IR 05000331/2002011

IR 05000331/2002-011(DRS), on 03/11/2002 Through 3/29/2002, Ies Utilities, Inc., Duane Arnold Energy Center. Safety System Design and Performance Capability

ML021270557
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	05/03/2002
From:	Gardner R NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EEB
To:	Vanmiddlesworth G Nuclear Management Co
References
-nr IR-02-011
Download: ML021270557 (28)

Text

SUBJECT:

DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-331/02-11(DRS)

Dear Mr. Van Middlesworth:

On March 29, 2002, the NRC completed a baseline inspection at your Duane Arnold Energy Center. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on March 29, 2002, with Mr. R. Anderson and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to reactor safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, the inspection focused on the design and performance capability of the standby diesel generator (SDG), essential service water (ESW), and 125Vdc systems to ensure the systems were capable of performing required safety-related functions.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). This issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements.

However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Duane Arnold Energy Center.

G. Van Middlesworth -2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Ronald N. Gardner, Chief Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-331/02-11(DRS)

REGION III==

Docket No: 50-331 License No: DPR-49 Report No: 50-331/02-11(DRS)

Licensee: Alliant, IES Utilities Inc.

Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center Location: 3277 DAEC Road Palo, Iowa 52324-9785 Inspection Dates: March 11 through March 29, 2002 Inspectors: Z. Falevits, Lead Inspector A. Dunlop, Reactor Inspector G. ODwyer, Reactor Inspector D. Schrum, Reactor Inspector S. Sheldon, Reactor Inspector R. Quirk, Consultant Approved by: Ronald N. Gardner, Chief Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000331-02-11(DRS), on 03/11/2002 through 3/29/2002, IES Utilities, Inc., Duane Arnold Energy Center. Safety System Design and Performance Capability.

The inspection was a routine baseline inspection of the design and performance capability of the standby diesel generator, essential service water, and 125Vdc systems. It was conducted by regional engineering specialists and a consultant. The inspection identified one Green finding, which was a Non-Cited Violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www/nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violations.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Green. The licensee failed to establish adequate measures to assure that the design requirements in calculations E92-007 and E92-008, specifically the number of battery cells, were correctly translated into work instructions in Work Order A5250. This was required to insure that the 1D1 125Vdc battery would remain capable of performing its design function (operable) with 57 instead of the nominal 58 connected cells.

The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because, although the calculated number of cells in the battery was not conservative and not consistent with the technical specification bases, the 125Vdc system was judged to be capable of supporting the plant during a station blackout or similar design basis accident.

Additionally, there was no actual loss of safety function. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified(Section 1R21. 2).

Report Details 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity 1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (71111.21)

Introduction Inspection of safety system design and performance verifies the initial design and subsequent modifications and provides monitoring of the capability of the selected systems to perform design bases functions. As plants age, the design bases may be lost and important design features may be altered or disabled. The plant risk assessment model is based on the capability of the as-built safety system to perform the intended safety functions successfully. This inspectable area will verify aspects of the mitigating systems and barrier integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

The objective of the safety system design and performance capability inspection was to assess the adequacy of calculations, analyses, other engineering documents, and operational and testing practices that were used to support the performance of the standby diesel generator (SDG), essential service water (ESW) and 125 Vdc systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The inspection was performed by a team of inspectors that consisted of a team leader, four Region III inspectors, and one consultant.

The standby diesel generator (SDG), essential service water (ESW) and 125 Vdc systems were selected for review during this inspection. This selection was based upon:

• having a high probabilistic risk analysis ranking;

• having had recent significant modifications; and

• not having received recent NRC review.

The criteria used to determine the systems performance included:

• applicable Technical Specifications;

• applicable Updated Final Safety Analysis Report sections; and

• the systems design documents.

The following system and component attributes were reviewed in detail:

System Needs Process Medium - water Energy Source - electrical power Control Systems - initiation, control, and shutdown actions Operator Actions - initiation, monitoring, control, and shutdown Heat Removal - cooling water

System Condition and Capability Installed Configuration - elevation and flow path operation Design - calculations and procedures Testing - flow rate, pressure, temperature, voltage, and current Components The following components were selected for detailed review during the inspection. The ESW pumps, heat exchangers and control valves, SDG, SDG transfer pump, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) and air start system, and the 125Vdc battery and battery chargers. The following attributes were reviewed for these components:

Component Degradation Vibration Operation Equipment Protection - flood, missile and freezing Component Design - Inputs and Outputs Industry Operating Experience

.1 System Requirements a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the following attributes for the systems selected: energy sources (electrical and air), control systems, and equipment protection. The team also reviewed applicable electrical, I&C, and mechanical calculations. The team verified that procedural instructions to operators were consistent with operator actions required to meet, prevent, and/or mitigate design basis accidents.

To do this, the team reviewed design basis documents and plant drawings, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, requirements, and commitments identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and technical specifications (TSs). The team reviewed alarm setpoints and verified that instrumentation and alarms were available to operators for making necessary decisions in coping with postulated accident conditions. In addition, the team verified that system alignments were consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Design Review a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the electrical aspects of the 125Vdc, SDG, and ESW systems. The team reviewed electrical calculations for AC and DC power to selected emergency pumps and motor operated valves. The review included design assumptions, calculations, boundary conditions, and modifications.

