IR 05000341/1993024

Insp Rept 50-341/93-24 on 931115-23.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support,Ffd Facilities & Procedures, Specimen Collection Procedures & FFD Personnel Background Check

ML20059B284
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/28/1993
From:	Creed J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059B269	List: IR 05000341/1993024 ML20059B268 ML20059B276
References
50-341-93-24, NUDOCS 9401040070
Download: ML20059B284 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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REGION III

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Report No. 50-341/93024(DRSS)  :

Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43

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Licensee: Detroit Edison Company 2200 Second Avenue '

Detroit, MI 48226 Facility Name: Fermi 2 l

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Inspection At: November 15-19, 1993, Fermi 2 Site, Newport, Michigan November 23, 1993, NRC Region III Office, Glen Ellyn, Illinois t Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced Fitness For Duty Inspection Date of Previous Fitness For Duty Inspection: September 17-20, 1991 (initial 4 inspection)  ;

Inspector: bm3 kih e i2 /::ta /93 l Gary L. Pirtle Date Physical Security Inspector i

Approved By: bcd . Mo 12 taMn

,{edamesR. treed, Chief Date

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Safeguards and IRC Section Inspection Summary Inspection Between November 15-23. 1993 (Report No. 50-341/93024(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's Fitness For Duty (FFD) Program required by 10 CFR Part 26. The inspection included:

Management Support; FFD Facilities and Procedures; Specimen Collection Procedures; FFD Personnel Background Checks and Psychological Evaluations; Audits and Surveillances of the FFD Program; FFD Trends and Analysis; Monthly Lab Reports Provided to the Licensee; Blind Sample Test Program; Equipment Calibration; and Followup on Previous Inspection Finding Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined, except for some occasions when personnel granted unescorted access to the protected area were not in the FFD random test selection pool. Inspection results also included an inspection finding in reference to the Drug Test Consent Form requiring modification (Section 5.b)

Program strengths were noted'in reference to the FFD facilities, audits of the FFD program, and tracking and trending of FFD activities (Section 5.c)..

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Five previous inspection findings were reviewed and three of the items were :

closed based upon evaluation of the licensee's' actions. The items closed pertained to:  ;

A FFD concern not being reported in a timely manner (Section 2.a).

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Little guidance existed regarding disposition of alcohol odor cases-(Section 2.b).  ;

l -- The need for an effective tracking system to monitor security training 4 completion. extension dates (Section 2.c).  !

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I Two security related licensee event reports were also reviewed 'and closed (Sections 2.d and 2.e). .;

The licensee's actions were not sufficient to close out an inspection item pertaining to errors in documentation of compensatory measures (Section 2.f), i and another inspection item pertaining to identification and training of '

security staff personnel who would augment the security force could not be closed (Section 2.g).  :

Management support for the FFD Program continued to be strong and the program :

was receiving effective oversight and supervision on a day-to-day basi I

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REPORT DETAILS i

1. Key Persons Contacted In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the inspector interviewed other employees, contractor personnel, and members :

of the Security and Fitness For Duty staff. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the onsite Exit Interview conducted on November.19, 199 ,

• R. McKeon, Plant Manager, Detroit Edison Company (DECO)

• R. Stafford, General Director, Nuclear Assurance, DECO

• J. Korte, Director, Nuclear Security, DECO)

• J. Tibal, Principal Compliance Engineer, Licensing, DECO ,

• W. Miller, Director, Nuclear Licensing, DECO

• R. Johnson, Supervisor, Quality Assurance, DECO

• R. Newkirk, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering, DECO

• P. Fessler, Technical Manager,' DECO

• T. Stach, General Supervisor, Security Operations, DECO

• R. Fitzsimmons, Supervisor, Access Authorization, DECO >

• L. Goans, Supervisor, Security Operations Support, DECO

• J. Pendergast, Compliance Engineer, DECO

• R. Salmon, Principal Engineer, Safety Engineering, DECO ,

• R. Orwig, Nuclear Security Specialist, DECO l

• J. Louwes, Quality Assurance Auditor, DECO

• K. Riemer, Resident Inspector, NRC Region III t

2. Followup on Previous Inspection Findinas (Closed) Inspection Findina (Report No. 50-341/93017-01): This item was addressed in Section 3.a of the above report and pertained to one potential FFD issue not'being reported in a timely manner to an employee's supervisor. In this instance, one ,

employee reported to a second employee the odor of alcohol on a

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named individual. That employee discussed it with a third i employee. The second two co-workers were concerned about the specific incident and jointly decided to notify a superviso That was not done because one of the individuals took some approved vacation while the supervisor had a scheduled day of ,

