breaker closing and are properly worded to that ef fect; however, the lipCS pump breaker status alarm initiates from the pump motor breaker being open. This condition is normal and will result in this alarm being tripped at all times during normal plant operations, a condition which violates the station's proposed black alarm panel concept.
This condition was brought to the licensee's attention and is considered to be an open item (373/79-44-10).
c.
The low pressure ECCS systems have divisional alarms to monitor the integrity of the injection lines inside the reactor pressure vessel annulus area between the inner reactor pressure vessel wall and the outer diameter of the core shroud. The alarm is arranged so that a break in this line from either divisional ECCS loop (RilR A or LPCS for Division 1; RllR B or RHR C for Division 2) will trip the divisional oriented alarm. The alarms are identified as follows:
(1)
IH-13-P601 B407 "RIIR B/C Line Integrity Monitor" (2)
lli-13-P601 C404 "RllR A Line Integrity Monitor" Item (2) above, should be Ill-13-P601 "R11R A/LPCS Line Integrity Monitor" to correctly identify the possible conditions present when the alarm trips. This condition was brought to the atten-tion of the licensee and is considered to be an open item (373/
79-44-11).
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
8.
Plant Walkthrough The inspector conducted plant walk throughs to ascertain the status of plant construction and plant cleanliness on various occasions during this inspection period.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this area.
9.
Management Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection period. The inspector summarized the scope of his inspection findings.
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