The team also performed a single failure review of individual components to determine the potential effects of such failures on the capability of the system to perform its safety functions. Additionally, the team performed analyses to verify that design values were correct, appropriate, and translated into operational and maintenance procedures.

Documentation reviewed included drawings, procedures, calculations, corrective action requests, and maintenance work orders identified in the attachment to this report, as well as the design bases document for the 125Vdc, SDG, and ESW systems, the technical specifications, the USAR, operator training procedures, and risk analysis documents.

The purpose of the reviews was to determine whether the design bases of the system were met by the installed and tested configurations.

b. Findings Plant Operation with One Battery Cell Jumpered Out The team identified one Green Finding that is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to assure that design requirements in calculations were correctly translated into work instructions. The team noted that on April 11, 1991, the licensee operated the plant at power with 57 cells installed in the 125Vdc, 1D1 battery, instead of the previously analyzed 58 cells. The licensee failed to perform the required analysis and 50.59 evaluation prior to operating with cell number 51 jumpered out. This did not result in an actual loss of safety function for the associated equipment, because there were no extended battery discharges while the cell was jumpered out. As a result, the issue had very low risk significance.

The most up-to-date analysis for the 125Vdc battery load and sizing were calculations E92-007, 1D1 Battery Load and Margin Calculation, Revision 4, and E92-008, 1D2 Battery Load and Margin Calculation, Revision 4. These calculations were based on 58 - cell batteries and a minimum allowed voltage of 105V. Therefore, the minimum analyzed cell voltage was 105V/58 cells, or 1.81V per cell. Operation with 57 cells was permitted by the bases for Technical Specification 3.8.4.1. The minimum average cell voltage for the Technical Specification permitted configuration is 105V/57cells, or more than 1.84V per cell.

The team evaluated this issue and determined that a change from 58 to 57 cells would reduce the limiting scenario (station blackout (SBO)) design margin by over 10 percent.

Based on the battery discharge characteristic curves in the calculation changing from 58 to 57 cells for loads lasting four hours results in approximately 10 percent loss of capability. The short term (one minute loads) would be reduced by approximately 20 percent. As most of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) scenario loads are base loads for the four hour duration, the reduction of margin would still be approximately 10 percent. The licensees calculation showed 27 percent margin; reducing this by 10 percent would still result in margin >10 percent which is the value desired for SBO. This

evaluation does not include the load increases from the many non-conservative load estimates.

The team noted that on at least one occasion, the licensee operated the plant at power with only 57 cells installed. Specifically, on April 11, 1991, battery 1D1 cell number 51 was jumpered out using work order A52520. The work order approval was based on BATTRY-C173-01, Batteries Equipment-Specific Maintenance Procedure, Revision 29, which provided the steps to jumper out a battery cell. No analysis or 50.59 evaluation was performed to verify if this change to the facility was acceptable.

The team determined that there was a credible impact on safety because BATTRY-C-173-01 permitted plant operation with the number of battery cells below the analyzed configuration. Had a station blackout occurred, vital plant equipment may not have operated as required with the number of cells less than the analyzed limit. Therefore, the issue was more than a minor violation. The team also concluded this issue affected the mitigating system cornerstone because vital equipment required to mitigate a design basis event may not have operated or performed at the capacity assumed in the accident analyses. The team subsequently determined that the batterys capacity margin would be reduced; however, the battery would remain operable.

The team determined there was no actual loss of safety function because there were no accidents or events requiring long term battery discharge while only 57 cells were installed in 1D1. The error in the procedure did have a credible impact on safety; however, since only the mitigating systems cornerstone was affected, and no extended discharges occurred, the finding is considered to be of very low safety significance (Green) by the significant determination process.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis . . .

are correctly translated into specifications, . . . procedures, and instructions.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish adequate measures to assure that the design requirements in calculations E92-007 and E92-008, specifically the number of battery cells, were correctly translated into work instructions in Work Order A5250. This violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-331/02-11-01). This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as AR 30281, AR 30371 and AR 30385.

.3 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations (SE) and Screenings a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed completed (SE) for the design changes to the plant.

b. Findings Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Mechanical Seal Failure

On August 2, 1999, the licensee performed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation (Safety Evaluation 99-041) to support the decision to not inspect or flow test the cooling water supply to the RHR pumps mechanical seal heat exchangers. The bases for the licensees decision was the inability to perform a flow test due to the configuration of the associated cooling water piping. The four RHR heat exchangers had not been tested or cleaned in the past. Upon completion of SE 99-041, the licensee changed the Duane Arnold FSAR and Technical Specification Basis to eliminate the need for heat exchanger cooling. The licensee assumed it could operate the RHR Pumps with the heat exchangers plugged for the remaining life of the plant.

The licensee based SE 99-041 on the Byron Jackson Pump Division (Borg-Warner Corporation) vendor manual, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance Instructions for Type U Mechanical Seals, issued in 1969, which stated that the mechanical seal components were designed for temperatures up to 450 degrees Fahrenheit (F).

