IR 05000346/2005004

IR 05000346-05-004 (DRS) on 04/18/2005 - 05/06/2005 on Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; Safety System Design and Performance Capability

ML051660047
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/14/2005
From:	Reynolds S Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III
To:	Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-05-004
Download: ML051660047 (13)

Text

une 14, 2005

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION 05000346/2005004(DRS)

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

On May 6, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a baseline inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on May 6, 2005, with Mr. B. Allen and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on the design and performance capability of the direct current (DC) power and auxiliary feedwater systems.

Based on the results of this inspection, three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance were identified, which involved violations of NRC requirements. However, because these violations were of very low safety significance and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issues as Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven A. Reynolds, Chairman Davis-Besse Oversight Panel Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000346/2005004(DRS)

w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information Attachment 2: Technical Specifications Table 4.8-1 cc w/encl: The Honorable Dennis Kucinich G. Leidich, President - FENOC J. Hagan, Senior Vice President Engineering and Services, FENOC L. Myers, Chief Operating Officer, FENOC Plant Manager Manager - Regulatory Compliance D. Jenkins, Senior Attorney, FirstEnergy Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health Public Utilities Commission of Ohio President, Board of County Commissioners of Lucas County J. Papcun, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000346/2005004(DRS); 04/18/2005 - 05/06/2005; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station;

Safety System Design and Performance Capability.

The inspection was a three-week baseline inspection of the design and performance capability of the auxiliary feedwater and DC power systems. The inspection was conducted by regional engineering inspectors. Three Green Non-Cited Violations were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

C

Green.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1,

Procedures and Programs, regarding an inadequate procedure related to transferring the suction source for the motor-driven feedwater pump from the condensate storage tank to the backup service water supply. Specifically, implementation of the procedure would have placed a significant quantity of air into the suction piping for the pump, potentially degrading the pump or making it inoperable. After the inspectors identification, the licensee initiated an operations standing order to adequately fill the affected section of piping prior to transferring the suction supply.

The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the attribute of equipment performance, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems and components that respond to initiating events. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the results of the SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet. (Section 1R21.2.b.1)

Green.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specifications Table 4.8-1 for the failure to identify that a battery cell float voltage reading was below the required 2.13 volts minimum value. Based on Table 4.8-1, note (2), this required an action (i.e., equalize charge) within 7 days to restore the voltage such that the battery would remain operable, which was not accomplished. This was considered a past operability issue. Subsequent readings on the battery cell were within the Technical Specification required value, which addressed present operability concerns.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the attribute of human performance, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of the DC power system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The human performance finding also had a cross-cutting aspect because the licensee failed to identify a voltage reading that did not meet acceptance criteria during the surveillance. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the results of the SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet.

(Section 1R21.2.b.2)

Green.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1,

Procedures and Programs, regarding an inadequate maintenance procedure related to battery charging. Specifically, the maintenance procedure did not ensure that adequate electrical isolation was maintained when a non-Class 1E single cell battery charger was used to charge a single battery cell.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the attribute of equipment performance, which could have affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of the DC power system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance based on the results of the SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet.

(Section 1R21.2.b.3)

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability

Introduction:

Inspection of safety system design and performance verifies the initial design and subsequent modifications and provides monitoring of the capability of the selected systems to perform design bases functions. As plants age, the design bases may be lost and important design features may be altered or disabled. The plant risk assessment model is based on the capability of the as-built safety system to perform the intended safety functions successfully. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the mitigating systems and barrier integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

The objective of the safety system design and performance capability inspection is to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses, other engineering documents, and operational and testing practices that were used to support the performance of the selected systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Specific documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the attachment to the report.

The systems and components selected were the auxiliary feedwater (AFW), including the motor-driven feedwater pump (MDFP), and direct current (DC) power systems (two samples). These systems were selected for review based upon:

• having high probabilistic risk analysis rankings;

• considered high safety significant maintenance rule systems; and

• not having received recent NRC review.

The criteria used to determine the acceptability of the systems performance was found in documents such as:

• licensee Technical Specifications (TS);

• applicable Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) sections; and

• the systems' design documents.

