IR 05000334/1980016
| ML19351E431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1980 |
| From: | Beckman D, Hegner J, Mcbrearty R, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351E418 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-80-16, NUDOCS 8012100102 | |
| Download: ML19351E431 (22) | |
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. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-334/80-16 Docket No.
50-334 License No. DPR-66 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Facility Name:
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 Inspection at: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection conduc ed: Ju e 1-30, 1980 I
N Inspectors:
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'ckman, e rR ident Inspector date' signed
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94 220 Y D.
,ef, Resid fnspector
/dat/e signed
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(/3-Ek h x fl/2lP/
R. A. McBrearty, Reactor Inspector
/date signed Approved by:
8 0-9})2llo
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E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Meactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, RO&rls Branch
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Inspection Summary:
Insoection on June 1-30,1930 (Inspection Report No. 50-334/80-16)
Areas Insoected: Routine inspection by the resident inspectors (96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />) of:
licensee actions on previous inspection findings; plant operations; IE Bulletin followup; in-office review of licensee event reports; licensec event followup; and reporting requirements.
Results: Three items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction - Failure to notify the NRC regarding an imediate reportable event, Paragraph 4; Infrac-tion - F clure to maintain procedures to control out-of-service survey instru-ments, Faragraph 2; Infraction - Failure ta implement and document corrective actions in response to Notices of Violation, Paragraph 2.)
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8012100/07
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Balcerek, Nuclear Engineering and Refueling Supervisor R. Burski, Senior Compliance Engineer S. Fenner, QC Supervisor K. Grada, Acting Operations Supervisor R. Hansen, Maintenance Supervisor J. Kosmal, Radiation Control Supervisor J. Sieber, Superintendent, Licensing and Compliance P. Valenti, Station Engineer J. Werling, Station Superintendent H. Williams, Chief Engineer The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Ideatified Inspection Findings The NRC Q tstanding Items List was reviewed with responsible licensee per-sonnel.
Items selected by the inspectors were subsequently reviewed through discussions with licensee personnel, documentation review, and field inspec-tion to determine whether licensee actions specified in the items had been satisfactorily completed.
Outstanding items are addressed below and -in Paragraph 3.
The overall status of previously identified inspection findings was reviewed, and planned and completed licensee actions were discussed for those items not reported below.
(Closed) Unresolved Iten (79-24-04)/ Infraction (79-24-01): Attempted Us'
of Obsolete Calibration Data to Calibrate an RCS Loop Temperature Instru-ment.
Previous inspector review determined that although correct data was subsequently used for the calibration, the data was not incorporated into formal revisions of the procedures nor issued as an On-the-Spot Change; either action would have authorized use of the new data.
The licensee's action to prevent recurr nce stated in DLC letter dated February 27, 1980 was to incorporate document control methods in the Main-tenance Manual (11M) to ensure that only current procedures and data were
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available for use in safety related activities.
The inspectors verified that document centrol procedures were incorporated in BVPS Maintenance Manue,1, Chapter 1, Section A.7, Revision 10.
The MM revision requires that the Precedures Engineer hold the original Approved Cop" of an affected procedure so that no working copies can be issued until a revision is com-pleted whenever revised data is received via a Maintenance Manual / Procedure Change Request (MMCR).
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The inspector discussed the requirements of the MM with selected Procedures Engineers to confirm that they possessed a working knowledge of the require-ments and were implementing the procedure as stated in the manual.
In addi-tion, the inspectors selected the following Maintenance Surveillance Pro-cedures for which an Mi2R had been submitted and verified that the Approved Copy b'd been controlled in accordance with the revised MM procedure:
MSP 1.04 Reactor Protection Logic System Train A Bi-monthly Test,
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Revision 10.
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MSP 1.05 Reactor Protection Logic System Train B Bi-monthly Test,
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Revision 10.
The inspectors had no further questions on this matter.
(Closed)
Infraction (80-01-04):
Installation of a Tenporary Jumper Without Authorization.
A tenporary jumper had been installed on RCS temperature recorder T-RC-448B during maintenance but had not been removed or properly legged at completion of the maintenance.
In the licensee's reply to the Notice of Violation dated April 29, 1980, the licensee stated that:
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the I&C technicians will be instructed by May 2,1980, en the proper use of jumpers with emphasis on the use of jumpers during troubleshooting."
During reinspection of this matter on June 6, 1980, the inspectors requested that the licensee provide records which document that the training specified above had taken place; the licensee was unable to provide such dccumentation.
The responsible incividual stated that the training had taken place as specified during a safety meeting but that the meeting minutes did not indicate that the training had been performed.
The licensee elected to reperform the specified training.
The inspector subsequently reviewed the Daily Training Roster, dated June 16, 1980, which served as documentation of the training session and verified that all technicians had recc..ad the required training.
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The failure to document corrective action is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states in part:
...The identif-
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ication of the significant condition adverse to cuality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented...". DLC Quality Assurance Program QP-13, Control of Non-Conforming Items, Section 13.3.4, Revision 4, states in part:
... records shall be maintained to show
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objective evidence of action taken to correct conditions adverse to quality.