However, the licensee failed to take into account the critical temperature for operating the mechanical seals which is the temperature allowed for the actual sealing surface face. The vendor data indicated that the maximum water temperature for these seal faces was 150 degrees F. The inspectors determined that without a cooling water supply to the mechanical seals the water remaining in the seal will not support the sealing surface as a lubricant. The seal would fail in a relatively short period of time depending on the original condition of the seal.

During the inspection, the licensee attempted to obtain design information from several vendors to allow operation of the seals without seal cooling. The licensee did eventually receive a memorandum, Alliant Energy Containment Pumps - Upset Conditions, March 28, 2002, from Flowserve Corporation that stated that the seals could survive torus cooling temperatures following a LOCA without total failure, but with damage and several gallon per minute leakage. The vendor stated that accelerated mechanical seal face wear could be expected at approximately 200 degrees F. The vendor conditioned this statement with the judgement that the amount of wear was difficult to predict and the seals not failing was conditional on corrosion, shaft run-out, and varying product characteristics. The licensee did not provide any test data for high temperature seal operation to support the statements that the mechanical seals would not fail in high temperature applications.

After receiving the above information from the vendor, the licensee stated that they would put the heat exchangers back into the Generic Letter 89-13 Program and take credit for seal cooling for the RHR Mechanical Seals. Seal cooling flow had never actually been isolated from the RHR heat exchangers, so no actual damage would have occurred to the RHR Pump Mechanical Seals. The licensee stated that the seal heat exchangers would be opened and cleaned during the next RHR pump outage. In addition, the heat exchangers would be put into the preventive maintenance program for periodic cleaning. The inspectors considered the pending corrective actions for the RHR Pumps acceptable.

The licensee performed an Operability Evaluation (AR#30414), March 28, 2002, for continued plant operations. The licensee used the Core Spray Pump evaluation to bound the RHR and Core Spray Pumps because the Core Spray Pumps do not have

seal coolers and these pumps operate at a higher RPM (more frictional heat in the seals). The inspectors considered the Operability Evaluation acceptable, however, it contained significant weaknesses. One significant weakness was that the licensee used the original design specifications to determine the acceptability for continued use of the RHR and Core Spray Pump Seals without seal cooling. The original GE design specification for pump seals specified that the seals be capable of operation at temperatures of 212 degrees F for one day and operation at temperatures of 200 degrees F for six months. The licensee did not receive a seal that meets these design requirements during plant construction. The current seals can only survive at these temperatures for a short time period without cooling. The licensee stated that additional information would be provided for this condition and that this was a potential Part 21 issue. This generic condition of the seals appears to be applicable to other BWR plants. A second weakness in the Operability Evaluation was that shutdown cooling temperatures were not addressed.

The inspectors considered the RHR pump seals operable based on the fact that water could still be seen flowing in the RHR Heat Exchanger Sight Glasses. In addition, it appears that no RHR Seals were damaged during the last shutdown of the plant when the seals were subjected to temperatures above 300 degrees F.

The licensee stated in the conclusion of the operability evaluation that a more exhaustive evaluation and analysis would be required to ensure that RHR Pump Seals would perform their design function. The significance of the RHR pump issue is dependent on whether the Seal Cooler Heat Exchangers are found plugged and potentially incapable of performing their function. The licensee issued AR 30234, dated March 17, 2002, to resolve the issues related to the evaluation of the seals. The NRC will review the licensees evaluation to demonstrate that all seals will meet their design basis conditions. These issues will be tracked as Unresolved Item 50-331/2002-011-02.

Pending the outcome of the above evaluations and inspections, these issues will be evaluated in the Significance Determination Process (SDP).

Conclusions The team determined that additional evaluation and analysis would be required to ensure that the RHR and Core Spray Pump Seals would have performed their design function. These issues will be tracked as an Unresolved Item. Pending the outcome of the above evaluations, these issues will be evaluated in the SDP.

.4 System Condition and Capability a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed periodic testing procedures (listed in the attachment) and results to verify that the design requirements were demonstrated by the performance of tests. The team also verified the environmental qualification of a sample of system components for operation under design environmental conditions and assumed operating parameters (e.g., voltage, speed, and power).

The team also reviewed the systems operations by conducting system walkdowns; reviewing normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; and reviewing the UFSAR, the TSs, design calculations, drawings, and procedures. In addition, the team reviewed the operations department operator work-arounds to ensure no design assumptions were invalidated by past or current operator daily practices..

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.5 System Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The team performed selective field inspections of the 125Vdc, SDG, and ESW systems.

The purpose of these walkdowns was to assess the adequacy of materiel condition and installation configurations by focusing on the installation and configuration of piping, components, and instruments; the susceptibility to flooding, fire, or other environmental concerns; physical separation; provisions for high energy line break; accessibility for operator action; and the conformance of the currently installed configuration of the systems with the design and licensing bases.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

6. Safety System Testing a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the program and procedures for Technical Specification required battery testing. The review included service and performance tests.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of 125Vdc, SDG, and ESW systems problems identified by the licensee in the corrective action program to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design issues. In addition, CRs written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified 4OA6 Meeting Exit Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Anderson and other members of licensee management on March 29, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee R. Anderson, Plant Manager S. McVay, System Engineer T. Evans, Operations Manager K. Huber, System Engineering Manager E. Weinkam, Regulatory Services Director C. Bleau, Licensing Engineer J. Ertman, Engineering Team Leader J. Quimby, Project Engineering I&C G. Hawkins, Design Engineering Supervisor M. Fairchild, Nuclear Oversight NRC P. Prescott, Senior Resident Inspector M. Kurth, Resident Inspector J. Jacobson, Chief, MEB/DRS

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-331/02-011-01 NCV The licensee failed to establish adequate measures to assure that the design requirements in calculations E92-007 and E92-008, specifically the number of battery cells, were correctly translated into work instructions in Work Order A5250.