One of the individuals did not want to report the issue until the ;

other employee returned. Therefore, a potential safety issue was j not effectively reported in a timely manne Section 5.1.5 of procedure FIP AD4.02 " Drug and. Alcohol Testing" l was revised to require personnel to advise supervisors immediatel of any FFD issues or concerns they are aware of. This issue is :

considered close l (Closed) Inspection Findina (ReDort No. 50-341/93017-02): This item was addressed in Section 3.a of the above report and

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pertained to little guidance existing regarding disposition of ;

alcohol odor FFD case l

Section 5.1.5 of procedure FIP AD4.02 " Drug and Alcohol Testing" :

was revised to require the detection of the odor of alcohol to be *

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reported immediately to supervisors. This issue is considered close t c. (Closed) Inspection Findina (Report No. 50-341/93017-03): This item was addressed in Section 5.b of the above report and- ;

pertained to the need to develop an effective tracking system to monitor completion of training requirement completion extension i dates. The Security Force Training and Qualification (SFT&Q) Plan allows extensions, for up to 90 days in a three year period, to e

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complete training requirements. Such training normally must be '

completed every 12 months. The potential need existed to be able to monitor training completion extension dates for in excess of '

100 personnel for S to 10 training categorie '

The Security Department developed an effective computer based tracking system to monitor training completion date extensions for the required categories of training. A crosscheck of training documents and computer based data showed .that the information had been accurately entered. This issue is considered. close d. (Closed) Security Licensee Event Report (SLER) (SLER No.92-S0 dated Auaust 13. 1992): This SLER was submitted because some specific compensatory measures and response to certain alarms for a short period of time (seven minutes) had to be terminated because of severe weather conditions and sighting of a funnel cloud west of the plant perimeter (Specific compensatory measures and type of alarms not responded to is consider as Safeguards Information and exempt from public disclosure). The actions were taken for personnel safety purposes. After the severe weather had-ended, the protected and vital areas were searched and no anomalies were note '

The security forces actions were determined to be appropriate under the existing circumstances and this issue is considered close '

e. (Closed) Security Licensee Event Report (SLER) (SLER No. 92-S0 .

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dated September 9. 1992): This SLER was submitted because a weapon was detected during the search process for entry into the ,

protected area. The weapon was in a bag belonging to a site ,

employe The security force's actions were determined to be appropriate and this issue is considered close f. (0 pen) Inspection Findina (Report No. 50-341/93017-04): .This item was addressed in Section 5.c of the above report and pertained to l

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the need to assure that security staff personnel are trained to be able to support the uniformed security force during contingency events. The previous inspection showed that about 20% of the two staff groups were not adequately trained to augment the uniformed security force. The Security Department agreed to clarify the augmentation capability in the security plan and complete the required training as early as practica During this inspection, it was determined that the security plan revision had not yet been completed and only part of the required training had been completed. The Security Director agreed to complete the security plan revision within 30 days after receipt of this inspection report and complete the required training as early as practica This inspection also disclosed that two staff personnel- who perform duties as training and firearms instructors were considered as exempt from weapon qualification training requirements because of their instructor status. The inspector noted that the Security Force Training and Qualification (SFT&Q)

Plan does not allow weapon qualification and familiarization training to be exempted for any security force member because they are instructors. The inspector confirmed that neither of the two personnel had performed security post duties that required them to be armed with a weapon. Therefore, this issue is primarily an administrative issue. The Security Director stated that security force personnel required to be armed while on post would also be required to complete the designated weapon qualification and familiarization trainin The two issues described above will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio (00en) Inspection Findina (Report No. 50-3441/93017-05): This item was addressed in an attachment to the inspection report noted above and pertained to administrative errors involving documentation of compensatory measures (details of the . issue are considered to be Safeguards Information and exempt from public disclosure) . Review of the documentation for a certain type of contingency requiring compensatory measures disclosed that administrative errors pertaining to documentation of compensatory measures continued to be a problem. Although the type of error identi.fied in Report No. 50-041/93017 occurred only once, other documentation errors were evident (e.g. in one case, the compensatory measure was not documented on the required form (was documented on another form), in one case there was an error in time for an operability test, in another case, the radio call sign number was recorded rather than keycard number, and in another case, the time for termination of compensatory measures was not recorded). These errors were noted for a review of about five instances where compensatory measures were required. These errors are administrative in nature, however, they are excessive in

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number and security officers and supervisors are not providing ;