.1 System Requirements

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the USAR, TS, system design basis documents, system descriptions, drawings, and other available design basis information, to determine the performance requirements of AFW and DC power systems, and their associated support systems. The reviewed system attributes included process medium, energy sources, control systems, operator actions, and heat removal. The rationale for reviewing each of the attributes was:

Process Medium: This attribute required review to ensure that the AFW system and MDFP would supply the required amount of water to the steam generators in order to remove heat from the reactor following normal transients and design basis events.

Energy Sources: This attribute needed to be reviewed to ensure that the AFW system and MDFP would start when called upon, and that appropriate valves would have sufficient power to change state when so required. This attribute also needed to be reviewed to ensure that the DC power system was sufficiently sized to provide power to the components it supplied.

Controls: This attribute required review to ensure that the automatic controls for the AFW and DC power systems were properly established. Additionally, review of alarms and indicators was necessary to ensure that operator actions would be accomplished in accordance with the design.

Operations: This attribute was reviewed because the emergency operating procedures permitted the operators to manually control AFW and MDFP operations to maintain desired steam generator water level. The MDFP was manually initiated, which required a number of actions to align the system for operation. Therefore, operator actions played an important role in the ability of the AFW and MDFP systems to achieve its functions.

Heat Removal: This attribute required review to ensure that the heat generated while the AFW system was running can be effectively removed and that the temperature in the battery rooms would be maintained within the batteries design requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 System Condition and Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed design basis documents and plant drawings, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, requirements, and commitments identified in the USAR and TS. The inspectors compared the information in these documents to applicable electrical, instrumentation and control, mechanical calculations, setpoint changes, and plant modifications. The inspectors used applicable industry standards, such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), to evaluate acceptability of the systems design. Select operating experience was reviewed to ensure the issue was adequately evaluated and corrective actions implemented, as necessary. The inspectors also reviewed operational procedures to verify that instructions to operators were consistent with design assumptions.

The inspectors reviewed information to verify that the actual system condition and tested capability were consistent with the identified design bases. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the installed configuration, the system operation, the detailed design, and the system testing, as described below.

Installed Configuration: The inspectors confirmed that the installed configuration of the AFW, including the MDFP, and DC power systems met the design basis by performing detailed system walkdowns. The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of piping, components, and instruments; the placement of protective barriers and systems; the susceptibility to flooding, fire, or other environmental concerns; physical separation; provisions for seismic and other pressure transient concerns; and the conformance of the currently installed configuration of the systems with the design and licensing bases.

Operation: The inspectors performed a procedure walk-through of selected manual operator actions to confirm that the operators had the knowledge and tools necessary to accomplish actions credited in the design basis.

Design: The inspectors reviewed the mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation design of the AFW, including the MDFP, and DC power systems to verify that the systems and subsystems would function as required under design conditions. This included a review of the design basis, design changes, design assumptions, calculations, boundary conditions, and models as well as a review of selected modification packages.

Instrumentation was reviewed to verify appropriateness of applications and setpoints based on the required equipment function. Additionally, the inspectors performed limited analyses in several areas to verify the appropriateness of the design values.

Testing: The inspectors reviewed records of selected periodic testing and calibration procedures and results to verify that the design requirements of calculations, drawings, and procedures were incorporated in the system and were adequately demonstrated by test results. Test results were also reviewed to ensure automatic initiations occurred within required times and that testing was consistent with design basis information.

b. Findings

Three findings of very low safety significance associated with Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) were identified.

b.1 Air Void in Suction to MDFP When Aligned to Service Water

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a finding involving an NCV of TS 6.8.1, having very low safety significance (Green) for an inadequate procedure related to the transferring of the suction source for the MDFP from the condensate storage tank (CST)to the backup service water (SW) supply. Implementation of the procedure would have placed a significant quantity of air into the suction piping for the pump, potentially degrading the pump or making it inoperable.