50-331/02-011-02 URI The licensee needs to perform a more exhaustive evaluation and analysis for continued use of the Core Spray Pump seals without cooling and to ensure that RHR Pump Seals would perform their design function. In addition, more detailed analysis, inspection and calculations are required to support Operability Evaluation (AR#30414).

Closed None Discussed None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AC Alternating Current ADAMS NRCs Document System AR Action Request CFR Code of Federal Regulations DAEC Duane Arnold Energy Center DBD Design Basis Document DC Direct Current DCP Design Change Package DRS Division of Reactor Safety EMA Engineered Maintenance Action ESW Essential Service Water NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Drawing RHR Residual Heat Removal RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling SDG Standby Diesel Generator SDP Significance Determination Process TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Calculations Number Title Revision or Date 440E-001 Determine Size of 125V Batteries 1D1 and 1D2 Revision 1 APED-R20-004 Analysis of the 1A4 Essential Electrical Power Revision 3 Distribution System APED-R20-003 Analysis of the 1A3 Essential Electrical Power Revision 3 Distribution System APED-A61-091 Station Blackout Asset Enhancement Program Revision 1 Evaluation Task T0903 CAL-E99-003 125Vdc Electrical Distribution System Short Revision 1 Circuit Calculation CAL-IELP-E90- 125 Volt Battery 1D1 Load and Sizing Revision 0 001 CAL-IELP-E90- 125 Volt Battery 1D2 Load and Sizing Revision 0 002 DAEC-HWC-E2 Load Addition to 1L182 - Diesel Generator Revision 0 Loading E-79-01 Diesel Generator 1G21 and 1G31 Loading and Revision 0 Response E92-007 1D1 Battery Load and Margin Calculation Revision 4 E92-008 1D2 Battery Load and Margin Calculation Revision 3 EC-10A Diesel Generator Loading Revision 0 CAL-BECH-MC- Sizing Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps April 20, 1990 153 IP044A & B CAL-IELP-M79-19 RHRSW & ESW System Self Cleaning Strainers August 31, 1990 Sizing of Accumulator for Backwash Valves CAL-IELP-M79-20 RHRSW, ESW Strainers Backwash Orifices February 20, 1980 CAL-IELP-M81-09 EDG Fuel Oil Day Tanks (1T037A/B) Level July 30, 1991 Volume Relationship CAL-M91-005 Emergency Service Water Pump TDH Analysis August 11, 1995 CAL-M92-029 MEDP, Pressure, Flow, and Temperature November 5, 1992 Determination for Emergency Service Water System Motor Operated Valves

CAL-M93-078 ESW/RHRSW Pit Plump Down Times August 11, 1995 M91-14 Standby Diesel Generator 7 Day Fuel Oil September 9, 1991 Requirement MC-139 Schematic of Diesel Fuel Oil System July 7, 1982 446-M-001 Diesel Generator Cooler Performance Revision 1 446-M-002 Performance Study for RHR Room Coolers Revision 0 446-M-003 ESW Heat Loads Revision 2 446-M-005 Performance Study for RCIC Room Coolers Revision 0 446-M-006 Performance Study for HPCI Room Coolers Revision 0 446-M-007 Chiller Performance Revision 0 446-M-008 Control Building Control Room Heating Revision 0 446-M-009 Diesel Generator Coolers Thermal Performance Revision 0 Determination of ESW Flow 446-M-0010 Control Room Temperature W/O Coolers Revision 0 446-M-0011 Transient Temperature Model Revision 0 CAL-IELP-M77-04 M77-4 Sizing for Replacement ESW Pumps August 24, 1977 DCR-742 7884-M15-104-1 Seismic Calculations for Nuclear Standby Diesel March 3, 1972 Generators CAL-M84-034 Seismic Analysis for Emergency Diesel Generator February 26, 1995 Air Start System 7884-8-P-18 Diesel Generator Air Intake Seismic Check Revision 1 7884-1-B-8 Underground Diesel Oil Tank IT-35 Design Basis Revision 1 Earthquake Seismic Loads M87-46 Battery Rack Anchorage Evaluation Revision 1 401-13 Calculation Diesel Air Intake Modification February 4, 1981 CALC-IELP-M92-97 Core Spray Operation With Reduced ESW Revision 0 Cooling to Motor 466-M-009 Diesel Generator Coolers Thermal Perfomance- Revision 0 Determination of ESW Flow 466-M003 ESW Heat Loads Revision 2 APED-R20-003 1A3 Essential Electrical Power Distribution Revision 3 APED-R20-004 1A4 Essential Electrical Power Distribution Revision 3