I adequate attention to detail for this administrative' matter. This l

issue will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio j i

3. Entrance and Exit Interviews At the beginning of the inspection, Mr. Robert McKeon and other members of the licensee's staff were informed of the purpose of

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this inspection, it's scope, and the topical areas to be examine :

' The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in section 1 at the conclusion of the onsite inspection activitie A general description of the scope and conduct of the inspection

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l was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit interview. The details of each finding discussed are referenced, as noted, in the report. Personnel present were i

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advised that:

(1) A violation was noted because some per.sonnel eligible for random drug testing were not in the random selection pool for various periods of time (Refer to Section 5.a). .;

(2) Three of five previous inspection findings would be recommended for closure, and two previous inspection ;

findings would remain in an open status. Additionally, two security related Licensee Event Reports were also reviewed i and would be recommended for closure (Refer to Section 2). d

(3) An inspection followup item was noted during this inspection pertaining to the need to revise the Drug Test Consent form'

(Refer to Section 5.b).

(4) Program strengths were noted pertaining to the Fitness For-Duty (FFD) facilities, audits of the FFD program, and tracking and trending of FFD activities (Refer to Section i

5.c).

4. Proaram Areas Inspected Listed below are the areas examined by the inspector in which no findings (violations, deviations, unresolved items or inspection followup items) were identified. Only findings are described in subsequent Report Details sectio The below listed clear areas were reviewed and evaluated by the inspector. Sampling reviews included ~ interviews,- observations, and document reviews that provided independent verification of compliance with requirements. Gathered data was also used to evaluate the adequacy j of the reviewed program and practices-to adequately protect the health and safety of the public. The scope and depth of inspection activities i

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were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the Fitness For Duty program,

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The areas inspected in which no findings were noted and compliance was I adequate included: Management Support; FFD Facilities and Procedures; )

Observed Specimen Collection and Processing; FFD Personnel Background i Checks and Psychological Evaluation; Audits and Surveillances of the FFD i Program; FFD Trends and Analysis; Monthly Lab Summary Reports; Blind Sample Test Program; and Equipment Calibration Schedul . Fitness For Duty Proaram G P 81502)

One violation, one inspection followup item, and three program strengths were noted and are described below: CFR 26.24(a)(2) requires personnel subject to Part 26 to be immediately and continuously eligible for selection for random testing required by 10 CFR Part 2 Contrary to this requirement, between October 1992 and August 1993, there have been four occasions when personnel with unescorted access authorization to the protected area and required to be eligible for FFD testing were not in the FFD random selection pool. The periods of ineligibility for FFD selection for random testing generally ranged from one day to five days and involved from one to five personne In all cases except the most recent, when it was discovered that the personnel were not in the random selection test pool, the individuals were FFD tested by the licensee when the deficiency was noted. The personnel in the most recent case were not tested when the deficiency was noted because they had been administered a preaccess FFD test a couple days before the deficiency was noted.

p None of the personnel tested were positive for drug or alcohol l use.

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In all of the cases noted above, the licensee identified the fact that some personnel were not in the FFD random selection poo However, the corrective actions initiated by the licensee were not adequate to prevent recurrence of the deficiency and therefore the violation does not meet the criteria of Section VII.B.(2) as a licensee identified violation (34193024-01). An inspection followup item was noted in reference to the Drug Test Consent Form used by the licensee. The form used to obtain permission from individuals to participate in the FFD drug testing program erroneously states that the test results can be releasee to the licensee's Medical Department. However, the licensee's Medical Department does not have a need to receive the test result data and in fact does not receive the test data. The FFD test results are received and reviewed by a contract Medical Review Officer (MRO) rather than the licensee's Medical Department. The consent form requires revision to correctly identify the personnel authorized to receive the FFD test results. The licensee agreed to revise the consent form (341/93024-02).

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i c. Program strengths were noted in reference to the FFD facilities, audits of the licensee's FFD program, and tracking and trending of FFD activities by the'FFD Administrato .

(1) The FFD facilities were excellent in quality, neat in appearance, ample in size, and well equippe (2) The licensee's audits of the onsite FFD program and the-offsite laboratory were excellent. .The audits were very broad in scope and depth and the audit findings were- !

technically correct and well documen (3) The FFD Administrator had trended and tracked most aspects of the FFD program, to include, days and times for random FFD-testing, FFD positive test results by substance and i category of personnel and category of testing (e.g. random, ,

pre access, etc), blind sample test results, calibration of t breath analysis equipment, and number of personnel randomly selected from 0 TO 6 times for FFD testing within a given ,

year. The trending and tracking effort exceeded regulatory requirements and most of the data was evaluated from the '

time of program implementation in 199 .

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