The records shall document...the implenentation of corrective measures." This finding is included as an example in the item of noncompliance in the attached Notice of Violation regarding the licensees failure ta take and document corrective actions specified in its replies to Notices of Violation.
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(0 pen)
Inspector Follow Item (80-06-05):
Containment Hydrogen Recombiners -
Potential for Blower Failures.
Additional discussion between the licensee and the vendor determined that the installed insulation (brand name:
Kapton) was that specified by the vendor for the blower power wiring. The licensee also confirmed that the wiring harnesses currently installed were the correct model by comparing them to certified replacement harnesses received from the vendor.
Regarding the durability and effectiveness of the insulation, the licensee has obtained technical data from the vendor which is believed to provide satisfactory evidence of those qualities and has provided this information to the inspectors for independent evaluation.
This item will remain open pending NRC evaluation of the technical data provided by the licensee.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (80-06-01):
Quality of Frisking Performed by Per-sonnel Exiting PAB Controlled Area.
As the current cutage progressed, in-spectors had observed that the quality of frisking performed by personnel exiting the PAB Controlled Area through the Men's Locker Room portal was deteriorating, i.e., although whole body frisks were being performed as required by licar.see procedures, on occasion, personnel performed them in a hurried or ir, attentive mi.nner.
The licensee has implementad a series of measures intended to preclude a breakdown in radiological controls including:
prominently displayed signs at all frisker stations clarifying frisking requirements, conducting train-ing for both licensee aad contractor personnel which included participation and observation by the Resident Inspectors, and distribution by DLC memor-anda of a warning to a'il licensee and contractor personnel that discipli-nary action could result if unacceptable frisking practices were observed.
The inspectors observed frisking at the Mens Locker Room Exist Portal on June 3, 4, 6, 9 and 16, 1980, and noted that personnel exiting the controlled area were performing accootable whole body frisks.
During the exit inter-view, these findings were brought to thh attention of the Radcon Supervisor.
The inspectors stated that the program implemented by the licensee appeared to be effective, out would remain so only as long as the licensee continueo to emphasize the importance of ' risking.
These comments were acknowledged by the Radcon Supervisor.
The inspectors stated that they had no further questions on this matter.
(Closed)
Infraction (80-01 -02):
Failure to Set Radiation Monitor Trip and Alarm Setpoints in Accordt.nce with TS Requirements for Mode 6.
During Mode 6 operation on January 2?,1980, the inspector had noted that alarm / trip setpoints on radiation monitor RM-215B (Containment Gaseous Activity) and RM-VS-104A/B (Containment Area Monitors) exceeded the allowable limits specified in TS Table 3.3-6.
The alarm /setpoints were immediately reset by licensee personnel.
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The inspectors verified 'the action to prevent recurrence specified in DLC
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letter dated April 29, 1980, as follows:
Radcon Daily Log Sheets for the period June 1-23, 1980, were reviewed
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to assure that-log sheets indicated TS requirements for required RM alarms /setpoints in Mode 6 and that Radcon personnel were properly annotating the log and cognizant of plant operating status.
Radcon Instrument Procedure 2.1 Process Mon ** toring, Revision 5, Table
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4.2.1 was reviewed to verify that it included clarification of Mode 6 setpoints.for referenced radiation monitors, t
Daily Training Roster dated May 22, 1980, was examined which documented
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that Radcon personnel with RM resp 9nsibilities had reviewed the re-
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quirements of TS 3/4.3.3 as well as the revisions discussed in the above two items.
I The inspact0r: had n; further questions en this matter.
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(0 pen)
Inspector Follow Item (80-12-03):
DLC to Establish Log Keeping
, Methods for Monitoring Radioactive Waste Inventories for Unanticipated Trends / Releases.
On June 17, 1980, the acting Operations Supervisor imple-mented a trial log sheet which records Gaseous Haste Decay Tank pressures every four hours as part of the continued followup on the system leakage identified by LER 80-38 (Reference Paragraph 7 of IE Inspection Report No.
80-12). On June 26, a daily, temporary log was established for all radio-active waste tanks which recorded daily pressure or level readings for
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trend determination and included a weekly inventory balance to confirm that
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indicated tank contents agreed with inventory changes resulting from waste discharges or transfers.
The acting Operations-Supervisor stated that, pending format improvements to the log sheet form the log would be incorporated i
into the permanent log keeping system of the BVPS Operating Manual.. This item will remain open pending NRC review of that action.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (78-29-02): Denonstration of Ultrasonic Calibra-tion Acceptability.
The licensee's inservice inspection contractor made
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available samples of forged, rolled plate and cast material of the follow-
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ing dimensions to demonstrate and compare acoustic characteristics of'each of the materials:
Forged, SA508 C1 2, heat number 6027, 6" x 18" x 41/2".
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f Rolled plate, SA533 GRB C1 1, heat number D-1691, 6" x 18" x 31/2".