CAL-E92-020 AC Motor Operated Valve Degraded Revision 9 Condition/Voltage Calculation CAL-E95-006 4.16kV Essential Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoint Revision 2 Calculation CAL IELP M76-10 Emerg. Diesel-Generator Air Start Compressor Revision 0 Exhaust Line CAL IELP M81-09 EDG Fuel Oil Day Tanks (1T037A/B) Level Revision 1 Volume Relationship CAL IELP M82-35 Emergency Service Water Flow Orifice FE- February 2, 1983 4938A,B, Differential Pressure vs. Flow Condition Reports/Action Requests Initiated as a Result of this Inspection Number Title Revision or Date AR 30216 Calculation M91-14 Does Not Take Into Account March 22, 2002 NPSH Requirements of the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps AR 30150 USAR Section 8.3.1.1.5 Degraded Voltage Text March 11, 2002 Incorrect AR 30195 Multiple Active Calculations of Record For March 14, 2002 125Vdc Battery Profile and Sizing AR 30207 Breaker Sequence Modeled in CAL-E92-07 and March 15, 2002 CAL-E92-08 is Non-conservative AR 30212 Battery Profile Non-conservative with Respect to March 15, 2002 IEEE-485 Guidance AR 30266 Calculation CAL-E92-07 Not Updated To Reflect March 22, 2002 Plant Design Change AR 30281 Plant Operation with 57 of 58 Cells in Vital March 21, 2002 Battery AR 30314 Non-conservative Error in 125Vdc Short Circuit March 21, 2002 Calculation AR 30362 Use of Non-conservative Non-Design Values in March 25, 2002 Battery Margin Load and Margin Calculations AR 30371 Add Sensitivity Analysis to Battery Margin Load March 26, 2002 and Margin Calculations AR 30380 Use of Non-Licensing Basis Battery in Power March 27, 2002 Uprate SBO Analysis

Number Title Revision or Date AR 30381 Number of Battery Starts and Assumed in SBO March 27, 2002 Profile AR 30385 Inadequate Technical Evaluation Before March 27, 2002 Revising Battery Maintenance Procedure To Permit Jumpering Out a Cell AR 30392 Questionable Values Used in Modeling Breaker March 27, 2002 Coil and Spring Charging Motor in Battery Load and Margin Calculations AR 30417 Non-conservative Value for Containment Spray March 29, 2002 Pump Motor Used in Diesel Generator Loading Analysis AR 30414 RHR Pump and Core Spray Pump Operability March 28, 2002 Evaluation AR 30302 Review NE & SW Corner Rooms, RHR, Core March 21, 2002 Spray, Heat Load Calculations 466-M-003 AR 30377 Typographical Errors in CAL-E95-006 March 27, 2002 AR 30405 CAL-E92-020 AC MOV Degraded Voltage Calc, March 28, 2002 Needs to be Revised AR 30410 Invalid Assumptions in CAL-IELP-M76-10-Ref March 28, 2002 AR 30392 Questionable Values Used in Modeling Breaker March 27, 2002 Coil and Spring Charging Motor in Battery Load and Margin Calculations AR 30458 Tech Spec ITS Comment Resolution May be April 3, 2002 Incorrect Condition Reports/Action Requests Number Title Revision or Date AR 27349 FSAR Diesel Generator Loading Sequence February 28, 2002 Table Values AR 9110 Degraded Voltage Setpoint Adequacy July 23, 1997 AR 22576 1P099B Stopped Very Quickly Following STP October 16, 2000 NS54002 AR 26499 Request Operability Determination for A ESW June 25, 2001 Pump Due to Increasing Calculated D/P

AR 26968 1K004 After Cooler Leak at Welded Joint Near August 3, 2001 Inlet AR 27060 Clarification of Requirements in EMP-1P099-FV August 16, 2001 AR 30347 1P099B Vibration Levels in the Alert Range March 22, 2002 NCR-90-005 Parts for RHRSW Strainers 1S090A/B March 5, 1990 Purchased Under PO S40440 AR 24484 UFSAR Documentation Discrepancy March 29, 2001 AR 29926 10 CFR Part 21 Notification on Core Spray and February 20, 2002 HPCI Surface Temperature for HVAC Design AR 27339 Review NE and SW Corner Rooms, RHR, Core August 28, 2001 Spray, Heat Load Calculations AR 13156 SER 3-98: Recurring Event Flooding of ECCS September 29, 1998 Rooms AR 19459 Potential for Unmonitored Release During April 23, 2000 Maintenance via Storm Drain AR 26597 Investigate Controls on Corner Room to Torus August 24, 2001 Room Doors AR 27350 Form an Engineering Team to Review Design August 24, 2001 Basis Calculations AR 27054 NRC 50.59/Modification Inspection: Safety August 20, 2001 Evaluation 99-041, ESW Flow to RHR Pump Seal Coolers, Requires Clarification AR 18358 1K010C Blown Fuse January 4, 2000 AR 18680 Can 1VSF0568 or B Be Removed From Service March 5, 2002 Without Declaring RHRSW/ESW & SBDG Inop AR 19364 Minor Work Authorized on Protected System April 5, 2000 AR 20885 Locked Valves Not Shown As Locked On P+IDs July 20, 2000 AR 21394 Scaffolding in B SBDG Room Erected for 4 August 22, 2000 Days Without Engineering Review AR 22378 TDRs in 1C468A&B Should be Periodically November 8, 2000 Replaced AR 13146 Circuit Breaker Reliability September 23, 1998 AR 2551 Evaluate QL 1 Agastat 2400/7000 Relay for January 22, 1997 Periodic Replacement AR 18089 Incorrect Fuse Installed in 1C469B February 8, 2000