Discussion: On May 2, 2005, during an NRC walkdown of the piping associated with the MDFP, review of Procedure DB-OP-06225, MDFP Operation, and questioning of the suction piping configuration susceptibility to air entrapment, the inspectors identified that the configuration of suction piping from the SW alternate suction supply would align approximately 11 feet of voided 6-inch piping to the pump. The subject voided section was located approximately 60 feet from the MDFP suction inlet. Upon implementing the SW lineup to the MDFP, per DB-OP-06225, Section 5.3, Transferring MDFP Suction from the CST to Service Water, the voided line would be lined up to the suction of the pump and could have potentially caused significant damage to the pump.

Procedure DB-OP-06225, Section 5.3, re-aligns the suction for the MDFP from the CST to the SW supply by closing drain valve SW336 and then opening the normally closed manually operated SW supply valves SW6391 and SW6392. The piping in between these valves was normally maintained drained by opened valve SW336 to preclude potential leakage through SW6391 from being inadvertently supplied to the steam generators, which could adversely affect SG chemistry. Section 5.3 of DB-OP-06225 was determined to be inadequate, in that, implementation of the procedure as written would line up an approximate 11-foot section of the voided piping to the suction of the MDFP.

The licensee documented the concern in condition reports (CRs) 05-02526 and 05-02522 and promptly issued an Operations Standing Order 05-005 that would adequately fill the affected section of MDFP suction piping prior to transferring the MDFP to the backup SW suction supply. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was evaluating past operability of the MDFP and reviewing corrective actions for the CR, including procedure revisions to DB-OP-06225 to preclude potentially damaging the MDFP due to air ingestion.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the failure to ensure piping between the two isolation valves for the SW connection to the MDFP was filled prior taking a suction from the SW system was a performance deficiency and a finding. The volume of air in the voided section of SW piping could have adversely affected the MDFP if the SW system was used as a suction source. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, in that the finding was associated with the attribute of equipment performance, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems and components that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, implementation of Section 5.3 of DB-OP-06225 as written would have placed a significant quantity of air into the suction piping for the pump, potentially degrading the pump. This finding was only applicable to those events where the CST and off-site power would be unavailable (e.g., external events such as seismic and severe weather events).

The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, Phase 1 screening, and determined that the finding screened as Green because it was not a design issue resulting in loss of function per Generic Letter (GL) 91-18, did not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function, did not result in exceeding a TS allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation.

Although the finding was associated with a seismic event, the finding was determined not to be potentially risk significant based on the seismic screening criteria, Question 3.

For the purpose of significance determination, the inspectors conservatively assumed that the function of the MDFP would be failed. The finding only affected one train of a multi-train safety system (MDFP considered one train of AFW function to provide water to the steam generators), such that the finding did not result in the total loss of a safety function. This resulted in the finding screening as Green.

Enforcement:

Technical Specification 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Appendix A. This included procedures related to plant operations such as DB-OP-06225, Section 5.3, which implemented actions to place SW in the suction supply for the MDFP.

Contrary to this requirement, on May 6, 2005, Section 5.3 of DB-OP-06225 was determined to be inadequate, in that, implementation of the procedure as written would align a significant amount of voided piping to the suction of the MDFP, potentially degrading the pump due to air ingestion. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR 05-02526), it is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRCs Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000346/2005004-01). The licensees initial corrective action included issuance of an operations standing order to address the voided section of piping.

b.2 Battery Cell Float Voltage Less Than 2.13 Volts

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a finding involving an NCV of TS Table 4.8-1, having very low safety significance (Green) for the failure to recognize that battery cell float voltage was below the TS Table 4.8-1 Category B minimum limit. As a result, the licensee did not perform an equalizing charge to restore the battery to within the TS limits.

Description:

Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.2.b required verifying that battery parameters in Table 4.8-1 meet Category B limits. The float voltage for each connected station battery cell was required to be greater than or equal to 2.13 volts. Note

(2) of Table 4.8-1, stated that any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that they are within their allowable values and provided the parameter(s) are restored within limits within 7 days. The allowable value was 2.07 volts (see Attachment 2). The licensee incorporated these requirements into the acceptance criteria of procedure DB-ME-03001, Station Batteries Quarterly Surveillance.