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Cast, SA216 GR WCC, heat number 4852, 4 1/2" x 13 1/2" x 3".
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The inspector reviewed mill test certificates for each of the above samples to verify material identification, and made measurercr.ts to determine the acoustic attenuation characteristics of the three materials.
The above checks were accomplished to ascertain that the ultrasonic system calibration associated with the inservice inspections of steam generator welds 1-1, 2-1 and 3-1 and pressurizer *mid number 7 were accomplished using acoustically acceptable calibration blacks.
Pararraph 3.2.5 of ASTM E426, Standard Recommended Practice for Fabrication and Luntrol of Steel Reference Blocks Used in Ultrasonic Inspection, pro-vides a method for checking attenuation by comparing multiple reflections from the back surface of the test block material with that of the material to be inspected.
The ASTM document requires that the sum of the amplitude of the first three back reflections from both samples shall compare within
+ 25%.
Using the method of ASTM E428, the inspector took attenuation measurements from five locations on each sample.
Equipment for the measurements included a Model 303 Branson Sonoray flow detector and a 2-25 MH,1" diameter Z
Aerotech transducer, serial nunber C18815.
The average of the sum of the readings from each sample was used for the canparison with the following results:
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Casting / forging compared within 13%.
Casting / plate compared within 6%.
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Plate / forging canpared within 18%.
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The data indicated that the forged material was the most attenuative and the plate material was the least attenuative of the three samples checked.
Based on the above demonstration the inspector stated that the ultrasonic system calibration for the aforementioned welds was considered acceptable.
(0 pen)
Infraction (80-01-03):
Failure to Calibrate Safety Related Instruments on or Before Their Specified Due Dates.
On January 24, 1980, during a tour of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Main Cardox Fire Protection
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Unit rooms, an inspector had noted that several indicators used to verify t
the operability of the EDGs and the Cardox Fire Protection Uni' had not been recalibrated.
Additionally, the inspector was unable " *dertify the existence of a calibration procedure or specified calibratio-
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the level indicator (LI-FP-202) on the Main Cardox Fire Protection Unit.
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Inspector review conducted June ll,1980.of the actions taken by the licensee stated in DLC letter dated April 29, 1980 determined through review of calibration records and stickers that all affected instruments
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had been recalibrated and that a format change for computer scheduling cards had been implemented.
The inspector had no further questions on these matters.
During the course of the review, the inspector examined the following instrument calibration procedures:
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ICP-36-PI-205, EGD Fuel System 1 Filter Inlet Pressure Indicator PI-
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l EE-205 Calibration, Revision 0, performed January 25, 1980.
I ICP-36-PI-205, EDG Fuel System 1 Filter Inlet Pressure Indicator PI-
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EE-206 Calibration, Revision 0, performed January 26, 1980.
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ICP-36-PI-207, EDG Fuel System 2 Filter Inlet Pressure Indicator PI-
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EE-207 Calibration, Revision 0, performed January 25, 1980.
ID.3t-PI-208, EDG Fuel System 2 Filter Inlet Pressure Indicator PI-
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Et-20E Calibration, Revision 0, perfomed January 26, 1980.
ICP-36-PI-209, EDG Lube Oil Engine Pressure Indicator PI-EE-209
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Calibration, Revision 0, perfomed January 25, 1980.
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ICP-36-PI-210, EDG Lube Oil Engine Pressure Indicator PI-EE-210
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Calibration, Revision 0, performed January 26, 1980.
ICP-36-PI-211, EDG Lube Oil Filter Pressure Indicator PI-EE-211
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Calibration, Revision 0, perfomed January 25, 1980.
ICP-36-PI-212, EDG Lube Oil Filter Pressure Indicator PI-EE-212
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Calibration, Revision 0, perfomed January 26, 1980.
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During the review, discrepancies were noted in the munner in which the
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above calibration procedures had been performed by maintenance personnel.
The method of calibration chosen by the maintenance technician was deter-mined by the inspectors to be acceptable but not in strict accordance with.
stated procedure with respect to the use of calibration equipment and
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standards.
During discussions with the Maintenance Supervisor and Instru-ment Engineer, the inspectors expressed concern that deviations from stated procedures without prior review by responsible licensee personnel, even
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when the deviation was minor and employed as an acceptable alternative, was not good practice. The inspectors also expressed concern with deviations that might result because of ambiguous statements in procedures.
As a result of additional discussions with the Maintenance Supervisor after the end of the inspection period, the Maintenance Supervisor committed to implement the following actions to improve the quality of maintenance de-partment surveillance procedures:
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l Maintenance technicians would be instructed through training sessions
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to comply with verbatim procedural requirements, except as noted below.
When interpretation of a procedural step was required, the step had
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more than one interpretation or the step was incorrect, the maintenance technician performing the work would take the procedural question to a foreman or Instrument Engineer for resolution.
The resolution would be noted on the procedure critique sheet (attached
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to each pro:edure) prior to continuing-the procedure.