Electrical and Mechanical Drawings Number Title Revision or Date BECH-E104 4160V ACB 152-101 System Control and Revision 2 Sheet 3 Protection BECH-E104 4160V ACB 152-103 System Control and Revision 0 Sheet 4 Protection BECH-E104 4160V ACB 152-201 System Control and Revision 0 Sheet 5 Protection BECH-E001 Single Line Diagram Station Connections Revision 26 Sheet 1 BECH-E027BECH Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 125Vdc Revision 23-E027 BECH-M113 P&ID RHR Service Water & Emergency Service Revision 58 Water Systems BECH-M132<1> P&ID Diesel Generator Systems Revision 8 BECH-M146 P&ID Service Water System Pumphouse Revision 67 C-149 Underground Diesel Oil Tank IT-35 Plan & Revision 4 Details M010-101 RHR Service Water Pump 1P-22A thru D Revision 0 M015-002 Fuel Oil System Schematic Revision 10 M015-005 Starting Air System Schematic Revision 10 M015-056 1000 Gallon Fuel Oil Day Tank Revision 5 M41-154-3 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Data Sheet Revision 2 7884-M-10-DS- ESW Pump Data Sheet Revision 3 M10-1 7884-M32-1-3 Model GA-1K-150# DES (Submerged) Revision 1 7884-M32-10-1 Diesel Oil Pumps Revision 1 93-286 EDG Cylinder Differential Temp Exceeded September 27, 1993 Allowed Value 94-0382 EDG Cylinder Differential Temp Exceeded August 31, 1994 Allowed Value AR 9110 New Load Case for 4160 Degraded Voltage June 26, 1997 Relay Setpoint

AR 13108 A EDG Pressure Switch, PS3244A, Did Not October 28, 1998 Function Due to Foreign Material AR 16587 Fuel Oil Level Indications for EDG Day Tanks September 10, 1999 AR 18481 Lube Oil High Temp Switch Out of Cal February 8, 2000 AR 19373 Change Setpoints on LIS3208 & 10 March 17,2000 AR 21797 Div I 125VDC Alarms September 6, 2000 AR 24177 Set Point Change for PS4929A and PS4929B February 20, 2001 AR 24617 FI 4938A Out of Spec March 29, 2001 AR 27129 1G100/ENG Generator Output Frequency Out- August 27, 2001 of-Spec AR 29326 1G031/ENG Jacket Coolant Temp Low Out of December 23, 2001 Spec AR 29632 10 CFR Part 21 Issued on all Woodward January 24, 2002 Electronic Controls with Electrolytic Capacitors AR 29952 EDG Accident Loading February 20, 2002 AR 29953 Engineering Power Systems Analyses February 20, 2002 APED-E21- Elem Diag Core Spray System Revision 22 006<2>

BECH-E001<1> Single Line Diagram Station Connections Revision 26 BECH-E104<025> 4160V & 480V System Control & Protection Revision 16 BECH-E104<026> 4160V & 480V System Control & Protection Revision 18 BECH-E106<005> Standby Diesel Generator And Auxiliary Control Revision 7 BECH- Standby Diesel Generator And Auxiliary Control Revision 3 E106<005A>

BECH-E106<006> Standby Diesel Generator And Auxiliary Control Revision 5 BECH-E111<008> Service Water Systems Revision 15 BECH- Service Water Systems Revision 3 E111<008A>

BECH- Service Water Systems Revision 4 E111<008B>

BECH- Service Water Systems Revision 3 E111<008C>

BECH-E111<028> Service Water Systems Revision 2

BECH-E113<053> Heating & Ventilating Systems Revision 15 BECH-E113<040> Heating & Ventilating Systems Revision 11 BECH- Heating & Ventilating Systems Revision 5 E113<040A>

BECH-M404<2A> Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tank IT-37A, Revision 2 IT-37B Level Settings Diagram M015-006<1> Diesel Generator Control Revision 17 M015-006<1A> Diesel Generator 1G21 Start Circuit A & B Revision 6 Governor Control & Excitation Control M015-006<2> Electrical Schematic Diagram Remote Alarm Revision 15 Contacts M015-006<3> Electrical Schematic Diagram AC Auxiliaries Revision 11 M015-006<4> Electrical Schematic Diagram Relay Contacts Revision 11 M015-015<1> 3 - Line Schematic Revision 10 M015-015<2> 3 - Line Schematic Revision 11 M015-015<3> 3 - Line Schematic Revision 14 M015-015<4> 3 - Line Schematic Revision 12 M-132-F.D. SH 1 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 M-132-F.D. SH 2 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 M-132-F.D. SH 3 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 M-132-F.D. SH 4 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 M-132-F.D. SH 5 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 M-132-F.D. SH 6 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 M-132-F.D. SH 7 Functional Description Diesel Generator System Revision 0 Vendor Manuals and Drawings Number Title Revision or Date Crane Company Chempump Series G Revision 2 9085100910 Standby Diesel Generator Baesler Voltage Revision B Regulator Schematic TC-3573 Core Spray Pump Curve June 16, 1971