In response to questions regarding the battery TS requirements, the licensee performed a review of battery surveillance data (completed since 2003) to verify past battery operability. During the review, the licensee identified that the voltage reading from surveillance DB-ME-03001 for Battery 2N, completed on December 5, 2003, showed that the float voltage for cell #60 was 2.114 volts, which was below the 2.13 volts minimum TS limit identified in Table 4.8-1 Category B limits. However, no actions were taken by the licensee to assure that the cell was restored within 7 days as required by the TS and the surveillance procedure. The inspectors verified that the measured float voltage obtained during the surveillance was above the allowable value (2.07 volts) as identified in TS Table 4.8-1 for Category B limits, and also verified that the float voltage for this cell obtained during subsequent surveillances were within the TS limit. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CR 05-02415) and determined the issue was reportable based on the failure to meet a TS requirement.

The licensee intended to initiate a Licensee Event Report within 60 days of discovery for the TS violation.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the failure to recognize that the measured float voltage during a TS surveillance for Cell #60 of Battery 2N was below TS Table 4.8-1 Category B limits and not taking appropriate actions as specified in the TS was a performance deficiency and a finding. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, in that the finding was associated with the attribute of human performance, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of the DC power system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the low float voltage could have potentially challenged the functionality of Battery 2N. The finding also had a cross-cutting aspect because the licensee failed to identify a voltage reading that did not meet acceptance criteria during the surveillance.

The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, Phase 1 screening, and determined that the finding was not a design issue resulting in loss of function per Generic Letter (GL) 91-18, did not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function and did not affect external event mitigation. With respect to question 3, although the violation occurred, the low float voltage of cell #60 did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the DC power system. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the finding has a very low safety significance (Green). Subsequent surveillance tests on the battery cell were within the TS limits. No additional voltage reading outside limits were identified.

Enforcement:

Technical Specification 4.8.2.3.2.b required verifying that battery parameters in Table 4.8-1 meet Category B limits. Note

(2) of Table 4.8-1 stated that For any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that they are within their allowable values and provided the parameter(s) are restored to within limits within 7 days. The Category B limit for battery cell float voltage was 2.13 volts.

Contrary to this requirement, on December 5, 2003, the float voltage for cell #60 of Battery 2N did not meet the TS Category B limits during the performance of surveillance DB-ME-03001. The measured voltage value was 2.114 volts, which was less than the minimum value of 2.13 volts, and no actions were taken by the licensee to assure that the cell was restored within limits within 7 days. However, because this violation was of very low safety significance and because the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR 05-02415), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000346/2005004-02).

The licensees initial corrective action included ensuring the batteries met the TS operability requirements.

b.3 Single Cell Battery Charger

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a finding involving an NCV of TS 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, having very low safety significance (Green) for an inadequate maintenance procedure related to battery charging. The procedure did not ensure that adequate electrical isolation was maintained when a non-Class 1E single cell battery charger was used to charge a single battery cell on safety-related batteries.

Description:

Section 8.1.5 of USAR, Power System Design Bases, listed IEEE Standard 308, Criteria for Class 1E Electrical Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, as one of the documents implemented in the design of the electrical systems.

The IEEE Standard stated that non-Class 1E circuits shall be independent and shall have proper isolation from Class 1E systems and components. This isolation could have been provided and ensured by utilizing Class 1E fuses or breaker.

The inspectors identified that Procedure DB-ME-09200, Station Battery Maintenance Guidelines, used to perform single cell charging on station batteries, was inadequate in that the procedure did not ensure that adequate electrical isolation was maintained between non-Class 1E equipment and the safety-related batteries. Specifically, Section 8.5, Individual Cell Charging, did not ensure adequate electrical isolation fuses were used between the non-Class 1E single cell battery charger, Alber Model PSC-10A, and the associated safety-related station batteries. Enclosure 3 of the procedure, Individual Cell Charging Hook-up, specified 15 amp fuses to be used for electrical isolation between the single cell charger and the single cell safety-related battery. The procedure did not indicate that the fuses were to be Class 1E. In response to question from the inspectors, it was determined that the fuses used in this connection were non-Class 1E, 15 amp, Gould Shawmut, Type ATM.

Without proper isolation capability, an electrical fault on the non-Class 1E battery charger could have been transferred without interruption into the station battery.