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Review of the procedure and critique sheet by appropriate maintenance personnel would take place, in accordance with ncrmal review require-ments, prior to forwarding the procedure and associated data to other Power Stations departments for review; final review would be by the Maintenance Supervisor.
The Maintenance Supervisor stated that a review of the Maintenance Manual first had to be perfomed to determine the scope of work necessary to
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incorporate the change noted above.
This item will remain unresolved ending inspector review of the implementation of licensee actions above.
p(80-16-01)
The inspectors also noted that the level indicator (LI-FP-202) on the Main Cardox Fire Protection Unit was calibrated using a maintenance work request (MWR 806542) which included an OSC approved temporary procedure and that no pennanent calibration procedure had yet been issued by the licensee. The Instrument Engineer stated that the permanent calibration procedure was still in preparation by a vendor and had not yet been submitted to the licensee.
Receipt and availability (of the pennanent procedure will be ver-ified during a future inspection.
80-01-03)
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As part of the licensees corrective action specified in DLC letter dated April 29,1980, the level indicator (LI-FP-202) on the Main Cardox Fire Protection Unit was to have been placed on a calibration frequency in accordance with the QA Program no later than April 29, 1980.
Appendix IV to BVPS Maintenance Manual, Chapter 1, Section 0, Calibration. Program specifies the instruments to be calibrated per the QA Program and provides associated frequencies.
On June 6, 1980, inspector review of Appendix IV, Revision 4, detennined that the subject instrument had not been added to the list as stated in the licensee's reply to the Notice of Violation.
Although the inspectors acknowledge that the instrument had been included in the licensee's computer schedule program (which is not subject to the
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licensee's QA program), the failure to include the instrument in the OA Program Administrativa Controls constitutes noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states in part:
" Measures... adverse to quality...are promptly identified and corrected...",
and OLC Quality Assurance Program OP-13, Control of Non-Conforcing items, Revision 4, Section 13.3.1 which states in part:
"A corrective action system shall be established to assure that significant conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected." This finding is in-cluded as an example in the items of noncompliance in the attached Notice of Violation regarding the licensee's failure to take and docun. ant correc-tive actions specified in its replies to Notices of Violation.
(Closed)
Deficiency (79-27-06): Failure to Follow Radcon Instrueent Control Procedures for Out-of-Service Equipment.
On January 4, 1980, an inspector had determined that Radiological Control procedures had not been adhered to in that an Out-of-Service (00S) sticker for a survey in-strument had been found discarded in the Primary Auxiliary Building. The associated instrument had been returned to service without the required log entries being completed.
During inspector review on June 2,1980, of licensee actions to prevent recurrence as specified in a DLC letter dated April 18, 1980, the inspector verified that the revised procedure identified in the referenced letter had been incorporated in Ra. icon Manual (RCM) Chapter 1, Standards and Require-ments, on February 8,1903.
The previous procedure for control of CDS instruments in RCM Chapter 1, Appendix 10, Section B, Instrument Records and Foms, was deleted with OSC approval on March 29, 1980.
Review of records maintained in the Radcon Field Office determined that the deleted procedure was still being implemented to control 00S survey instruments.
Discussion with licensee personnel detemined that the revised procedure in RCM, Appendix 1, Radcon Administrative Guide, Revision 9, was not being imp emented because the tags, vice stickers, required by the revised pro-cedure for identification of 00S instruments had not yet been received from the tag supplier.
The inspector also n6ted that several calibration pro-cedures fur survey instruments continued during this period to reference the deleted procedure.
These included:
Radcon Instrument Procedure 3.1, GM Survey Meter - Model E140N/HP
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210, Revision 4.
Radcon Instrument Procedure 3.2, GM Survey Meter - Model E520/HP
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240, Revision 3.
Radcon Instrument Procedure 3.3, GM Survey Meter - Model E530N/HP
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200 - HP 220A, Revision.
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In order to detennine whether a loss of control had resulted during the period subsequent to deletion of the old procedure, the inspector reviewed entries in the Radcon Instrument Deficiency Log, which was still being
maintained in accordance with the deleted procedure.
The log was reviewed for completeness and for appropriate sticker postings.
In addition, the inspector selected several entries to verify the 00S instruments had been identified as required.
The following instruments were selected and data reviewed:
Probe Type Probe Number Date of Entry 00S Sticker Number
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HP 210
May 30, 1980 1-522 E-530 368 June 2, 1980 2-749 HP 210
June 2, 1980 1-527 No deficiencies were noted by the inspector.
The inspector brought these findings to the attention of the Radcon Foremen, Radcon Engineer, and Radcon Supervisor.
Licensee personnel stated that they were aware that the revised procedure could not be implemented since the tags were unavailable. The Radcon Supervisor stated that discussions with the supplier had led cognizant Radcon personnel to believe that the tags were to have been received prior to OSC approval to delete the old procedure and OSC members had been so informed.