Number Title Revision or Date Vendor Manual Installation, Operation, and Maintenance 1969 Instructions for Type U Mechanical Seals Vendor Manual Borg-Warner High Pressure Heat Exchangers June 1970 Functional Control Diagrams (FCD)

Number Title Revision or Date APED-E41-012 High Pressure Coolant Injection System FCD Revision 8 Sheet 1 APED-E41-012 High Pressure Coolant Injection System FCD Revision 7 Sheet 2 APED-E51-013 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System FCD Revision 11 Sheet 1 APED-E51-013 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System FCD Revision 11 Sheet 2 APED-E51-013 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System FCD Revision 3 Sheet 3 APED-E51-013 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System FCD Revision 7 Sheet 4 Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs)

Number Title Revision or Date BECH-M113 RHR Service Water & Emergency Service Water Revision 58 Systems P&ID BECH-M146 Service Water System P&ID Revision 67 M015-002 Fuel Oil System Schematic Revision 10 M015-005 Starting Air System Schematic Revision 10 Modifications/Design Change Packages Temporary Mod Jumper Out Bad Cell in 125Vdc Battery 1D1 April 11, 2001 01-027 PMP 0080 Reduce Battery Load on Battery 1D1 June 29,1993 DCR-669 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Line Header April 20, 1977 DCR-914 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Cross-tie April 20, 1980 DCP-1149 Diesel Air Start System Improvements June 6, 1987

DCR-1332 Diesel Oil Pumps Flowmeter January 9, 1986 DCP-1497 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System August 20, 1992 Minor Mod. 278 Emergency Diesel Generator Air Start System May 1, 1991 Improvements SE 99-041 Change Emergency Service Water Flow Revision 1 Requirements to the RHR Pump Seal Coolers DCC 2584 High Pressure Drop Across Air Filter at IC93 C-5 August 9, 1994 and IC94 C-5 Replace the Annunciator Card EMA A53379 Relocate Diesel Engine Governor Booster January 4, 2001 Assembly 141 Provide Air Filters in Diesel Air Start System Revision 1 488 Emergency Service Water System Revision 3 A34181 Replace PI3265A May 16, 1997 A45188 Replace Speed indication for 1G-31 February 7, 2000 A52175 Setpoint Change - PS4929A & PS4929B Revision 0 DCR 984 Replace TS3270A and 3270B with new Switches June 11, 1980 DCR 1113 Annunciators and Computer Logging for Station June 30, 1982 Batteries DCP 1149 Modification to Diesel Generator Air Start System December 24, 1987 Procedures Number Title Revision or Date ACP 1410.6 Temporary Modification Control Revision 27, 30 BATTRY-C173-01 Equipment Specific Maintenance Procedure - Revision 29, 31 Batteries ACP 1203.59 Power System Configuration and Analysis Revision 1 AOP 301 Loss of Essential Power Systems EMP-1P099-FV Emergency Service Water Flow Verification Test Revision 7 OI 324 Standby Diesel Generator System Revision 52 Specifications Number Title Revision or Date Battery Current Summation Program Revision 0 BCSUM.EXE Software Design Specification

Number Title Revision or Date 37706N Woodward EG-A Control August 1992 Standards., Guides, and Codes Number Title Revision or Date IEEE Std 945 IEEE Recommended Practice for Sizing Large 1983 Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations IEEE Std 450 IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, 1987 Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations ANSI N45.2.11 Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design 1974 of Nuclear Power Plants System Descriptions Number Title Revision or Date Emergency Service Water System Description Revision 3 SD-324 Standby Diesel Generator System Revision 3 SD-375 Plant DC Power Supply System Revision 5 Technical Specifications Number Title Revision or Date 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power 3.7.3 Emergency Service Water 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.7.3 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System Amendment 223

Number Title Revision or Date B 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operations Amendment 223 B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown Amendment 223 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air Amendment 223 Work Requests Number Title Revision or Date A45792 ESW Pump 1P099B Slows Down Faster than February 26, 2002 1P099A A53520 Jumper Out Cell Number 51 in 1D1 Battery Due April 11, 2001 to Low Voltage A18851 Cylinder Differential Temp Exceeded Allowed December 9,1993 Limit A32606 PS3225A Calibration Data Sheet September 4,1996 A39124 LIS3216 Calibration Data Sheet November 10,1998 A45187 PS3233A Calibration Data Sheet September 21,1999 1089796 PS3224A Calibration Data Sheet December 5, 1995 1096100 PS3232A Calibration Data Sheet December 4, 1996 1097611 LIS3207 Calibration Data Sheet April 4, 1997 1103710 LIS3209 Calibration Data Sheet March 7, 1998 1103712 LIS3215 Calibration Data Sheet March 10, 1998 LIS3208 Calibration Data Sheet 1117154 Calibrate FI4938A August 17, 2001 1117155 Calibrate FI4938B August 17, 2001 1118927 LIS3210 Calibration Data Sheet March 1, 2002 STP 3.3.8.1-02 4KV Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage January 28, 2002 Calibration Safety Evaluations Number Title Revision or Date E-99-03-08 Provide Instructions For Jumpering Out Weak April 1,1999 Battery Cells