In response to this deficiency, the licensee initiated CR 05-02455, indicating that single cell charging should not be performed on the station batteries until Procedure DB-ME-09200 has been revised to require Class 1E fuses for isolation between the single cell battery charger and the safety-related station batteries.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the failure to have an adequate maintenance procedure to ensure proper electrical isolation when a non-Class 1E single cell battery charger was used to charge a single cell on the safety-related batteries was a performance deficiency and a finding. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, in that the finding was associated with the attribute of equipment performance, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of the DC power system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate electrical isolation fuses between the non-Class 1E single cell battery charger and safety-related battery may fail to interrupt a fault on the non-Class 1E charger, which could potentially render the safety-related battery incapable of performing its required safety function.

The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, Phase 1 screening, and determined that the finding screened as Green because it was not a design issue resulting in loss of function per GL 91-18, did not represent an actual loss of a systems safety function, did not result in exceeding a TS allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. In addition, there was no actual fault on the non-Class 1E charger that resulted in rendering any of the station batteries incapable of performing their required safety function.

Enforcement:

Technical Specification 6.8.1a required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A, Item 9.a., stated that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with written procedures appropriate to the circumstances. This included procedures such as DB-ME-09200, Section 8.5, which implemented actions to install the non-Class 1E charger.

Contrary to this requirement, inspectors identified that Procedure DB-ME-09200 was not appropriate to the circumstances in that Class 1E electrical isolation devices between the non-Class 1E single cell battery charger and safety-related battery were not required or established. However, because this violation was of very low safety significance and because the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (CR 05-02455), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000346/2005004-03). The licensees initial corrective action included not performing single cell charging on the station batteries until the procedure was been revised.

.3 Components

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined the AFW, including the MDFP, and DC power systems to ensure that component level attributes were satisfied. Specifically, the following attributes of the AFW and DC power systems were reviewed:

Equipment/Environmental Qualification: This attribute verifies that the equipment is qualified to operate under the environment in which it is expected to be subjected to under normal and accident conditions. The inspectors reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that the AFW, including the MDFP, and DC power components were qualified to operate within the temperatures specified in the environmental qualification documentation.

Equipment Protection: This attribute verifies that the AFW, including the MDFP, and DC power systems are adequately protected from natural phenomenon and other hazards, such as high energy line breaks, floods or missiles. The inspectors reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that the AFW and DC power systems were adequately protected from those hazards identified in the USAR which could impact their ability to perform their safety function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Review of Condition Reports

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of AFW, including the MDFP, and DC power system problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. In addition, condition reports written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action program. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

Section 1R21.2.b.2 described a human performance finding that had a cross-cutting aspect because the licensee failed to identify a voltage reading that did not meet acceptance criteria during a surveillance test.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exits

.1 Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B. Allen and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 6, 2005. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

B. Allen, Plant Manager

N. Barron, Mechanical Design Engineering

M. Bezilla, Site Vice President

A. Bless, Regulatory Compliance

B. Boles, Manager, Plant Engineering

R. Carritte, I&C/Electrical Design Engineering

J. Grabnar, Manager, Design Engineering

J. Hartigan, Mechanical Design Engineering

R. Hovland, Manager, Technical Services

P. Jacobsen, I&C/Electrical Design Engineering

E. Johnson, DC System Engineer

J. Kendall, I&C/Electrical Design Engineering

S. Loehlein, Director, Station Engineering

D. Nassar, Mechanical Design Engineering

K. Ostrowski, Manager, Plant Operations

M. Parker, Supervisor, Plant Engineering

C. Price, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

R. Smith, AFW System Engineer

J. Sturdavent, Regulatory Compliance

F. Swanger, Nuclear/Analysis Design Engineering

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

A. M. Stone, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety

C. Thomas, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Williams, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened/Closed

05000346/2005004-01 NCV Inadequate Procedure Places Air Void in Suction to MDFP When Aligned to Service Water (Section 1R21.2.b.1)

05000346/2005004-02 NCV Battery Cell Float Voltage Less Than TS Minimum of 2.13 Volts (Section 1R21.2.b.2)

05000346/2005004-03 NCV Inadequate Electrical Isolation When Using a Single Cell Battery Charger (Section 1R21.2.b.3)

Attachment 1