When it was subsequently determined that the tags had not been delivered as expected, but that the old procedure had been deleted, the Radcon Supervisor directed that the old procedure continue to be implemented and assigned responsibility for control of 00S instruments to a single individual. When questioned by the inspector as to why the old procedure had not been immediately reinstated, the Radcon Supervisor stated that further discussions with the supplier continued to lead Radcon per u..ael to believe that the tags would be available within a short time. The Radcon Supervisor stathd that the deleted procedure would be fonnally reinstated within one week if the expected tags were still not received. When tb5 tags failed to arrive, the inspector verified on June 11, 1980 that the deleted procedure was fonnally reinstated. The new tags did arrive shortly thereafter and the revised procedure was implemented.
The inspector also noted that corrective action had already been in tiated on the calibration procedure deficiencies noted above.
The failure to maintain procedures to control Out-of-Service radiaticn sur-vey instruments and failure to maintain calibration procedures is contrary to TS 6.11 which states:
" Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and shall be approved, maintained.and adhered to for all operations involving per-i sonnel radiation exposure."
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This finding constitutes failure to take corrective actions as specified in licensee replies to Notices of Violation.
Because the licensee took steps to provide alternate methods of control of 00S instruments when the licensee identified that the corrective act.on could not be implemented as planned; and because no loss of control occurred, these findings are not cited as an item-of noncompliance.
The inspectors noted, however, that no notification was made to NRC regarding the inability to complete the corrective actions specified by the licensee's letter and during discussua with the Superin-tendent of Licensing and stated that, when DLC management does become aware of such matters, NRC:RI must be informed.
The Superintendent acknowledged the inspectors comments.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (76-13-03): Missing Local Valve Position Indicators.
The inspector toured containment on June 19, 1980 accompanied by a licensee representative in order to examine selected valves identified as requiring local valve position indicators.
Valves examined were randomly chosen by the inspector from MWR 777791 dated September 22, 1977 which lists valves inside and outside containment identified as having no local position indi-cators.
Twenty-five valves were selected by the inspector for visual examination as follows:
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PCV-RC-456 MOV-SI-852A TV-55-102A1 PCV-RC-455C MOV-SI-852C TV-55-103Al PCV-RC-4550 MOV-SI-865A TV-55-104A1 MOV-CH-201 MOV-SI-8650 TV-55-105A1 MOV-CH-310 TV-CC-103Al TV-55-109Al MOV-CH-311 TV-CC-103C1 TV-55-111A1 MOV-SI-851A TV-CC-105D1 TV-55-112A1 M0V-SI-851B MOV-CC-1118 MOV-SI-851C TV-55-100A1 Valves selected were found to have acceptable local position indicators with the following exceptions:
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Motor operated valves MOV-SI-865A and C did not have separately
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attached local position indicators.
The subject valves have no intemediate throttled positions.
Visual comparison of valve stem position and limit switches provide adequate indication of valve
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position.
The inspector judged this to be acceptable and had no further questions.
Motor operated valve MOV-CC-1119 was awaiting reinstallation of a
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broken pointer on the local valve position indicator.
The inspector noted that a separate maintenance work request, MWR 806457, had been issued to correct this deficiency.
The inspector requested that the licensee notify him upon completion of this work.
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This item remains open pending inspector review of local valve positicn indicators outside containment which were still being modified per the MWR 777791 at the close of this inspection.
The inspector additionally performed random observations of valves inside containment but not identified by the licensee's listing (MWR 777791) and confirmed, on a sampling basis, that all valves observed were appropriately equipped with local position indicators.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (76-27-04):
Neutron Levels in Personnel Access Hatch.
Modifications to reduce neutron levels to levels specified in the FSAR by installing removable shielding inside containment in the area of the personnel access hatch were scheduled for installation during the current outage.
The inspector reviewed portions of Design Change Package 275 associated with the modification and BVPP #158-0, Installation Procedure for the Removable Personnel Airlock Shielding.
Shield material had been fabricated from "Pennali JN", a special grade of pressed beechwood laminate impregnated with hydrogen and boron.
At the close of the inspection, the licensee was in the process of erecting the steel frame supports for posit-ioning the removable Pentali JN panels.
Discussion with the Radcon Engineer indicated that neutron surveys will be performed as part of the normal ra' con survey performed during return to power operations to ascertain whether the installed shielding effectively attentuates the neutron flux below that specified in the FSAR.
This item remains open pending inspector review of neutron level survey results.
(0 pen)
Infraction (80-03-01):
Failure to Conduct Housekeeping Tours.
An inspector had noted that the licensee had failed to conduct housekeeping tours required in Maintenance Manual Chapter 1,. Conduct of Maintenance, i
Section J Housekeeping, Revision 4, during the months of December 1979 and January,, 1980.
NRC review of the licensee reply dated April 28, 1980, detennined that the licensee proposed corrective actions to prevent re-currence was unacceptable and that additional measures would be required.
Subsequent to discussions with the Resident Inspectors, the licensee identified additional action that would be taken in DLC letter dated July The revised proposed correcti' e acticns were reviewed by the 2, 1980.
v inspectors; implementation of the corrective action will be reviewed during future inspections.
3.