Number Title Revision or Date Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 8.2 Offsite Power System 8.3 Onsite Power Systems 8.3.1.1 Auxiliary AC Systems 8.3.1.2 Standby AC Power Systems 8.3.2 DC Power Systems 9.2.3 Emergency Service Water system Revision 15 9.5.4 Diesel-Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer Revision 15 System 9.5.6 Diesel-Generator Starting System Revision 15 UFSAR Change Change the Values of Emergency Service Water August 2, 1999 No.99-030 Flow Requirements in UFSAR Table 9.2-1 From 6 GPM to 0 GPM.

Table 9.2-1 Emergency Service Water Flow Requirements Revision 15 Miscellaneous Documents ANSI/ISA- Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related February 29, 2000 67.04.01-2000 Instrumentation ISA-RP67.04.02- Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints January 1, 2000 2000 for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation ISA Draft Graded Approaches to Setpoint Determination September 2000 TR67.04.09 (Draft 5)

Battery 1D1 Performance Test Surveillance November 5, 1999 Battery 1D1 Service Discharge Test April 12, 1998 Battery 1D1 Service Discharge Test May 9, 2001 Technical Evaluation Report Duane Arnold May 13, 1991 Energy Center Station Blackout Evaluation RCIC Vacuum Pump Breaker Coordination March 22, 2002 Curve Standby Diesel Generator Exciter Breaker March 22, 2002 Coordination Curve Inverter 1D25 Supply Breaker Coordination March 22, 2002 Curve

Safety Evaluation of the Duane Arnold Energy January 23, 1973 Center SD-454 Emergency Service Water System Description Revision 3 DBD-R42-001 125 VDC System Design Bases Document Revision 4 DBD-R43-001 Standby Diesel Generator System Design Revision 2 Bases Document DBD-E13-001 Emergency Service Water System Design Revision 6 Bases Document Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program for Revision 16 Duane Arnold Energy Center Emergency Service Water and EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump IST Data (1995-2002)

7884-24 Diesel Generator Pre-op Test Revision 1 NG-90-2031 ESW and RHRSW Strainer Backwash Safety August 16, 1990 Classification NG-91-0620 Operating EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps at March 14, 1991 Less Than Specified NPSH for a Limited Period of Time NG-91-2656 Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps, 1P-44A/B, NPSH August 30, 1991 Requirements Memorandum Alliant Energy Containment Spray Pumps - March 28, 2002 Upset Conditions Vendor Manual Installation, Operation, and Maintenance 1969 Instructions for Type U Mechanical Seals Vendor Manual Borg-Warner High Pressure Heat Exchangers June 1970 DBD-E13-001 Duane Arnold Energy Center Design Bases Revision 6 Document for Emergency Service Water System EQR: Qual-L200- Environmental Qualification System Component Revision 1 03C, 02C, 01C Evaluation Worksheet Memorandum EDSFI IR 91-0002 Unresolved Item #5: August 21, 1991 Engineering Analysis of EDG Air Supply Ducting Common Mode Vulnerability (Tornado)

QUAL-SC101 Environmental and Seismic Service Conditions Revision 11 M015-147 Emergency Diesel Generator Inter Cooler Heat Revision 0 Exchanger Specification Sheet

M015-146 Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Revision 0 Cooler Heat Exchanger Specification Sheet MO15-145 Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Revision 1 Heat Exchanger Specification Sheet 7884-APED-E11- Technical Manual Residual Heat Removal March 21, 1972 2776-32-2 Pump - Byron Jackson Pump Division Letter from Steve Rose, Flow Solutions Division March 28, 2002 of Flowserve, to Jim Dvorsky, Alliant Energy about RHR and Core Spray Pump Mechanical Seals NG-93-4271 A EDG #6 and #7 Cylinder Temperatures October 1, 1993 NG-94-0828 Input to Degraded AC Voltage Calculation for March 2, 1994 Motor Operated Valves, CAL-E92-20 Memorandum NG- DAEC Safety Syatem Design Inspection (SSDI) February 22, 2002 02-0157 Preinspections Surveillances (completed)

Number Title Date performed STP 3.8.1-11 Standby Diesel Generator Air Compressor, Air December 27, 2001 Start Check Valve, and Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Tests STP #99 Diesel Generator 1G-21 Fuel Line Test April 2, 1982 STP NS540002 Emergency Service Water Operability Test December 21, 2001 EMP-1P099-FV Emergency Service Water Flow Verification October 22, 1999 &

Test July 6, 1999 EMP-1E053-HT Emergency Diesel Generator 1E-53A & B July 6, 2000 &

Coolers - Heat Transfer Test August 28, 2001 STP 3.7.9-02 CB/SBGTS Instrument Air Compressors System March 19, 2000 &

Leakage and Capacity Test June 16, 2000, September 9, 2001 &

December 8, 2001 EDSFI Report Review of Corrective Actions taken to Address April 15, 1991 331/91002 Selected Design Issues Documented in EDSFI Report 331/91002 28