IE Bulletin Followup - IEB 79-21, Temperature Effects on Level Instruments During prior review of the subject bulletin, the inspectors noted and verified that temporary corrective action had been implemented and that final corrective action was still being evaluated.
In addition, the licensee's response noted that the prc:edure revisions and training required by IEB Item 4 were in progress in conjunction with NSSS Vendor Owner's
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Group and that an implementation schedule would be forthcoming pending NRC:NRR approval of the procedure reference guidelines. At that time, the inspector informed the licensee that a supplemental response to the IEB should be forwarded to the addressees specified in the IEB providing the schedule for procedure revisions and the final corrective action for steam generator level instruments when they are available.
Discussions during this inspection with the Acting Senior Compliance Engineer determined that final licensee action for correcting temperature
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effects on steam generator level measurements was in progress during the
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current outage; however, the supplemental response to the IEB had not yet been submitted to NRC:RI.
During the exit interview, the Superintendent of Licensing and Complianc ? conunitted to supplying the information requested by the inspector during the earlier IEB review prior to start-up.
The acceptability of the licensee's response and evaluation of corrective action remains unresolved pending NRC review of the supplemental infonaation (79-22-04).
Review of Plant Operations a.
General Inspection tours of selected plant areas were conducted on the dates noted during the day shift with respect to housekeeping and cleanli-ness, fire protection, radiation control, physical security and plant protection, operational and maintenance administrative controls, and Technical Specification compliance.
Acceptance criteria for the above areas included the following:
BVPS FSAR Appendix A, Technical Specifications
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BVPS Operations Manual, Chapter 48, Conduct of Operations
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OM 1.48.5, Section D, Jumpers and Lifted Leads
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OM 1.48.6, Clearance Procedures
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OM 1.48.8, Records OM 1.48.9, Rules of Practice
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BVPS Operations Manual, Chapter 55A, Periodic Checks - Operating
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Surveillance Tests BVPS Operations Manual, Chapter 54, Station Logs
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BVPS Maintenance Manual, Chapter 1, Conduct of Maintenance
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Section J, Housekeeping
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Section 0, Calibration
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BVPS Radcon Manual, Various Sections
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SAD 25, Housekeeping and Cleanliness Procedure
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10 CFR 50.54(k), Control Room Manning Requirements
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BVPS Physical Security Plan
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Inspector Judgement
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Areas Toured Control Room (June 16)
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Primary Auxiliary Building, except High Radiation Areas and Loose
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Surface Contamination Areas (June 4, 6, 9 and 16)
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Service Building (June 6 and 16)
Main Steam Valve Room (June 6)
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Purge Duct Room (June 6)
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East / West Cable Vaults (June 6)
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Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms-(June 5)
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Containment Building, including High Radiation Areas (June 4 and
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Water Treating Area (June 6)
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Protected Area (June 11, 16, 18 and 21)
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Intake Structure (June 19)
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Main Cardox Fire Suppression Unit Room (Jure 5)
Feedwater Regulating Valve Room (June 3)
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' Ventilation System Room (June 3)
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Decontamination Building (June 6)
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Fuel Building (June 6)
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Switchgear and Cable Tray. Areas (June 18)
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The inspectors toured the Control Room on a daily basis during the normal work week to review logs and records and conduct discussions with operators concerning reasons for selected lighted annunciators, knowledge of recent changes to procedures, facility can'iguration and plant conditions.
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Observations
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(1) Control Room Instrumentation Conformance Control Room Instrumentation Conformance with -Technical Specif-ications.
Control Room monitoring instrumentation was observed to verify that instrumentation and systems required to-support-Mode 5 operations were in conformance with Technical Specifica-tion Limiting Conditions for Operations.
The following instru-mentation / indications were observed with respect to the LCOs indicated:
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Boric Acid Flowpath TS 3.1.2.2
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Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Operability TS 3.1.2.5 Boric-Acid Storage Tank Leve11ande
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Temperature TS 3.1.2.7
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Concentration TS 3.9.1 Residual Heat Removal Flow TS 3.9.8
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Radiation Monitor Operability TS 3.3.3.1
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RM-LW-104
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RM-RN-100
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RM-VS-104 A/B
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RIS-VS-106 l
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RM-VS-103 A/B
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AC/DC Electrical System Availability and
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Distribution TS 3.8.1.2; 3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4
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(2) Radiation Controls Radiation controls including posting of radiation areas, the conditions of step-off pads, disposal of protective clothing, filling vut radiation work pemits, compliance with radiation work pemits, personnel monitoring devices being worn, cleanli-ness of work areas, radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability (portable and permanent), area monitor calibration, and personnel ' frisking procedures were observed on a sampling basis in the following areas:
Primary Auxiliary Building (June 4, 6, 9 and 16)
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Containment Airlock Area (June 4 and 19)
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Containment (June 4 and 19)
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During a containment tour on June 19 to verify replacement of missing local valve position indicators, the inspector and accompanying licensee personnel expressed their intention to enter a posted High Radiation Area to a radiation technician (Rad Tech) stationed at the area barrier.
The technician had been observed by the inspector to be maintaining a Personnel Dose Tracking Log of personnel entoring and exiting the posted area.
When questioned by the inspecwr as to why the Rad Tech had not requested dosimetry infomation from the inspection party, the individual stated that the expressed duration of the tour and his knowledge of the area allowed him some degree of freedom re-garding dose tracking of personnel under his purview.
After completing the tour, this discussion was brought to the attention of the Radiation Control Foreman.
He stated that the Rad Tech had generally expressed a policy that had been enforced earlier in the current outage but that current licensee policy required that dosimetry infomation for all personnel entering /
exiting a posted High Radiation Area be logged by the assigned Rad Tech.
The Radcon Foreman stated that all Radiation Technicians would be reinstructed in that policy.
The inspector subsequently reviewed the Daily Training Roster dated June 19, 1980 Dosimeter Tracking Sheets, and had no further questions on this matte.
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(3) Plant Housekeeping Plant house 9.eeping conditions including general cleanliness cor-ditions and control of material to-prevent fire hazards were observed in areas listed in Paragraph b.
Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations and verification of posted fire watches in these areas was also observed.
(4) Control Room Manning Control room manning was observed on the dates and noted in Paragraph b. above and during other periodic control room visits.
(5) Surveillance Tests The inspectors reviewed completed surveillance tests available during control room tours to verify that surveillance tests were
being completed, that the results were being reviewed according to approved procedures, and appropriate corrective actions were identifieo if necessary.
The following records of Operating Surveillance Tests (OST) were reviewed:
OST 1.49.2, Shutdown Margin Calculation, Revision 8, performed
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June ?3 and 18, 1980.
OST 1.20.1, Spent Fuel Pool Level Verification, Issue 1,
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perfomed June 13, 1980.
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OST 1.7.8, Boric Acid Storage Tanks and Refueling Water Storage Tank Level and Temperature Verification, Revision 10, perfomed June 12, 1980.
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OST 1.39.1, Ueekly Stati6n Battery Check, Revision 3, per-
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formed June 9, 1980.
OST 1.11.10, Boron Injection Flow Path Power Operated
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Valve Exercise, Revision 21, performed June 17, 1980.
OST 1.7.4, Centrifugal Charging Pump Test, Revision 14,
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performed June 17, 1980.
OST 1.33.17, Portable Fire Pump Operational Test, Revision
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12, performed June 17, 1980.
OST 1.33.1, Fire Protection System Monthly Inspection Test,
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Revision 17, performed June 16, 198 ~
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(6) Plant Security / Physical Protection Implementation of the physical security plin was observed periodically during inspection of areas listed in Paragraph b. with regard to the following:
Protected Area barriers were not degrcded;
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Persons and packages were checked prior to hilowing entry
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into the Protected Area; Vehicles were properly searched and vehicle access to the
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Protected Area was in accordance with approved procedures; and, Security access controls to Vital Areas were being maintained
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and that persons in Vital Areas were properly authorized.
(7) Ooerational and Maintenance Administrative Controls Equipment control procedures used by the licensee to control plant equipment and activities were examined to verify that taas were properly filled out, posted and removed as required by approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed logs and records for com-pleteness.
The inspector verified proper posting of the follow-ing tags / controls on June 3, 1980:
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Danger tags' posted on feedwater regulating valves for performance of level transmitter relocation activities associated with Equipment Clearance #416876/416877.
During review of the above, the inspector noted minor discrep-ancies with regard to information required on Equipment Clear-ance #416876 as to the number of taqs issued.
The matter was discussed with the Acting Operations Supervisor who immediately acted to assure that the proper number of tags was determined and indicated on the clearance.
Additional review by the in-spector of equipment clearances determined that this was an isolated case.
The inspector had no further question.
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(8) Tornado Watches / Warnings On June 2, 6 and 7, 1980, the licensee was notified that tornado watches were in effect for areas which included the licensee's facility.
During the initial tornado watch on June 2 and 3, 1980, the Resident Inspector verified that the licensee had implemented the appropriate emergency procedure: Operations Manual 1.53.4; E-9 Acts of Nature - Tornado, Revision 22.
In addition, on June 6,1980, at 1950 hours0.0226 days <br />0.542 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.41975e-4 months <br />, the licensee was notif-ied that a tornado warning had been declared; the warning was terminated'at 2045.
No tornado was sighted in the imediate vicinity of the facility and the facility sustained no damage as a result of the accompanying storm activity.
(9) Review of Design Change Review of Design Change Package 130 (DCP 130) - Recirculation Modifications for Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps FW-P-2; -3A; -38.
Inspector review of DCP 130 was performed on June 24, 1980, to verify that control of design documents was in accordance with approved procedures; reviews, approvals and documentation of changes reflected the same level of quality as the original design package; and, transmittal control of design changes be-tween license organizations was in accordance with approved procedures.
The following documentation was reviewed:
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System Release Cover Sheet (DCP 130)
Transfer Inspection Checklist (DCP 130)
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DCP 130 Cover Sheet
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DCP 130 Document Transmittal Sheet
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Equipment Release #ER-130-1 l
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Equipment Test Package Index for ER-130-1 and associated Proof Tests
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(10) Containment Tour During a routine containment tour on June 4,-1980, the inspectors noted several gouges on a six inch cold leg safety injection line adjacent to vent line ISI 330.
This observation was brought to the attention of the QC Supervisor for evaluation and appro-priate corrective action.
During the exit interview, the inspectors informed the licensee that DLC actions regarding this matter would be examined during future inspections (80-16-02).
Except as specified in Paragraph d. below, the inspectors' findings in the areas identified above are acceptable.
PARAGRAPH 4.d. CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
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5.
In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LER's were reviewed.
Report Number Event Date Title 80-28/03L May 4, 1980 Loss of No. 4 Vital Bus Inverter 80-32/03L May 5, 1980 Closed VCT Outlet Valve MOV-CH-115C
- 80-34/03L thy 12,1980 Plugged Main Filter Bank Fire Nozzles 80-35/03L May 12, 1980 Fuel Building Minimal Negative Pressure 80-36/03L May 14, 1980 Weld Crack on RHR Vent Valye (RH 211)
80-37/01T June 19, 1980 Containment Liner Seam Weld Deficiencies
- 80-38/03L May 17, 1980 GaseousWasteTank(GW-TK-1A) Leaks 80-39/03L May 24, 1980 Loss of No. 3 Vital Bus Inverter 80-40/0lT June 3, 1980 Code Rejectable Welds of Auxiliary Feed-water and SI Lines Special Report May 15, 1980 Loss of Meteorological Instrumentation 80-41/03L May 2, 1980 Loss of SLCRS Fan VS-F-4B 80-42/03L June 19, 1980 Seismic Inadequacies in Recirc Water Lines 80-44/01T June 30, 1980 SG Snubber Embedment Overstressed due to Calculational Error
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- Reports selected for onsite followup.
- 0nsite followup documented in Inspection Report 50-334/80-12.
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Onsite Licensee Event Followup For those LER's selected for onsite followup (denoted by an asterisk in Paragraph 5), the inspector verified that the reporting requirements of the Technical Specifications and Procedures SAD 14 and SAD 23 had been met; that appropriate corrective action had been taken or planned; that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by Technical Specif-ications and Procedure SAD 21; that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2).
The follow-ing findings are related to the LER's reviewed onsite:
LER 80-19 - Crack in Liquid Waste Evaporator Channel Head.
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licensee had reported on March 10, 1980 that liquid waste evaporator lines had been plugged due to insufficient flushing after transferring evaporator bottoms.
Ilhile steam flushing, a crack was found in the channel head of Liquid Waste Evaporator bottoms heat exchanger (LW-E-4). The cause of the crack was determined to be failure due to chloride stress corrosion.
Temporary corrective actions was to weld a
sleeve over the channel head of the heat exchanger since additional cracks appeared when initial weld repairs were completed.
At the close of the inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee was in the process of purchasing a new vessel made of mate-rials not susceptable to chloride stress corrosion.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed Engineering Memorandum CO218 which identified actions planned by the licensee regarding non-destructive examination for certain portions of the Liquid Waste System.
During the exit interview, the Nuclear Engineering and Refueling Supervisor agreed to provide the NRC with the results of that examination when available.
This information will be reviewed by the inspectors during future inspections (80-16-03).
7.
Possession of Controlled Substance Onsite oy Contractor Security Watchperson The inspectors were informed by licensee security personnel on June 2,1930 that an unamed security watchperson manning a protected area perimeter watch post was indefinitely suspended after being discovered at his post with two bags of a substance alleged to be an ounce of marijuana.
A contractor security force lieutenant observed the individual manipulating small plastic bags of brown substance similar in appearance to marijuana at about 4:45 am on June 2,1980.
When the individual became aware of the lieutenant's presence, he swept the substance from the guard shack
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desk into a brown paper bag which he then placed into a second personal hand bag.
When confronted by the lieutenant and a second security officer (summoned as a witness) the individual admitted having or,e ounce of marijuana in his possession and surrendered the substance to the two security officers.
The individual was immediately suspended and left the site after questioning by security contractor supervision.
The mat -n was referred to local law enforcement (Shippingport Police Department) by the licensee for investiga-tion of potential criminality at 7:30 PM on June 2.
The confiscated sub-stance was retained by the security contractor and turned over to the local police. The identification of the substance as 2.8 ounces of marijuana was later analytically confirmed by the Pennsylvania State Police. The security contractor will conduct an onsite investigation of the matter to determine the additional extent, if any, of drug use onsite.
The inspectors had no further questions on this matter.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or deviations.
Unresolved items addressed during this inspection are discussed in Para-graph 2 of this report.
9.
Exit Interview Meetings were held with senior facility managenent periodically during the course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
A summary of inspection findings was also provided to the licensee at the conclusion of the report period.
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